S. Hrg. 101-1071

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 11, 13; NOVEMBER 27, 28, 29, 30; DECEMBER 3, 1990

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Notice to Readers

In addition to the 10 open hearings appearing in this volume the Committee on Armed Services also conducted two closed sessions on the situation in the Persian Gulf. On the afternoon of November 27, 1990, the committee met to receive a closed briefing from the intelligence community on the Persian Gulf. A second closed briefing on the Iraqi nuclear issues was held by the committee on the afternoon of November 28, 1990. For national security reasons these two briefings are retained in the classified records of the Armed Services Committee.

September 11, 1990

Page

Cheney, Hon. Richard, Secretary of Defense 8

Powell, Gen. Colin L., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 23

September 13, 1990

O'Donnell, Hon. Terrence, General Counsel, Department of Defense 97

November 27, 1990

Schlesinger, Dr. James R., former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence 113

November 28, 1990

Morning Session

Jones, Gen. David C., USAF (Retired), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 182

Crowe, Adm. William J., Jr., USN (Retired), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 191

Afternoon Session

Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., President, Kissinger Associates and former Secretary of State 260

November 29, 1990

Morning Session

Webb, Hon. James, former Secretary of the Navy 305

Luttwak, Hon. Edward N., Arleigh Burke Chairholder in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies 315

Perle, Hon. Richard, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 326

Afternoon Session

Helms, Christine M., International Affairs Consultant 381

Placke, James A., International Affairs Consultant 401

Marr, Dr. Phebe, Middle East Historian and Specialist on Iraq 410

November 30, 1990

Morning Session—First Panel

Page

Odom, Lt. Gen. William E., USA (Ret.), Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute, and former Director, National Security Agency 460

Morning Session—Second Panel

Milhollin, Gary, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 519

Graham, Dr. William R., Senior Vice President, JAYCOR, and former Presidential Science Advisor 534

Spector, Leonard S., Director, Nuclear Nonproliferation Project, and Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 544

December 3, 1990

Cheney, Hon. Richard B., Secretary of Defense 638

Powell, Gen. Collin, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff 659

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; and Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Richard D. Finn, Jr., Douglas George, Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., David S. Lyles, T. Kirk McConnell, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and William H. Smith.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, Ronald P. Kelly, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., Mark B. Robinson, and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht, Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Mary J. Kampo, Claire M. Kelly, Cindy Pearson, Kelli J. Pronovost, Melissa A. Ramsey, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Phillip P. Upschulte and Milton D. Beach, assistants to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; C. Richard D'Amato and Melvin G. Dubee, assistants to Senator Byrd; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Patrick F. McCartan, assistant to Senator Wilson; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Thomas G. Moore, assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott; and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Armed Services meets today to receive testimony from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, on the situation in the Persian Gulf region. It is my intention to conduct as much of this hearing as possible in open session, but we will go into closed session at the end if necessary.

Mr. Secretary, General, if you get to a question that you want to defer to closed session, we will respect your wishes on that.

We welcome both of you here today. We congratulate both of you and the Joint Chiefs on your tireless efforts in directing the deployment of U.S. forces to the region and in assisting the President in mobilizing the impressive international response to Iraq's aggression.

I would also like to publicly salute the thousands of men and women deployed in the region and acknowledge the sacrifices of their families back home. Members of this committee, including Senator Warner and myself, and Senators Levin, Cohen, and Glenn and perhaps others, have visited our forces in the Persian Gulf, and we know firsthand the difficult circumstances of that region and that mission.

I also want to acknowledge those military personnel who put in many long, hard days and nights in supporting our forces in their role back home. I know the operational planners on the Joint Staff, in the services, and at the Central Command as well as the personnel at the Transportation Command in Illinois and the Forces Command in the State of Georgia have been the backbone of this extraordinary movement of men, women, and materials.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the key role of our citizen-soldiers, our National Guard and Reserve personnel who have been an integral part of this operation from the beginning.

From the first days after the Iraqi invasion through the meeting with President Gorbachev in Helsinki last Sunday, I believe that President Bush and the administration have handled this crisis well. As we enter into a new phase and the prospect of protracted confrontation grows, I believe we must be clear about our objectives and begin to think through some difficult questions. I know that you have already done some thinking on these questions, but I am going to be asking them as we go along.

First, what can be done to increase significantly other nations' deployments of ground forces, particularly heavy, armored units, to Saudi Arabia?

A related question is whether such allied or friendly deployments allow us to forego some additional U.S. deployments that are now planned but have not yet been executed into the region? In short, is the level of U.S. ground forces now planned for the region and the level now in the pipeline being established independent of other nations' deployments in the region? If they are not being calibrated into other nations, then the question is why not?

Second, what plans are being made by the Defense Department in the sustainability area, particularly for the welfare and morale of U.S. troops in the field? How often will we rotate troops, and will the rotations be accomplished individually or in units? What additional use of reserves is contemplated, if any?

The answers to these questions can have an enormous impact on costs as well as morale.

I also have been and continue to be concerned as I mentioned, Mr. Secretary, to you and to General Powell a week to 10 days ago, about whether we are going to get so many American forces over there on the ground that we do not maintain a sufficient rotational base back here at home. The question then is do we go into Europe to begin to rotate some additional forces from Europe?

So all of these are important considerations, as I view it, for our ability to be patient, as the President has counseled, and to sustain our presence there and give the strategy a chance to work.

A third set of questions, which also bears heavily on costs, concerns where the Defense Department comes out on a whole host of discretionary benefits for military personnel now under consideration in the Defense Department and on Capitol Hill. Just a few that have been mentioned: free mail; imminent danger pay; basic allowance for quarters; life insurance benefits; and exemption from Federal income taxes. The Department of Defense estimates the cost of these benefits for a force of 100,000 is approximately $700 million per year.

Under current law, some of these benefits kick in automatically if hostilities break out. But is the Defense Department in favor of extending these benefits short of war? If so, is that inconsistent with the President's letter to Congress stating that hostilities are not imminent under the War Powers Act?

Fourth, what can we do to increase significantly other nations' financial contributions to the costs of this crisis, not only in assisting those nations most adversely affected by the imposition of sanctions against Iraq—and there are a number of those, as we well know—but also in offsetting the very large cost to the United States of its military deployments?

Administration officials have given conflicting signals on whether outside contributions will or will not offset costs directly associated with U.S. military deployments.

Fifth, what oversight should be in place with respect to the expenditure by the executive branch of these outside contributions, assuming that we get outside contributions?

So far, I have heard the administration takes the position that these donations will be handled under the 1954 law governing gifts. The legislative history of this statute makes it clear that the act was intended to permit citizens motivated by "patriotic feelings" to make "relatively small" donations "to support the defense effort." This legislation did not contemplate a massive multi-billion dollar effort independent of the normal authorization and appropriation process.

I am in favor of getting help. The question is how we handle it and how those expenditures are handled with Congress and the administration.

Many in the executive branch have argued that since Congress retains the power of the purse, it should abandon its insistence on War Powers-type legislation. That has been going on a long time independent of this particular confrontation.

As a co-sponsor of S. 2 along with Senators Mitchell, Byrd, and Warner, I favor a very significant revision of the War Powers Act to eliminate the automatic withdrawal provisions and to rely more heavily on Congress' power of the purse to reflect the congressional will.

I think the War Powers Act does not work as it now is written and I think it never will work as it is written, so I am in favor of changing that. If U.S. military activities in support of Desert Shield are to be largely bankrolled by outside contributions, however, then the power of the purse, the very final oversight mechanism that Congress has, and the relationship to the constitutional warmaking powers have to be very carefully examined.

As George Mason, one of the Founding Fathers, said during the Continental Congress, quoting him, "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands, whether legislative or executive."

Sixth, what efforts are we making to streamline and improve the multilateral chain of command in the region? With some forces commanded by Arab military officers; others under U.S. command; and still others under the control of the Western European union, the potential for command coordination problems is very high.

Finally, what can we do to correct certain deficiencies in our defense posture that have been highlighted by this contingency, particularly in the area of sealift and the need for lighter but more lethal weaponry that can be moved where it is needed, as it is needed, in a more rapid fashion?

Mr. Secretary, I am not saying that we can answer all of these questions here today, but these are the ones that I have that I believe we need to start thinking through together. We are very interested in your responses. Senator Warner and I intend to have the committee consider in the very near future any needed supplemental authorizations and other legislative measures or changes for our activities in the Persian Gulf, particularly measures relating to the personnel, morale of the personnel, and compensation of the personnel.

Without objection, I will insert in the record the letter we outlined to you and General Powell for this hearing.

[The letter follows:]

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

August 17, 1990

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The events of the past month associated with the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf region have far-reaching implications for the tasks that lie immediately ahead in the remainder of the 101st Congress, especially as it relates to the budget summit and the defense authorization and appropriations bills. It is imperative that the Congress understand as completely as possible the policy goals of the action, the scope of our military commitments, the scale of our current and planned deployments, and the budget implications of these activities for the fiscal year 1991 budget request and the out-years.

To assist the Committee in fulfilling its responsibilities during this time frame and in making necessary decisions, the Committee requests that you and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify before the Committee on September 11, 1990, at 2:00 p.m. While upcoming events and activities could expand the list of items of interest, the Committee is interested in exploring the following issues:

- What specific national security objectives did the President establish when he directed the Department to initiate deployment of forces? When did the President issue these objectives and the direction to deploy?
- At the time the President directed the Department to initiate deployment, what forces were envisioned as required to carry out the objectives? Has there been any change in the estimate of the forces required to carry out the mission? What is the current disposition of U.S., allied, friendly, and enemy forces? What follow-on activities, such as Reserve mobilization, does the Department have underway or planned?

- Have the national security objectives outlined by the President changed since he directed the deployment of forces to the region?

- What command arrangements exist and are necessary to coordinate the actions of U.S. forces along with the forces of other countries? What are the command arrangements for U.S. forces?

- What are the budgetary implications of the policies and actions undertaken as a result of the President's directives? What are the additional costs of these actions over and above the normal Department of Defense activities anticipated in the President's budget request for fiscal year 1991, as revised by your major aircraft and ship review? What cost sharing arrangements are anticipated to limit the budget impact on the United States?

While we anticipate that elements of your presentation will have to be offered in closed session, the Committee intends to proceed initially with open testimony and would ask that formal statements be provided for the open session.

The staff points of contact are Mr. Arnold Punaro, Staff Director, and Mr. Pat Tucker, Minority Staff Director, for any further details in preparation for the hearing.

Thank you for your assistance in this important matter.

Sincerely,

Sam Nunn
Chairman

John Warner
Ranking Minority Member

Chairman **Nunn**. Let me announce that after Senator Warner gives his opening statement, what I would request the members do is refrain from further opening statements at this time until we can hear from the Secretary and General Powell. Then I will give each member an additional 4 minutes, so each member will have 10 minutes, when we come to your time, for any comments you would like to make to precede the questioning. Otherwise, Senator Warner and I will stick to the 6 minute rule, and we will move from there. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with you in expressing the sentiment of this committee on behalf of the men and women and their families who are deployed in this operation. We are fortunate that we have a President of courage and foresight and a Secretary of Defense, as well as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to back him up. We are all very proud of the actions you have taken.

I would like to start by reading a term from the dictionary. It is entitled, "Mercenary: working or acting merely for money or other reward for the sole purpose of money compensation. Fighting for a cause solely for pay or remuneration."

I hope, if we achieve nothing else in this hearing, it is to put that term out of the context of any reference to this military operation. It is clear to me, and it is clear to the country, as it is clear to the world, that this military deployment was undertaken not only for the national interest of this country, security as well as economic, but for the hostages, for many other reasons, and certainly they march for the cause of freedom. I think it is an insult to the men and women in the Armed Forces to have that term applied to them in any way.

This adversary, Saddam Hussein, is a most unusual individual. We have witnessed acts here in this time and place in history that we thought were well behind us in the history of mankind, but never let it be said that this man was not trying to acquire wealth for his own personal benefit, or the benefit of the Third World. He had clearly, as an objective, to amass this wealth to build a military force far greater than the one that he possesses today.

When I hear concern about the cost of this operation, I would like to ask those to calculate alongside the cost had we not undertaken this operation. Not only the economic costs as a consequence of control of economies which he would have had largely through oil, but what about the cost to the security of people throughout the world if this man were to continue with an unlimited treasury in his hell bent effort to have weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and possibly, in the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons?

So I think we are all fortunate that we are here today, and there is every prospect that this matter can be solved short of military conflict.

We have learned some lessons. It seems to me that it is not too soon to begin to plan for the future. Many countries have stepped forward and made some indication that they are going to contribute funds. As the chairman said, we have to figure out how we incorporate those funds into the budget, but it is the United States that has the preponderance of the military forces.

The chairman and I visited with Senator Dole and other members. It was clear to us that it was disproportionate in terms of U.S. participation, but when you stop to think, there was no other way it could have taken place.

Most countries configure their military, equip their military and train their military to operate within their borders to protect their borders, or just short distances. We are one of the few nations in the world that train, equip, such that we can project long distances. I think we have got to examine in the future the options whereby other nations begin to take on that obligation and cost so that they can participate in a multinational force in a future date.

So I join the chairman and other members in saluting both of you and your subordinates for a job well done today, and we are anxious to hear from you now.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Senator Coats has submitted a prepared statement that he asks be made a part of the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Senator Coats follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAN COATS

Secretary Cheney, General Powell, I welcome you and thank you for appearing before the committee today. Your appearance here symbolizes the close consultation between the administration and the Congress that has been ongoing since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield.

While I hope and pray that our economic sanctions against Iraq will achieve our goals in the Middle East, I am encouraged by the fact that if we are forced into military action the United States is prepared. At stake is not merely the secure flow of oil from the Middle East, although this is certainly an important concern. Operation Desert Shield is really about regional and global stability. We simply cannot stand by and allow an aggressive and expansionist power dominate an entire region, threatening the forces of moderation and peace.

Our military forces have performed in an exemplary manner in deploying to the Persian Gulf and I am confident that if forced into battle they would distinguish themselves. This capability and state of readiness has been made possible by the fact that, over the last decade, we have rebuilt our military, transforming it into the best fighting machine the United States has possessed in decades, perhaps in history. Our military personnel and equipment are in better shape than in recent memory.

Ironically, several short months ago many in Congress and elsewhere were literally competing to cut the defense budget and take credit for emasculating the Department of Defense. No proposal seemed radical enough. Some even suggested that we could cut defense spending by as much as $100 billion in a single year.

In just over a month, we have gone from discussing the "peace dividend" to pondering a war supplemental. As deplorable as Saddam Hussein's actions have been, they do underline the fact that the post-Cold War world remains filled with immediate and latent dangers, many exceeding our worst fears.

Thus, as the Congress resumes its consideration of the defense budget, we must consider the fact that our military personnel are currently faced by an opponent armed with a large and technologically advanced air and ground force. An opponent, moreover, who possesses medium-range ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and an emerging nuclear weapons program. Given this situation, our military readiness and technological superiority is all the more important. I only hope that my colleagues will take these factors into consideration as we attempt to restructure our military posture in a manner appropriate to the post-Cold War era.

It is also clear that international cooperation is becoming increasingly important in protecting global stability. While our alliances will continue to fulfill many of their traditional roles, we must place increasing emphasis on so-called out-of-area contingencies. Our Asian and NATO allies have a special obligation to security in the Middle East, and I hope that they will be forthcoming in assisting us financially and militarily with Operation Desert Shield.

Mr. Secretary, General Powell, thank you again for appearing here today and congratulations on your superb job managing Operation Desert Shield.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Cheney and General Powell, we are pleased to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD CHENEY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner.

I have a statement for the record. The Chairman does, as well. We ask to be permitted to submit them, and I have an oral presentation that I would like to make. And then I would call on the Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We will be glad to have those in the record, but we also will give you all the time you need to make them. So do not feel that you are pressed for time. We want to hear from you and whatever views you have.

Secretary CHENEY. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Referring back to the letter of invitation that we received some weeks ago, the committee asked that we talk about the background of the President's decision to commit forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to our national security objectives, the way in which the decision was made, and the deployments that have gone forward. What I would propose to do at this time is speak in general terms about our strategic considerations and our overall policy objectives, the guidance we have received from the President, and the background of the decision. And then I will ask General Powell to speak to the question of the deployment of forces to date, enforcement of the sanctions, and the other elements that I think are more appropriately viewed from a military perspective.

It is my understanding, as you mentioned at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there may be some subjects that ought to be discussed in executive session, and we will reserve comment on those until later.

Let me echo something that you said, Mr. Chairman. I have been Secretary now for some 18 months, and I must say the performance of the United States military and DOD civilians, but most especially our uniformed personnel, has been absolutely phenomenal in this exercise. I might be accused of speaking with a certain bias, because I happen to have the privilege of currently serving as Secretary of Defense.

The fact of the matter is, the forces that we are deploying, the equipment that we are operating with, of course, we inherited.

Decisions made by prior Secretaries and Presidents and prior Congresses, and members of this committee in years past, resulted in the kind of military capability that is in the Middle East today at the direction of the President. I think it would be inappropriate for us not to give recognition to my predecessors as Secretary, the General's predecessors as Chairman, previous Presidents, and previous Members of Congress who did in fact make the tough decisions and provide us with the wherewithal that we are using today.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, let me spend just a few minutes sketching in the background and reminding everybody of the circumstances that led to the U.S. presence in such significant numbers in the gulf today. We did, of course, in late July watch a massive buildup of Iraqi forces on the border with Kuwait. There has been a lot of comment about our intelligence capabilities at the time. And I would have to say the capabilities were generally very good. We were well aware of the physical elements of the buildup, of the increase in capability that was represented in terms of possible Iraqi efforts.

But, of course, what we could not know, and what no intelligence system could tell us, was what the intentions of Saddam Hussein were at the time. All of the reports we received from those most directly affected focused specifically on the proposition that Saddam Hussein will never invade Kuwait. And that of course is the refrain we heard from most of the governments in the region, and from the Kuwaitis themselves, all of whom said that this was simply an exercise in saber rattling that ultimately would lead to some kind of accommodation between the Kuwaitis and Iraq, and that would be the end of it.

I think you will find in your travels through the area—I certainly found when I have been out there, now on two different trips in the last month—that most of the leaders in that part of the globe feel they were, in fact, very consciously and deliberately misled by Saddam Hussein. And that it clearly was a well thought out deception plan to hide the fact that he was getting ready to take Kuwait, and ultimately to set the stage for the brutal invasion that we all witnessed on August 2.

It is well known by now that the President moved rapidly to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, to mobilize world leaders and world opinion, worked the phones very aggressively, worked the United Nations, and ultimately created, if you will, the collection of world interest that currently constitutes the strategy to thwart further aggression by Iraq, and hopefully, to force Saddam Hussein to give up his ill-gotten gains.

I think it is important to mention, from a strategic standpoint, that this set of developments came at a key moment in U.S. history when we are talking about a shift in U.S. strategy, the fact that the administration was in a posture of wanting to move from being prepared to have conventional forces that could deal with a global conflict with the Soviets to a situation in which we focus on, instead of global conflict, regional contingencies as the major force driver. And that, given improved U.S./Soviet relations we anticipated in the future, we would be able to reconstitute forces before we would be faced with a global conflict involving the Soviets.

Of course, we had a session with the chairman and ranking member of this committee, and three other key defense committees, on August 2 to discuss that very proposition, and to, in effect, give a pre-brief prior to the President's speech at Aspen, where he was to lay out the beginning discussion of this new strategy. The plan at the time was that we would have spent the last 6 weeks talking about that, giving briefings on the Hill and making speeches, elaborating our new strategy, based specifically upon that notion of regional contingencies, as opposed to global conflict. But August 2 was also the day that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

So, we have spent the last 6 weeks sort of doing it, rather than talking about it. But it is, I think, a classic example of the way in which U.S. interests still require us to maintain, and occasionally deploy, significant military force, even in a world dominated by improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region, I think, are well known, but bear repeating today. We do, of course, have historic ties to governments in the region, that hark back with respect to Saudi Arabia to 1945, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with King Abdul-Aziz on the U.S.S. *Quincy*, toward the end of World War II, and affirmed at that time that the United States had a lasting and a continuing interest in the security of the kingdom.

We obviously also have a significant interest because of the energy that is at stake in the gulf. Iraq controlled 10 percent of the world's reserves prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Once Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, he doubled that to approximately 20 percent of the world's known oil reserves. Of course, within a couple of hundred miles of the border of Kuwait, in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, reside another 24 or 25 percent of the world's known reserves.

So, we found ourselves in a situation where suddenly, as a result of his invasion of Kuwait on August 2, he was indeed in control of the Persian Gulf region's key reserves without ever having actually taken any more territory than Kuwait itself. Once he acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as large as the one he possesses, he was clearly in a position to be able to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that gave him a strangle hold on our economy and on that of most of the other nations of the world as well.

[The map referred to follows:]


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Al Jubayl
Ad Dammām
Dhahran
Al Hufūf
Shīrāz
Bandar-e Būshehr
Bandar-e 'Abbās
no defined boundary
Administrative Line
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When we look at the map, Mr. Chairman, that appears to the right, it outlines in fairly stark terms the kind of problem we were faced with as we thought about how best to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. We could and did, in fact, move naval assets into the region. First of all, while the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Independence* and battle group was headed out to that region anyway, we sped it up and deployed it in the Gulf of Oman, down there on the right hand side (indicating).

The fact of the matter is, it is very difficult to get at Iraq with naval assets and, having no significant land forces deployed in the area, we were clearly in a situation in which the only way we could proceed to counter Saddam Hussein's million-man army and his 5,000 tanks, many poised on the northern border of Saudi Arabia, was if we could get access to the area, if we could get agreement from the governments in the area to allow the deployment of U.S. forces.

The background to all of that was, of course, the invasion on August 2 followed by a meeting between the President and most of his senior advisers at Camp David on Saturday morning, August 4. General Powell was there, together with the senior military commanders who are currently in Saudi Arabia. At that time we began to discuss the military options that were available to us, but all of it, of course, turned upon getting access.

The President had talked with King Fahd and numerous other leaders at length during that period of time, and ultimately sent a team of us to visit with the King and to brief him both upon our intelligence in terms of what it showed with respect to Iraqi forces, and also to give him some idea of what our capabilities were in terms of responding to what he, and we all, perceived to be a very serious threat.

The commitments I made to the King at the direction of the President, in meeting with him in Jiddah on August 6 included specifically:

First, we were prepared to deploy significant force to the Kingdom, sufficient force to deter further aggression; second, we would stay as long as we are needed; and third, we will leave when we are no longer needed or when we are asked to leave.

Those, I think, were important considerations in the King's mind. As he contemplated the possibility of inviting U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and considered our proposal, he ultimately approved the request and made the request himself. The reasons he cited at the time included:

Obvious threat to Saudi Arabia and its independence and sovereignty represented by the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers deployed on his northern border; the historic relationship between the United States and the Kingdom; his personal relationship with President Bush going back to the time when the King served as Interior Minister and President Bush was Director of the CIA in the mid 1970s; and key, I think, is he cited as well the fact that he trusts the United States of America, that he knew he could count on our commitments, that we were in fact prepared to send sufficient force to do the job and also that we have no ulterior motive and that we would leave when we were no longer required or when he asked us to leave.

That evening, Monday, August 6, I passed the King's approval back to the President by telephone. He, at that point, verbally authorized me to proceed with deployments. I passed that word to General Powell who was here in Washington and to General Schwarzkopf, our regional Commander in Chief who was with me in Saudi Arabia, and we began the buildup, which I will let General Powell describe in a moment.

I think our objectives have been clear cut and restated several times since, but I think it is important to restate them for the purposes of this hearing. That is, we insist upon the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait borders; the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; the protection of American lives in the region; and the restoration of stability in the Persian Gulf.

It is important, I think, to point out that this is a massive international effort in that some 24 or 25 nations have now deployed forces for the area; that the action has been sanctioned by numerous resolutions passed unanimously by the U.N. Security Council; that the Arab League has met on this subject a number of times and deployed forces to the region; and the long list of participants of the world's nations have come together to oppose Saddam Hussein's aggression.

Our military mission is clear cut. There is no confusion or doubt about it. Specifically, we were told by the President to deploy forces in order to deter further aggression by Iraq against other nations in the region; second, to defend Saudi Arabia and others should deterrence fail; and third, to use the military forces we have deployed to enforce the sanctions voted by the United Nations and basically, to enforce the interception or embargo or quarantine, if you will, on economic activities with Iraq.

The size of the deployment is a factor of some debate. I am well aware that there is great interest in how large the deployment will be or how long we will stay. Let me just comment briefly on those two propositions.

The length of the deployment is as we stated originally to King Fahd and to the others with whom we have discussed the subject. That is, we are there as long as we are needed until the situation resolves itself, and we are there until we are asked to leave specifically by the Saudis but by other governments in the region who have invited in U.S. forces as well.

With respect to the size of the deployment, the fact is that we have embarked upon a course of action that we believe requires a significant deployment of U.S. force. As we have stated previously—and we can perhaps go into this in greater detail in executive session—there are now well over 100,000 American military personnel deployed to the Arabian Peninsula and the seas around Saudi Arabia; that we believe we need to continue the deployment for an additional period of time specifically to make certain that we have sufficient forces in the region to be able to deal with any contingency.

There is a natural tendency to wonder at what point we are going to cut that off. We have not yet made that decision, but I think the worst possible sin we could commit would be to send enough forces to get into trouble but not enough forces to be able to deal with it should in fact a situation of hostilities arise.

While we are very eager and have encouraged others to deploy to the Kingdom—and we will be prepared to talk about that—the bottom line is, having exposed American military personnel to a situation in which they may well get into combat or they may well be in the midst of hostilities, we want to make absolutely certain that we send enough to be able to deal with any contingency that may arise. That, more than anything else, is the principle that is governing our deployment.

The decision about when to stop the deployment, at what level, obviously will finally be made by the President based upon the advice of our military commander on the scene, General Schwarzkopf, General Powell and the members of the Joint Chiefs. I will not speculate beyond that at this point. We may want to pursue that later on in executive session.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just close with a couple of thoughts. There has been a lot of talk about a more peaceful world situation in which the significant enhancement in U.S.-Soviet relations allows us now to harvest a peace dividend to reduce the extent to which we expend our national treasure on building and maintaining military capability. I am not here today to argue that Operation Desert Shield or the situation in the Middle East justifies a complete reversal of the course that we have embarked upon about trying to achieve some long-term savings in the defense budget.

I do think it is incumbent upon me to point out, as I am sure many of the members of the committee already have, that, in fact, if we ever needed evidence of the value of U.S. military force, of the importance of U.S. commitments, of the ability to project that force to trouble spots at various places around the world where American interests or American lives may be at stake, it seems to me the situation in the Middle East today is proof positive of that.

We clearly are in a situation where it is still enormously important for us to be able to recruit young men and women to wear the uniform of the U.S. military, to go in harm's way if need be, and that we have an obligation as a government, as a nation to give them the training, equipment, and support they need to do the job that we ask them to do on behalf of all of us.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Cheney follows:]

STATEMENT BY

HONORABLE RICHARD B. CHENEY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the recent events in the Persian Gulf region. Today, United States military forces are involved in one of the most significant multinational operations that has occurred in the past 40 years. The long-term implications of this operation for our military force structure, strategy, US presence and security relationships in the region, and economic security are equally significant.

The events of this crisis are well known. On August 2nd, Iraqi armed forces, without provocation or warning, invaded the sovereign nation of Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed through Kuwait in blitzkrieg fashion in a few short hours. Witnesses report hundreds of casualties. The invasion was clearly "naked aggression."

International indignation and condemnation was immediate. The United Nations Security Council voted overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion and demand the Iraqis immediate and total withdrawal.

President Bush acted quickly and decisively. Immediately after the invasion, he ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that froze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets.

On August 6th, four days after the invasion of Kuwait, I briefed King Fahd about the threat from Iraq and the military capabilities we could provide to help deter further Iraqi aggression and to help defend Saudi Arabia. King Fahd's decisive and courageous decision to request foreign assistance speaks to the seriousness of the situation. In our discussion, King Fahd talked about his personal respect for President Bush and great trust in the United States. He spoke of his faith in our commitment to help defend his country, to stay until the job was done, and when the job was done and we were asked to leave, in fact, to leave. This trust in America, held by many countries, is key to our ability to help achieve a more secure and stable world.

After unparalleled international consultation and exhausting every alternative, President Bush on August 7th ordered the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia to protect vital US interests. In doing so, he set forth clear, straightforward objectives to:

- deter and, if necessary, repel further Iraqi aggression;
- effect the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and
- protect the lives of American citizens.

This kind of clarity about what we seek to achieve is key to the effective, appropriate use of military forces.

With that same commitment to clarity of purpose, President Bush has kept Congress fully informed about our efforts, and we intend to continue doing so.

Failure to counter Iraq's aggression and territorial gains would have severe consequences for US interests. In the short-term, Iraq could manipulate and cause destabilizing uncertainty in the international oil market, force up prices to crippling levels, threaten regional states, and begin the process of building a strong and widespread political base. With the conquest of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has direct control of the capacity to produce five million barrels of oil a day and a potentially strong influence over production of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, which is another seven million barrels a day. This would give Saddam Hussein an extremely powerful oil weapon. With this weapon, he could coerce oil importing nations in Europe, Japan, and even the United States, which depend increasingly on Gulf oil.

Over the long-term, Iraq would be much stronger militarily. Given its additional resources, Iraq could expand its vast arsenal of conventional and non-conventional weaponry -- soon to include nuclear weapons. His military strength, coupled with enhanced economic and political power, would give Saddam Hussein even greater coercive power over his neighbors on oil and other issues.

The deployment of US forces to the region has gone exceptionally well, and the level of multinational cooperation is unprecedented. Today we have well over 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the region. We have elements of several Army divisions, numerous Air Force fighter and strategic aircraft squadrons, a Marine Expeditionary Force and its supporting units, Special Operations Forces, two carrier battle groups, a battleship, and other naval assets in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea.

The United States is not alone in this important mission. At the invitation of the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, military forces from 25 other countries are participating in the land-based DESERT SHIELD operation and maritime enforcement of the UN-directed economic sanctions.

These multinational forces face a formidable threat. Iraq has elements of 11 divisions in Kuwait, totaling 173,680 troops, over 1500 tanks, 1000 armored personnel carriers, and 778 artillery pieces. An additional 11 Iraqi divisions are deployed in southern Iraq in support of those forces in Kuwait for a total of about 250,000 troops in the Kuwaiti theater. These are battle-hardened units, with leadership that has demonstrated a proclivity to use any and all forms of warfare, against civilian as well as military targets.

Even outside the immediate area, we recognize that terrorism is potentially a significant weapon in the Iraqi arsenal, and on September 4th Iraq was put back on the Department of State's list of states aiding and abetting terrorism. During this period of heightened tension, the terrorist threat to our forces in Saudi Arabia and to US personnel and interests worldwide is, and will remain, high. Pro-Iraqi demonstrations in major cities continue to fuel anti-American sentiment. US officials have received bomb threats, death threats, and verbal warnings from international terrorist organizations. Though no specific credible threats have yet been identified, it is imperative that we take adequate precautions to protect our interests worldwide. The Department of Defense, working closely with other US government agencies, is taking measures to enhance the protection of our servicemen and U.S. civilians overseas, as well as here in the United States.

Current operations in the Persian Gulf involve the first involuntary call-up of Selected Reserve units and individuals under the Total Force Policy established in 1973. Under this policy, Reserve components provide a high percentage of the total capability in a number of specific functional mission areas. Initially, there were sufficient volunteers to support this operation. By August 22nd, prior to the Presidential call-up of Selected Reserves, approximately 11,500 volunteer reservists were serving on active duty under orders.

The scope of DESERT SHIELD requires an involuntary call-up of Reservists to provide various capabilities, many of which reside in the National Guard and Reserve components. Mission areas being fulfilled by Reservists include airlift, port security, cargo handling, and medical support. By August 31st, more than 8,800 Reservists had been called up and 7,600 volunteers were still on active duty. I anticipate that by the end of September, close to 50,000 Reservists will be called.

Mr. Chairman, as you and your colleagues who have visited the region can verify, much has been accomplished in the month since President Bush ordered the deployment of US forces to assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia and enforcement of economic sanctions. We can be proud of the speed and efficiency with which the military undertook its mission and set up defensive positions. I dare say this type of operation would not have been possible ten years ago.

Fortunately, predecessors of mine in the Pentagon, military commanders, and Congress had the foresight to plan and program for a Persian Gulf contingency. While operating in this area of the world with its long logistic lines, harsh environmental conditions, and minimal infrastructure will always be extremely difficult, we are better organized, trained, and equipped than we would have been ten years ago. In December 1982, members of this committee approved an Administration proposal to establish the US Central Command. This command, with its full attention devoted to the region we call Southwest Asia, has proven invaluable both during the Iran-Iraq war and the current crisis. Since 1980 we have done extensive planning and conducted training and exercises, including our major biennual exercise BRIGHT STAR in Egypt and other regional states, for desert warfare.

Important programs, such as expanding airlift capacity with C-5Bs and KC-10s, expanding sealift with the fast sealift ships and the Ready Reserve Fleet, afloat prepositioning in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, military construction and prepositioning ashore in the region, and procurement of specialized equipment such as that for water production were implemented. Although most of these programs improve our capability for regional contingencies in general, during the last 11 years we have spent over $20 billion on programs directly related to Southwest Asia -- primarily for construction in the region and prepositioning ashore and afloat. During the same time we spent over ten times that figure to build and maintain the forces we are using in Desert Shield. These investments, while costly, have proven extremely worthwhile.

The United States is expending considerable resources to support this operation. By the end of fiscal year 1990, we will have spent more than $2.7 billion in additional costs over and above budgeted funds. We expect these incremental costs to total about $15 billion in FY 1991, if the crisis continues for the entire fiscal year. If conflict occurs, these costs would multiply many-fold.

The additional expenses of $1 billion per month are only one-third of our total costs associated with the military response. The other two-thirds is made up of $1 billion per month associated with our substantial investment in the forces deployed, and about $1 billion in normal baseline operating costs.

President Bush has firmly endorsed the concept of burdensharing for this crisis and announced his Economic Action Plan to solicit contributions from other countries for their fair share of the burden. Last week the President sent Secretaries Baker and Brady to the Persian Gulf region, Europe, and East Asia to discuss sharing responsibility with our friends and allies. Our response to the Persian Gulf crisis has enjoyed broad support from the American people and Congress, and we have demonstrated our willingness to bear our fair share of the burden. We recognize, however, that for the American people and Congress to sustain this effort, they must see that others are contributing their share as well.

In most cases, other countries are sharing the responsibility, and sharing it willingly. Secretaries Baker and Brady had successful and fruitful discussions in the countries they visited. Kuwait, for example, agreed to contribute $2.5 billion to the United States for military defensive purposes, and $2.5 billion in economic aid to states most affected by the crisis. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also contributed significant amounts, including direct support for our military forces deployed to the region.

The question often asked is, "How long will we be there?" I cannot give a definitive answer. We were invited by the Saudi Arabian government to help defend the Kingdom, as were other nations, and we will be present as long as it takes to achieve our mutual objectives. When that is done, or when Saudi Arabia asks, we will leave. Likewise, we have been invited to use facilities in other Gulf countries, and when we are asked to leave we will do so.

Our relationship with Saudi Arabia was founded on trust, as exemplified by the historic meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz, held aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal in February 1945. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this meeting in US-Saudi relations; King Abdul Aziz later called the meeting "the high point of my entire life" and said that "the hope of the Arabs is based upon the expectation that the United States will support them."

The strong American commitment to this region has been reaffirmed by every Administration since. Harry Truman told King Abdul Aziz in 1950 that any threat to Saudi Arabia was "a matter of immediate concern" to the United States. The first U.S. military advisory mission to Saudi Arabia was established in 1943 and our naval forces have been in the Persian Gulf since 1948.

In the future, our relationships with the Gulf states will undoubtedly change. Indeed, they already have. Facing this threat together and conducting DESERT SHIELD operations will shape our security relations for years to come. We will be working with the regional states to make arrangements for them to be able to defend themselves better and to receive reinforcement troops if that ever becomes necessary again in the future. It is imperative, therefore, that we take steps to ensure that countries like Saudi Arabia are never again in such a vunerable position requiring such a massive U.S. deployment. Accordingly, we will be consulting with you in the future on how we can strengthen our regional allies, both in terms of hardware and interoperability of command and control with U.S. forces. We will need your help and support.

Mr. Chairman, we--Congress and the Administration--have worked together in the past to prepare our forces for the possibility of the type of operation in which we are now engaged. We look forward to your support in continuing this partnership as we take the necessary actions to protect US interests, seek peaceful, lasting solutions to regional problems, and build long-term security relationships with our friends in the region.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Before turning to our questions, Chairman Powell, we welcome your statement.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General **Powell**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before the committee, and let me take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the committee for the very strong support you have given to our efforts in the Persian Gulf in Operation Desert Shield.

As the Secretary pointed out, the mission assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces to achieve the objectives stated by the President was to rapidly move forces to the region so that we could deter and defend against Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia.

Deterrence is a belief you want to fix in the mind of your opponent so that he will not take that course of action. He will be deterred from it, because he thinks he will be unsuccessful. Defense, on the other hand, is the real, honest-to-God capability you put on the ground to make sure that he never has any reason to change his mind, or to hedge his bet.

On the evening of August 6, when Secretary Cheney called me and told me to begin the deployment, at that time we only had 10,000 U.S. forces in the region, and these were naval forces as part of Joint Task Force Middle East and as part of the "Indy" battle group that had just recently arrived in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman.

So at that time we were starting from an absolute standing start, and in order to begin deterring as quickly as possible, we immediately began to move those assets that could be moved most quickly, namely air power and light ground forces in the person of fighter aircraft of the Tactical Air Command and the 82nd Airborne Division, units that we knew we could get in place quickly, put an

American flag on the ground and begin the process of deterrence, giving a clear deterrence signal to Mr. Saddam Hussein.

The aircraft we selected to go in first were fighters, because we wanted to make sure that we were able to keep the skies safe for the rest of our deployment, and we thought that we were assured that if we could get an adequate fighter complement in early, that would be the biggest sign of deterrence that we could put in front of Mr. Saddam Hussein. So initially, those are the forces that went in.

It was important to do that very, very quickly, because at that time, the Iraqis had close to 140,000 troops already in Iraq, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Hussein had said that he would begin withdrawing forces the day before——

Chairman NUNN. You mean already in Kuwait?

General POWELL. I am sorry, I mean already in Kuwait. I beg your pardon. Already in Kuwait, notwithstanding the fact that he said he would begin the withdrawal on that Sunday, the day before the President ordered the deployment.

At the same time that we began moving these air forces and light ground forces into the region, we began the mobilization of other forces and the lift assets that would be necessary to move them.

One of the first forces we alerted and started moving was the U.S. Marine Corps, two marine expeditionary brigades that would marry up with the maritime pre-positioned ship squadrons that were located in Guam and Diego Garcia; and I might say, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that has turned out to be a most successful concept—the marrying up of our marine expeditionary brigades by air with maritime pre-positioning ships that brings 30 days worth of supplies to the point of crisis.

We also began alerting heavy forces—the 24th Infantry Division, the 197th Infantry Brigade. It takes longer to get heavy forces there, and light and lethal is good, but in this kind of an environment you also need heavy and lethal, and so we started the process of assembling fast sealift and assembling heavy forces, recognizing we were going to be facing a potential enemy that had 5,000 tanks, and some of those tanks were the most modern tanks that the Soviet Union has in its inventory.

We also, then, as we built up our fighter capability, we started adding attack aircraft that could go into a ground attack mode: F-16s, F-15Es, A-10s, naval aviation, F-117, and a variety of other air forces began to flow into the region. We instantly began to increase intelligence assets and command and control assets being introduced into the area so that we could control all of this in a very coordinated way.

Attack helicopters were launched early into the flow to give us a ground antitank capability with a very capable Apache helicopter, and then the logistics units began the flow so that we could sustain all of this.

Finally, additional naval forces were introduced into the region. The carrier battle group came down into the Red Sea out of the Mediterranean, the battleship *Wisconsin* was launched from the east coast at rapid speed to get into the region, and then as we went further and further into deployment we were able to pull up additional lift assets.

The Ready Reserve Fleet, 38 ships, or a total of 41 ships, were activated out of the Ready Reserve Fleet, and I must say we were enormously gratified by the number of reserve volunteers who offered their services before the President announced the Reserve component call-up on August 22.

But as we got into it, it was clear we were going to need Reserve component call-up as part of our total force concept, and on August 22 President Bush gave us that authorization, and we anticipated that we would have to call up in this first pass up to a little short of 50,000 reservists by the end of October.

So far to date we have called up some 11,000 reservists, and that call-up has gone very, very smoothly, and we are trying to call-up only those units that we have a real need for, rather than just a generalized call-up to bring people up and disrupt their lives, and we do not really have a need for them.

At the same time that our build-up was going on, the Iraqis continued their build-up in Kuwait as well as pre-positioning additional Iraqi forces just north of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, until today there are some 173,000 Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait as well as other formations just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border.

As time passes, and as our build-up continues, we believe we are well on the way to having a confidence level that we will be able to successfully accomplish the mission given us by the President to defend Saudi Arabia and the other nations in the region from Iraqi aggression. But we are not there yet, and as the Secretary has mentioned, we need to continue our build-up for some time to come.

I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that this is the largest, most complex, rapid deployment of U.S. forces since World War II. Five weeks ago today we had 10,000 people in the region, all aboard ships and JTF/ME and in the "Indy" battle group. Today, as the Secretary has mentioned, we have well in excess of over 100,000 people.

It has been the equivalent of moving a city about the size of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and sustaining a city about the size of Chattanooga, Tennessee. We have airlifted 75,000 people. We have airlifted 65,000 tons of equipment. By sea lift, we have moved 180,000 tons of equipment. There are 55 ships, now, either loading or en route to the area of operations.

Our lift assets have been tasked to the maximum to support this, although it is starting to balance out now, as we get over the hump and as other nations come to our assistance.

We have learned a great deal about our transportation system. I am enormously proud of what the Transportation Command, our latest command, has been able to do under the able leadership of General H.T. Johnson. They have just done a brilliant job. Although there have been some glitches from time to time, you still have to go back and look at what they did, and those glitches were rather minimum compared to the significance of their achievement.

Of course, I have to give a great deal of credit to General Norm Schwarzkopf, my favorite bear, and the magnificent job that he and his staff have done in organizing this entire operation and commanding it both from their headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, as well as what they did in the region setting up that operation, and it is going extremely well.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, a lot of other people, other headquarters, participated in this operation. Our intelligence community, our signal community, Forces Command, Strategic Air Command with their tanker fleet were indispensable to this operation. The entire Department, I think, has shown what it is capable of doing.

I might point out a few other points, Mr. Chairman, before concluding, and that is first of all, the units that we now have in theater are setting up defensive positions. They are training with their Saudi colleagues and their colleagues from other nations who have contributed forces. We have begun live fire exercises so we can make sure we do not lose any of our combat skills.

I know that the committee is quite interested in the morale of our troops over there. I can say to you that the morale is excellent. All you have to do is see NBC every morning and get those little snapshots of those great young men and women talking to the folks back home.

We have got the mail, so it is now arriving 5 to 7 days after it is dropped into a Post Office box here in the United States. Before Operation Desert Shield, it was taking our people in Saudi Arabia 10 days to 14 days to get their mail. We have got it down to 5 to 7. Showers are going up, either through contracting out, or the old Vietnam 55-gallon drum system, but the troops are getting their showers. We are bringing in a full range of morale and welfare activities from AT&T phones to FAX capabilities so letters can go back and forth by FAX.

Red Cross, USO is operating. The laundry system, believe it or not, is working. This is a trivia item, Mr. Chairman, but you can get 24 items returned in 48 hours after you have turned it in to the field laundry facility. The armed forces radio and television service is hard at work providing for our troops. Stars and Stripes are there. So I think we are doing very, very well.

One thing I am particularly proud of is that we had two different cultures come together rather suddenly in Saudi Arabia over the last 5 weeks, and one might expect a lot of incidents. They simply have not happened. It is because our troops are well led, well trained, well behaved, and we should be very proud of the way that they have conducted themselves so far.

Command and control I know is an area of interest to the committee. I think the command and control system we have is a good one right now. The chain of command is clear from the President of the United States to the Secretary of Defense through me to General Schwarzkopf and his component commanders. It is clean, it is neat, it is understandable.

Because, however, there are a lot of other nations in the theater, and because, obviously, the Saudi Government is sovereign in their own land, we have created arrangements with them so that there is close cooperation and close coordination, and it is an arrangement which everybody understands, and in my judgment, and in the judgment of General Schwarzkopf, it is working very, very well.

With respect to the interception operations that were the third mission given to us, those are going well. We have intercepted over 750 ships. We have diverted four ships because they were carrying prohibited material to locations that they should not be carrying prohibited material to.

We had a meeting in Bahrain within the last day or so with the other nations who will be contributing to the interception operation, and there will be another meeting in another day or so with the actual commanders of all of those national fleets to put together a regime where we divide up the area of responsibility and get our signals down straight, the means by which we talk to one another, and I think that is going extremely well, and I would say to you the interception operation has just about shut off all sea lines of communication going to and from Iraq.

We are very interested in our rotation policy, Mr. Chairman. The service chiefs, the Secretary's staff and my staff, are examining what is most sensible. We are very anxious to have a unit rotation policy so we do not start ripping units apart, and obviously we will have to get a flow going, and yes, Europe will be included in the total pocket we look at to flow troops from but I am not prepared today to tell you exactly how long an individual soldier or unit will remain in theater before being rotated out as a unit.

While in theater, though, we are planning tours, we are planning R&R so that guys get a break and they are not always up on the line and get a chance to come back and find a regular cot in an air conditioned place and somewhere to relax for a while, while we are establishing the final rotation policy.

With respect to the various items that the committee is interested in confirming concerning compensation, we are supportive of the free mail proposal. It was an amendment to our supplemental but I believe the Senate acted on that last evening. We are fully supportive of that. We are looking at all the other items that range from basic allowance for subsistence, basic allowance for quarters, waiving taxes and a variety of other things.

The only caution I would state at this time, Mr. Chairman, is that we have to be a little cautious before we waive all of that away in the enthusiasm of the moment for this operation because we have troops all over the world who are serving in circumstances that are as arduous and demanding as those circumstances in which our troops in Desert Shield are serving. So equity, I think, demands that we take a careful look at that before we move too fast. We are doing that in the Department under the leadership of the Secretary's staff.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that the credit for what we have been able to do so far goes to the men and women of our Armed Forces who are executing with professionalism and pride Operation Desert Shield. Yes, they are dirty, they are a little hot, they are concerned, they would like to be home, but they are professional G.I.s. They are well trained, well lead, and they are doing a magnificent job.

As the Secretary pointed out, this did not happen by accident. This force was created by hard work, by the work of previous Congresses, by the work of my predecessors, the Secretary's predecessors, and the previous administration. We put together an outstanding force that you see operating not only in Desert Shield but around the world serving United States' interests. We got what we paid for. We got what the American people deserve, and I hope that as this committee considers the future course of the American Armed Forces and the challenging years ahead, you keep that in mind so that in 10 years from now if another crisis breaks out, those who come after us can thank us for keeping in place a proud, ready, trained and professional armed force.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Powell follows:]

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL, USA

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the military aspects of U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf region.

As Secretary Cheney indicated in his statement, U.S. forces are in the Persian Gulf region to support the President's national policy objectives. Our military objectives are to deter further aggression by Iraq, and to enforce the mandatory Chapter 7 sanctions of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions 661, 662 and 665. In accomplishing these objectives, we are working very closely with allied and friendly nations--today, over 25 in number--who have sent or are in the process of sending military forces to the region. Saddam Hussein is facing a multi-national military force. This multi-national force will be capable of a successful defense if Iraqi forces invade Saudi Arabia. It will also have the capability to respond should Iraqi forces invade any other nation in the area.

Because of the tremendous distances involved, we phased our overall operation for the defense of Saudi Arabia. In the initial phase naval, air superiority and light ground forces moved swiftly to provide an immediate deterrent presence. In the second phase attack aircraft, additional fighter aircraft, and maritime forces were deployed. In the current phase, we are building up heavy ground forces and additional air, maritime and sustainment forces to insure a successful defense of Saudi Arabia.

With respect to enforcing the UN sanctions, a multi-national naval force, consisting of U.S. naval forces and naval forces from twelve other allied nations--with additional forces from four other nations en route--is intercepting maritime vessels in the relevant ocean areas to determine their destination and whether they are in compliance with the UN sanctions regarding prohibited cargo. U.S. Navy support for this operation includes 11 ships in the Persian Gulf, 23 ships in the North Arabian Sea, and 13 ships in the Red Sea. To date, we have intercepted over 750 ships and we have boarded and diverted four ships that were not in compliance with UN sanctions, including two Iraqi ships.

U.S. investment in forces and equipment capable of deploying quickly to any part of the world has paid off. The movement of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and surrounding Gulf Coast countries is the largest rapid deployment of U.S. forces since World War II. We moved more forces and equipment in the first three weeks of Desert Shield than we moved during the first three months of the Korean War. This massive deployment of troops and equipment is the equivalent of moving and sustaining a city the size of Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Desert Shield has also convincingly demonstrated the value of a full range of balanced forces. In Desert Shield we have needed and deployed light forces, maritime forces, heavy forces, tactical and strategic air forces, mobility and sustainment forces.

As you know, we had to move as quickly as possible. As a result, Operation Desert Shield has taxed U.S. airlift and sealift to the maximum. The Military Airlift Command's organic fleet of aircraft is fully employed, with nearly 90 percent currently dedicated to Desert Shield missions. The remaining aircraft continue to support DOD's other worldwide requirements. According to established plans, for the first time in history we activated a portion of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF Stage I made 38 civil aircraft available for DOD use. If required, Stage II and III can make an additional 78 and 277 aircraft available. To date, airlift has deployed over 75,000 people and over 65,000 tons of equipment. Moreover, the extent of Strategic Air Command's tanker support has been impressive--all combat aircraft deploying to the region required multiple aerial refuelings.

More than 180,000 tons of cargo has been sealifted to the area of operations -- with an additional 55 ships loading or en route. All eight of the Navy's fast sealift ships are supporting the deployment. As of today, seven of these ships have completed the 15 day journey and offloaded their cargoes in Saudi Arabia. Nine Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS-2 and MPS-3) from Diego Garcia and Guam have unloaded. These ships carried combat equipment and 30 days of supplies for the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Forty-one Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships have been ordered activated and thirty-two are ready for sea. We are exploring options to increase our sealift capability, including getting ships from our allies.

Committee members will be pleased to hear that in all of these lift efforts, the U.S. Transportation Command has performed superbly. Coordinating the largest rapid lift in America's history has not been an easy task, but the new unified command has proven its worth.

You are aware that on 23 August, the President invoked, for the first time, the provisions of section 673b, Title 10, United States Code, the Selected Reserve Callup Authority. This augmentation of the Active Armed Forces provides us with the capability to perform certain critical military activities. The Reserves and National Guard are an integral part of our Armed Forces. Currently we are ordering to active duty units and individuals to perform a wide variety of tasks both in this country and in and around the Arabian Peninsula.

We are all aware of the personal sacrifices being made by the reservists being called up. I assure you that we will only call those we need, and will retain them for only the period of service that is absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission. The most immediate need is for Army logistics forces to sustain the growing combat power in the theater of operations. We also will be calling up Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard units and individuals to support strategic lift and enhance the flow of forces and supplies to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area. Finally, individual

Army and Navy reservists are being called up to backfill critical medical specialists who have deployed to meet theater medical requirements.

In addition to those called up under the Presidential Callup Authority, many more reservists and guardsmen have supported this operation on a volunteer basis, logging thousands of air miles in support of strategic airlift, aerial refueling and tactical reconnaissance requirements, and pitching in to assist where needed in the deployment process. These are patriotic men and women, totally dedicated to our national defense. In short, our Total Force policy is working well in Operation Desert Shield.

All of the U.S. forces in Operation Desert Shield are organized as a joint force under the Central Command's Commander in Chief (USCINCCENT), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. This joint force includes Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps component commanders.

Major U.S. forces deployed to the Middle East come under the operational control of USCINCCENT when they enter the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. USCINCCENT has primary responsibility for Operation Desert Shield and is supported by the other combatant commands and numerous federal departments and agencies. General Schwarzkopf's naval component commander commands both U.S. naval forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia and U.S. naval forces for the multi-national Maritime Intercept Force.

General Schwarzkopf's mission is "to deploy forces to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and take actions in concert with host nation forces, friendly regional forces and other allies to defend against an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed." General Schwarzkopf is coordinating closely with the military forces of Saudi Arabia and the other allied forces in theater.

U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries are part of a command arrangement that has established an effective coalition of Arab and Western forces. These forces are organized along national lines with national forces being assigned separate areas of operations. National Force Commanders are maintaining close coordination and cooperation on all issues.

Host nation support has been outstanding. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have provided unprecedented use of airfields, port facilities, beddown locations, heavy equipment transport, and water for all allied forces.

A large Iraqi military force remains in Kuwait. It has the capability to attack Saudi Arabia with very little warning. As of this week, approximately 173,000 Iraqi troops with over 1,500 tanks continue to occupy positions in Kuwait. Moreover, 11 Iraqi divisions are deployed in southern Iraq in position to support the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf are well trained and well supported. Together with the military forces of participating Arab and Western countries, these forces will be capable of defending Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack and enforcing the UN sanctions.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Powell and Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your statements.

I will start the questioning and ask the clerk to please keep the time and alert us when 6 minutes has expired.

Mr. Secretary, the first question is to you. What can be done and what is being done to increase by a significant degree other nations' deployment of heavy ground forces to Saudi Arabia, particularly by the Arab nations?

Secretary CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that is a subject on which we are working. I have in my own personal contacts discussed the subject with a number of the nations in the region that are involved out there, their leaders. It is perhaps in terms of going into the details a subject that might better be pursued in executive session simply because of the timing of announcements.

There are, in fact, forces from other Arab nations en route or which will shortly be en route, a significant increase in the military capability of the allied forces that are being deployed in Saudi Arabia and the region; but, as I say, I think it would perhaps be best if we discussed that in executive session in terms of the specifics.

Chairman NUNN. It is happening, though?

Secretary CHENEY. Yes, sir, it is.

Chairman NUNN. General, a question on that one for you. Are we taking into account any kind of assumption about what other nations are going to do in our planning of how many U.S. forces we need in the region, particularly the heavy forces from Egypt and/or Syria?

General POWELL. When we began this operation, Senator, the only thing we could count on were Saudi forces, obviously. So our plan did not have an assumption that we could count on. Obviously as these other forces arrived, it gives us something to work on.

My mission from the President and the Secretary of Defense was to use U.S. forces working with Saudi forces to deter and defend, and I still do not think we are there, and these other forces are still some time away from being there as well.

Chairman NUNN. Are you going to take them into account as you are sure they are going to arrive? Is that part of the planning, or are we planning a totally independent force of the U.S. capable of achieving all the goals?

General POWELL. Obviously as other forces arrive and as their capability is known and as they are integrated into all the other forces in the region, I would have to take that into account.

Chairman NUNN. Are you taking them into account before they arrive, as they are in transit? We are setting in motion a whole lot from back here that is going to be in transit for 2, 3, or 4 weeks.

General POWELL. There has been a lot of discussion over the last several weeks, Mr. Chairman, about things being in transit, but they are not yet in transit. When the announcements are made, and we know that other forces are arriving, I think that would be the appropriate time to seriously begin thinking about and planning for it.

Chairman NUNN. I understand that from a purely military point of view because of psychology and a whole kind of framework about whether it is going to be the United States versus Iraq or whether it is going to be a concerted U.S.-Arabs-other countries versus Iraq. I think that is enormously important.

I was encouraged when the Secretary first came back or maybe it was when he was over there several weeks ago. He made reference to the Egyptians' commitment to have forces in there. President Mubarak made it very clear to us he was ready to put forces in there. That was 10 or 12 days ago. There is something missing here as to why we cannot seem to get Arab forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia with heavy equipment when they are willing to do it, when we want them there, and I presume the Saudis want them there. What is missing?

Secretary CHENEY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, first of all I would argue that there are a significant number of nations including Arab nations that have in fact committed troops to Saudi Arabia. The list includes the Egyptians, Syrians, Moroccans, and the Pakistanis.

Chairman NUNN. Very small numbers and very light equipment.

Secretary CHENEY. That is right.

Again, coming back to something which I think Senator Warner mentioned in his opening remarks, there are very few nations in the world that have the logistical capability we do to take large, heavy forces and move them that far. So the proposition of getting heavy forces and mechanized divisions from other nations is a complicated one. It is being worked. I am confident that it will in fact happen.

I am reluctant to talk about the details in open session partly because of some of the sensitivities that are involved. The fact of the matter is there are, I would guess, now 8, 9, 10 other Arab nations that have made some commitment of forces in the area based upon their own capabilities.

Finally, the other point that needs to be made is that to put additional heavy forces in the region creates a logistical strain, if it is our logistical system that is providing the ammunition, food and all of the other things that go into supporting a heavy force in the field. That limits our ability to deploy our own forces. So part of the sticking problem, if you will, has been arranging the logistical support for these heavy forces when they come in in a way that does not detract from our own capability to support our forces.

Chairman NUNN. General, what are your assumptions with respect to rotating our troops? Do you have any kind of rule of thumb about how long you can keep individuals in the field without some kind of rotation policy? I am not asking you right now for the specifics of your plan, although if you have it I would welcome it. What are the general parameters that you work on regarding rotation?

General POWELL. We do not have the specifics of the plan, Senator. But with respect to the naval forces, for example, we have tried to adhere to a policy of only 6 months at sea before returning to port. We have had to break that already because some of the units that are in the Persian Gulf that were planning to rotate back were held in position because of this crisis.

So 6 months has been the standard practice that we have been trying to use for our naval forces. Six months is also the accepted maximum on TDY or temporary duty. But we have not come down firmly on 6 months. We really have to look at it. And it may be service-specific and unit-specific. There may be some units in the Air Force, for example, where you can rotate out pilots a lot easier than it is to rotate out a larger ground unit that is located in a place that is more difficult to get to, yet they are serving in an even more arduous set of conditions.

Chairman NUNN. I was going to say those ground units up front without facilities are going to be the ones that are going to have the hardest time to adjust.

General POWELL. Exactly. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. And that is where the patience is going to be needed. If we want to be patient here, as we do as a Nation and give the strategy a chance to work, and the President has made that plain—of course unless something happens, in which case all bets are off—but if we want to do that we have got to plan how we are going to rotate those units. And I think we have got to take that into account before we send all the units that would be the rotating units over there to begin with.

General POWELL. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, we fully understand that. That is being taken into account. I am just not prepared today to tell you what the bottom line answer is.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Powell, do you agree with my reading the dictionary on mercenary?

General POWELL. Yes, sir, it is in the dictionary, so it must be right.

Senator WARNER. You better believe it. So let us put that one down. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney, I listened very carefully, as we all did, to a very interesting presentation. And you recounted the objectives of the United States in this mission. And you got to page 3, and I missed a word. The written text says restore the legitimate government of Kuwait and protect the lives of American citizens. Is that "the" or "a" legitimate government?

Secretary CHENEY. As far as I am aware, Senator, there is only one legitimate government in Kuwait today, and that is the one we support, the one we have been working with in terms of our current efforts.

Senator WARNER. The one that was displaced?

Secretary CHENEY. Correct.

Senator WARNER. And we are strong on that commitment and not leaving ourselves and flexibility for some other possibility?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, it is not just a U.S. objective, Senator. I would point out it is also the U.N. objective. We have been supporting that international effort. And the international effort has been to call for the Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of the legitimate government.

Senator WARNER. General Powell, in the course of the early deliberations by the Joint Chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law now provides for individual members to express their views if they have views inconsistent with that of the Secretary and the Chairman. In this instance I presume there was full consultation among all members of the JCS, and I would be interested to know, was it a unanimous decision by the JCS to go forward with this operation as outlined by the President and the Secretary?

General POWELL. There was full consultation on a regular basis between the Chiefs and myself, the Chiefs and the Secretary, and the Chiefs and the President. And there was no dissent. It was unanimous agreement among the Chiefs.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney, when we were visiting in Moscow with General Secretary Gorbachev I brought up the question of the Soviet advisors, experts, contractors, call it what you may. And his explanation which again he reiterated during the course of the summit conference was that he felt that he could not pull them back because it would jeopardize upwards of 6,000 to 8,000 other Soviet persons there, many of whom or most of whom are not affiliated in any way with the military operation.

My question to you is, is there any evidence to date that the Soviets had notice of this military operation through those advisors? And did they in any way try to impress upon Saddam Hussein the illegality of this operation, the futility of this operation, and the fact that the world in all likelihood would turn against him?

Secretary **CHENEY**. Senator, I have seen no evidence of any prior Soviet knowledge. But there is no reason why I necessarily would know. Obviously, it is conceivable, but I have seen no evidence to support it. I guess I would argue, where the Soviets are concerned, as I have noted to the members of the committee, as somebody who is a skeptic on the Soviets, that the fact of the matter is their performance in this particular crisis I think has been admirable.

I cannot say that I agree with every single step they have taken, or that we would not like to see the withdrawal of the rest of their advisors, but the fact is that the United Nations has been effective. The Security Council has worked. As the President himself has said, the success of having a joint U.S.-Soviet policy for the most part, in terms of dealing with this, has been enormously helpful, and it really is a milestone in international relations. So we have been very pleased with their overall level of cooperation.

Senator **WARNER**. Do you have any evidence that those Soviet personnel in any way involved themselves in this operation once it commenced and the borders of Kuwait were trespassed?

Secretary **CHENEY**. There is no evidence of that, Senator. They have indicated that the people who are there function in a technical capacity and an advisory capacity, but they are not operating with units. We have not seen any evidence to contradict that.

Senator **WARNER**. Mr. Secretary, turning to efforts by other Cabinet officers and perhaps to some extent by yourself to gain support from our allies, both monetary support and, as the chairman and others here in the committee have mentioned, the addition of troop support, now that we have some reports that there will be some forthcoming monetary support, how do you intend to apply that to the budget formula that is being worked on at the very moment we are here in this hearing?

For example, we have heard totals of up to $12 million so far pledged by various nations, primarily the Arab nations. Is that to be applied directly to the Pentagon budget and the cost of this operation? Does it go into the general treasury?

Second, the chairman and I are both of the opinion that we require legislation to be specific about this, but what is the general planning within the administration? Are you coming forward to the Congress and asking for some legislation on this?

Secretary **CHENEY**. We are, first of all, happy to accept all donations and offers of assistance. Like the chairman, I think it is important that others contribute to the venture.

I am encouraged by the reports I have received with respect to the travels of Secretary Baker and Secretary Brady in this regard. I do not have yet sort of a final rack-up, if you will, of exactly what the amounts will be, and where they will be disbursed.

In some cases, we have encouraged contributions by others to sort of front-line states, those nations that are most directly affected by the sanctions, to bolster their support for the economic sanctions, so that would be a direct bilateral relationship that does not directly involve the United States, but we have encouraged those gifts.

In some cases, we are talking about host nation support, the kind of thing that we already have arrangements with—where we have U.S. forces stationed around the world, the host country, Saudi Arabia or the other states in the region that have U.S. forces deployed would provide such things as fuel, and other kinds of support that our folks need.

The third category, generally, would be direct financial contributions to offset some of the cost of the operation.

I do not want to leave anybody with the impression that the total cost to the United States is going to be offset. That is clearly not the case, but I think a significant amount will be. It is our intention to work with the Congress to try to decide exactly how much is needed as we go through the budget negotiations that are now underway.

I was on the telephone at some length about this last night to figure out exactly how much funding we need in 1991 for the defense budget and then have a clearly identifiable additional increment that funds Desert Shield.

In terms of the funds coming in, they basically go to the Treasury. My attorneys at the Department have informed me that their reading of the existing statutes is that under—I think it is 50 U.S. Code, I think section 1151, there is authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to receive donations, contributions for specific defense purposes.

It cites "Defense." It is a unique kind of authority. So if somebody wants to contribute to this cause, in effect it goes to the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury, and goes into the Federal Treasury. Another authority in that same statute is that for other types of real property that might be donated, for example, it can go to the Administrator of GSA.

That authority is on the books. Our attorneys think it is adequate. We are prepared, though, to work with the Congress if there is need for clarification, or if in the wisdom of the Congress——

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Secretary, let me say that I think this sort of thing is unprecedented in my research, but the second part of the question was, if these sums are forthcoming in the amounts we are now discussing, and hopefully greater amounts, could it be possible that this would once again be applied to the defense budget so that we could possibly have the peace dividend that we were looking to prior to the gulf operation?

Secretary **Cheney**. The assumption that we have made internally for planning purposes—and again, I do not want to give the final bottom line on it because we do not know yet. We need checks in hand before I am confident in saying that X amount has been offset, but for planning purposes, internally, we have been looking at a situation in which the $15 billion additional cost that we came up with for 1991—which is an estimate, let me emphasize that, an additional budget authority for Desert Shield—that we think we could offset about half of that from these other sources.

That is strictly planning. That is strictly preliminary. That is strictly an estimate. I may be back tomorrow with a modification, but that is the kind of thing that we are looking at. In other words, that the incremental cost to the Department for Desert Shield, that about half of it may be offset by these outside sources.

Senator **Warner**. My time is up, but I think that much of this is generated by increased revenue to the Arab countries as a direct result of the increased price of oil.

Secretary **Cheney**. In some cases that is correct.

Senator **Warner**. I would hope that you would look as hard as you can to getting money to restore some of that budget money before this gulf situation ends for the peace dividend.

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, when Secretaries Brady and Baker made their presentations they had recommendations firmly in mind. It was not sort of open-ended, but we in effect suggested levels of assistance that we thought was appropriate.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I am going to ask everyone to stay on time, or I will have to interrupt because we have a large number of Senators here, which indicates the keen interest in this hearing and in our witnesses. So we are going to have to make sure that we stay on time to give everybody a chance to ask questions in the open session.

Senator Kennedy, under the early bird rule you are next.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join in welcoming the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and also the Secretary of Defense.

I want to say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, I think all of us have been impressed with the leadership that has been provided by the President in the organizing of the international community on the wanton aggression by Iraq in this particular circumstance.

It is really unprecedented, and to the extent—and I am sure Secretary Cheney and General Powell have been involved in that effort. I think they deserve the commendation and genuine appreciation of the American people.

Second, I think all of us are enormously impressed by the success of the movement of these troops over the period of time and the way that this has taken place. I think it is a strong indication of the professionalism in the military, and I think both of you deserve the credit in those particular areas.

I know the focus of the attention of the hearings today is on the particular military implications as well as other political implications facing both the United States, our allies, and the world community on the Gulf States.

I would like, in the limited time, to focus on an issue which has been raised and referred to by Senator Warner. I understand that General Powell had mentioned it earlier. That is, about where we are going in terms of the military budget as has been pointed out by Senator Warner, the complicated negotiations that are taking place. We are very mindful of not only what is going to be necessary for our own security but we have to recognize we are facing in many instances changed conditions with which we are going to have to deal.

No one is suggesting any kind of a unilateral disarmament, but we are also against a background where about half of the military budget was focused on the defense of NATO and then the 10 or 15 percent with regard to the strategic needs of this country. I think all Americans must have been surprised this morning to find out that Germany now is going to be actually paying some $8 billion per year to the Soviet Union to keep their troops in Central Europe. So those circumstances have not changed.

I, for one, appreciate the fact that General Powell has indicated that he thought there still would be a peace dividend. Many of us believe that not only do we need to have the adequate security and defense but we also have to deal with many of the important security issues here at home, strengthening our educational system and meeting many of our domestic needs and challenges.

I want to commend what Secretary Cheney has said with regard to the participation of other countries in this defense. I was, quite frankly, appalled that it took a month for the OPEC countries to make a decision that they were going to increase production and that other of our allies, such as Japan, had indicated some positive response initially and then seem to be reconsidering their position.

I am not going to take the time to dwell on the implications of that, but the fact that we have American servicemen in that area and then these countries are thinking twice about whether they are going to produce more oil I found enormously distressing, whether we will be able to get into that particular issue.

I really would be interested in hearing the comments of the General and Secretary about whether we are going to be faced in this defense debate, that we cannot cut back no matter where we are on some either strategic or other big-ticket items because now they may have a regional justification when they have had no regional justification before.

I can think of SDI. We may have our differences. A very small component is being allocated in research to be used against tactical weapons or missiles, low projected missiles. Maybe there is some justification for increasing that particular aspect of the SDI, but I would hope that we would not be hearing about the importance of B-2 and SDI in terms of this regional conflict.

Would Secretary Cheney and General Powell care to respond?

I will have just one other question, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Cheney. Let me take a quick cut at it, if I may, Senator, and the Chairman may want to jump in as well.

Let me explain what we have tried to do in terms of the planning that the President has directed us to undertake and on which we, as I said at the outset—have only had the opportunity to brief the chairman and ranking member of the four committees because of developments in the last few weeks. We have been so busy doing this regional contingency in Southwest Asia that we have not had time to go around and discuss what we believe is a significant change in our overall strategic posture.

That is, with the change that has occurred in the world in Eastern Europe, as you correctly state, Senator, the eventual expected Soviet withdrawal, the commitment to get out of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, et cetera, we think the likelihood of a global conflict involving conventional forces between the United States and the Soviets is significantly reduced and that in any future scenario we might paint we would have adequate time to reconstitute forces to deal with that kind of conflict. The driver, therefore, in terms of thinking about the kind of force structure we need to retain now are what we describe as regional contingencies.

Now it was not through any special foresight, but one of the ones on which we focused was Southwest Asia as we were developing this concept. Having said that, however, we find in the Southwest Asia scenario, in Iraq we are facing Soviet tanks, Soviet SAM systems, Soviet aircraft. To the extent we were designing systems in the past built around the Soviet threat, that is exactly from an equipment standpoint the kind of thing we are faced with today.

In terms of strategic systems like SDI, our assumption and our planning even under the new scenario is that we still have to maintain strategic deterrence—the Soviets have not given any indication of giving up their own strategic capabilities—that sort of the backbone of the defense of the homeland of the United States which remains building and deploying strategic systems. SDI, I continue to believe, is very important.

We see now as we contemplate the possibility of hostilities with Iraq that we are faced with a country that has ballistic missiles, short-range systems, SCUD's, that has improved upon those and gotten its own homegrown variety that has a longer range, that it has weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, that it has been working on other types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and possibly biological systems, so that we clearly are faced with a Third World country that presents us with a first rate military threat with which we have to deal.

Dealing with these kinds of threats requires us to look to new technologies, requires us to maintain modern forces, requires us to consider the possibility that things like SDI are important. SDI is that portion of our budget where we currently have ensconced programs that would allow us to deal with a short-range tactical ballistic missile threat, and that is why we think it is important for us to continue.

Will there be a peace dividend? I do not describe it that way. I think there will be, there can be a long-term reduction in the defense budget below what had previously been anticipated, and I do not think that has changed that much.

We still have to deal, though, with the situation in Iraq and Saudi Arabia today that may well require us to spend more money than we had planned on 6 months ago. It may involve a more lasting kind of commitment than we had expected, but the fact is we are there now, it is important, and I do not think it shifts the overall strategic emphasis in our defense budget.

Senator KENNEDY. I would mention just one other area, because the time is moving on, and that is with regard to the movement of the various refugees outside of Jordan, 100,000 today maybe going to 300,000. Most of the refugee agencies believe that.

I notice in your testimony that we are fully strapped in terms of the Military Air Command and also for the Desert Shield missions. I understand that.

I understand the importance of Jordan, the stabilizing of Jordan, and the hope that Jordan will actually support both the U.N.'s position with regard to the embargo and the delicacy that has taken place there and the deterioration of the human condition with all of the implications that has in terms of the stabilization of the Jordan regime.

I would be interested in the recommendations you have. I know the limitations in terms of funding for this, whether it has to come from the State Department or the Defense Department, to make available, as I understand it, people carriers. It is not military air transport but basically the kinds of commercial carriers that are even being utilized today.

I want to know whether it would not be worth the estimates of between $50 billion and $125 billion to move all of those people back to their countries and remove what is clearly becoming increasingly an enormously festering problem in terms of the stability not only of Jordan, but in terms of the world community generally with these refugees. I do not know whether you have made some recommendations or whether that should be directed more to the State Department?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, the State Department is more directly involved. The President has specifically authorized the expenditure of a significant sum. I would want to check. But it seems to me the number is around $28 million that we have signed off on. And again, I would want to check that for the record, Senator. But that is now being used as many other countries have contributed as well.

[The information follows:]

According to the State Department, the total U.S. Government contribution to the international effort to assist refugees in leaving the gulf crisis area is $10 million, of which $2.5 million is from previously obligated funds and $7.5 million was authorized by President Bush for this emergency.

Others, like the Saudis, have provided aircraft to move Egyptian workers who have migrated out of Kuwait into Jordan, to lift them back into Egypt. In some cases we are dealing with people whose home countries are not in any position really to receive them. When they get from there, you have sort of moved the problem from Jordan to their home state location. We are prepared to help, keeping in mind the limitations that you cited, that our lift capability from the military standpoint is, at this point, pretty well committed to our efforts to support our troops in Saudi Arabia.

Senator **Kennedy**. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General Powell, I would like to follow up quickly on a point made by Senator Warner earlier. And that is, while we are enormously grateful for the amounts of money that the various Arab countries are contributing to the defraying of the expenses on the part of Desert Shield, virtually every cent of that money is being generated by the substantial increase in the price of oil. So we are not in any way depleting the enormous wealth of those regions by calling upon them to help defray the expenses. And I think a simple calculation would show that is coming strictly out of the so-called windfall profits that will be generated as a result of the increase in price.

I was looking at this morning's headlines and stories, and I must tell you I was equally disturbed as Senator Kennedy. I went back to a writer who wrote about a war that took place some 2,500 years ago, the Pelopennesian War, and I remember reading a statement by Thucydides. And he said that, "For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the means to prevent it."

And then there was this one phrase that I had remembered. He said, "Meanwhile, each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is of the business of someone else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays." And, "To you who would call yourselves men of peace, I say: you are nothing without men of action by your side."

I remembered reading that some time ago, and I refer to it now in conjunction with what I see taking place with respect to the West German Government. The statement that they are prepared to expend $7 billion or $8 billion to house Soviet soldiers but have little more than pocket change, if that, left over to help defray some of the expense of the refugees in Jordan, I find rather appalling.

And frankly, when I turn to the Japanese, who have offered, hesitantly, to appropriate some $1 billion, which I would say is a mere bagatelle compared to the enormous wealth they have and to the vulnerability of their nation to a cutoff of oil.

I also read an item in the Washington Post that their union seamen even resisted transporting urgently requested vehicles to our forces in the Persian Gulf. As of last week, the Japanese had only lined up a total of 3 doctors for a medical unit that Prime Minister Kaifu had promised he would dispatch. I would say that this kind of cooperation coming from allies who have more than a small amount of interest in the continuation of the flow of oil going to their countries is not going to stand well with me, and I suggest with a lot of other members. And I would hope that we would continue to express that discontent to the various leaders.

Another point I would like to make is that last week I had occasion, thanks to you, Secretary Cheney and General Powell, to travel to the Middle East. One of the notions that was raised is that if only the United States Congress had approved more arms sales to the Saudis, had approved more arms sales to the Jordanians, and other countries in the region, we would not be faced with this problem now. To which my response was that if only the United States, the Western Europeans, the Soviet Union, had not engaged in this orgy of arms sales, we would not be faced with this particular situation today.

And I would hope that whatever Secretary of State Baker has in mind for a GULFO or a METO or whatever kind of arrangement we are looking forward to in that region in the future, that we would really be focusing not on establishing an equilibrium, a political/military equilibrium at higher levels of armaments, but rather, seeking some kind of international imposition of sanctions for those nations who continue to arm inherently unstable nations.

The question of Soviet advisors Senator Warner has already touched upon, although talking about Soviet economic advisors is something of an oxymoron in today's terms, but the notion that somehow we are going to be supplying economic assistance to a nation that is providing some form of economic advice and some form of military advice, however tenuous, to soldiers who are poised to attack and kill American soldiers, is still troubling to me.

And I cannot accept the rationale offered by President Gorbachev that this is merely the carrying out of a contractual obligation. I think it sends a conflicting message to Saddam Hussein: on the one hand seeing President Bush and President Gorbachev standing side by side, condemning the invasion, saying they support the sanctions, and at the same time keeping as many as 5,000 or 6,000 civilians in that country who, in one fashion or another, provide moral support, if not technical support.

So I would just like to reiterate that I do not think that it is satisfactory for the Soviets to adopt the position of a landlord who sees the tenants wrecking the apartment, but does not want to evict the tenants because they might not pay the back rent. That is not acceptable for me.

Another point I would like to talk about is that of the embargo. Many people might question the wisdom as to whether or not we should have extended the embargo to food and medical supplies in the first instance. And now of course we are starting to see some erosion of that support. President Bush and President Gorbachev have indicated that any exceptions or exemptions from that embargo would first have to go through the United Nations. And I think that is entirely appropriate.

The first problem we are going to have is how to distinguish between food and firearms. That is a major problem that the U.N., through its agencies, will have to contend with, namely the search and possible seizure of certain types of cargo. But once you get over the determination of food from firearms, then you have the question of, assuming it is food and not howitzers, how do you know that Saddam Hussein is not feeding his troops first, his advisors second, and his "guests" in his house of horrors last? He is likely to continue dragging out innocent foreign "guests," and displaying them as people who are being either dehydrated or starved by U.S. policies. So I think we have that to contend with.

Another point I would like to raise concerns the War Powers Act. I agree with what has been said about the War Powers Act, that it has not proven to be effective or workable. But, fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon your perspective, it happens to be the law of the land. Until it is either challenged or changed, the War Powers Act is the law of the land. And I have said this privately and reiterate it today publicly that I believe that the President will be well served to at least comply with the spirit if not the exact letter of that law by formal notification to Congress and also requesting a vote by the members on his policy.

As I have indicated, I think that once there is blood on the sand popular opinion might very well shift, and Congress might then be in hot pursuit of public opinion that is flowing in the opposite direction.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, during our trip we heard some urging on the part of the Kuwaitis, and I hear this—and this is not all in the form of a question which I will then have to repeat.

Secretary CHENEY. That is all right. I was going to refer to the General, anyway. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. The Kuwaiti defense minister called for quick, decisive offensive action. I know that you do not share that particular view, but I would also urge a measure of caution to those who are looking for quick, surgical strikes against the Iraqis.

This notion that somehow we are going to go in and just simply wipe out the Iraqis within a matter of a couple of days with air power I think is sadly mistaken. I think that you and General Powell and President Bush have pursued the correct course of action and by resisting that siren call for aggressive action now.

I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman, right now, and would care to hear any response to that long series of questions I asked the Secretary and General Powell.

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you, Senator. General.

Senator COHEN. I might say that your silence will be construed as agreement. [Laughter.]

General POWELL. As the Senator knows, Thucydides also once said, "Of all elements of power, restraint impresses men most."

Senator COHEN. I take it, then, that you, too, agree with my last statement? You and Thucydides?

General POWELL. I agree that a powerful nation has to wield its power with care.

Senator COHEN. Well, let me ask you specifically, Mr. Secretary, you responded that there have been specific requests made to specific nations for specific amounts. What specific requests have we made of our Western European allies?

You and I have attended a number of Wehrkunde conferences together. You have heard me raise this issue time and time again, especially when it came to the reflagging of the Kuwaiti ships, that the NATO alliance could not continue to maintain the position that it could not contribute to the defense of interests beyond its geographical border while their jugular vein, our jugular vein, is sitting out there naked and exposed in the Persian Gulf.

We have made that argument year after year, and today, even as of today, it is met with rather bland indifference—let us take care of Germany first, or the Japanese saying well, let us take care of our northern islands first. We have got some negotiations going on there, and here is a billion for you over here in the Persian Gulf—that is not enough.

That is not enough, and they have got to do more, and it is not going to be, I think, in their interest when we start going through House/Senate conferences deciding how many troops are going to stay in Europe, and how much is going to be expended for defense of the Far East, when we have that kind of attitude exhibited.

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I do not have immediately in front of me exactly the contribution from each country.

I think it is important for us to distinguish between various allies. Some of them have in fact been very aggressively involved in the effort. Others have been somewhat more reluctant. They are faced, sometimes, with different historical circumstances.

Both the Germans and the Japanese do make the argument that, as a result of World War II and their constitutional provisions, there are sensitivities there about deploying forces out of area, or outside their country, that they find inhibiting.

But without question, I think there is an obligation, if you will—certainly the President believes this—of many of these nations to step up and contribute to the effort. I would not want to pass judgment today on any one of the countries you have cited without having more information in front of us.

The fact is, if you look at NATO, NATO as an organization has not acted, but most members of NATO have in fact contributed.

Senator COHEN. What have the Germans contributed?

Secretary CHENEY. The Germans at this point have sent minesweepers to the Eastern Mediterranean, and they have donated several vehicles, specially equipped vehicles, for dealing with chemical, biological and nuclear problems that are especially being fitted to meet our requirements and will be deployed in Saudi Arabia.

So the process is starting. I would not want to say that anybody, at this point, has refused altogether. The Japanese have as well. I think we need to get you the details, and then obviously the Congress can judge whether or not they think it is adequate.

I would not discourage members from speaking forthrightly about the importance of others contributing. I think it is vital, and I think it is important that our friends around the world understand that in fact there is a strong feeling on the part of the American people that this is a burden that should be shared.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. The Senator's time has expired. I believe Senator Glenn is next.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like unanimous consent that my entire statement be put in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Glenn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my welcome to our witnesses today, and congratulate them for their leadership in dealing with the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.

As you know Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, Senator Cohen, and I also recently visited the Middle East. During our trip we had the opportunity to meet with some of the men and women of our Armed Forces that are deployed throughout the region. Without exception, and in spite of some of the most severe operating conditions in the world—at one forward location we visited, the temperature was 124.7 degrees—our people are performing superbly.

I can assure the families and friends of the men and women who are currently serving in the Middle East that they are ready in every aspect to carry out their mission, and that their morale is high. However, given the harshness of the environment and the possibility of a long-term commitment, I have been concerned that we recognize these personal sacrifices of our service members and their families in a tangible way.

Consequently Mr. Chairman, on August 22, I wrote to Secretary Cheney urging him to consider providing appropriate additional benefits similar to those previously accorded military personnel operating in a hostile area. These benefits could include: imminent danger pay, free mailing privileges, income tax relief, and overseas savings options. (Without objection Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert a copy of my letter to Secretary Cheney in the record following these remarks.)

Later today I will introduce a bill to address these four issues and also the matter of restoring Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) payments to those service members who have lost them as a result of being deployed on Operation Desert Shield, as well as addressing Variable Housing Allowance and leave reimbursement provisions for activated reservists.

Although Secretary Cheney has not yet responded to my letter, I look forward Mr. Chairman, to discussing these and related matters with both our witnesses at the appropriate time.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

JOHN GLENN
OHIO

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3501

August 22, 1990

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I feel it important that the men and women of our Armed Forces participating in Operation Desert Shield receive appropriate additional benefits similar to those previously accorded military personnel operating in a hostile area. It is entirely appropriate that the nation recognize the personal sacrifices of our service members and their families in a tangible way.

As you know, if conditions warrant there are a number of actions that the Administration can take without Congressional approval including hostile fire/imminent danger pay, free mailing privileges, federal income tax relief, and investment options. I urge you to consider these and any other suitable benefits for implementation on a priority basis.

As Chairman of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I stand ready to discuss these and related matters, and to assist as appropriate should legislative action be required.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

John Glenn

John Glenn
United States Senator

JG:pup

Senator GLENN. Several of us were privileged to travel over to that part of the world during this last break, and we experienced first-hand some of the operating conditions that they are encountering over there. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the thermometer, but the day we were up north of Jubayl with the marines someone had a thermometer on their wrist that indicated 124 degrees, and it felt like that. So they are operating under very adverse conditions.

As you indicate, their morale is very high. They are not without gripes about what is going on, as no force like that ever has been without some gripes, but some of these are things that I think in order to keep that morale high, we should look at on a priority basis.

Some of these benefits have been mentioned here. The post office was addressed on the floor yesterday. I have been concerned that we not just piecemeal these things but that we do it in some sort of a rational way.

I am going to submit legislation this afternoon which I have here and have ready to be submitted, that includes all of these different things that apply, sometimes after hostilities have started, where the President has authority. Some are already in effect, some are not.

But to take away all this—we ought to be concerned for what is right for the troops in the gulf and not hold them hostage to what the Washington semantic discussions are about, whether it is war powers or is not war powers, and being afraid to submit legislation because of that.

This package will include the postal, income tax, imminent danger pay—and let me add on that one that we already have the following places around the world designated for imminent danger pay, some left over from times past, but right now we have Liberia, the Philippines, Laos, Afghanistan, Peru, Columbia, El Salvador, Lebanon, Iran, Cambodia, and Vietnam, all that qualify for imminent danger. If all of those are still on the list, we can well add the Persian Gulf to it, I can well guarantee you, and the people over there would appreciate that.

Also, the savings plan that has been put in sometimes in the past, subsistence allowance, BAS—basic allowance for subsistence. That one was brought up to me at every stop, and other members of our delegation that were over there. That one is really an irritant, and it is where the enlisted lose $177.30 a month. I know when they go on field duty that is supposed to no longer be given to them, and I think we have to address that worldwide on some other basis, maybe later on. Right now, though, what has actually happened is, our all-volunteer forces have enough married people and family people, who have considered that $177.30 part of their income, and mom and the kids back home are not getting the $177.30. So by going to the Persian Gulf, these people have taken a pay cut.

General POWELL. So does every troop that goes to the field and has it cut off, Senator. That is to the point.

Senator GLENN. That is right, but I am not sure that that is right. We ought to address that on a bigger scale basis, but right now, in holding hands with the people out there and making sure they know of our concern, I think we should try to address that. I agree with you, the bigger picture is one that we should have addressed before, but we can do it right here.

Where reserves are called up, variable housing allowance, we will address that and leave, reimbursing for unused leave, so we will have all of those, and I am going to submit individual pieces, each one of these, so we can consider them individually also.

I know you said you are putting your package together. I wrote to the Secretary on August 22, I believe it was, in regard to this. I do not have an answer yet, but I hope your package is forthcoming shortly so that we can work together on what is feasible on this. Do you have any timeframe that you are trying to hit on that?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, in connection with the fiscal year 1990 bill for this, we are looking at a supplemental request—a supplemental appropriation that would come to Congress. Basically, part of it comes under the Feed and Forage Act, where, in effect, I am authorized to obligate funds to support forces in the field and send the bill to the Congress.

As part of that supplemental, we are looking at some of the specific issues like, for example, the mail question, and we will have, I think, a position on some of these issues in that supplemental that hopefully will be addressed by the Congress within the next couple of weeks.

Senator GLENN. Well, the mail in particular is one that is not supposed to occur until shots have actually been fired. The income tax is not supposed to occur until actual hostilities have started. The others—the imminent danger pay, the savings plan, the subsistence allowance—I understand the Secretary can do on his initiative. Is that correct? Is that your interpretation of those?

Secretary CHENEY. Yes, I can, if I do some of these. Imminent danger pay is one. But again, as the Chairman pointed out in his opening comments, we have to look at it in the framework of our total deployments around the world, and while we want to make certain that we do in fact provide the kind of support our folks in Saudi Arabia need, that is not the only place we currently have people deployed, and we want to treat everybody fairly and equitably across the board regardless of which spot on the globe they might actually be deployed to.

Senator GLENN. I agree with that, and I think this is something we probably should have addressed before in the BAS in particular. That is really an irritant. Every place we stopped we got hit with that one, or at least I certainly did. People seem to know that we are on the Armed Services Committee. Some of us were over there, and so they sort of sought us out on some of these things. That one is a real irritant, I can say.

General POWELL. I understand that perfectly, Senator. We will look into it very carefully.

Senator GLENN. General, can you tell me more about the command structure? You and I talked a little bit about this before I went over there.

It is one thing to have a European group that is there under their own command some way if they are not under our command. As I understand it, the Arab group is under the Arab command there. Our group is under our own command, reporting to General

Schwarzkopf and then to you and the President with all the coordination lines in between. Now little dotted coordination lines are fine until the shooting starts, and then coordination lines have a way of coming apart, people doing what they want to do in that situation and not get hurt.

What is the position there? Who is in charge? Let me give you a hypothetical. Let us say the blockade does not work. Now King Fahd indicated when we were over there that we would come back to the U.N. Our group was the one that he gave that to. Now is that our understanding? Does King Fahd have the final say in what we do or not do?

It is one thing if you are on defense. It is another thing if you have to go on the offense. Who is in charge?

General **POWELL**. The U.S. forces are clearly under the command of General Schwarzkopf, who reports to the Secretary of Defense through me, and the Secretary of course reports to the President. The U.S. forces are clearly under the direct command of the President of the United States and no one else.

Senator **GLENN**. Could decisions be made to go north and take Kuwait militarily without King Fahd's approval?

Secretary **CHENEY**. I think it would be fair to say, Senator, not only that the arrangement we have worked out between ourselves and the Saudis safeguards the chain of command that General Powell mentioned but also is sensitive to Saudi sovereignty.

The fact of the matter is, we are there at the request of the Saudis. They asked us to come in. We are committed to stay as long as we are needed. We are committed to leave when we are no longer needed. The bottom line is, we obviously would not be in the business of conducting offensive operations from their territory without a lot of consultation with them in advance.

Now having said all that, our forces, though, are also there with the understanding—and the Saudis understand this as well—that they have not given up their inherent right of self-defense; that if an individual unit feels threatened they are in fact in a position to be able to deal with that threat.

Senator **GLENN**. Are we considering any action against nations that provide air shipments, that permit air shipping like out of Libya and maybe the Sudan and out of Yemen? Are we going to try to make an air embargo?

Incidentally, when I brought this up the other day, Marlin Fitzwater said we were not going to interdict airplanes. I never had suggested interdicting airplanes. I did suggest that maybe we might want to cut off communications, travel, things like that to nations that violate the embargo by air.

Are we considering that?

Secretary **CHENEY**. I would have to check on this, Senator, but I think in many cases Iraqi airways flights have, in effect, stopped because they no longer have anything to carry in terms of their commerce with other states and other nations. At present, in terms of military options, we are interdicting sea traffic, we are working diplomatically to encourage voluntary compliance of the sanctions around the world, but we have no authority or request or direction at this point to do anything about air flights.

Senator GLENN. General, in the command structure are we trying to get this under one command so it would be a really cohesive unit and not just two, three or four different groups over there with the same generalized purpose?

General POWELL. Within the construct that the Secretary laid out, I think there is more cohesion to it than may appear just from looking at a wiring diagram.

General Schwarzkopf, for example, is in the Ministry of Defense of the Royal Saudi Armed Forces. He has got almost a minute-by-minute relationship with the Saudi leadership, so I do not think it is as much of a problem as it may appear at first look at a wiring diagram, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Are we considering asking for a U.N. command over all?

General POWELL. I am not aware of any such request.

Senator GLENN. Are you considering it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHENEY. No, sir, I am not, but if the President said do it, obviously we would do it.

Senator GLENN. All right. As far as you know, the President is not considering that?

Secretary CHENEY. No. We have worked through the standing Military Committee at the U.N. in terms of trying to coordinate the naval effort which lends itself a little bit more to coordination, and the arrangements on the ground are as the General and I have described.

Senator GLENN. General, the Defense Daily article reported the Joint Chiefs have requested that the canceled SR-71 program, which many of us here supported as hard as we could clear down to the last ditch, as you are aware, be considered for reconstitution. Is that correct? If so, what is the status of the SR-71 review?

General POWELL. The Joint Chiefs have not made such a request.

Senator GLENN. There is no restudy of the SR-71?

General POWELL. We are constantly looking at all of our intelligence assets to make sure that we are giving the commander in the field what he needs, and we believe that his needs are adequately covered at the moment.

Senator GLENN. Well, there are times when all the satellites are not in the right position to give us information we want all the time, and I still think that was a bad mistake to lay that up at a time when we might need it and might need it in other parts of the world, too.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn, I hate to interrupt but we have to move on. The time has expired. I believe Senator McCain is next.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Powell, for a very informative briefing and spirited exchange. I would just like to make a couple of comments.

First of all, regarding the issue of rotation, I would hope and believe that we could get sufficient forces there before we consider the rotation aspect of it.

I would also hope that we would not make the mistake of the Vietnam war, which was rotating people in and out rather than units, as General Powell pointed out. The destruction wrought to a unit as there is constant change is certainly detrimental to capability.

As far as the use of air power is concerned, I do not think there are many of us who believe that a surgical strike would work, but there are also many of us who believe that there are two areas of concern that could erode the patience of the American people toward support of this activity.

One of them would be to get in a ground war and start trading American bodies for Iraqi bodies. We have spent $1 trillion in the last 10 years to develop significant air assets. I believe that those air assets can be used primarily to gain the objectives which we seek.

I also would find it hard to envision us transporting some 6,000 tanks to the area to fight a tank battle with the Iraqi army.

I would like to focus for a moment on the issue of burdensharing that Senator Cohen very eloquently described an issue about which; I also am deeply concerned. I do not think the American people can understand, and neither can I, a commitment by the West German Government of $8 billion to the Soviet Union to house Soviet troops and then to send—the word is not even "token", it is almost an insult—two minesweepers to the Eastern Mediterranean and perhaps loaning a few vehicles. Frankly, I think it can dramatically erode the very strong relationship that we have developed between ourselves and the Republic of Germany over the years.

I would hope that you will be able to tell the Congress very soon what we do expect in the area of West German participation.

As far as the Japanese are concerned, they certainly have proven again that they have the world's most flexible constitution. I think a vague commitment (which has to be approved by all the bureaucracies in Japan) for $1 billion is also nearly insulting.

I would suggest that we must tell both the Germans and the Japanese that the American people are keenly aware that it is the lives of Americans which are at risk here, not Japanese and not German, and we expect them to pick up a significant share of the burden. I think that if your number, Secretary Cheney, of $15 billion in fiscal year 1991 is the least bit accurate, perhaps an $8 billion contribution on the part of the Japanese would be in the ballpark. I would appreciate your views on that.

I sense from the people in my State that the support for President Bush and his policies are quite strong. I also sense an almost immediate frustration again with our so-called allies and their unwillingness to share the burden that we are now imposing on fighting American men and women and may for an extended period of time.

So I would appreciate again your response to that, particularly if you have any ballpark figures as to what kinds of funding the American people should expect from our two major allies in this very expensive enterprise.

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, I do not have with me today the specific numbers. I have not yet talked in detail with Secretary Brady or Jim Baker, who is still out on the road, to know exactly what kind of arrangements have been worked out in this regard, but I am sure we would be happy to provide that for the committee as soon as it is available.

[The information follows:]

Chancellor Kohl announced to Secretary of State Baker on September 15 a $1.93 billion FRG contribution to U.S. defense costs and an aid package for Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan. This figure does not include a FRG offer of $270 million to an EC fund for the gulf crisis. The Germans have offered about $1.05 billion to help with U.S. Desert Shield costs, including military in-kind assistance of about $660 million. This would include NBC protective equipment, military engineering equipment, and vehicles which could be put to the disposal of forces in the region. A second major component would be 60 Fuchs NBC reconnaissance vehicles. They have also offered a $260 million financial contribution to be used for transport ships and aircraft to move forces and supplies into the gulf.

The Japanese have committed $2 billion in their fiscal year ending in March 1991, to help with U.S. defense cost associated with Operation Desert Shield. The Japanese have announced that this $2 billion commitment will be distributed in the following manner: $350 million for lift, $400 million for the general goods and services, $80 million for charter by the government of Japan, $50 million for medical teams, $70 million to support other multinational forces, $50 million for a reserve fund, and $1 billion that remains to be distributed. The Japanese have also committed $2 billion in economic support for countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan that are bearing significant costs in support of the sanctions against Iraq.

Secretary CHENEY. I would guess to some extent that some of these are still in the matter of negotiation, if you will, government-to-government.

I am not here today to defend any one particular government in terms of their contribution.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree with the thrust of Senator Cohen's and my remarks?

Secretary CHENEY. The President has made it very clear that it is administration policy that we will seek support, burdensharing, responsibility sharing if you will, from other governments who stand to benefit from the action that the United States has taken.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree that so far the response has been less than satisfactory?

Secretary CHENEY. I would also agree that the response to date has been more than we have ever gotten before under any other set of circumstances. It may well be inadequate, and we expect fully to continue to work with our friends around the world to encourage their support.

In fairness to many of them out there, I would point, for example, to the efforts of the British and the French——

Senator MCCAIN. And the Turks.

Secretary CHENEY [continuing]. And the Turks and the Egyptians and the Moroccans and the Saudis and the Gulf States. There are a lot of people in this operation. The United States is not out there all by itself. There are literally thousands of military personnel from over 20 countries participating in the exercise, and there are a lot of people who have as much at stake as we in terms of their livelihood, in terms of the health of their economy, and in terms of their own security. Many of these have in fact contributed in a significant way.

I would like to reserve judgment on whether or not some of the nations have responded in a fashion that we ultimately think will be in keeping with our high esteem and expectations.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Secretary, the accolades that you have just extended to those other countries I think would serve to highlight the inadequacies of the German and Japanese response.

General Powell, do you want to dig into this one or pass?

General POWELL. No, the Secretary is doing just fine, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator McCAIN. General Powell, from the experience to date, do you see any inadequacies in the present inventory that you think should be addressed, either in a fiscal year 1990 supplemental or an addition to the fiscal year 1991 budget or authorizations?

General POWELL. There are some, Senator. I am not sure they are immediately fixable by throwing money at them in 1990 or 1991. We have to take a hard look at our lift posture.

Senator McCAIN. Sealift or airlift or both?

General POWELL. Sealift. We have to take a look at that. And as much organizational arrangement, as well as what additional assets we might need. I would encourage continued support for the C-17 program. It has demonstrated once again that strategic airlift is a national asset that we must have. And the C-17 is the successor we need to our strategic airlift fleet now.

We need to do more work, I think, within the ground forces on light armored vehicles, but not necessarily at the expense of main battle tanks. When I have to go up against a T-72 I want an M-1, not some little thing that fits in a C-130. But we still need a more capable light tank, and I know that the Army is hard at work on that.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you this on the issue of the battleship. As you know, we had a contentious debate on an amendment on the floor to retire all the battleships. Is the battleship playing an important role in this scenario we are facing right now?

Secretary CHENEY. It is, Senator. If you look at the geography that we are having to deal with out there in the gulf, we of course have moved the battleship U.S.S. *Wisconsin*. It is now deployed off the coast of Saudi Arabia, up in the central part of the Persian Gulf itself. Were Saddam Hussein's forces to come south into Saudi Arabia and head for the oil fields or other key parts of the country, they presumably would come down that coast road where they could obviously be interdicted by the enormous power of those 16-inch guns on the U.S.S. *Wisconsin*.

In addition to that, of course the ship carries the cruise missile and the long-range Tomahawk and holds at risk a lot of targets inside Iraq that presumably Saddam Hussein values very highly. So this situation was designed, if you will, for those battleships that we have now deployed out there. They are big enough and strong enough and tough enough to be able to withstand the kind of threat they face in the gulf. And they obviously provide us with enormous capability in terms of deterring further aggression.

Senator McCAIN. General Powell, does this make an argument also for the LH or more tank-fighting capable helicopters?

General POWELL. Yes, sir. I think the Apache is a fine aircraft and I am glad we have them over there in some number. But I think it also supports the need to do more work with respect to observation calvary type helicopters. So I think it does make a case for the LH.

Senator McCAIN. Does it make a case for continued production of the Apache?

General POWELL. I would love to see it all, more Apaches, LH, and AHIP, and everything else. But within a finite resource level you have to make certain tradeoffs as to what you can afford.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. I believe Senator Gore is next.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Cheney and General Powell, let me add my welcome and my commendation to those you have heard already. I think the two of you in particular have served our country extremely well during this difficult period. Those who have worked with you have done well. And of course our troops in the field and those who are backing them up here at home have our thoughts and prayers, and those of the entire Nation.

I respect the decisions that have been made thus far. I think the action taken was appropriate. I think the events as they have developed thus far indicate that many very difficult and tricky decisions lie immediately ahead. And I wonder about some of the choices we are going to have to soon face.

In that connection, let me ask you to focus on the goals of the operation in Saudi Arabia. As I heard you outline them, Mr. Secretary, they included deterring aggression against Saudi Arabia, restoring stability to the Middle East, securing the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoring the borders of Kuwait, and the legitimate government of Kuwait, and protecting American lives.

Did I leave anything out? Those were basically the goals as you outlined them, correct?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, I would make a slight distinction, Senator, in the sense that the goals decided by the President are the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of the Government of Kuwait, stabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf, and the protection of American lives. Our military mission to achieve those objectives has been to deploy forces to deter further aggression, to defend against an attack should deterrence fail, and to enforce the sanctions. I would make that distinction.

Senator GORE. All right. Now that is really the point I am getting at. The relationship between our military mission and the goals that we are pursuing. Our military mission as you have outlined it is to deter aggression against Saudi Arabia. Is that correct?

Secretary CHENEY. Saudi Arabia and our other friends in the region.

Senator GORE. And our other friends in the region.

Now how will that mission, coupled with the United Nation's sanctions, secure the goals that you have outlined?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, it is our hope, Senator, that the sanctions, the coming together, if you will, in the world in terms of denying Iraq the ability to conduct commerce with other governments will be sufficient to force the Iraqi Government, Saddam Hussein, to recognize that he has to give up his ill-gotten gains. That he has to withdraw.

Now, the question of deterrence and defense plays into this. I mean there are military forces that are out there now enforcing the sanctions, but there were two moments that we have been concerned about of potential significant danger. One was that first week or two where there were no forces deployed, when there was a possibility he could come south.

And the second period will arrive at that point when the sanctions really begin to bite and he may be tempted to lash out and use his military forces against the Saudis or others. So there is an interaction there, without question.

Senator GORE. All right. Now, do not misunderstand me. I support what we have been doing, but I have some questions about how it is going to work.

As I understand the way you explained the match between our military mission and the goals we are attempting to pursue, we are relying heavily on the impact of the embargo on Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

In the beginning, there was some uncertainty in Saddam Hussein's mind about whether or not some offensive military mission might be undertaken in response to provocation or given circumstances that could arise. But with the evolution of events, the assurances given to the Saudis, the consultations and the nature of the dialogue with the Soviet Union, it seems to me that an offensive mission looks less and less likely to Saddam Hussein.

I am not counseling that, I am just saying that objectively, it looks like less and less of a possibility. Therefore, more and more weight is put solely on the embargo with the military mission having as its principal purpose now, now that we have passed that point of vulnerability initially, its principal purpose is to protect American troops and our allies in the region, and friends in the region, against a lashing out by Iraq when the embargo begins to bite. Is that essentially accurate?

Secretary CHENEY. I buy the latter part of your statement, Senator, but I would be reluctant to make the judgment that an offensive possibility looks remote to Saddam Hussein.

Senator GORE. Less and less likely was the phrase I used.

Secretary CHENEY. That is one way you could argue, given the pace of world developments, the international effort that is involved here. Certainly, I have not been given instructions to carry out any offensive action. But it has not been ruled out either.

Senator GORE. I understand that.

Secretary CHENEY. I mentioned just one other factor, and that is that Saddam Hussein appears to us to be somebody sort of cut off from sources of information and he may, in fact, conclude exactly the opposite. He may look to the south and see significant U.S. and other forces deployed in Saudi Arabia, and he may not be, nor am I sure that I would want him to be, any more confident today that he is safe than he was a few weeks ago.

Senator GORE. Now coming back to the embargo itself. Looking at the map you brought with you there, it is obvious from that and all the explanations we have had, that with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the country with the longest and largest border with Iraq is Iran.

[The map referred to follows:]

Saudi Arabia
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
IRAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIA
BAHRAIN
QATAR
OMAN
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
(N. YEMEN)
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
(S. YEMEN)
N.Z.
HA'IL
AL MADINAH
AL QASIM
AR RIYAD
ASH SHARQIYAH
(EASTERN PROVINCE)
MAKKAH
ASIR
NAJRAN
JIZAN
Beirut
Damascus
Amman
Baghdad
Karbala'
Al Hillah
An Najaf
Al Amarah
Al Basrah
Abadan
Kuwait
Bandar-e Bushehr
Shiraz
Bandar-e 'Abbas
Tabuk
Jawf
Al Jubayl
Ad Dammam
Dhahran
Manama
Doha
Abu Dhabi
Dubayy
Ra's al Khaymah
Al Fujayrah
Al Buraymi
Suhar
Muscat
Sur
Riyadh
Al Hufuf
Buraydah
Unayzah
Medina
Yanbu al Bahr
Jiddah
Mecca
At Ta'if
Port Sudan
Al Qunfudhah
Khamis Mushayt
Najran
Jizan
San'a
Al Hudaydah
Ta'izz
Aden
Al Mukalla
Sayhut
Salalah
Socotra
(P.D.R.Y.)
Djibouti
Berbera
Asmera
Gondar
Dese
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

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If Iran chooses to allow smugglers or other supply lines to operate along that border, then they could, themselves, undo the effectiveness of the embargo and the blockade. Is that not correct?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, Senator, we think we have been able to do certain things that we are fairly confident of, and there are still questions about others. We are confident that we have been able to close off his ability to export oil at this point. We have closed the Persian Gulf to his traffic, pretty much closed the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, the pipelines across Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey are all closed. So his ability to move oil out of the country is severely limited.

He might be able to move a little bit to Iran, but not very much. And of course, they are a net exporter anyway. There is no reason why they would buy from him.

With respect to shipments of other kinds going into Iraq, obviously there are long borders there. A lot of it is very rough country. There is no question that probably there is smuggling there under normal circumstances, and there may well be more today because it is more profitable. But the willingness of the Syrians, the Iranians, and others to adhere to the U.N. sanctions is very important. No question about it. We hope that they will honor the commitments that most of them have made, at least publicly at this point, and comply with those sanctions.

Senator **Gore**. All right. The export by Iraq of oil to the rest of the world can be cut off, you believe, much more effectively than we could cut off the import by Iraq of weapons and other supplies that they might wish to bring in from the rest of the world. Is that fair?

Secretary **Cheney**. Yes, it is.

Senator **Gore**. Now, if this becomes a long and protracted involvement, the cutoff of their oil exports is extremely important, but given the willingness, if Iraq is willing to hang in there, then Iran is in possession of one of the keys to the effectiveness of the embargo on goods coming in. I wonder, in light of that, how many U.S. troops, do you believe, will be the total when the deployment has been completed?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, we have not publicly announced a specific level, nor do I believe it would be fair to say we have a specific level identified. We have general instructions from the President to deploy forces until we can do what he has asked us to do to deter, defend, and enforce the sanctions, and that deployment continues.

How much longer it will continue is a decision he will have to make based upon the advice he gets from our military commander on the scene and from the Chiefs.

Senator **Gore**. One final question, or maybe a couple of short ones here. On the goals, again, you specifically did not list the removal of Saddam Hussein as the authority within Iraq. That is explicitly not one of the goals of this operation. Is that right?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think it would be fair to say, Senator, we probably would not have any objection were that to occur. But the President has been clear on what our objectives are and our objectives are, as I have stated, those four specific points that he has mentioned.

Senator **Gore**. Well, I hope we can figure out a way to accomplish that myself, but that is not one of listed and explicit goals. Is that correct?

Secretary **Cheney**. That is correct.

Senator **Gore**. Nor is the removal of their incipient nuclear capability, one of our goals.

Secretary **Cheney**. I think it would be fair to say that we are indeed interested in avoiding further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We would not like to see the Iraqis acquire nuclear weapons, and we are prepared to use various means in order to try to deny them that capability. But that was true before this ever happened.

Senator **Gore**. I appreciate your testimony today. Thank you, very much.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Gore. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a few observations and then propound a few questions.

I think President Bush has exercised great courage and vision in acting as rapidly as he did. I believe in the end his actions are going to save many lives and much property.

Secretary of State Jim Baker has played a major role and is to be commended for the political agreements he has made over there.

I think you, General Powell, and our military leaders, by your conduct and the professionalism you have shown, have been most effective. I also believe our men and women in the gulf region by their exemplary service have brought credit to America.

Next, I would say, the embargo if successful in isolating Iraq and stopping the flow of Iraqi oil will cause Saddam Hussein to either capitulate or bring on war. We, therefore, need to be prepared for these eventualities.

Then the next big decision that is going to have to be made is, what happens to Saddam Hussein? If he capitulates, for instance, is he going to be allowed to stay there? This is a question a lot of the American people are asking today.

I understand that Saddam Hussein contends that Kuwait has taken some of his territory and taken some of his oil. I would expect an international commission could be appointed to resolve this issue.

Regardless of what transpires, the security of the Persian Gulf region is going to be a big problem. It is going to be a big problem for this country and many other countries. We should be developing some sort of security arrangement for the region.

Finally, if the Soviets are on our side, why do the Soviets still have advisors in Iraq? It seems to me that we ought to insist on their withdrawal.

These are just a few of my concerns which I see we must resolve. There are a lot of big decisions ahead of us. We might as well face the reality that there is no short term solution. This crisis could go on for some time.

I now want to take some time to ask this question: Mr. Secretary, what are the Soviet contributions to the peacekeeping effort?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, the Soviets have, I believe, two or three vessels in the gulf area which are present. They have not, at this point, contributed more forces than that. They have indicated they would not do so unless there was some sort of U.N. command in which they could participate or be a party to. They are present in the area but they obviously are not as active as, say, our forces are in terms of querying traffic and diverting ships that are in violation of the sanctions.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Cheney, I believe the President's decision to call up 49,000 reservists is supported by all citizens and a demonstration of the total force policy. If Operation Desert Shield extends beyond the maximum 180-day call of authority, does the Department have plans to ask Congress for an extension, or would you release those forces and call up other groups? Have you made any decision on that?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, we have not yet made a decision. There are a number of options available to us. We currently are operating under the authorization approved, I believe, initially by this committee and ultimately by the Congress that allows the President to call up to 200,000 reservists for 90 days and renew for

90 days in order to make it possible for the services to fulfill their operational requirements. Separate and apart from that, he has authority to declare a national emergency and call up reservists for up to 2 years.

We have not used that latter authority. Congress may want to consider some modification to the authority under which we are currently operating. One of the problems we are faced with that I have discussed with some members of the committee is a proposal that we call up combat units from the Guard and Reserve; for example, the 48th Brigade out of the National Guard in Georgia.

We have not yet done that, in part, because we are concerned that once we get them in, get them trained and ready to go, we would only have them in Saudi Arabia for 60 to 90 days and that is not long enough to justify the expense that would be involved. So we may want to look at the possibility of actually extending that 90-day authority under which we are currently operating.

Senator THURMOND. General Powell, as you know, this committee unfortunately terminated the Milstar program. This program would have given us a worldwide assured communications with our conventional and nuclear forces.

Does the current situation in the Persian Gulf highlight the future importance of the Milstar program, particularly if the situation turns into an armed conflict?

Secretary CHENEY. Milstar, we think, is an important program. The administration supports it, and we will be working to try to have the program adequately funded.

One of the problems—and General Powell may want to comment on it—when we get this many forces deployed at that distance is the sheer volume of communications back and forth, and deploying the kind of capability that Milstar represents in terms of capacity is, we think, important, although obviously we are not dealing with a situation here where some of its other properties would necessarily come into play.

General POWELL. I would like to underscore the Secretary's remarks. I wish we had Milstar now. It would give us jam-resistant capability, and we would be able to single hop our communications back to the United States and not have to bounce it through relay stations through Europe and elsewhere. So it has direct relevance to our operations in the Persian Gulf.

Senator THURMOND. I hope the decision in the conference will be favorable on this.

General Powell, considering the size and capability of the Iraq ballistic missile force, do our forces have a credible ATBM capability, and would you advocate additional emphasis on this type of capability?

General POWELL. I would advocate additional emphasis on that type of capability. We have a somewhat limited ATBM capability. Some of our systems over there are able to protect themselves, some of our air defense systems, Patriot and a small footprint around Patriot, but it is a very limited capability. So I certainly would align myself with your remarks that we put more effort into ATBM research.

Senator **Thurmond**. General Powell, considering the harshness of the climate and operating environment, how are our sophisticated weapons systems holding up?

General **Powell**. They are holding up rather well, Senator. You see film footage every night of the often-maligned M-1 tank racing across the desert in a cloud of dust and doing fine. You have to maintain that equipment. You have to make sure that you have an adequate supply of repair parts coming, filter systems, new engines when you need them. By and large, I am very pleased with the way the systems have been operating and how they have been holding up.

Senator **Thurmond**. This is the last question that I have.

Secretary Cheney, we all hope that this crisis will be resolved peacefully and without the cost of lives. If the resolution of the crisis allows Saddam Hussein to retain his military might, however, what will prevent him from repeating his aggression once the allied forces are withdrawn?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, we think that is an important issue. One of the things the President has asked us to look at is how we can enhance the security arrangements in that part of the world, in the Persian Gulf, to work with our friends in the area to improve their own indigenous military capabilities and see what kind of other arrangements might be required long term to ensure the stability and security in that area.

It is an important consideration. I today have no specifics to give you in terms of how we can do it, but we think it is a subject that we will want to address once we get by the crisis of the moment in terms of getting our forces on the ground and getting some resolution of the immediate conflict.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Chairman, I did not give my opening statement to save time. I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement appear following the statements of the ranking member on this side.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Without objection, it will so appear.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Thank you, Mr. Chairman: Secretary Cheney, General Powell, I join the distinguished chairman, Senator Nunn, and the ranking member, Senator Warner, in welcoming you to this committee's first hearing on the situation in the Persian Gulf region. I have followed the developments in the region through press accounts and in the information flowing from the Department of Defense. However, it seems that we never get enough information, and I appreciate hearing your firsthand account of the operation.

Operation Desert Shield has been—by all accounts—a near perfect operation. I believe the success we have enjoyed is a reflection of your outstanding leadership, the detailed contingency planning of General Schwartzkopf and his staff, and the professionalism and sacrifices of our men and women in the armed services.

Regardless of the final outcome of the deployment to the Middle East, our Nation has shown its willingness to stand up to aggression. I support the President in this decisive step to deploy our forces and in taking the bold step to call up our National Guard and Reserve forces.

We are also, in my judgment, witnessing the results of this committee's strong support for our Armed Forces over the past decade. There is no doubt that our equipment is ready and our soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines are prepared to face the danger posed by both the environment and the army of Saddam Hussein.

There will be some "Monday-morning-quarterbacking" of Operation Desert Shield. I expect that there may also be some legitimate concerns raised about operational shortfalls in our sealift, airlift, and the weapon systems deployed to the region. I hope this committee, the Congress, and the Department of Defense will act quickly to correct any valid shortfalls so as not to further expose our soldiers to unnecessary risks.

By his bold action, President Bush has stopped Saddam Hussein's aggression. We must now have the perseverance as a nation to let the political and economic isolation of Iraq bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In my judgment, the key to maintaining public support for Operation Desert Shield is the willingness of our allies and friends to share both the economic and military burden associated with the operation.

I strongly support President Bush's initiative to ask for increased burdensharing by all those nations who benefit from the sacrifices of our servicemen and women. We cannot allow a repeat of the Persian Gulf tanker escort experience where the United States paid the bill and our men and women made the sacrifices while the major oil-consuming nations reaped the benefits.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you for holding this hearing and expect that, at its conclusion, we will all have a better understanding of what the future holds for our Nation and the men and women who are serving in the Persian Gulf region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond, did you want to yield back the balance of your time?

Senator THURMOND. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, let me add my words of welcome and also my praise for the job that you, your organization, and the President have done. I backed you solidly in what you have done. We are proud of what you have done, and I think there is no question that we can now certainly declare victory in the first phase of Operation Desert Shield, the prevention of Saddam Hussein from taking over Saudi Arabia, which I am convinced he would have done had you not moved when you did. If this had happened, we would have had to go in shooting, which would have placed us at a very high risk. I say well done.

Let me get into some questions I have.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my opening remarks placed in the appropriate place in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Exon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the Armed Services Committee this afternoon and apprising us of the situation in the Persian Gulf. Since August 2, you and other members of the President's Cabinet and the executive branch have skillfully and tirelessly worked to prevent further bloodshed in an extremely volatile situation. Secretary Cheney and General Powell, you and your colleagues deserve the highest praise for your efforts this past month.

The American strategy for halting Saddam Hussein and restoring the legitimate Government of Kuwait is now the world strategy. Governments, as disparate as Syria, the Soviet Union, Britain, and Egypt have militarily joined the United States' call to quarantine Iraq in accordance with a unanimously approved uneconomic embargo. I cannot recall an instance when world opinion has been so prompt and universal against the action of one nation. President Bush and the world leaders deserve the credit for this unprecedented unity.

Time is now on our side. Through diplomacy and the tightening of the embargo against Iraq, I believe Saddam Hussein can be driven from Kuwait. Rash military action at this time would only result in the sacrificing of American soldiers and hostages and the destruction of the nation we and our allies are trying to save.

With this sound multinational strategy in place, we must look to the future and address some very important questions that will have a direct bearing on whether Saddam Hussein can be removed from Kuwait. I will listen with great interest as our distinguished witnesses address our progress at establishing a capable military presence in the region, increasing the military and economic contributions of other nations to what is, and will continue to be an expensive price tag for deterring further aggression by Iraq, and, most importantly, on the minds of all Americans, ensuring that all Americans presently held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait are quickly and safely returned.

Secretary Cheney and General Powell, I look forward to your testimony.

Senator EXON. First, tell me what you can about the censorship about which we hear. We are in Saudi Arabia at their invitation to protect their land and to try to return some degree of peace to the whole area. I have heard a great deal about the fact that they are censoring the mail that comes over from the United States. Is this true?

Is it true that our troops who want to have Bibles, for example, cannot have them in Saudi Arabia, or are those just wild rumors?

General POWELL. I assume service personnel who brought Bibles in with them as part of their personal property have them. I have no reason to believe they do not.

With respect to packages that are entering the Kingdom, because of Saudi sovereignty and because of their culture and religious beliefs, their customs inspectors are looking at those packages. Those things that are considered to be offensive such as obscene materials, naked women and in some cases religious items are being removed from the packages or in some way if it is something considered obscene or not consistent with the mores of their culture being obliterated with magic markers, such as a scantily clad lady smoking a Salem cigarette or something of that nature.

I have nothing against Salem cigarettes. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. I am certainly not for the distribution of anything obscene, but censorship is being applied to our mail and packages going in; is that right?

General POWELL. Customs inspectors are inspecting in the way I mentioned.

Senator EXON. Have we ever had that kind of activity before during our military history, General, to your knowledge?

General POWELL. I cannot answer that, Senator. I am not quite sure we have ever had a situation such as the one we now have.

Secretary CHENEY. If I might, Senator, I was very concerned about this at the outset. As General Powell mentioned in his testimony, the clash of cultures, because our cultures are very different, is obviously a source of potential concern, but it has worked amazingly well to date. We try to be sensitive to their sovereignty requirements and their customs and their culture, and they try to meet our requirements. So far, I think it has worked. These kinds of problems crop up from time to time, and we try to get them resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.

Senator EXON. Let us talk a little bit more then about culture. I recognize that everybody has a right to their culture, but we are not there because we want to be. We are there to protect against the invasion of Saudi Arabia and force the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Let us talk about that a little bit more.

I believe, General, you indicated in testimony previously that we have well over 100,000 personnel in the region at the present time?

General POWELL. Yes, Senator.

Senator EXON. That is people in Saudi Arabia to protect Saudi Arabia. Of that 100,000-plus, approximately how many are located in Saudi Arabia itself, as opposed to on ships in the adjacent area?

General POWELL. I would rather not get into specific numbers as to how they are distributed. I would say roughly a quarter to a third are at sea.

Senator EXON. A quarter to a third at sea.

Well, then, I take it from that I could say it is about 75,000 probably in Saudi Arabia?

General POWELL. I would be delighted to get very precise in closed testimony, Senator.

Senator EXON. All right.

If it is 75,000, or somewhere near that, how many foreign troops other than those from the United States are deployed? I heard testimony earlier regarding other nations in this multi-national peacekeeping force. I am curious to know of all of the other countries that supposedly are helping out over there, who and how many in toto do we have of foreign troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia?

General POWELL. I have those numbers, and we would be willing to share them in closed testimony, Senator.

Senator EXON. In closed session?

General POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. They are not very large, are they, compared with the amount of forces that we have there, General?

General POWELL. Not yet, sir. But we are expecting additional forces to be arriving on the ground.

Senator EXON. In your opinion, gentlemen, as each day passes without a resolution of the essential stalemate that is going on there now, with the continued emphasis and building up of our forces, which I think is very wise, do you see time on our side? Or, to put it another way, with each day that goes by with the present stalemate, do you think we slip closer to war or probably closer to an eventual outcome without a large amount of bloodshed?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, I think, Senator, we will be able to answer that question a lot better a year from now. We do not know, frankly. There are various theories about time being on our side, time being on his side. My own personal view is that we do in fact have the capacity to sustain the effort as long as is required. I think the American people will support it. Clearly, we would like to resolve it by peaceful means and have the sanctions take effect. Over time, the cost to the Iraqi economy is going to be considerable, since he can sell absolutely no oil outside his own country.

But I would be less than honest if I said I knew exactly how it was going to sort out or when it was going to sort out, or what steps we will have to go through between now and the final resolution. We are now better able to focus upon the future than we were in those early weeks when we were running around with our shirttails hanging out just trying to get some forces into the area. But I do not know how it ultimately is going to be resolved, except it is very important, given the commitment that has been made, not only by the United States, but by other Arab nations and the

United Nations, and nations all over the world. It is very important that we succeed in this venture.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, this committee led the effort in the early 1980s to acquire eight fast sealift ships that we call the SL-7s. I understand that these eight ships were very critical in the delivery of our first heavy armor on Saudi soil. Did they carry out their mission as they were expected to do? I did hear some problems about other disappointments of our sealift. Can you try and sort that out for me so that this committee would have a better understanding of what we should be doing in the future in this particular area, which I think is very important?

Secretary CHENEY. In my opinion, Senator, the fast sealift was a great investment and has been absolutely vital, and has worked generally very well. The Ready Reserve Fleet has been more of a disappointment in terms of maintenance of the craft that were there. It has taken longer to bring some of them out, to activate them and get them ready to go, difficult problems in terms of finding crews for them. They are manned by civilian crews. And, of course, they are not maintained by the military, they are maintained under MARAD.

The Chairman might want to comment. He has more detailed knowledge of it.

General POWELL. I agree. The fast sealift were well worth the investment.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

My last question, Mr. Chairman, has to do with forgiving debts owed to the United States. Of the 19 or so nations leading military support against Iraq, how many have debts to the United States and may be adversely affected by the embargo? And a follow-on question. What is the policy of the United States regarding debt forgiveness to these nations, similar to what the President proposed for Egypt's $7-billion debt?

Secretary CHENEY. If I may, Senator. We can get you the specifics on the debt status of those other nations that are participating in the military venture. Egypt, frankly, is a unique case. The President made the decision to recommend to the Congress, legislative relief and forgiveness of that debt for some very specific reasons. Partly because of the enormous economic burden they bear. Partly because of the historic relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. Partly because the debt has now accrued to the point where it threatens our ability under the Brooke amendment to continue the military to military relationship that has been so important in the past. And partly because of the superb leadership, for example, that President Mubarak and the Egyptians have provided in this set of circumstances.

So, we do believe the circumstances in Egypt are unique. We believe that debt relief is appropriate. We believe it also is affordable under the current circumstances. And that is why we have recommended to the Congress that the Egyptian debt be forgiven at this point.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Are you going to furnish that list for the record?

Secretary **Cheney**. Yes, sir, we would be happy to.

[The information follows:]

Five nations with deployed forces in the allied efforts have outstanding unpaid principal debts as of 4 September 1990 under the Foreign Military Financing Program or loans refinanced under FMS Debt Reform and guaranteed by the DOD.

[In thousands of dollars]

Country	*Principal*
Egypt	[2] $5,871,162
Greece	1,892,606
Morocco	[1] 342,967
Pakistan	[1] 1,266,582
Spain	716,800

[1] Includes loans refinanced under FMS Debt Reform.

[2] In addition, Egypt was in arrears $848,110 thousand. When added to this amount, totals $6,719,272 thousand.

These unpaid principal balances do not include undisbursed loan funds, arrears or future scheduled interest.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. I believe Senator Wallop is next.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my thanks, admiration, and congratulations to you both and the forces that you command. It strikes me that we have witnessed one of history's really great military movements, something the textbooks and historians may examine for some time to come. And I think it is clear that you command a really magnificent, professional military machine. And I think it is also clear that we remain, despite the dismal views of some Americans, a pretty great nation. The only one that could have responded and bellied up to that.

With that, I think it is fair to observe that great nations do shoulder some responsibilities. And I, without wishing to get any further into Greek history and Thucydides, would observe that while it is perhaps a good idea to continue to express dismay and even some outrage at the levels of contributions of certain allies, I worry that we demean our own sense of purpose and dangerously its public support by making that the focus of our attention, rather than the reasons for which we understood this mission in the first place.

I worry that if that becomes the rationale for our continued presence in Saudi Arabia and in the Middle East, then we run the real risk of eroding public support. Then the worst of all possible things happens, we will be a great nation which appears to have lost its resolve. And then my guess is that that may well consign us to a role in the world that no American would like.

So it is my hope that my colleagues, while focusing on these things, do recall that our principal purpose over there was not to get the support of allies, but in fact the missions and purposes that you have described, Mr. Secretary.

I also would observe before going on that, in light of Senator Kennedy's questions, it is a real shame when we see the nature of Iraq's military missile forces that we find that we have purposely left our forces, not you, but the Congress has purposely left our forces without intermediate range ballistic missile defense under these conditions.

How much safer would they be against these weapons had we used the technical skills we have and not kept them separated on either coast in the interest of some quirkish compliance and now we see that we have left our forces in a circumstance that is less than safe?

Mr. Secretary, I would observe, as others have, that the fall of Saddam Hussein is noticeably absent from the list of our strategic objectives. Suppose we do obtain those stated objectives? Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and American citizens are safe, and the legitimate government of Kuwait is restored.

But if Saddam Hussein, or a Ba'ath successive regime, is left with a military capability including these chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and the potential for nuclear weapons, are we not faced with a future even more dangerous than this Iraqi episode?

Is that what is meant in that statement that you made, to return stability to the region? Do we have some larger view that is encompassed within returning stability to the region?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, again, we have gone through a progression, if you will, in terms of our thinking, from those very earliest days of the crisis when our biggest concern was simply to try to make certain that he did not go any further, and we felt there was a very serious threat of that possibility, to the situation we are in now, where we are continuing, and hopefully, completing our deployments, working with others in a major international effort.

But the President has emphasized the extent to which this is indeed a cooperative venture. I wholeheartedly agree with your opening statement that in the moment of truth, when it was time for a decision to be made with respect to guaranteeing the security of Saudi Arabia and the Arab nations of the region, what counted was U.S. military force and resolve.

I mean, that is what you could get on the ground immediately, and that is what in fact could reverse the military balance and allow everybody else, then, to rally around and support the international effort that has now been mounted.

I think that was very important, but we are part of an international effort. We are part of a collective effort with our friends and allies in the region from all over the world, and we have an agreed-upon set of objectives, if you will, that are embodied in those U.N. resolutions from the Security Council and that is the policy that we are pursuing at present.

Those are the instructions that have been given to General Powell and me by the President. That is to deter, to defend, and enforce the sanctions, and to achieve the objectives that the President has outlined.

Senator WALLOP. Well, I worry, frankly, that what sounds so comfortable now will appear in the period of time as a lack of strategic purpose in that region.

You have heard the questions here. I think it is going to be hard to sustain the resolve of a Congress who is worried more about the contributions of allies than the purpose for which we are there, particularly as it drags on into years beyond.

Let me ask one further question. Should it be there is a provocation, is not the presence of Soviet advisors a deterrent to our military action against Iraq?

Secretary CHENEY. Should there be a provocation, Senator, the President would decide how to respond.

We obviously never speculate about what kind of response we might undertake under various hypothetical situations, but I can assure you, he would have a wide range of options available to him based upon the military forces that we have now deployed and are continuing to deploy.

I do not think there would be any doubt that we would feel it would be appropriate under those circumstances to hold at risk targets, assets if you will, that Saddam Hussein holds dear, and specifically assets inside Iraq, regardless of what the status might be of the various advisors who may or may not be present.

Senator WALLOP. Well, it is my hope that President Gorbachev, that General Secretary Gorbachev, understands that the presence of his advisors are in harm's way should those events take place, and that we will not have time to consult about that.

General Powell, let me ask you, what assets do the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia have that would give initial indication and warning of movements of Iraqi tanks toward contact, and specifically talking about the potential utility of J-STARS in this environment?

General POWELL. J-STARS would be a very desirable capability, should we have it. It is the system we have been working on for many years. It would give us the ability to see that kind of movement on the ground. We always thought of using it in the North German plain and the Fulda Gap, but it is just as useful in places like Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, perhaps even more.

Senator WALLOP. What about ATACMS? Would that also be of assistance?

General POWELL. Also a valuable system.

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I would yield back the balance of my time on these things. I hope—I genuinely hope—that the committee takes a serious look at the nature of the man that created this, in particular with your idea of ALPS that we once had. It strikes me that were he to have more than an IRBM capability, that he is just man enough to use it, and that the ability to defend against that would be just as valuable as would be the ability to defend against the kind of missiles he can array against our troops in the field today.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Wallop. I believe that Senator Dixon is next.

Senator DIXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General Powell, again may I express my complete support for the job you have done. My congratulations to you and to the President. To all involved a job well done.

I was at Scott Air Force Base during the time that I was home on the break, and had the opportunity to visit the ready rooms of the Transportation Command, and the Military Airlift Command. I can tell you that I was just tremendously impressed by the fantastic job that personnel are doing at those commands.

At that point in time, they had airlifted, I think, 55,000 military people, exclusive of those transported on ships, and all that military hardware, and as you pointed out, General Powell, since World War II, without a question the most massive movement of personnel and military equipment in the history of the world, and you are to be heartily commended.

The point I want to support you on, General Powell, is, as I saw those charts there, where they transport all of this equipment by C–141s and C–5s, as I recall, 65 hours round trip over and back, with, I think, about seven refuelings each way, each of those folks impressed upon me the tremendous importance of a larger cargo plane, the C–17.

I hope you know that I supported that in the committee, and that I very much support it now, and I hope the administration will join this Senator and others in making a fight in the conference committee to include funding for the C–17. I consider it to be the one thing I heard with those people that impressed me about a shortfall that we clearly have.

General Powell. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Dixon. Beyond that, I wanted to make some observations about things others have not talked about too much. I went around, may I say to both of you, in all of the areas of my State, the Reserve and National Guard units where there has been notifications and call-ups, I think at that time totalling somewhere between 500 and 1,000, and talked to those folks.

I was first of all impressed with the amount of volunteers you already have, particularly professional people, business people and others who could afford to volunteer their time, and the amount of time they have volunteered. It is extraordinary.

But beyond that, I want to call your attention to the fact that there is a substantial lack of understanding about what their protected rights are. I wonder whether you folks could make available to these people—and I would suggest also to members of this committee and the Armed Services Committee of the House—the various rights.

Now, they know their jobs are protected. They know incremental salary increases are protected. They do now know, I think, because it has been in the newspaper, that certain mortgage rates are lowered to 6 percent and so on, but there is no understanding of the general rights that they have.

I think it is tremendously important, so would you try to do that? I would appreciate it if you would make it available to us as well, because people like those of us on this committee get a lot of questions of that kind.

[The information follows:]

As in the case of members of the Active components, reservists receive information on their entitlements and legal protections during basic training. National Guard and Reserve units supplement and reinforce this initial training by providing premobilization handbooks to their members. Formal annual training programs update and further reinforce this information.

In the Army, for example, this training is an integral part of Forces Command's Mobilization and Deployment Planning System. Legal counseling is an important part of this system, provided in accordance with the Army's Family Assistance Handbook for Mobilization and the Premobilization Legal Counseling Program. At a minimum, this counseling must encompass the following topics: (1) organization of legal affairs, (2) estate planning, (3) wills, (4) guardianship of minor children, (5) powers of attorney, (6) protection provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, and (7) reemployment rights.

While these formal programs exist in all components, it is clear that additional information will always be needed at the time when reservists are activated. Today, reservists ordered to active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield are briefed and provided additional materials and assistance. In the Air National Guard, for instance, a team has been established to brief all participating units. In all services, Active component family centers and legal assistance offices also provide information on Reserve entitlements and issues.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has prepared a guide for Reserve component families affected by the current situation. This guide includes a letter from Secretary Cheney to the Reserve families, expressing his appreciation for their commitment and daily contribution to the ultimate success of our Armed Forces. The guide includes important information on compensation, medical care, available services at military installations, family assistance, legal assistance, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, civilian reemployment rights, and other matters of concern to reservists and their families. It includes an extensive list of DOD family program coordinators and private associations and organizations which can provide assistance to Reserve families.

Senator DIXON. Beyond that, one point I want to make is this. At the many town hall meetings I had, clearly there was a lot of talk about burdensharing and costsharing, but so many have talked to you about that I will spare you that, although be assured that if the people are going to have the patience to support this, we are going to have to be able to convince them that our friends are supporting this effort just as fully as our people would expect them to support it, but beyond that, I am getting questions from people saying, look, you have got 2,100,000 in the military right now. Why are you calling up Reserves, and things of that kind?

I would suggest that to the extent—and one of you, I think it was you, General Powell, indicated that you will be trying to draw out of Europe and other places to augment what you do there. I would hope we keep the use of Reserves and National Guard people as minimal as possible under the circumstances. Will there be an effort to do that?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, we have been extraordinarily cautious. The services first came forward at the recommendations for calling up the Reserves and General Powell properly forced them to go back and scrub it fairly extensively, which they did, before the package finally came to me, which I took to the President. But it is important to remember that the Reserves are different these days than they used to be, perhaps, during World War II. They are not just extra forces, they are completely integrated with the structure of our forces. So, when we call up certain units, you will find that certain types of specialties are found only in the Reserves. And for us to be able to run this deployment the way we have, we have no choice but to get reservists because they in fact are the ones who embody the specialties that we need.

Senator DIXON. I do understand that. I have made that point with folks back home. And I do note that your call-ups have been entirely specialists types. But I know you take into consideration the interruption of a life and so forth, and that you are avoiding it when you can.

This is a little bit repetitive of what my friend, the Senator from Ohio said, but I think it bears repeating. I talked to a group of 300 that were being called out of Scott Air Force Base over to the Mid East in a big auditorium. They had their wives and their children with them, and I tried to answer their questions. And then I said I will be in the back of the hall, if any of you have special problems, come talk to me and I will make these notes. Dozens stood in line about the separate rations or the subsistence problem.

One that struck at my heart was a staff sergeant, I remember his wife's name was Melody and he had three beautiful little girls, 8, 5, and 3. And he said, hey, Senator, you are going to take away $184 when you send me out there into the desert. How can you justify that?

And I hope we would reexamine that for those folks at that level of earning and so forth, a wife and three little kids, $184 is just the difference between living pretty decently and not living so well. And I just want to repeat as strongly as I can what Senator Glenn said. I want to work with you. I do hear what you are saying about the fact that there is this global situation everywhere, but we need to be responsive I think in that.

Another thing I would just like to say is a lovely young lady who is expecting in about 80 days came up with her husband and said, gee, if there is any way, we know they come over and they come back every 65 hours, if he could come back here we planned for him to be here when I have the baby. I know you cannot change the whole world for one individual, but to the extent that you can keep those special concerns in mind for people that do these special things for our country, I hope you will do that.

It seems to me that it is possible to put a guy on a plane and bring him back for a few days and send him back again if the thing is as stable as it is now. And I just want to plead to you, because you will hear from a lot of us from time to time to take those things into account. And because time is limited, let me just——

General POWELL. May I address the special rations issue, Senator. It has been mentioned quite a bit.

Senator DIXON. Sure, please do.

General POWELL. We try to apply the laws and regulations given to us by the Congress.

Senator DIXON. I understand that.

General POWELL. What the basic allowance for subsistence is, is to pay a serviceman for his food when it is not provided by the Government. And so when you live off post with your family you get that allowance to pay for your food. When the Government is providing you that food as a result of going off to field duty where you cannot get home every evening, that allowance is dropped. And we have been investigated repeatedly over the years by IG's and GAO's and a lot of other folks to make sure that anybody who is being paid this allowance, when that person went to the field and the Government was providing the meals, the allowance should be cut. Otherwise, it is a double benefit and it is improper. So we have to examine that, because it is happening all over the world at every post, everywhere.

Senator DIXON. My dear friend, I hear you. I understand it perfectly well. But it is awful hard to explain it to Melody and their 8-, 5-, and 3-year-old daughters. And I hope we can work on this some more. As I said, let us keep working on this.

General POWELL. Yes, sir. But I have had to explain it to many Melodys for 25 years. It is the law that the Congress has given us to work with.

Senator **Dixon**. Well, then, I think we ought to have another look at it,

General **Powell**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Dixon**. Now let me just say one more thing that is coming up at some of the meetings back home that concerns me. And I do not know how classified this is, you will have to make the judgment call. But there has been an awful lot of talk about embargo leakage and things of that kind, particularly in Jordan, oil trucks, and things of that kind, that clearly do not fall under any rules of humanitarian aid. I am not trying to set policy for the Government. You folks do a very fine job. But are you working that stuff?

Because it strikes me that—I support everything you are doing, we are there in force. Great. We are holding the line. Great. We are depending upon an embargo. That is the right thing to do. But it occurs to me that even with substantial support everywhere on the globe, that embargo is worth about as much as the integrity of it. And if there is a lot of leakage in Jordan and other places, that bothers a lot of us a lot. And it bothers the folks back home.

General **Powell**. We are watching it very, very carefully, Senator.

Senator **Dixon**. Now the one final thing. I hear everything you are saying about why we are there. I agree with all of it. And people are saying, hey, but surely we will not walk away from there without interrupting the chemical capability of this guy and the potential nuclear capability that was interrupted once with the help of the Israelis, but that he is probably working on again.

I presume, and I do not want to know all of this, because obviously we want him to come to the table and we want him to negotiate, and we want to achieve a peace that accomplishes all the goals we have in mind, but we surely are bearing in mind the necessity to interrupt that chemical capability and the potential nuclear capability, are we not?

General **Powell**. It is very much on our mind, Senator.

Senator **Dixon**. I thank the Chair.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Dixon. Senator Gorton.

Senator **Gorton**. Mr. Secretary and General, perhaps the greatest tribute to the successes which you have had so far have not been the specific words which each member of this committee has prefaced his questions with of praise to you and to your administration, but the fact that that praise has been so universal here and in my experience 2 weeks ago when the President met with a large number of Members of Congress. And the fact that in a body which is close to an election and often has partisan differences that the praise was genuine and the suggestions and the questions were supportive, rather than quarrelsome in any respect whatsoever.

This and the broad degree of support you have gotten from the American people are a tribute to what has taken place in the last month, but obviously they are only preliminaries. You, Mr. Secretary, have been very careful in describing what the goals and the purposes of this operation are with respect to the complete withdrawal from Kuwait by Iraqi forces, the restoration of the legitimate government there, and the protection of American lives. You have also been very careful in stating that it is not an express goal of the administration to reach those goals which Senator Dixon just spoke to, though you would be happy to have them happen.

But what you have done, of course, is you have defined what will constitute winning and what will constitute losing in this particular crisis, you have defined it for yourselves. And if we do not win in the sense of reaching those goals, all of this praise and all of these tactical steps will have been of no avail.

If, on the other hand, we do succeed, there can be tactical mistakes or bruised feelings on the part of some allies and the like, and they will be forgotten as well. So if I have any counsel here before I go on to two sets of questions, it is with all of the questions about details which you have had here, all of the advice about details, as important as burdensharing may be and benefits may be and the like, please keep your eye on the ball.

It is overwhelmingly important to the United States of America, and I think for the peace and order and justice of the world community that we win, that there be that unconditional withdrawal, that restoration of the status quo ante. There will be plenty to talk about after that. But it seems to me that that is simply not negotiable. And the most important goal you have is to see to it that we attain that kind of victory.

Now I have two questions or two sets of related questions that I simply want to emphasize they are, of course, subsidiary to this principal goal. The first one I suspect you are not going to want to answer right here, but if you have an answer in closed session or in writing or by a briefing I would appreciate it. That question has to do with your capabilities.

Is it your belief now, General, that we have forces in place in Saudi Arabia adequate to win a victory should there be an attempt by Iraq to invade Saudi Arabia? That may be one that you can answer here, right now.

I go on from that to the more general question as to how confident you are in our capabilities. Do you have adequate forces now to liberate Kuwait if that became the goal of the administration? Iraqi troops be cut off from their supplies, from even food and water, by air without an attack on the ground? Do you or will you soon have the capability to destroy their tank forces by air without a tank battle?

If the answer to any of these questions is equivocal as of September 11, is there a time in the immediate future when answers to those questions will not be equivocal?

General POWELL. With respect to your first question, with each passing day I am more confident of our ability to defend Saudi Arabia and the other friendly nations in the region against any kind of an Iraqi attack, but we are not yet there. As the Secretary has pointed out, there is more that has to be done, and we are doing it. That is why the flow will continue and we have not made a judgment as to when we will stop the flow.

With respect to the second part of your question, that is very hypothetical. It deals with a variety of things that are best left to a closed session.

Senator GORTON. I appreciate that, but I would like to feel informed myself as I make up my own mind on questions which you have of us as to your answer to those questions.

The second question relates to the single issue which has occupied more of the time of the members here this afternoon than any other, burdensharing.

Has the administration considered at all what seems to me to be a shorthand to that kind of burdensharing? We are obviously in Saudi Arabia at the Saudis' behest. They and the Gulf States control a tremendous percentage of the supply of oil. These allies about whose contributions we are extremely restless, Japan, Germany and some others, are heavily dependent on oil from the Arabian peninsula.

Have we considered suggesting as strongly as possible to Saudi Arabia that it impose, let us say, a defense surtax on all oil sold to noncontributing countries of $4, $5, $10 a barrel and simply pay that as a contribution to our defense of their interests?

I have not seen that discussed. It seems to me we are going hat in hand from one to another asking them for something, and the Saudis can very easily charge them in the form of a tax.

Secretary CHENEY. If I might, Senator, we have not made that recommendation to the Saudis. I think it is important to point out that they have contributed in many very significant ways to the operation themselves, increased production, et cetera, to try to stabilize prices.

I am thinking off the top of my head now and reacting to your comments and suggestions. I guess I would argue there are a couple of reasons why I would have reservations about that approach. One is that it is the notion, sort of the manipulation, if you will, of the oil markets that is one of the reasons why the occupation by Saddam Hussein of Saudi Arabia or the gulf oil fields would be unacceptable, and I would be a little reluctant about getting into a position where we might be accused of encouraging the same kind of behavior on the part of another actor. So that would bother me a bit.

With respect to the overall proposition, I think the best way for us to proceed is to encourage those nations to contribute, based upon the international interest, as well as their own national interest, and that is the tack we have taken today.

Senator GORTON. Please do not hold your breath till the Japanese pay their fair share out of the goodness of their hearts, Mr. Secretary. Think about some alternative methods.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gorton.

Mr. Secretary and General, you have been here quite a while. We have a vote on right now, but assuming you are not iron men you might want a short break. Senator Bingaman is on his way back from voting, so we will start back as soon as he gets here.

Secretary CHENEY. All right. Do you have an estimate, Senator, for when we will conclude this evening?

Chairman NUNN. We were thinking in terms of going into closed session. I will defer to your judgment. My thinking is by the time you get through it will probably be another 30 or 45 minutes before we conclude. My guess is about 5:45 p.m. based on the list we have here now. It has been a long time and a long day for you, and you probably have a lot of things to do when you get back over across the river.

So we could perhaps get one or both of you back up here for a closed session, or we could get a couple of members of your Joint Staff up here to get the information we seek on that. I do not think it is an awful lot, and we will do that on another day this week if you prefer.

Secretary CHENEY. If I may suggest, Mr. Chairman, especially in light of the absence of other members, we might want to go ahead and set up a special closed briefing where we could, in fact, provide the kind of information, either the General or I or some of our people. We would be happy to respond to some of those questions that should be dealt with in closed session.

Chairman NUNN. Why not do that another day this week, and I can be in touch with you tomorrow. We are going to have three or four votes now, and people are going to be in and out. So I think it would be preferable to do that. We will work with you to accommodate your schedule or get one of your top staff people, whatever is more convenient.

Secretary CHENEY. We will be happy to do that.

Chairman NUNN. We will take a 5-minute break.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator BINGAMAN [presiding]. We will call the hearing back to order.

Senator Nunn suggested that I go ahead and ask my questions. He did not think we needed to have a quorum here to hear them. [Laughter.]

Senator BINGAMAN. So I will proceed on the assumption that my colleagues will read the record tomorrow.

Again, thank you both for being here, and thank you for waiting.

For those of us who are doing cleanup batting here, I wanted to ask about a subject that really has not come up. That relates to the long-range ballistic missile capabilities that Iraq has. There has been a history of involvement by Brazilian engineers in helping Iraq to upgrade its long-range ballistic missile capability, or at least that has been alleged by various people.

There is some dispute about whether that relates to their defense needs or whether it relates to nondefense needs. I think it is clear that they have been involved, and in fact I think it is undisputed that they presently have 23 Brazilian engineers in Iraq working in some aspect of this issue right now.

There was an incident reported in the paper on I guess September 7 in the New York Times which said that the State Department has decided to allow the export to Brazil of rocket components that some experts contend could assist efforts by Brazilian engineers and Iraq to develop a long-range ballistic missile. Then it went on to try to explain how this happened and said government officials said the initial license was apparently granted erroneously and was allowed to remain in force because the casings, which is what was involved here, had been treated by the time the error was discovered. That account could not be confirmed.

Mr. Secretary, are you in a position to shed any light on this at all? Obviously several of us here in the Congress and I know yourself and many others in the administration have been working hard to try to enforce the missile technology control regime, strengthen that, urge our allies to do a better job of complying with that.

Could you shed any light on this incident?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I cannot. While certainly I would want to speak in support of the missile technology control regime and our efforts obviously to deny the Iraqis, especially in light of recent events, the development of that kind of sophisticated capabilities, I have no specific knowledge that links Brazil to that effort. It might perhaps best be a subject that we pursue through the intelligence community or in closed session.

I am not saying today I have any information. I simply cannot shed any light on that.

Senator BINGAMAN. Do you know if there is any investigation or inquiry being conducted within the executive branch to specify the chronology of events that led to this decision which the newspaper account at least indicated was an erroneous decision to grant a license?

Secretary CHENEY. I do not know if there is any such investigation underway. Again, I would have to look at the specifics in that case, but ordinarily that process is handled through the Commerce Department, not DOD. Occasionally, we have the opportunity under the statutes to comment or to be involved in the process, but the final issuance of those kinds of licenses I think for the most part rests with the Commerce Department.

Senator BINGAMAN. General Powell, did you have any thoughts on this?

General POWELL. No, I can shed no light on it either, Senator.

Senator BINGAMAN. I will perhaps follow up with a letter request to the appropriate official, whoever that is, and try to get some information on it in that respect.

That is the line of questions that I had which had not been pursued up until now, and rather than prolong the deliberations I will go ahead and defer to Senator Lott who is here ready to ask questions. He is next.

Senator LOTT. I thank the acting chairman. First, I would like to ask unanimous consent to include an opening statement I have prepared in the record.

Senator BINGAMAN. That will be included in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR TRENT LOTT

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General Powell, it is a pleasure to welcome you back before the committee today.

I want to commend you on your accomplishments of the last 40 days. The planning and execution of Operation Desert Shield is a monument to the joint efforts of the services and most of all, to the individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen who are directly responsible for carrying out this extraordinary operation. I imagine that their efforts have exceeded even your expectations.

In spite of the comments of a few critics, it is clear that the rebuilding of our Armed Forces by President Reagan is continuing to deliver big dividends—from the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact in Europe and elimination the Noriega regime in Panama—to today's stand against another evil aggressive dictator in the Middle East. It is fair to say that the moral stand of the United States and the other nations of the world would mean nothing without the military force to back up words with deeds against the blatant aggression of Iraq against a small and helpless nation.

Some express disappointment that now there will be no peace dividend—to them I say that this is the peace dividend. To have peace, you have to be able to defend it from challenge. It brings to mind the words of a wise former Secretary of War, Elihu Root and I quote:

"Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression . . ."

Today, our Armed Forces are prepared to repel aggression thanks to the efforts of the last decade. In the face of defense cuts proposed by many in Congress earlier this year, I wonder how well prepared we would have been to face this situation in 1995 or even 1991 for that matter? I detect a noticeable silence from these quarters now.

Now, I do have a few questions.

Senator LOTT. Mr. Secretary and General Powell, I welcome you, and like all others before me I congratulate you for a very outstanding job that you have done with Operation Desert Shield. I am very proud of the job you have done and also, of course, both your presentations here today as always is very impressive, so thank you for what you have done.

I know you are working overtime, so I will try not to keep you too long, but there are two or three points that have been made that I would like to emphasize and a couple that have not.

Number one, the greatest concern that I have had as a new member of this committee over the last 1½ years has been my really worrying that we did not have adequate lift capability. That includes amphibious lift, airlift and fast sealift. I think this exercise has proven that is absolutely right. The eight fast sealift ships you have have served you well.

I would like to make note again of the fact that we provided some money last year through the subcommittee that I was on, and I believe you have that money over there and still have a little left over. Some of it you ate up for other things, but you have a little money left, and I would hope that you would take another look at that and maybe come back to us. Let us do some more on fast sealift capability.

Of course, regarding the C-17, we support the C-17 but did you not recommend a significant reduction in the numbers there?

Secretary CHENEY. On fast sealift, certainly, Senator, we would be happy to go back and revisit that. It has been crucial in this particular incidence, and we could have used more of it, without question.

The C-17 basically is tied up in the question of how much lift we need in the Department. When the plane was designed, it was designed with the notion in mind that we wanted to go to 66 million ton miles per day in terms of our lift capacity which was calculated in accordance with our requirement to get 10 divisions in Europe within 10 days of a conflict. That European requirement is fading now, so the decision that I made earlier this year and recommended to the Congress was that instead of building 210 C-17s which would take us up to 66 million ton miles, we simply replace our existing fleet with C-17s, which would be about 120.

So we reduced the total buy to maintain the current airlift requirement. I think that is probably still a sound decision, but obviously it should be reviewed in light of the experience here in terms of whether or not we want to go higher than the 120 we have recommended.

Senator LOTT. Well, I would hope that you would review the decision on the C-17 and certainly take a very close look at fast sealift.

Every witness we had testify before the Armed Services Committee in subcommittee and full committee last year and this year said we do not have adequate sealift capability, we ought to do something, but nobody had been doing anything. So now we have a perfect example of why we need it. We need to look at it.

The Ready Reserve is not very ready.

Secretary CHENEY. I would say, and General Powell may well want to chime in, we have certain kinds of capabilities that have been vital here. The General, in his testimony mentioned the MPS, the maritime prepositioned ships, in Diego Garcia, Guam and so on. Those have been absolutely vital.

Senator LOTT. That has proven to be a very wise idea and decision.

Secretary CHENEY. Yes. To the extent that you have that kind of capability prepositioned, then that cuts down on your lift requirement in terms of having to move tanks by sea because you already have that out there. That has been helpful.

The fast sealift has worked well.

The Ready Reserve Fleet has been, I think, something of a disappointment.

Senator LOTT. I might say on this that we had a hearing in the Merchant Marine Subcommittee that I serve on in the Commerce Committee with Senator John Breaux, who is the chairman. It was conclusive in that hearing that the Ready Reserve was in pretty bad shape, and I think you have had it proven here. You had some transport moving some heavy equipment, maybe tanks, that had to be towed, as I understand.

General POWELL. Well, that turned out to be one of the fast sealifts, but there was a good reason for that, Senator. It was due to go into maintenance when the crisis came along, and we elected not to put it in maintenance and to use it. It has some trouble along the way.

The Ready Reserve Fleet is in use now. It came out slower than we thought it would come out. It took a little longer to get it going, and we started to run into some difficulties in manning it; but it has not been a total failure. I mean, it just is not at the state of readiness at which we would like to see it.

Senator LOTT. I just hope we would take a look at it again. I think we could maybe have fewer ships but in better condition that could be deployed quicker if we would really work on it.

General POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LOTT. I worry about who has the responsibility here. MARAD maintains it for you, and I just think we need to look at those lines of control and how they are maintained.

General POWELL. I would agree.

Senator LOTT. With regard to the LHD, Mr. Secretary or General—I guess Mr. Secretary—in your POM for 1992 through 1997 there were no LHD's indicating the LHD buy would end at five ships. I once again take it from this experience that LHD's have proven to be very, very important, very effective, and that maybe that decision is being reconsidered.

Secretary CHENEY. That will depend in part, Senator, upon what we do. The total force structure for the Marine Corps is still an open question in connection with the 1992–1993 package that will go to the President in December. The LHD's have been important just like a lot of other ships. Our problem is, given the fiscal guidance we have, how much do we expand, how much have we got out there to spend. We love the battleships. They are great in the Persian Gulf situation, but we had to get rid of two out of the four for 1991. We love the aircraft carriers, but again we have had to cut back on the carrier force. Given the budget environment in which we have to operate, we do have to make some tough choices.

Senator LOTT. That was past tense. We were operating in.

Secretary CHENEY. Right.

Senator LOTT. We are operating in a different defense budget atmosphere I believe now.

Secretary CHENEY. It clearly looks different, I think, to my former colleagues in the Congress now than it did 6 weeks ago, yes.

Senator LOTT. We see your view a little more clearly I think perhaps now.

General, in my State of Mississippi and really all over the country, we have a lot of people who are very interested in the National Guard. It is very much committed to the total force. very much committed to the concept of the roundout brigade. In this situation, however, the 48th Mechanized Brigade of Georgia is a roundout brigade for the 24th Division but it was not activated to be deployed with the 24th Division.

Similarly, in my own State of Mississippi the 155th Armored Brigade, a very proud part of the 1st Cavalry Division, was not called up.

My question is, are these units adequately trained to deploy to a combat theater? I had the impression in many instances they are every bit as competent as your regular military people, army people in particular. If they are not going to be called up, what does this say for your total force concept? If we are not going to use them, why do we have them? Why are we putting the money that we have into them?

I have gotten a lot of National Guard people that have complained very vociferously to me about these decisions.

General POWELL. I know both brigades very well, Senator. In fact, I visited the 155th at good old Camp Shelby, Mississippi last summer and watched them for a whole day of training. They are good units, but the fact of the matter is when you do mobilize them they do require some time after sbehave without corrective action, they will grow up undisciplined, addicted to antisocial behavior.

States and leaders are not children, and the wealth of historical examples of the folly of aggressiveas to when we will need them. When we do decide to call them up and send them, should it become necessary, we have to consider the amount of predeployment training they would need before you could ship them over.

One of the concerns we have is if you call them up and send them to the training we think is required and if you are only going to use the President's 200,000 callup authority which gives you 90 days plus another 90 days, total 180 days, you have to think twice before you send that unit all the way over to the Persian Gulf if you are only going to get about 60 to 90 days worth of utilization out of them once they arrive in theater. So that is one of the things that is going through our mind.

As was discussed here earlier this afternoon, consideration is being given to making it a longer period for callup authority to make it more sensible to call them up.

Senator LOTT. Clearly, you should do that.

General POWELL. We have not decided not to call them up. We have not yet decided to call them up. It is a matter that is under active consideration. We have been discussing it with General Schwarzkopf as to his need and as to our ability to put their equipment into the flow of equipment going to the Persian Gulf. So it is still an open question as to whether they should be called up and when they should be called up.

Senator LOTT. I understand that, and I share your concerns; but they are outstanding organizations. They have a lot of pride, and I think their pride is a little hurt right now. I think they think they could deploy very quickly. If the circumstances are right, I am sure that you will make that decision. I hope you will continue to evaluate it very, very carefully. If we are going to have this total force concept, we are going to have to make use of it sooner or later to see if it really works.

General POWELL. We are making good use of it right now, Senator Lott, and it is working very well.

Senator LOTT. Great.

One final question, and then I will cease and desist. Mr. Secretary, everybody has talked about this but I will take a little different angle on the burdensharing.

You mentioned the French as doing a pretty good job. I mentioned the French and the Japanese together in a statement yesterday, and I have gotten a list from the French Embassy today about how much they were doing. The concern I have is that they have some men in the area, actually in Djibouti, I believe, in Africa. They are about to put their first actual men on the ground in Saudi Arabia I guess with a helicopter detachment, 100 men.

Without being specific, though, I really do not think very many countries except maybe Britain have really fulfilled what they should have done, and I hope they will do more. Let us take it in a more generic sense.

Are we encouraging our NATO allies in particular, Italy, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, everybody to put people on the ground in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary CHENEY. We are indeed, Senator. Just these last few days, for example, my colleague in the Cabinet, Secretary Baker, in a NATO meeting in Brussels specifically encouraged all of our NATO allies to do more, including putting troops on the ground.

There is one qualifier that needs to be pointed out here; that is, it is not sort of in our purview to invite foreign forces into another country. In effect, what we have done is respond to the Saudi request. We are there, and we are encouraging others to contact the Saudis to see what other kinds of arrangements might be worked out. The Saudis have invited a number of them in, but the final decision to take somebody in obviously rests with the Saudis in terms of granting access.

They have been very good about that, but the French need to deal with the Saudis to close any kind of an arrangement that might be worked out.

Senator **Lott**. I have talked about it a lot. It is the only thing I expect American people are going to expect. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lott. Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my welcome and my voice of support and thanks for what both of you have been doing. The administration, I believe, has taken the correct course in this matter, and the two of you have had a critical role in the success of that course. We commend you on it.

I was out there with a group of my colleagues about a week ago. One of the great issues for all of us, and you have both made reference to it but particularly you, General, is the morale of our forces. It is very high. I heard no complaints. When we asked what we can do to help, they were forthcoming but not complaining. We want to keep it that way, and a number of the things that you have mentioned today, General, and you, Mr. Secretary, will be very helpful in that regard, including those basic things like cards, newspapers, radios, pop, cigarettes——

Senator **Warner**. With an emphasis on cigarettes, as I understand it.

Senator **Levin**. You knew I would get to that. You were waiting on pins and needles over there. [Laughter.]

Senator **Levin**. Seriously, we have marines under a piece of camouflage out there in the desert, at least we did a week ago, with absolutely nothing to do. They can do that for a while and they may not complain, but if their morale is going to be good we have to get them some of those—they are not amenities. They are really basic things if you are killing a lot of time. I am glad to hear that you are really going to be working on those issues, because morale in the field is critical if we are going to stay the course. It is a long course possibly if we have to stay. So I can only add my voice also to that of my colleagues here on that issue.

I was a little bit troubled by the question of censorship by the Saudis of the materials going in, not the pornographic part of it but the religious materials that they censor.

The end of the year is the holiday season for us, and religious materials are going to be going there. Are you saying that religious materials cannot be sent to Saudi Arabia around Christmastime and get through their customs? Is that what we are to expect from them?

General **Powell**. It is a very delicate matter, Senator, and it is something I have started to take up with General Schwarzkopf. He and I will be pursuing it in greater detail in the course of the next several days.

Senator **Levin**. I think it is important to the Members of Congress that you speak up on this issue so you can tell the General to let the Saudis know how important we feel it is.

I understand the interface issue, but there is no reasonable ground as far as I am concerned to deny religious materials going in. You very carefully said that if they are brought in with the person there is no difficulty, but you left out the problem of shipping them in. This is the season of the year when religious materials of all seasons should freely be allowed to enter. I will just say that and hope that you carry that message.

Chairman NUNN. I would agree with that. They are sensitive, but we also are sensitive.

General POWELL. I understand Senator, and it is something we have to work with them on.

Senator LEVIN. I want to get to the troop level issue. I believe Senator Nunn started this, and others have addressed it as well. I want to get to the question of what is an adequate level of troops; not the number, which you indicate is not yet resolved and if it were it may even be classified, but it is the principle of it.

Will the number of troops that we will consider adequate be a number which would allow us to prevail in the event that we wanted to pursue the offensive option, or is it the number of troops which will allow us to carry to the mission of deterring Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia and defending Saudi Arabia, or is there no difference between those two principles?

Secretary CHENEY. I would ask the General to respond, Senator.

I come back again to the proposition of the mission we have been given in terms of deterrence and defense and enforcement of the sanctions. That is what the President has signed off on. There is an overall force package that fits with that general concept, and that is what we have briefed the Saudis on as well. That is the plan we are embarked upon right now.

At some point I would expect General Schwarzkopf will come in to the Chiefs and the Chairman, and they will come to me and to the President and say, okay, we think we are now in a position to be able to defend and we recommend at this point that we not deploy any more forces, that we concentrate on sustaining those who are here.

At that point——

Senator LEVIN. That is different in your mind than the level it would be necessary to carry out an offensive option if that were pursued?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, yes and no. In a sense, for example, with the forces we have right now today, were there a provocation, were there some kind of a decision made by the President for us to undertake aggressive action, we clearly are in a position to be able to do that, and each day that goes by we have a wider range of options available to us.

Again, the mission that I have been given is specifically to deter and defend, that is——

Senator LEVIN. Is that the same mission as being able to successfully carry out an offensive effort to remove Iraq from Kuwait? Is that the same mission or a little different?

Secretary CHENEY. I think it is different.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

Next, what level of troops does that assume, the way you just defined it, from other nations? This is something which Chairman Nunn was going at and which I would like to pursue.

We want other nations to go in. You say we are actively pursuing it, and the American people's staying power will to some extent be dependent on the extent the burden is being shared. So burdensharing has a lot to do with prevailing on our mission here, on our willpower. I do not separate it as perhaps some of my colleagues do. Burdensharing is not just dollars. Yes, that is important, but it is also whether your mission can succeed if that mission is a matter of sustaining your will.

My question is, is what you call an adequate level of troops to secure, defend and enforce the sanctions affected by whether or not there are 20,000 troops from other countries, 30,000 troops, or 50,000 troops? If so, what level of troops do you assume are coming from other countries in your own thinking about what level is adequate or necessary for our own troops?

Secretary CHENEY. I would state, Senator, that I think there clearly is a relationship between how much force we would require relative to what everybody else has there.

We, for example, at present deployed a lot of air assets, but we find the Saudis also have a fairly significant air capability, and working together with them expands our total capabilities. We need less than would be the case if there was no Saudi capability there.

When we start to talk about significant ground forces from the other Arab States, the same thing is true.

Senator LEVIN. And Europe.

Secretary CHENEY. And Europe.

At present, the really significant other presence tends to be primarily at sea. Some of those nations are actively participating in efforts to stop traffic that violates the sanctions. I would argue that the British and the French are very much in that camp. There are other forces at sea like, for example, Soviet forces who are not playing in that operation.

So, I think it is still too early for us to be able to state that country X has contributed Y and therefore we can cut back by Z, but clearly there is a relationship.

Senator LEVIN. There is, so that if Egypt provides 10,000 additional forces, that means we would have to provide fewer forces to carry out our mission?

Secretary CHENEY. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator LEVIN. On the burdensharing issue directly, you indicated a very rough planning measure that you are using. It might cost us $15 billion next fiscal year and that perhaps half of that would come from other sources. It is just a rough planning guide.

Does that half include the host nation's support?

Secretary CHENEY. Yes, I think it would.

Senator LEVIN. Is that our goal, or is that our prediction?

Secretary CHENEY. It is what we think is a realistic expectation. Again, $15 billion is an estimate. I cannot say that strongly enough. It depends upon no hostilities, a 6-month rotation policy, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator LEVIN. Finally, did you see an article in yesterday's paper that said the United States must get Saudi permission in most cases to fire on Iraqi jets? It was an article in the New York Times. Have you been asked about that this afternoon?

Secretary **Cheney**. I have not seen the article.

General **Powell**. I saw it; and no.

Senator **Levin**. Should I read parts of it, or can you remember?

General **Powell**. There is more in the headline than there is in the body of the story.

Senator **Levin**. Yes, but the part of the article that does raise the question is at the end when it says that as a result of these procedures one main way to protect American planes is for the AWACS plane to order them to fly away from Iraqi planes if it appeared that they were about to be attacked. If we thought there was a threat we would pull those airplanes back, the suggestion being that because there are these layers—well, let me keep reading. This is Colonel Tom Bliss talking. " 'There are all kinds of layers to go through', he added. We are probably taking some risk in doing that." This is the quote that troubled me. "But it is necessary."

Could you comment on that part of the quote that we are taking additional risk by these layers of consultation that we are going through to see what we should do if we got Iraqi planes flying at our planes?

General **Powell**. You have given me a quotation that I have not had the opportunity to discuss with the colonel in detail, but I think the point he was making is that we are trying to put together something of an integrated air defense system over there because there are lots of airplanes flying around and there is a lot of electronic gadgetry up in the sky. We are not looking for provocation to start a war, so I am sure there is some control over all the aircraft that are flying.

I am just as sure and as I think the article just as clearly pointed out that if it becomes a case of inherent right of self-defense, if an American F–15 pilot thought he was in any danger, he is free to defend himself.

Senator **Levin**. But as to whether or not that plane coming at him requires him to evade it which he is also able to do or defend himself, that choice between evasion and defense, if he has time is he instructed that he is not to make that decision but to check with some other authority which could include a Saudi voice on that issue?

General **Powell**. There are just too many hypotheticals, Senator. I do not know whether they are along the border, deep within Saudi territory, whether our guy is over the border. I just do not have the whole picture in front of me to give you an informed answer.

Senator **Levin**. If you could comment for the record, then, on that article, because my time is up. Just give us whatever comments you like.

[The information follows:]

The respective Rules of Engagement and chains of command are clearly understood by the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia. The United States Armed Forces deployed in and around the Arabian peninsula remain under U.S. command. This is consistent with the understandings between the two governments.

Senator **Levin**. Again, my thanks and gratitude to you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Mr. Secretary and General Powell, we have two more Senators coming back who will arrive in just a moment. Let me just ask you a question, and I hope Senator Wirth will be back here in time to not have an interruption. If he is not, we will take a minute or two. We have another vote up there, and time is running out.

Mr. Secretary, do you plan to ask for a supplemental for payment of the expenses that you are incurring between now and the end of this fiscal year in the next 30 days?

Secretary **CHENEY**. That is currently our intention, Senator. I have made the recommendation to OMB, and as of late last night it was still being worked. I do not know whether it has been transmitted yet. I expect it will be shortly. It basically would be a supplemental to fill out the costs between now and the end of the fiscal year we are currently in, for fiscal year 1990.

That is for less than $2 billion.

Chairman **NUNN**. One other question.

If you get, let's say, $7.5 billion from other countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and others—and they come in and give you that much in cash or a check, is it your understanding of the law now that that money would be deposited in the U.S. Treasury and would be available for expenditure? Or, on the other hand, do you believe that that would have to come through congressional appropriation?

Secretary **CHENEY**. I believe, and, again, I am not an attorney, so I would want to go back and check with the General Counsel of the Department, but it is their view that, in fact, the Government would receive the funds, specifically, that the Treasury would receive the funds, but we would, in effect, then spend them for that specific purpose; that this authority resides in Treasury to receive gifts, in effect, for specific defense purposes.

Chairman **NUNN**. Without coming back to Congress before they are expended?

Secretary **CHENEY**. I, frankly, have not addressed that question to them.

Chairman **NUNN**. Could you get your General Counsel to work on that?

Secretary **CHENEY**. Sure.

Chairman **NUNN**. We have to have some understanding of that because we need to have some provision in law that addresses that. This is going to be unprecedented, and, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, combining the power of the sword and the power of the purse was a fundamental matter with the Founding Fathers. They did not believe that should ever occur. It has never occurred, to my knowledge, before, of course, legally at least. There is nothing covert here. I mean, we are discussing this on the record and we are discussing it openly. So there is no concern about "trying to pull one over." But I do think we need to clarify the law on that now.

Secretary **CHENEY**. Frankly, I had not looked at it from that perspective, Senator, but will be happy to do so.

Chairman **NUNN**. General Powell, one other question. How about women in Saudi Arabia? Are they being accorded fair and equitable treatment within that society, as their role as a member of the American military would, in my opinion, dictate?

General **POWELL**. They are getting along quite well, Senator. I think the Saudis are learning a great deal about women and how women can perform very demanding, challenging, and difficult tasks.

I won't say to you that there are no little grindings of gears that take place when a Saudi airman sees an American female crew chief on an F-15. There is a little of that. But, by and large, some of the concerns that we had a few weeks ago have not materialized with respect to the presence of women in Saudi Arabia.

Every now and then we hear from the Saudis that, gee, we'd prefer it if we didn't see them driving trucks at night, but if that is their job, to drive a truck, they drive the truck. So we have gotten along rather well.

Chairman NUNN. We are insisting that our women be able to perform their jobs fully?

General POWELL. Absolutely.

Chairman NUNN. How about off time, now? Are we handling that one?

General POWELL. We are handling that one. We are asking our female GIs to respect the customs and traditions of the country in which we are guests.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth, I am going to have to run to avoid missing this vote. When you get through, we have two other Senators who have not asked questions. But they may not be returning because of votes. They are Senator Coats and Senator Shelby. So if they are not back by the time you conclude, if you could, dismiss the hearing and adjourn, assuming I'm not back, but I'll be back if I can.

Secretary Cheney, we'll be back in touch with you about a closed session later this week.

Thank you, both of you, for being here. You have been a great help to us.

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you.

General POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WIRTH [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From Thucydides to Melodie to Wirth. Here you are. [Laughter.]

I would add my commendations to the two of you for the efforts that have been undertaken. I have recently come back from a swing around a great part of the State of Colorado, and I found that people in all areas have a very good feeling for how we executed this, for how we involved our allies in it. There is a very strong sense of support there.

I think you all know that, and that is due to your good work and that of all of the very good people who are under your command.

I think people also have the feeling that this is going to be a lot easier to get into than to get out of. They are beginning to start to ask the inevitable questions, which I think we all have to tend to.

Before getting to two of those, one of which relates to energy policy and the other of which relates to our long-term search for stability in the Middle East, there are just a couple of questions that also came up that I would like to know how to answer.

One concerns the intelligence issue.

You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement—and I have been here for most of the afternoon and I have not heard any other reference to it—you mentioned in your opening statement that our intelligence on Iraq was pretty good. The question that I have been asked at a variety of town meetings was if our intelligence was good, and we've spent a great deal of money on that, why were so many Americans and so many Westerners, and so on, caught there. Were we caught by surprise or not?

I am sure you have answered this question a lot of times, but it did not permeate the media in Southern Colorado. So maybe we can get an answer from you here.

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, I did state that I thought the intelligence had worked well. I think our technical capabilities, in terms of being able to monitor events in that part of the world, especially since the invasion, have been very good.

Before the invasion of Kuwait, we were able to monitor the buildup of Iraqi forces. I won't go into detail in an open session, but we clearly were able to see that they were amassing forces on the border. What we could not do is read Saddam Hussein's mind. We could not know what his intentions were, and in that closed, tight society in which he operates, obviously, what one man thinks can make all the difference in terms of whether they invade or don't invade.

All of the advice we got from other governments in the region, from the Kuwaitis and others who were directly dealing with Saddam Hussein was he will never invade; that he has done this before; that he is simply trying to coerce the Kuwaitis into a more cooperative OPEC pricing policy, one more consistent with Iraq's desires than Kuwaiti desires, and, therefore, this is simply a threat, but he will never actually use the force.

Obviously, all of that advice was wrong.

What I have discovered in my travels, in the region since, is there is a sense of outrage on the part of many of the leaders we are dealing with, who are supporting us, and who are actively involved in the effort, a sense of outrage at Saddam Hussein's obvious, clear-cut prevarication, if you will, the fact that he obviously, deliberately deceived many people he dealt with and had had good relationships for years, in order to be able to persuade them that he wasn't going to invade when, in fact, he had planned all along to do exactly that.

Senator **Wirth**. I am not asking the question for the purpose of second guessing, but, obviously, there is a judgment line. You receive intelligence, you know certain things are happening, and you interpret that. What weight do you give to that interpretation to say to American nationals I think it is time to leave, or whatever? That was a useful answer and that is helpful. I thank you.

A second question that comes up on a steady basis relates to the $7 billion loan forgiveness to the Egyptians, which I think has been touched upon once briefly this afternoon. I sense some significant concern about that, and in some places really deep alarm, and in some places outrage, at the idea of a forgiveness of a $7 billion financial commitment from the Egyptians, and saying what does that do to our deficit, and so on, and then asking who is next in line.

Do you have negotiations on that front as to who is next in line? If we are going to be forgiving $7 billion to the Egyptians, certainly there are very significant commitments that the Israelis have made over a long period of time and they will come in with some great justification and say if you forgive the loans to the Egyptians, how about the loans to us. I understand Bangladesh has forces in Saudi Arabia at this point who are joining our overall force. Are we going to be forgiving their loans and so on?

Are you in a position to talk about that? Is that your bailiwick or does that belong to Secretary Baker or Secretary Brady?

Secretary CHENEY. It is probably better directed to my colleagues at State or over at Treasury.

The problem that has arisen with respect to Egypt is the size of the loan relative to the size of their economy; to the fact that they are about to fall under the Brooke amendment sanctions that would make it impossible for us to continue the kind of close relationship we have had in the past in military matters, in terms of sales.

There is the special relationship that has grown between the United States and Egypt and the fact that the President felt this is a unique situation. It is not a recommendation he has made for a number of countries. It is a recommendation that he has made to the Congress specifically with respect to Egypt.

We think it is justified in this case. We do think, in light of our expectations about possible repayment of the loans, which, frankly, were limited, that, in fact, it can be justified, that now is the time to do it, and that it is very important, in terms of helping Egypt get on its feet economically and given the burden that it is bearing in this current situation and from the implementation of the sanctions, because they are there and immediately hit—they have had hundreds of thousands of Egyptian guest workers who, in fact, have had to flee Kuwait and Iraq—that this kind of assistance is justified.

Senator WIRTH. I did ask the question at a variety of meetings: how many people there thought the loan would be paid back if we didn't forgive it. Not very many hands went up around the room. I think people understand that. But I think there is a symbolism to it and also a concern that if we do this for the Egyptians, we are going to be doing it for other people, and if we are considering the cost of this to be $15 billion—I think that was the figure that you used for fiscal year 1991—we can anticipate that that cost is going to be significantly higher, both in terms of this kind of loan forgiveness and, obviously, in terms of the energy costs, which is a different way of accounting. This is a very expensive proposition for the American public.

Secretary CHENEY. I believe in this case, Senator, that the actual budgetary impact is fairly insignificant. But, again, we would have to get the details, and those are best derived from State or Treasury. We would be happy to get them for you. It is not $7 billion all of a sudden added to our budget deficit.

Senator WIRTH. Why not?

Secretary CHENEY. Because of the way it has been financed in the past——

Senator WIRTH. Well, we are not going to get it paid back.

Secretary CHENEY [continuing]. And the way it has been carried on the books, I'm told.

Senator WIRTH. Just one other comment on the issue of burden-sharing.

Again, in this very substantial discussion with an awful lot of people in Colorado, I found very deep concern. You have heard that here over and over and over again.

One gentleman in Southern Colorado described it to me in a different way, which I thought was helpful. He said we are involved in our community with the United Way, and everybody shares by their commitment and their resources. He said by my examination, we get about 12 percent of our oil from the Middle East, the Europeans get about 30 percent of their oil from the Middle East, and maybe the Germans do, and the Japanese get about 60 percent of their oil from the Middle East.

He said if you follow the United Way model, that gives me a kind of guideline, he said, for how much we ought to expect the Japanese to pay. It seems to me this is not an unhelpful way of describing, again, the deep concern—and putting it in very American terms—about a United Way model and a very real worry that we are going to play "Uncle Sugar" again and not have a fair share paid by our allies.

You have heard that over and over and over again. I am not asking you to comment on it. It is just a different window on it which I thought, having heard it all, is the best description of what we ought to expect. It's the best description that I heard during the month of August.

Let me ask you, if I might, about energy. I made some notes here, and you described our goals: that we have to get the Iraqis to leave, to restore the legitimate government, to save American lives and to provide a durable peace in the region. Those are the goals that we have in that area.

My guess is had there been an incursion of one kind or another between two countries in Central Africa, we would not have found ourselves going in with a major American effort to get that one country to leave, to restore the original, more legitimate government, to save American lives and to provide a durable peace in that area.

The variable in this is oil, isn't that right?

Secretary CHENEY. It's one variable. It certainly is an important variable because, if you look at the growing consumption of oil and the declining resource that is available, clearly the Persian Gulf is important today and will become even more important in the future. But I also would not overlook the historic ties and relationships between the United States and the Government of Saudi Arabia and I think the principles that are involved: the objection to the kind of outrageous aggression that has occurred here.

It's not just the United States that has made a decision to be concerned about Iraqi aggression. It is the entire world. It is the United Nations. It is the Security Council that voted unanimously.

So, again, it is not a sole judgment or one that is simply based on oil.

Senator WIRTH. Well, I would guess if this had happened in Central Africa, there would have been a much lower set of concerns than there is here.

Secretary CHENEY. I don't quarrel with that.

Senator WIRTH. The real variable that charges this and that gets the world's concern is oil, is energy.

Secretary **Cheney**. I am sure that is a significant portion.

Senator **Wirth**. You described that very well on page 3 of your testimony, and I thought gave a very good description of that.

This suggests that, as we redefine in this day and age our national security goals as we move away from the confrontation of the superpower and the Cold War that, once again, we have to be faced with energy as a major national security concern.

What does this do to the kind of planning and thinking that goes on in the Department of Defense, in the National Security Council? What is this administration now beginning to do to redefine our national security to include the energy variable?

Again, the New York Times does not come to a lot of places in Colorado, and I think the Washington Post comes to none. Maybe this has been going on. Maybe the President has been talking about it. Maybe the administration has been talking about it. I have not seen discussions coming out of the administration about energy and national security.

Have there been such? Are you working on this? What kind of comment have you all made now for the record and for the American public on energy policy?

General **Powell**. Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no specific comment with respect to energy policy. But as the Secretary has pointed out, in that particular part of the world, because of our historical ties with the nations in the region and the importance of that part of the world for our future energy security and the future energy security of the Free World, as we do our military planning in the Department, we look at that as an area of tension and an area where U.S. forces perhaps might have to be used, just as they were used for this contingency that we are now involved in.

It turns out that, over time, we had put in place plans. We had been trying to work with our friends in the region to develop joint operating procedures, to work together on joint exercises in the case that our presence might ever be needed for a contingency to defend their interest and the vital energy interests of the world in that region.

Senator **Wirth**. Presumably, one of the things that you will also want to do is to eliminate the threat. That is one of the parts of thinking, I would think, in terms of long-term security interest. We would say one of the things we ought to be doing is to, is why do we have a Strategic Defense Initiative. Well, perhaps that would allow us, under that set of thinking, to eliminate the threat.

I would think that we would have not only contingency plans for "what happens if," but a major national commitment. This becomes more of a political issue, Mr. Secretary, coming out of the administration, you know, a sense that we really should commit ourselves once again, as we talked a decade ago, when you and I were first Members of the Congress, about energy independence and that as a major national goal.

Has that now entered the dialogue? Is that now an important set of variables for us to be considering? Should that be higher on the agenda of those of us concerned about national security and national economic policy?

Secretary CHENEY. I think it clearly has to be, Senator. I think there are some things that are different this time around than in previous crises affecting this part of the world.

For one thing, we have diversified sources. For another, we have become more reliant on nuclear power, so we generate more of our electricity with our nuclear capabilities and less with imported fuel oil than was true in the past.

We have obviously made adjustments in terms of the efficiency of our automobiles, et cetera. But I would not deny, based upon this set of circumstances, that it is an area that clearly needs to be continuously addressed.

But, since I left the Congress and the House Interior Committee, I now devote my time to the military side.

Senator WIRTH. I understand.

Secretary CHENEY. I think Secretary Watkins and the folks at the Department of Energy would be the best place to go for a look at that specific aspect of how this crisis has affected those policies.

Senator WIRTH. I would agree that Secretary Watkins has responsibility. But I would say so do you, so does Secretary Baker, and so does Secretary Brady. This issue now looms large. We are, as you know, more than 50 percent dependent. You know all of the numbers. More than 50 percent on imported oil 2 months ago. This is the first time that has happened, I think, in our Nation's history. We are more dependent now than we ever have been. This is a major variable and not one that, it seems to me, just gets consigned to one department, but it is an overall national security interest of the first order.

We would not be there. If we weren't dependent upon oil, we wouldn't be there. I would bet you that.

Secretary CHENEY. I can't say that. But, clearly, it is factor. It is a hypothetical question.

Senator WIRTH. Of course it is. But dealing with hypotheticals and long-term goals is one of the things that presumably we ought to be here to do, less than second-guessing you.

One final question.

As we talk about a "new international order" and as we look to the final of your four goals, which is to provide stability for the region, the question is how to go about doing that. There are a number of models out there. One is for us to do it unilaterally.

My guess is that over a long period of time we do not have the economic resources, we are not going to have the patience to have large numbers of U.S. troops committed there for a very long period of time, and I would guess that it is not going to be politically acceptable for the United States to be so predominantly involved in the Middle East as we are now.

That would be just my perception as to what a long-term future looks like for a unilateral U.S. effort.

A second model for providing stability in the region is one that Secretary Baker talked about the other day, and that was having some kind of Middle East NATO model, which I saw you commented on. I wasn't sure that you were in agreement with what Secretary Baker was suggesting. It seemed to me that was a little bit like the CENTO days and John Foster Dulles. I don't think that works. But that is a second model.

A third one would appear to be some kind of international model, which has been suggested by the Soviets and has been suggested by others, that envisions a broad, international United Nations framework.

I don't know if you have had a chance to comment on this, Mr. Secretary. Maybe you would like to provide us with a view that you might have of how we go about assuring this longer-term stability in a region like the Middle East.

Secretary **Cheney**. I think, Senator, that we clearly are interested in long-term security and stability in the area. I think that, as in most instances in the post-war period, we have achieved that through the collective efforts of several nations. At the same time, I am a little reluctant to get into the business of taking one particular model that has worked in one part of the world with one set of nations and saying that it necessarily has applicability in another part of the world.

But there are already structures in the area that offer some basis upon which to build. There is a Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, which involves the Saudi and the Persian Gulf States—Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE. There are various elements in the Arab world and in the Arab League, the United Nations peacekeeping forces, as well as bilateral arrangements involving the United States.

I would expect that out of the current difficulties we would see emerge some new arrangement that enhances the security in the region. I am reluctant today to say exactly what that is. I think we will know it when we see it. I think we know it will have to rest, first and foremost, upon the nations in the region who are the most directly involved, and that we have to be sensitive to their concerns about sovereignty and their legitimate concerns about the role they want the United States to play.

In the final analysis, the United States has continuously, since the end of World War II, operated on the basis that where we are wanted and where we can be helpful and where we have something to contribute, we are, indeed, prepared to contribute, but that we will do so only as long as we are wanted. That is our commitment to the Saudi in this case. We are there as long as they need us. We're there as long as they want us. We'll leave when they no longer care to have us there.

Senator **Wirth**. I think that is a good answer, Mr. Secretary, and a good start in thinking about what this kind of arrangement might be. I do not see us being able to sustain or be sustained for a very prolonged period of time, and we ought to be groping for some other kind of arrangement. That is something that obviously is going to test our understanding of this new world in which we have arrived, and test the Soviet Union as well. It is a fascinating and important challenge.

You all certainly have done a very admirable job, not only over both of your careers and the last month, but over the last 4 hours. This has been a very interesting afternoon.

With enormous gratitude from us—and which I can see on your faces I am going to draw this to a close and you can get out of here.

Thank you both very much for being here. The committee will be adjourned.

Secretary **Cheney**. Thank you.

General **Powell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

SAUDI ARMS SALE

Senator **Warner**. The administration is reportedly preparing a major arms sale package for Saudi Arabia—the second arms sale to the Kingdom since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. How will this arms package impact on the ability of the Saudis to better provide for their own defense? Would congressional opposition to this package significantly increase the burden on U.S. forces in the region?

Secretary **Cheney**. Proposed defense sales to Saudi Arabia and the other gulf countries are predicated on the fact, which became clear on August 2, that these countries require much stronger armed forces to be able to deter aggression by its more powerful and more populous neighbors. The Saudi armed forces now are about ⅒ the size of those of Iraq. They are outnumbered by the Iraqi air force on the order of 4-to-1 and by Iraqi tank forces by more than 10-to-1.

While the Saudis do not seek to build a force large enough to rival others in the region in size, it is entirely reasonable to believe that they are capable of developing forces that could accomplish three objectives as part of a cooperative relationship between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other concerned countries:

—deter potential aggression by making it much more costly to any adversary.

—in case of attack, defend the Kingdom in cooperation with allies.

—play a major role in the collective defense.

BURDENSHARING/MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator **Warner**. Although a number of Arab and Western nations have deployed military forces to the Persian Gulf region, the mission to defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression appears to be primarily a U.S. military effort. Could you please comment on the military significance of the Arab and Western forces that have been sent to the gulf?

General **Powell**. Significant numbers of Arab and allied Western forces continue to arrive in Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield. [Deleted.]

Senator **Warner**. Could you please comment on the military significance of the Arab and Western forces that have been sent to the gulf? What specific actions could our friends and allies take to more fairly share the burden with the United States in the gulf?

Secretary **Cheney**. The military significance of Arab and Western military contributions to the multinational force is significant and becoming more so as time passes. Despite the initial prepondence of U.S. forces deployed to defend Saudi Arabia, we expect the share of forces contributed by our European allies and friendly Arab countries to increase dramatically, thereby providing more balanced responsibility sharing. Britain, France, Syria, and Egypt have announced plans to deploy significant levels of ground forces to Saudi Arabia. At least 25 countries have contributed military forces to the land-based Desert Shield, thus far, making it a truly multinational operation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF U.S. FORCES

Senator **Warner**. I am concerned about the command and control of our own forces. Central Command Headquarters appears to be the only Joint Headquarters in the theater. Should we consider establishing a Joint Headquarters at the operational level; similar to the command arrangement we had in Panama?

General **Powell**. Command and control arrangements for every operation have to be tailored to fit the circumstances. In comparing Panama and Desert Shield, the two operational circumstances were dissimilar enough that the arrangements for command and control had to be treated differently. The Panama operation was a much smaller contingency operation—a situation tailor-made for Joint Task Force operations. Desert Shield, on the other hand, is a classic theater operation for which the present command and control arrangements are the most logical and efficient. Central Command is an operational level Joint Force which controls its component commands exactly as the contingency plans and Joint Doctrine envisaged (and the CENTCOM commander desires). The present organization appears to be working very well, and we would hesitate to inject another level of Headquarters where it does not appear to be warranted.

RESERVE COMPONENT COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

Senator WARNER. We have called to active duty several of our Reserve component combat service support units. Unfortunately, in some cases, we do not have very many of some of these specialized units. What are our alternatives when these Reserve component units must be released from active duty?

General POWELL. [Deleted.]

ATBM CAPABILITIES

Senator WARNER. General Powell, there has been some discussion about Patriot deployments in the Middle East to, among other things, counter Iraqi ballistic missiles. I am aware that the Patriot has been tested against various classes of tactical ballistic missiles [deleted]. Do you feel that Patriot provides our forces with a modicum of ATBM capability?

General POWELL. [Deleted.]

STATUS OF U.S. CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Senator WARNER. General Powell, are we lacking in the deployment of chemical protective equipment to the Middle East? In other words, are U.S. forces being given everything they need to protect themselves from Iraqi chemical weapons? If not, what is still needed?

General POWELL. Our forces are being provided with everything needed to protect themselves from chemical weapons, should the Iraqis make the decision to employ such weapons. [Deleted.]

IRAQI CHEMICAL FORCE DISPOSITION

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney and General Powell, there has been conflicting information over whether Iraq has the existing capability to launch ballistic missiles with chemical warheads. Can you provide the committee with a clarification about Iraqi chemical and biological capabilities, particularly with respect to ballistic missiles. How much of a threat do these capabilities pose to U.S. forces?

Secretary CHENEY. Iraq has missile capabilities that pose a very real threat to armed forces and population centers in the region. The U.S. Armed Forces and other friendly forces in the region must be prepared to guard against any chemical or biological threat from Iraq.

General POWELL. [Deleted.]

SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney, in the event that the situation in the Persian Gulf should escalate into a shooting war, what, if any, shortfalls in spares and repair parts can you anticipate at this time?

Secretary CHENEY. As you might expect, it is extremely difficult to anticipate spares and repair parts requirements in a scenario where there is a broad spectrum of threats and methodologies to counter those threats. Recognizing that fiscal constraints have limited the resources available for war reserve stocks, the Department nevertheless is in a good position with regard to spares and repair parts to support potential Desert Shield operations. The Department has no known "war stoppers" today with regard to spares and repair parts.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney, what have you undertaken to plan for meeting sustainability requirements in the event of a shooting war?

Secretary CHENEY. The development of a theater logistics infrastructure is underway to sustain the forces. The Department will ensure that the forces in Operation Desert Shield have the supplies and equipment they need to execute their mission.

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Cheney, could you please provide an update of the status of contributions or pledges from other nations toward the cost of Operation Desert Shield?

Secretary CHENEY. See attached chart.

FOREIGN COMMITMENTS TO US DESERT SHIELD COSTS*

($ millions)

GULF STATES	JAPAN	GERMANY	KOREA	TOTAL
6000 OF WHICH: KUWAIT - 2500M OTHERS - 3500M INCLUDES HOST NATION SUPPORT FOR US FORCES	2000 OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY: $350M LIFT $400M GENERAL GOODS & SERVICES $80M CHARTERS BY GOJ $50M MEDICAL TEAMS $70M MNF SUPPORT $50M RESERVE FUND $1B UNDISTRIBUTED	1050 OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY: $130M FUCHS NBC VEHICLES $260M LIFT $660M OTHER IN-KIND	95	9145

*Defense costs only. Commitments to third countries for economic support are additional.

Senator **Warner**. How will these contributions be applied to U.S. costs? What legal mechanisms might be required to allocate these funding contributions to offset DOD expenditures? Will the funds be used to offset fiscal year 1990 expenditures of the Department of Defense or will some other mechanism be used to provide credits, for example, for future expenditures?

Secretary **Cheney**. It is anticipated that these contributions will be applied to offset U.S. costs using existing authority of the Department of Defense to accept gifts of funds. Under this existing authority such gifts would be deposited into the "National Defense Conditional Gift Fund" in the Treasury. Thereafter they would be transferred to currently applicable appropriations of the Department of Defense. It is unlikely that any contributions would be received in time to offset costs for fiscal year 1990 and credits to offset costs for future expenditures would be handled by crediting appropriations from which such expenditures would be made.

OFFSETS FOR PERSIAN GULF OPERATIONS

Senator **Warner**. What do you estimate to be the impact, if any, of continued FMS sales, loan forgiveness, and allied contributions on total DOD expenditures for operations in the Persian Gulf?

Secretary **Cheney**. To the extent that these contribute to the international effort in the gulf area, they can help keep DOD expenditures below what they otherwise might have been.

SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF—COST ESTIMATES

Senator **Warner**. Secretary Cheney, I understand that your cost estimates are based on an individual 6-month rotational schedule for all regular military and reserve personnel in Operation Desert Shield. Is this correct?

Secretary **Cheney**. Yes, the cost estimate was based on an assumption for the purposes of this calculation that military personnel will rotate every 6 months. The Department's cost estimates also assume that heavy equipment, vehicles, or weapon systems initially deployed with our forces will remain in place. The actual decisions on rotation have not been made.

Senator **Warner**. What impact does this schedule have on airlift and sealift costs, as well as fuel expenditures?

Secretary **Cheney**. Of the $3.8 billion planned to support airlift and sealift for fiscal year 1991 Desert Shield operations, military personnel rotation costs total only about 8 percent. The Department estimates that rotation of military personnel, including fuel expenditures, will total approximately $660 million in fiscal year 1991. The remaining costs are for deployment of additional forces and for resupply of the forces already deployed to the Persian Gulf area. These figures are based on the stated assumptions.

Senator **Warner**. Will all U.S. troops be in place in the Persian Gulf region by the beginning of fiscal year 1991, and if not, what impact would the continued buildup have on fiscal year 1991 lift costs?

General Powell. No, all U.S. troops will not be in place by the beginning of fiscal year 1991. [Deleted.] Resultant impact on fiscal year 1991 strategic lift costs is estimated as follows:

1. Airlift (troops)	$322.0 millions
2. Airlift (sustainment)	$1,771.0 millions
3. Sealift (unit cargo)	
Port Handling	$9.0 millions
Ocean Transportation	$140.2 millions
4. Sealift (sustainment)	$462.0 millions
5. Total Strategic Costs	$2,704.2 millions

The above figures were developed based on the following assumptions:

a. Mission remains defensive--no combat or new lift requirements that may emerge from combat situations.

b. No major unit rotations or large numbers of individual rotations.

Senator Warner. Can you provide any additional explanation for the enormous discrepancy between DOD and CBO estimates of lift and fuel costs for this operation?

Secretary Cheney. The CBO estimate does not recognize the requirement to continue force deployments that will increase the overall size of the forces in the region in fiscal year 1991. The Army expects to be continuing to deploy active component units in the first quarter of fiscal year 1991. The CBO lift estimate also appears not to recognize sufficiently the need to transport consumable/expendable supplies and materials throughout the year or the distance of the force from the supply base. Finally, the CBO estimate assumes an increase of $5 per barrel for the fuel consumed during transportation while the DOD estimate includes an increase of $10 per barrel.

SEALIFT

Senator Warner. I am concerned about our sealift capability. I understand that a number of foreign-flagged ships have been chartered and that there has even been discussion of chartering a Soviet ship to transport U.S. tanks from Texas to Saudi Arabia. How many ships from the Ready Reserve Force have been activated? What is their status? Also, how many foreign-flagged ships have been chartered in support of Desert Shield?

General Powell. As of 11 September, a total of 42 ships have been activated from the RRF. Thirty-two ships have been tendered to Military Sealift Command (MSC), eight are not yet ready for sea, and two ships, Marine Aviation Support, are en route to the area of operation. The two aviation support vessels are not common user lift and are dedicated to USMC support. Thirty-five foreign flag vessels are also under charter to MSC supporting the Desert Shield deployment.

Senator Warner. What is your assessment of the adequacy of our Nation's sealift capabilities?

Why was it necessary to charter foreign-flagged ships?

How serious is the discussion of chartering a Soviet ship to move U.S. Army forces?

Do we need to review the structure of the Ready Reserve Force?

General Powell. Our Nation's sealift capability needs improvement. The decline of our merchant marine continues unabated. As a result, the non-availability of military useful U.S. merchant shipping and the lack of sufficient numbers of the kinds of ships we need in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) drove the requirement to charter foreign-flagged ships. [Deleted.] During the upcoming Congressional Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS), we will review our total sealift requirement and the, structure of the RRF. [Deleted.]

[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:06 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn and Warner.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel.

Professional staff member present: Robert G. Bell.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel.

Staff assistants present: Lisa H. Kettlewell and Cindy Pearson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. Mr. O'Donnell, let me go through a series of questions that we have here and you can answer them. Maybe you would like to make some kind of opening statement. I'd be glad for you to do that.

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. O'DONNELL. I'll just go ahead and answer your questions, if that's alright.

Chairman NUNN. We consider this unclassified, is that correct?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Cheney testified on Tuesday that funds donated by foreign governments will be processed under the Defense Gift Provisions in Chapter 26 of Title 50 of the United States Code. Will all funds donated by foreign governments be processed under the Defense Gift Statute or will any funds be processed under the gift authorities of the Department of State or other Federal agencies?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Senator, insofar as I know, all funds that are going to be received will be processed through the Defense Gift Statute at the present time.

I must say that I do not know if there are any plans to supplement or receive gifts in the Department of State or any other agency. None of that has been brought to my attention. The only thing I'm aware of is the fact that funds will be received by the

Secretary of the Treasury and he must have an affirmative act of receipt in order to make the gift complete. Then it will be transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Defense Appropriations, where it will be merged in a given defense appropriation, and complete accountability and recordation of that transaction will be present at both the Department of Defense and Department of Treasury to be made available to Congress.

Senator **Warner**. For the record, does that mean Title 50, Chapter 26, sections 1151 through 1156?

Mr. **O'Donnell**. That's partially correct, Senator. We have really three ways of accepting support. One is to have forces show up in the region, as we discussed earlier today. The second way is host nation support, which is section 9008 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act. Host nation support, of course, is a provision that's been around in the Appropriations Act for 35 years. It allows us to accept support in the region and it can be quite substantial support. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it could be fuel, labor, commodities, foodstuffs.

Chairman **Nunn**. We'll have all sorts of precedent for that, though.

Mr. **O'Donnell**. We have all sorts of precedent with that.

Chairman **Nunn**. You're talking about mainly cash.

Mr. **O'Donnell**. As for the cash, the only existing authority in the United States Code for the acceptance of cash payments—and we're talking here about substantial contributions by some of these countries—is 50 U.S.C. 1151, which, as you know, was enacted in 1954 as a gift statute, permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to receive monies for defense purposes and the GSA to receive property for defense purposes. Unlike other gifts, which may go to the General Receipts of the Treasury, this money would be permitted to go to a Department of Defense appropriation. We intend to send to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees within 24 hours a letter and a document which set forth——

Senator **Warner**. Do you mean 24 hours from now?

Mr. **O'Donnell**. Yes, 24 hours from now—a letter and a document which set forth the procedures that we have developed to ensure that there is complete control within the Department of any funds that come through the Treasury account as gifts or contributions from other countries.

As you know, in the supplemental appropriation request we have proposed—and you will receive this formally tomorrow—new legislative authority that would permit this burdensharing to go forward in a way that Congress would presently recognize and, I hope, find acceptable. This statute was not enacted in contemplation—there is no question about that—of large, substantial payments from foreign countries, although there is nothing in the language or in the legislative history that would preclude it from applying to those types of contributions. But we would prefer to have current statutory authority that the committees would find acceptable to process these contributions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other countries who we expect to make substantial financial contributions.

Chairman **Nunn**. That helps a lot, to have that statutory request. I'm delighted to hear that. If the contribution from a foreign nation is a general gift for defense purposes, what guarantee is there that the funds will be used for Operation Desert Shield?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The guarantee comes in our internal controls which will require it to be used for Operation Desert Shield, and that will be under the general auspices of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, who will have the delegated authority from the Secretary to ensure that that is the case. The second portion of that guarantee, if you will, will be the reporting to Congress, because you will know how we are using these funds.

Although when the funds come in, if they go into O&M accounts they will be merged, and I'm not quite sure how we will—money is fungible—precisely record the transactions. But we are working on that aspect. I suspect that that will be present in the procedures as we finish them tonight and get them up to the Hill tomorrow on how we are going to handle these accounts.

Chairman NUNN. Will the funds be used only to pay for the incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield—for instance, active duty pay for reservists—or can they be used to pay the costs the Department of Defense would have incurred regardless of Operation Desert Shield—for instance, active duty pay for active duty members?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Senator, I'm going to have to take that question for the record. It's my understanding that the Secretary intends that these funds be used for the incremental costs for Operation Desert Shield. But I cannot represent that presently for you for the Department of Defense. I'm going to have to take that question back.

[The information follows:]

We anticipate that all of the funds in question will be donated for the purpose of assisting in the payment of the incremental costs (i.e., additional costs) incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with Operation Desert Shield. Since the donor's intent must be effectuated, the funds should be used only to pay the incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield operations. To keep track of the disposition of such donations, procedures have been instituted which will identify the donor, amount, conditional terms, and the appropriations accounts to which contributions have been transferred from the Treasury gift account.

Chairman NUNN. The second part of that question, took as if so, will this permit the Department of Defense to spend more money on non-Operation Desert Shield activities than it would have spent on such activities in the absence of Operation Desert Shield?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would like to handle that question in the same way, Senator.

[The information follows:]

Because the Department anticipates that the gifts will only be for the additional costs associated with Operation Desert Shield, the funds should not be used for non-Operation Desert Shield activities.

Chairman NUNN. What use can be made of the funds if the donor attaches conditions to the gift that are inconsistent with U.S. law?

Mr. O'DONNELL. There must be an act of receipt. If the conditions are determined to be unacceptable, I would imagine that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, would have to refuse the gift if there were illegal or unacceptable conditions. But the intent of the contributor must be honored, and that is a present statutory requirement. The funds must be put into an appropriation to effectuate the intent of the contributing country.

It is our understanding that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to the extent they make these financial contributions, will provide it for the general Department of Defense purposes in connection with Operation Desert Shield and not place further conditions on those funds. If they do it that way, then I'm sure that the Secretary of the Treasury would have no difficulty in accepting it under those circumstances.

Chairman NUNN. May the donated funds be used in a manner contrary to any provision of law—for instance, on the end-strength limitation or a ceiling or a fence on an appropriation account?

Mr. O'DONNELL. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that this funding could not be used to fund any activity contrary to the law. What it would permit, for example, is the funding of the deficiencies created by obligating funds under the Feed and Forage Act. We are now creating, by obligations, a deficiency. These funds, theoretically, could be used to liquidate that deficiency. But I have not heard and do not believe that the funds may be used for any illegal or improper purpose at all, and I know that that is not the intent of the Department of Defense or the Secretary.

Chairman NUNN. May the donated funds be used to provide funding for a project which, although not expressly prohibited by law, was requested by the administration and denied funding by Congress?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like an opportunity to look at that question. I know that that is not the intent in this exercise. But I have not had a chance to look at the legal issue relating to that, and I would like to take that question, if I might, for the record.

[The information follows:]

Once the donated funds have been credited to the appropriate defense appropriation account, they will be treated in the same way as funds which are appropriated by Congress. Accordingly, these funds will be used in exactly the same manner as appropriated funds and will be subject to all restrictions and understandings applicable to appropriated funds.

Chairman NUNN. Once the funds are received, are they different from any other appropriated funds in terms of being subject to a limitation subsequently imposed by Congress?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The funds, once transferred from the Treasury account to the Department of Defense account, become merged with the existing appropriations and, therefore, are treated as other appropriations are treated.

Chairman NUNN. So, if Congress came in and denied the use of those funds for Operation Desert Shield after you'd already put them in the bank account—let's take this hypothetical. I think most of this is hypothetical because I know you are dealing with it in good faith and I want to make that plain. But we have to consider the precedent here.

Let's assume that Congress decided that you could only spend $7 billion for Operation Desert Shield next year, or let's assume that Congress said that you can't spend any money on Operation Desert Shield after July 1 of next year. Assume the Saudis came in and gave you $10 billion. Let's take the first case, where Congress had said specifically no more than $7 billion could be spent on Operation Desert Shield and you received another $10 billion from the Saudis. Would you be able to spend that $10 billion on Operation Desert Shield without coming back and getting Congress to approve it?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Senator, again, I would like to answer that question in writing. I think that you would have a substantial constitutional confrontation under circumstances like that. It certainly is not contemplated, but I don't have a legal opinion for you at this point.

Chairman NUNN. I'm not suggesting that Congress is going to put a limitation on you. But I am just trying to think through this intellectually.

[The information follows:]

Once the gifts are credited to the Department's appropriations, they are subject to all of the restrictions then applicable to funds appropriated by Congress, plus the additional restriction that they must be obligated and expended only for the defense purposes for which they were contributed.

If a gift were offered for a purpose which was prohibited by law, the Department would have to advise the donor that the funds could not be used for the intended purpose and, therefore, could not be accepted. Hopefully, the donor would then reconsider and still make the gift, but for an authorized purpose. This has been the practice of the Department under the gift statute.

Under this practice, under the example just given, if there were a limitation of $7 billion on Operation Desert Shield expenditures and a gift of $10 billion were offered, the Department could accept the use of only $7 billion and would either have to return the remaining $3 billion, keep it until it could be used in a way that would effectuate the donor's intent, or try to get the donor to change the purpose for which the gift was given so that it could be used.

Chairman NUNN. What is the relationship between the timing of the receipt of the gift, the assignment of the gift to the appropriate accounts, and the impact on deficit calculations under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings?

Mr. O'DONNELL. To my knowledge, we have not received any substantial gifts at this time, and I don't know whether we will receive and actually have credited to appropriations substantial financial payments prior to October 1. How it would play under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is something I'm going to have to get back to you on as well. That's a very difficult question.

[The information follows:]

A gift would not have any direct impact on deficit calculations. It would, however, have an indirect impact. Because the use of the gift would mean that the Department would not have to rely on funds drawn from the Treasury for expenses covered by the gift, this would reduce the amount of funds that had to be borrowed by the Treasury. This reduction could, therefore, result in an ultimate deficit reduction by reducing the Treasury's borrowing requirements.

Chairman NUNN. What statutory authorities will you use for purposes of acceptance of donations of property and services?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We will use section 9008 of the 1990 Department of Defense Appropriations Act for property and services in the area. That is the host nation support provision. For property outside of the area, we will use 50 U.S.C. 1151, unless or until we get the legislation that we are seeking in the supplemental. 50 U.S.C. 1151 is the only other statutory provision that we have.

For services that are not host nation support services, we have found a series of GAO decisions going back to the Second World War which permit the receipt of services under exigent circumstances such as those we have existing in the Middle East operation. But we expect that most of the services versus money or property will be provided in the region and, therefore, come under the host nation support provision. That is the way we are trying to direct this effort.

Chairman NUNN. What procedures will you use to account for receipt and use of donated property and services?

Mr. O'DONNELL. As to property and services, we have set up a system whereby the CINC will have to report, through the Joint Staff, to the OSD the extent and type of host nation support, services, and property received in the region. That is the only mechanism that we can use to keep careful account of property and services that are contributed to the U.S. forces. We intend to report periodically the extent of these property and services to Congress so that everyone will know what it is that we are receiving.

I talked to the staff before the hearing about the difficulty of being detailed and precise when you're getting fuel support in many different locations in Saudi Arabia for tanks or aircraft or things of that nature. But we have prepared written instructions to ensure that, to the best possible extent, all of that is kept a matter of record, so that the Secretary will know it and so that the committee will know it.

Chairman NUNN. May donated property and services be used in a manner contrary to a provision of law that would apply if the property or services were acquired with appropriated funds?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't believe that it can be. But I will address that issue with the tandem issue that you raised just a moment ago on that point.

[The information follows:]

No. Donated property would become the property of the Department and could only be used in the same way as other defense property. Similarly, contractual services could not be used in a manner contrary to law.

We would note, however, that some services might be acquired by donation which could not be acquired by the Department using appropriated funds. For instance, the Department may not, in most cases, use appropriated funds to acquire services from foreign air carriers or foreign ships. For instance, the Fly America Act, 49 U.S.C. 1517 and the Cargo Preference Act of 1954, 46 U.S.C. 1241 prohibit the use of appropriated funds for such purposes. If, on the other hand, such services were offered to the Department for free by those carriers or foreign countries—for example, to transport equipment to the Middle East—the Department could accept such services.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, please feel free to interrupt on any of these. I have just about four or five more questions and then I will be through.

Senator WARNER. Well, I'll tell you, just as a colloquy between the two of us, I would like to consider joining with you in drafting this and putting it in.

My questions would relate solely to section 9 of the Constitution which, just on a quick reading here, makes it clear that the Founding Fathers intended that we, in Congress, retain the right to make appropriations. I would just read from this section: "No monies shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law."

In the previous section, section 8, there is a provision that we are to make all laws which would be necessary and proper for the carrying and the execution of the foregoing powers, among them to declare war, grant letters of mark, to raise and support armies, and so forth. You know all that. I would urge you to go through this.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Senator, I'd agree. We'd have a real problem with augmenting appropriations if we did not have a mechanism for receiving contributions, whether it is host nation support on the one hand or property and cash contributions on the other.

Senator WARNER. We are breaking new ground and are here to help you.

Then, in your last section, 1154, there is a sort of continuing appropriation here. It more or less says that the Secretary of the Treasury, in order to effectuate the purposes—and so on and so forth—considers such money as being appropriated. That is for yachts to Annapolis and pool tables for the Air Force and Officers' Club. Isn't that right, Arnold, for pool tables and such.

Mr. PUNARO. Yes, sir, though they wouldn't buy anything as cheap as a pool table in the Air Force. [General laughter.]

Senator WARNER. I think the Chairman is on the right track and I intend to join with him and we'll be helpful in this matter. But I would go back and make some references to the constitutional provisions. There is some draft, which I seem to have here, which has no official status, and it does not seem to me to touch on that problem.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I can assure you that my marching instructions from Secretary Cheney and Secretary Atwood are that I am in charge and responsible for making sure that the mechanisms set up are appropriate and legal and above board, and I intend to execute that responsibility.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, the way this thing is drawn up now, my inclination is that it ought to be sent to the Treasury for a special fund and then subject to authorization and appropriation by the Committees of Congress. That is my first cut at it.

Chairman NUNN. I think that is correct, or we could have a special account where we would go ahead and authorize and appropriate against the anticipated receipt. I would think that would be possible, too, up to a certain amount for specific purposes. I don't know whether that's possible.

Senator WARNER. We could authorize and appropriate subject to the receipt.

Chairman NUNN. Subject to the receipt of it, yes.

Senator WARNER. You go right ahead.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. I want to ask two or three other questions about the Feed and Forage Act and its related provisions. In 10 U.S.C. 2201 it permits you to incur certain obligations for certain items in excess of the amount authorized and appropriated for those items. Could you describe the controls you have in place to assure that this authority is exercised only as necessary to meet the exigencies of the current situation?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Senator, again I am going to have to get back to you in writing on that. That is primarily a control that has been set up under the Comptroller's offices. I am aware of those controls, but I am not conversant in dealing with them.

[The information follows:]

Based on a detailed review of requirements which were identified by the military departments in a joint review conducted by the Department of Defense Comptroller and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the OMB has apportioned specific dollar amounts relative to the Feed and Forage Act. The Department of Defense Comptroller has initially allocated a portion of the OMB apportionment and will distribute the remainder based upon further review of requirements. The Department is also accommodating some $652 million in requirements by a realignment of funds currently available. The delegation of authority to the Comptroller gives the Comptroller the authority necessary to control the Department's use of the Feed and Forage authority for Operation Desert Shield.

Chairman **Nunn**. Let me ask you these other questions on that, and if you have an answer now, that's fine. If not, you can just take them for the record. It is my understanding that the Feed and Forage authority is being used not only to pay for the incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield—for instance, fuel purchases in Saudi Arabia—but it is also being used to pay for costs the Department of Defense would have incurred regardless of Operation Desert Shield—for instance, fuel costs in the United States. The question is, does this permit the Department of Defense to spend more on non-Operation Desert Shield activities than it would have spent on such activities in the absence of Operation Desert Shield?

Mr. **O'Donnell**. I'll get back to you on that.

[The information follows:]

No. The Department is using the Feed and Forage authority to fund costs related to Operation Desert Shield.

Chairman **Nunn**. May funds be obligated under the Feed and Forage Act in a manner contrary to provision of law—for instance, in the end-strength limitation or a ceiling or a fence on an appropriated account? That is the same question that I asked a while ago as to the outside funds.

Mr. **O'Donnell**. I'll provide that answer in writing.

[The information follows:]

No. All restrictions applicable to the Department's obligations apply to obligations incurred under the Feed and Forage Act, except for the statutory provision (which is overridden by the Feed and Forage Act) that obligations cannot be incurred unless there are sufficient appropriations to liquidate those obligations.

The Feed and Forage Act is limited in its scope and could not be used for the purposes described in the question. It is limited to the "necessities of the current fiscal year." Both by its plain meaning and by implication, this means necessities for which the Department could incur obligations were there sufficient appropriations to pay for them.

Chairman **Nunn**. May such funds be used to provide funding for a project which, although not expressly prohibited by law, was requested by the administration and denied funding by Congress?

Mr. **O'Donnell**. I'll provide that answer in writing.

[The information follows:]

No. As with any other obligations incurred by the Department, obligations under the act would be subject to applicable laws and to the Department's understandings with Congress concerning items for which funding was requested but denied by Congress. No obligations would be incurred in a manner inconsistent with the law or those understandings. In view of the limited scope of the obligations which may be incurred by the Feed and Forage Act, it is highly unlikely that any Feed and Forage Act obligations permitted by that act would fall within the situation contemplated by the question—Congress has never denied, for example, food, fuel, or medical supplies to the troops. If, however, such a situation did arise, the Department would follow its normal procedures and its understandings with Congress concerning the use of such funds.

Chairman NUNN. If you could take a look at all of those questions, we would appreciate it.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I will do so.

Chairman NUNN. We may need to get you here at some point in time. But these are our concerns and you could take these questions and study them and get back with us.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I would advise you to deal with Andy Effron and Pat Tucker, our two legal geniuses on this staff. They tell us they know everything, though they sometimes don't. If you could do that, it would be useful.

Mr. PUNARO. If Andy could explain the Feed and Forage Act so that the average layman could understand it, he would be a genius.

Chairman NUNN. Well, he gave me a six-page memo on it and I understand some of it. But it is complicated. However, it is very, very important. What we don't want to happen is all of a sudden somebody gets into the middle of this situation and comes up with a severe legal problem or constitutional problem. I think that would be detrimental to the President's program and our relationship with our allies and all those things. It is a sensitive area for confrontation. We thank you, Mr. O'Donnell.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I will certainly do that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:27 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, and Coats.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; Richard DeBobes, counsel; Madelyn Creedon, counsel, and Daniel G. Sakura, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Douglas George, Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and William H. Smith.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Claire M. Kelly, special assistant; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Corts, Mary J. Kampo, Melissa Ann Ramsey, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Melvin G. Dubee, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Thomas G. Moore, assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott; and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The Armed Services Committee meets this morning to begin a series of hearings designed to assist Congress and the American people in examining and debating our policy in the Persian Gulf. These hearings are complementary to a series of hearings that will begin next week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The entire civilized world was shocked by Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait on August 2. Thanks largely to President Bush's leadership, the world community came together under the auspices of the United Nations to denounce and to punish Iraq's unprovoked aggression. President Bush clearly laid out the goals of the U.S. policy in the region: the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

Originally, these goals were to be accomplished through a combination of political and economic sanctions backed up by the deployment of U.S. military forces in the region. Last August the military mission which President Bush gave to the large U.S. forces deployed in Operation Desert Shield was clearly set forth: first, to deter further aggression by Iraq in the region; second, to defend Saudi Arabia from attack if deterrence failed; and third, to enforce the United Nations' economic sanctions against Iraq.

So the original military mission was to deter aggression, to defend Saudi Arabia, and to enforce the U.N. embargo while the political and economic sanctions worked to force the Iraqis out of Kuwait. President Bush stated on August 8, "The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the Persian Gulf."

As I view it, our military forces are accomplishing their original mission. Iraq's further military advance was deterred at the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia. There has been no attack on Saudi Arabia itself, and the United Nations' economic embargo has been successfully enforced and, as I view it, is beginning to squeeze the Iraqi economy.

The rapid deployment of U.S. military forces to the Persian Gulf was a challenging undertaking which included a number of significant military firsts: the first activation of a large number of Reserve and National Guard forces under the President's limited call-up authority, which incidentally this committee initiated in 1976; the first use of the Marine Corps maritime prepositioning ships; the first activation of the civil reserve air fleet; and the first major use of the national defense reserve fleet since the Vietnam war.

All of us on this committee, I believe, are proud of the professionalism and the skill with which this deployment has been, and continues to be, carried out by all segments of our Armed Forces. We are particularly grateful for the sacrifices and the dedication of the men and women in uniform and their families in this effort.

On November 8, our overall strategy and the military mission of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region changed abruptly. On that date, President Bush announced the deployment of additional U.S. military units that would double the current level of U.S. forces in the region to more than 400,000. Secretary Cheney made it clear that these additional deployments would not replace or rotate the forces now in Saudi Arabia, but would be in addition to the U.S. forces already in the region. The purpose of these additional deployments was to create, in President Bush's own words, "an adequate offensive military option" to carry out our goals in the region.

The President's announcement was a fundamental shift in the mission of our military forces. After just 3 months the administration has gone from the original military mission of deterring further Iraqi aggression, defending Saudi Arabia, and enforcing the embargo, to a military mission of liberating Kuwait. This fundamental shift raises a number of serious questions which these hearings will focus on for the next few days this week and early next week.

First, what are our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region? Is it in our vital interest to liberate Kuwait through military action by a largely American military force, justifying a military offensive in the next several months that could cost thousands of American casualties?

Second, will the United Nations' economic sanctions force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait? Is there credible evidence now that the sanctions are beginning to have some effect on the Iraqi economy? How long will it take to determine if these sanctions are going to be effective?

Third, is the massive infusion of U.S. ground forces ordered by the President needed to establish a credible military option? How long can we sustain over 400,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia? Has the President limited our options by creating a use-it-or-lose-it situation with the deployment of such large U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf? Why is the Defense Department ruling out rotating the force by bringing some of our troops back home? Is the administration creating a situation in which the decision to use military force will be dictated by logistics and the lack of sustainability rather than by deliberate policy?

Fourth, what should be our ultimate objectives in the region? Should our military objectives extend beyond the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty to the elimination of key aspects of Iraq's offensive military capability, particularly their ongoing nuclear efforts? What is the best estimate we have of Iraq's capability to build and use nuclear weapons?

Fifth, how durable is the multinational coalition? Are other nations also planning to increase their force size, or is it just the United States? How many coalition members would support offensive military operations with their own forces? How will constraints imposed by some coalition members affect our war plan?

Finally, what are the implications of a war in the Persian Gulf region for long-term U.S. interests in that part of the world? Have we thought through our long-term goals in the region, including the future balance of power among the nations of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East? Is our near-term military strategy compatible with our long-time and long-term military goals? Does our force structure match our strategy?

While we are holding these hearings this week, the United Nations will be debating a resolution authorizing the use of force. I believe this resolution will serve a useful purpose in warning Saddam Hussein that the world community believes that the use of force is justified in response to his aggression, his occupation of Kuwait, and his taking of hostages. It is my hope that Saddam Hussein will respond to this resolution, assuming it passes the United Nations.

This U.N. resolution, however, is not a substitute for fully informing the American people of our own Nation's objectives and strategy. Those of us who represent this Nation, which will be the Nation doing most of the fighting, supplying most of the military forces and taking most of the casualties, have the obligation to ask these fundamental questions. The question, as I view it, is not whether military action is justified. I believe it is. The question is whether military action is wise at this time and in our own national interest.

These hearings were set 2 weeks ago to begin today in order to accommodate the schedules of Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Secretary Cheney and General Powell were invited to lead off these hearings today, but they declined.

The committee also gave Secretary Cheney and General Powell the option of closing out this initial set of hearings which it planned to close on Friday. The administration chose not to testify this week, and the committee extended our hearings through Monday to accommodate their preferred schedule. So Secretary Cheney and General Powell have agreed now to testify on Monday, December 3 beginning at 9 a.m.

Our committee has a full schedule of hearings every day this week. I cannot think of a more appropriate witness to lead off these hearings than someone who has served as Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of Central Intelligence.

Dr. James Schlesinger is uniquely qualified to discuss U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and our military strategy in the region. On July 19, Secretary Schlesinger warned the White House that Saddam Hussein was seeking to fashion a reason for going to war, and this was 2 weeks before the war started.

Dr. Schlesinger, we welcome you back to the committee this morning. We look forward to your testimony and we thank you for being here.

This afternoon the committee will receive a classified briefing from the intelligence community in closed session.

On Wednesday morning the committee will receive testimony from former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe and Gen. David Jones, and on Wednesday afternoon from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

On Thursday morning we will hear from a panel of civilian experts on military strategy that includes former Navy Secretary James Webb, Dr. Edward Luttwak, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, and on Thursday afternoon from experts on the Iraqi economy, economic sanctions and other regional issues.

On Friday morning the committee will hear from the former Director of the National Security Agency, Lt. Gen. William Odom, and from a panel of experts on Iraq's potential nuclear capability.

I intend this morning to follow our normal committee procedure as we start this series of hearings and give each member 10 minutes during their initial recognition period for an opening statement and questions. Senator Warner and I will, of course, make our opening statements now, and we will take our normal time for questions.

Before turning to our first witness, I would call on Senator Warner for any comments he may have.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join with other members of this committee in opening this important series of hearings, perhaps some of the most important in the period I have been privileged to serve on this committee.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, your mention of the inability of Secretary Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appear here this week is a matter that you and I have discussed personally with them and my recollection of our conversation with Secretary Cheney was yesterday that he felt, and it was the administration's belief, that his appearance today might in some way conflict with the work in the United Nations. Therefore, while they support wholly the hearings going forward it would be in the best interest of the country to appear on Monday, and that was the reason.

Chairman NUNN. The Senator is correct.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. President—excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I want to get that point clear. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Speaking of the President, I hope that as we approach these hearings and we look at the importance of what we are undertaking that we follow the advice of one of our predecessors, and that was we will check politics at the water's edge as we proceed to make our contribution to the decision-making of a policy that will achieve, hopefully, a greater stability in the Gulf region.

Now, these hearings follow two formal meetings between the leadership of the Congress and the President and, indeed, a number of informal hearings between Members of Congress and the President, and I believe that our President has established a high water mark with reference to the consultative process between the executive and legislative branches as it relates to matters of foreign policy and national security.

Mr. Chairman, it would be our hope, and I think I am speaking for both of us, at the conclusion of these hearings if this committee could prepare a fact-finding report which would be useful not only by Members of the Senate but hopefully the general public as it continues to debate these issues.

Of late, there has been a good deal cf criticism directed at our President for failing to state, with what people say sufficient clarity and consistency, the goals of our Nation. I happen to believe that the President has very clearly set forth his perspective and the goals that he sees that are in the best interest of this country.

The problem, as I understand it, is that this is not just the President's problem, it is the Nation's problem, and that therefore we have to take into greater consideration the views of the people of this country and we, the Congress, are particularly able to do that better than the executive branch. That is the reason today we are here to join with our distinguished friend, Secretary Schlesinger.

At an appropriate time, I think it is imperative that the Congress set forth their goal in this crisis. Hopefully, they will be consistent with the goals of the President, but nevertheless, we have the responsibility to set forth our goals.

The Constitution in Article I, Section 8, clearly sets forth the powers of the Congress. We hear in the halls of the Congress and elsewhere the fact that we have the exclusive right to declare war. Well, this Senator believes that we do not, at this particular time, have the necessity to declare war. But we do have the responsibility to make clear what a declaration of war would encompass, and, furthermore, to discuss very clearly what is our other power, namely the power of the purse, to either support the President or not to support the President with the funds adequate to support the military forces of this country.

Each of us in the Congress must be able to answer the question of whether we are prepared to make that decision, namely to declare war, if it is necessary to obtain the goals as outlined by the President. If the President's objectives are inconsistent with ours in the Congress as the representatives of the American people, then we must say so, and must say so now.

If Congress supports his objectives, we thus have to say, are we prepared to do it by means of a declaration of war, or simply as we did in Vietnam, through the power of the purse. We owe no less to the hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform now serving in the Persian Gulf. We owe no less to the nations and allies who have come together to form this joint force facing off the threats of Saddam Hussein.

I hope and I pray that the culmination of international sanctions, international diplomatic pressure, and the threat of international military force, will be sufficient to bring about a peaceful resolution.

I would like to turn momentarily to the subject of the declaration of war. Perhaps we have lost sight of the meaning of that constitutional power in our fervor to debate military and diplomatic tactics, areas in which Congress really has little responsibility and very little experience.

We should remind ourselves that a declaration of war is a legislative act by the Congress, as the representatives of the people, committing all—and I underline the word, "all"—of our national resources, diplomatic, military, economic and political, to the common goal of altering or making possible to carry out acts or policies of another nation or force which are hostile to the interests of the United States.

Deciding whether or not such a national commitment to be made to accomplishing national goals is our job. Then, deciding how best to utilize the committed resources, is the President's job.

There also seems to be much confusion about the differences in a declaration of war and the use of military force. Just as a declaration of war does not require the President to immediately engage all available military forces in offensive operations, not every military operation requires a declaration of war. In fact, most instances of use of our military force abroad in hostilities in our history as a nation have not been incident to a congressional declaration of war.

The Congressional Research Service has identified some 215 instances from 1798 through 1989 in which the United States military forces have been used abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities to protect U.S. interests or citizens. In only five of those instances was the use of military force pursuant to a declaration of war by the Congress.

In most of the remaining 210 instances I believe that most would agree that the U.S. goals sought to be obtained by the use of military force could be obtained without the congressional commitment of all our national resources. That is, a declaration of war was not needed to obtain our national goals, and it would have been inappropriate and unnecessary for Congress to pledge all U.S. resources to obtaining these goals.

I would pose that question during the course of these hearings to each of our witnesses as to whether the situation as we now view it would require the magnitude of a formal declaration of war, or should we give such congressional support as deemed necessary by virtue of the power of the purse.

Mr. Chairman, I also believe that the window of opportunity for Congress to make these goals known is short and that we should undertake this at the earliest opportunity. I look upon these hearings as laying a foundation for that opportunity. I thank the Chair.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Dr. Schlesinger, we are pleased to have you here this morning, and we look forward to your statement, after which time we will begin rotating with questions.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be back with you once again, and I deeply appreciate the invitation to discuss with this committee the challenge posed to American policy and potentially to America's Armed Forces by the developments in the Gulf.

When last I addressed this committee at the beginning of the year, I examined the implications for American policy, attitudes, deployments, and budgetary allocations implied by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet threat. In a sense, today represents the continuation of that earlier testimony, for what we are to examine beyond the details of the Gulf crisis itself is how this Nation should grapple with the altered conditions in this post-Cold War environment.

Mr. Chairman, if you will permit I shall deal initially with the shape of the post-Cold War world in which the sharp ideological divisions, and the coalitions and alliances polarized to reflect those differences, have now become muted. Some, stimulated by the response to the crisis in the Gulf, have expressed the hope that we are now engaged in fashioning a new international order in which violators of international norms will be regularly constrained or disciplined through the instrument of collective security. Put very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I believe that such aspirations for a Wilsonian utopia are doomed to disappointment.

What is emerging is likely to resemble the somewhat disordered conditions before 1938, an era of old-fashioned power politics marked by national and ethnic rivalries and hatreds, religious tensions, as well as smash and grab and the pursuit of loot. Such elements clearly mark the catalyzing event, Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, and has marked the behavior of a number of players on the international scene since August 2.

To suggest that the international order will miraculously be transformed and that the players on the world scene will be motivated by a dedication to justice and international law strikes me as rather naive.

Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Warner have posed the question, "What are America's interests in the Gulf?" I shall mention three and leave it to the committee to decide whether they are in ascending or descending order of importance.

First is oil. There is no way of evading this simple reality. Oil provides the energy source that drives the economies of the industrial and underdeveloped worlds. Were the principal exports of the region palm dates or pearls or even industrial products, our response to Iraq's transgression would have been far slower and far less massive than has been the case.

Nonetheless, this should not be misunderstood. Our concern is not primarily economic—the price of gasoline at the pump. Were we primarily concerned about the price of oil, we would not have sought to impose an embargo that drove it above $40 a barrel. Instead, our concern is strategic. We cannot allow so large a portion of the world's energy resources to fall under the domination of a single hostile party. Any such party, even Saddam Hussein, would ordinarily be concerned with the stability of the oil market, the better to achieve the long-run exploitation of his economic assets. However, concern properly focuses on the extraordinary periods during which he might use his domination of these oil resources to exploit the outside world's vulnerabilities for strategic mischief.

Second, the United States has had an intimate relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That reflects a number of shared strategic objectives as well as Saudi efforts to stabilize the oil market—most dramatically in the period after the fall of the Shah. It is embodied in the Carter Doctrine, which pledges military resistance to external assaults on the Kingdom, as well as the Reagan corollary, which subsequently pledged resistance to internal subversion.

Failure of the United States to honor such commitments would raise questions about the seriousness of the United States, not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere. It is notable that down through August 2 Kuwait itself rebuffed attempts of the United States to provide similar protection, though President Bush's remarks since that date have tended to establish a U.S. commitment to the security of Kuwait.

Third, since the close of World War II, and particularly since the establishment of the State of Israel, the United States has had a generalized commitment to the stability of the Middle East and to the security of Israel. On numerous occasions this generalized commitment has led to U.S. diplomatic or military involvement in the region not always marked by complete success.

Let me turn now to the alternative strategies available to the United States and its allies. The first, of course, is to allow the weight of the economic sanctions imposed in August gradually to wear down the capacity and the will of Iraq to sustain its present position. The embargo, backed up by a naval blockade, is the most successful ever achieved aside from time of war.

Early on it was officially estimated that it would require a year for the sanctions to work. It now appears to be working more rapidly than anticipated. In 3 months time, civilian production in Iraq is estimated to have declined by some 40 percent. Oil exports are essentially nil, and export earnings have dropped correspondingly. The hoard of hard currency necessary to sustain smuggling is dwindling away. The economic pressure can only grow worse.

While Iraq's military posture does not appear to have been seriously affected as yet, as the months go by that, too, will be seriously weakened. Lack of spare parts will force Iraq to begin to cannibalize its military equipment. Military industry, as yet significantly unaffected, will follow the downward path of civilian industry. In short, the burden on both Iraq's economy and her military strength will steadily increase.

We know that such burdens must ultimately affect political judgment and political will. In time, the original objectives of the United Nations will be attained. Already Saddam Hussein shows a willingness, if not an eagerness, to compromise. One no longer hears that Kuwait is for all eternity the 19th province of Iraq. But for some, ultimately may not be soon enough; and for others, the original objectives may not be sufficient.

To the extent that those original objectives are augmented by demands that Saddam Hussein stand trial as a war criminal, that Iraq provide compensation for the damage it has done, that Iraq's military capacity must be dismantled or destroyed, or that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power, Saddam's determination to hang on will be strengthened.

Some may prefer such a response, in that it precludes a settlement and makes recourse to military force more likely. Nonetheless, if one avoids this list of additional demands and is satisfied with the original objectives, the probability that the economic sanctions will result in a satisfactory outcome is very high.

One should note that since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them because they will not have produced the hoped-for results in 6 months time.

In this connection, one should also note the frequently-expressed view that Saddam Hussein must not be "rewarded" for his aggression but instead must be punished. As an expression of emotion, it is understandable, but it must not be allowed to obscure our sense of reality. Saddam Hussein is being punished and punished severely. He has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year; indeed, $30 billion at the current oil price. Iraq's credit is totally destroyed, and the remnants of its hard currency reserves are dwindling.

When Saddam looks across the border at Saudi Arabia or the UAE, they are prospering because of his actions from which he, himself, has derived no benefit. He is likely to be consumed by envy. His own economy is rapidly becoming a basket case.

Moreover, the position of preponderance that he had earlier achieved in OPEC is now gone. He is diplomatically isolated, his military position will slowly be degraded, his pawns in Lebanon have been wiped out by his chief Baathist rival, Assad, who has immensely strengthened his own position. He has been forced to accept an embarrassing peace with Iran, and that nation's position relative to Iraq is slowly being improved. Sympathetic nations such as Jordan and Yemen have been harshly treated, and neither they nor he have had any recourse.

On the benefit side stands only the looting of Kuwait.

In brief, Saddam Hussein staked Iraq's position on a roll of the dice and lost. Only if he has a deeply masochistic streak can he regard himself as rewarded. To allow our own political rhetoric to obscure the severe punishment that has already been meted out or to suggest that our current policy is in some way unsuccessful and that Saddam's position is now or is potentially enviable strikes me as misconceived.

To be sure, imposition of the sanctions has not been painless. Given the limited spare production capacity for oil and the psychological reaction to the prospect of war, oil prices have shot up at their peak. They have more than doubled. The higher oil price, along with the political and economic uncertainties, have imposed a heavy burden on most national economies. Many, including our own, had already started or were tipping into recession. For most economies, the Gulf crisis has either reinforced or initiated a further contraction.

I do not want to understate the cost. In the case of the American economy it will amount to $100–$200 billion in lost economic growth, but that price has already been paid. The oil market, reflecting a sizable shrinkage of expected demand as a consequence of higher oil prices and the impact of recession, has now been brought precariously into balance. The world is able to do without Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude. Thus, to sustain the embargo, no further price need be paid. In effect, we can leave Iraq in isolation until it comes to its senses.

That brings us to the second alternative—the military option. There is little question that the United States and its allies can inflict a crippling military defeat on Iraq. It can eject Iraq from Kuwait. It can destroy Iraq's military forces and military industries. It can destroy, if it wishes, Iraq's cities. The question is, at what cost, and whether it is wise to incur that cost.

Whenever a nation accepts the hazards of war, the precise outcome is not predetermined. Depending upon the military strategy chosen and the tenacity of Iraq's forces, there could be a considerable variation in the outcome. In the event of an all-out assault on entrenched Iraqi positions, the casualties may be expected to run into several tens of thousands. However, if we avoid that all-out assault, make use of our decisive advantages in the air and exploit the opponent's vulnerabilities by our own mobility, the casualties could be held to a fraction of that prior estimate.

In between 4 and 8 weeks it should all be over, save for starving out or mopping up the remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The question then becomes whether one goes on to occupy Iraq to destroy the balance of Iraqi forces and the like. That would be far more difficult and time-consuming, but circumstances could make it unavoidable.

I think it prudent to say no more about strategy and tactics in this session, Mr. Chairman. Suffice it to say the immediate price will not be small. American forces would be obliged to carry a disproportionate burden in any struggle.

This will affect the attitudes of our public and the attitudes in the Middle East regarding the United States. I believe that the direct cost of combat, including that of a probable scorched-earth policy in Kuwait, will be the lesser part of the total cost.

The Middle East would never be the same. It is a fragile, inflammable and unpredictable region. The sight of the United States inflicting a devastating defeat on an Arab country from the soil of an Arab neighbor may result in an enmity directed at the United States for an extended period, not only by Iraq and its present supporters, but ultimately among the publics of some of the nations now allied to us.

To be sure, there are no certainties, yet that risk must be borne in mind. Moreover, the United States will be obliged to involve itself deeply in the reconstruction of the region in the aftermath of a shattering war. In brief, the noncombat costs of a recourse to war, while not calculable in advance, are likely to be substantial.

On November 8, President Bush announced his decision to acquire "an offensive military option" and nearly to double U.S. forces deployed in the Persian Gulf. That announcement altered the strategic, diplomatic and psychological landscape. The deployment of four additional armored divisions implied that the United States might itself choose to cross that "line in the sand" and forcibly to eject Iraq's troops from Kuwait.

As the President indicated, the earlier deployment in August had been intended to deter further Iraqi aggression. One must recognize that to this point Saddam Hussein has remained unmoved either by appeals or by international declarations. It is only the prospect that force might be used against him that has brought forth any sign of willingness to compromise.

The principal goal of the administration at this time in deciding on these deployments may simply be to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Yet, the situation is more complicated. As Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, Mr. Gorbachev's special envoy, has indicated after conversations with Saddam Hussein, even if Saddam is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait, he would require clear evidence that the sanctions would be terminated and that military force would not subsequently be employed against Iraq. In the absence of such commitments, his incentive to withdraw is weak.

The new deployment might also point to an intention to resort to the military option. The deployment will be complete beginning late in January or early February, and for technical reasons that deployment will be difficult to sustain. That no doubt adds to the pressure, the immediate pressure on Saddam Hussein, but it also increases the pressure to choose the war option.

Since our forces will already have been deployed, it also diminishes the immediate cost of going to war. It should also be pointed out that the extended period required to complete the additional deployments also makes the first strategic alternative of relying on the sanctions less costly. By the time the deployment is completed, military action is initiated and the fighting ceases, at least 8 months of what was originally estimated to be the 11 months required for the sanctions to work will have elapsed. Even more of the time and cost involved in making the sanctions work will have thus already been incurred. At that juncture, however, only a modest part of the cost of exercising the military option will have been incurred.

It should also be noted that Mr. Primakov's observations were confined to the original objective of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate regime. Of late, to those original objectives some additional goals have been hinted or stated: the elimination of Iraq's capacity to intimidate her neighbors, the removal of Iraq's military capability, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and the ending of Iraq's quest for a nuclear capability.

The general effect is to paint Iraq as a rogue or outlaw state, and that its menace to its neighbors and to the international order must be eliminated. To the extent that these additional objectives are embraced, either in appearance or reality, the prospect for a voluntary Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait is sharply diminished. To achieve these objectives there is really no alternative but to resort to war. Saddam Hussein's inclination to dig in will be stiffened, and in all likelihood the willingness of Iraqi forces to resist will be strengthened.

Consideration of the military option will be influenced by attitudes within the international coalition that the United States has organized. By and large, that coalition has revealed strong ambivalence regarding the military option and a preference for a diplomatic solution, with those least directly involved most dubious about the military option.

While the members of that coalition may be prepared to accept military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, to this point they have shown little inclination to embrace the sterner objectives of policy that may have been stated but never officially presented or embraced.

There is, of course, a third strategic alternative: the possibility of a diplomatic solution. Though it remains an eventual possibility, I shall spend little time on it in this hearing for two reasons. First, the United States is probably precluded from any negotiations with Iraq by the position that it initially announced: we will not have any direct communication with Iraq until it has left Kuwait.

For the United States itself to enter into negotiations would represent too much of a diplomatic retreat. To be sure, others have been willing to serve the role of diplomatic intermediaries. Since August, the possibility of an Arab solution has been raised on several occasions. The Soviets, the French, and others have conducted explorations. But as the probability of recourse to war rises, the probability of a diplomatic settlement of necessity shrinks.

That brings me to my second reason for limiting discussion of the diplomatic alternative. If there is to be a diplomatic solution, it will be several months before the outlines gel. It can only gel, gentlemen, as the United States completes its current military deployments.

The United States, given its position, will be obliged to appear merely to acquiesce in such an outcome out of deference to pressures from other elements of the international community. There is something more, however, to be said about the diplomatic situation. In your letter of inquiry, Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Warner inquired about the durability of allied support for the multinational coalition in regard to the original demands on Iraq and the use of sanctions. That support has been firmer than we might have anticipated.

Saddam's appeal to the hearts and minds in the Arab countries seems to have peaked in September. There has been little restlessness elsewhere in the coalition, no doubt in large degree due to the fact that the world can do without Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude.

Moreover, the status quo includes authorization for the naval blockade, which can therefore be continued indefinitely. It would take a positive act of the United Nations to remove that authorization.

However, that coalition is likely to prove less durable if combat actually takes place. Particularly would this be the case if the objectives turn to the new and sterner demands of war policy reflecting the decision that Iraq has become an outlaw state that must be dealt with now.

Needless to say, the international coalition has yet to embrace that line of reasoning.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I close with two observations regarding the inherent difficulties in the emerging situation.

First, if the United States conveys the impression that it has moved from the original international objectives to the sterner objectives that Saddam Hussein must go, that Iraq's military establishment and the threat to the region must be dismantled or eliminated, et cetera, then whatever incentives Saddam Hussein may presently have to acquiesce in the international community's present demands and to leave Kuwait will shrink toward zero.

This may please those who have decided that the war option is the preferable one. But it makes it increasingly hard to hold together the international coalition, which we initially put together to bless our actions in the Gulf.

That brings us to the second observation. The more we rely on the image of Iraq as an outlaw state to justify taking military action, the more we will make holding together the international coalition inherently difficult, if not impossible.

International approval of our actions is something on which the administration has set great store. It has provided the desired legitimacy. To abandon it would mean the undermining of any claim to establishing a new international order.

Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me one final word that goes beyond the crisis in the Gulf. That crisis has preoccupied our attention for more than 3 months and is likely to do so for many months more. It has diverted our attention from subjects that may be of equal or even greater importance.

Six months ago all of us were deeply moved by the developments in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and with the prospect that these nations might move toward democracy and economic reform. Members of this committee will recall our high hopes at that time.

Yet, in the intervening period, with the diverting of our attention to the Gulf, those prospects have been dealt a grievous blow. First was the Soviet decision to force the former satellites to pay hard currency for their oil. Second, that was followed by the Gulf crisis that has sharply raised the international price of oil. The prospects and hopes for Eastern Europe, while our attention has been diverted, have been seriously damaged.

Yet to return to my original theme, in the shaping of the post-Cold War world, it is not clear that the evolution of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may not be more important than developments in the Gulf.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. I have many questions and I know all the members of the committee will have many questions. I am going to try to confine mine to three this morning.

In boiling down your views, is it your view that the liberation of Kuwait at this time is a vital U.S. interest, one that would justify military offensive by largely American military force at the cost of a large number of casualties?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think that it was a vital interest on the 2nd of August when it took place. But the investment of American prestige, the investment of the prestige of the President of the United States now makes it vital for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

I do not think that it is necessary, to achieve that objective, for us to turn to war. I think that we can avoid war and still achieve the objective of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Chairman NUNN. I think you probably anticipated and covered my second question, but for clarity purposes, do you believe that the war option or the use of force option now, at this juncture, is a wise option for the United States?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not believe that at this time. I think that if we wished to react with the use of military force that it is better to do so either when the current buildup is completed or alternatively to have struck back in anger early in the fall.

As our military capacity to wage war has risen gradually over the 6 months of the build-up, the psychological support for war has diminished. It probably peaked out in September in this country.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Schlesinger, on Thanksgiving Day President Bush told a group of U.S. soldiers "Those who would measure the time table for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat."

Continued quote, "Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that is why more and more of your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency. You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure, he has never possessed a weapon that he did not use."

Could you give us your view on how soon Iraq will be able to produce a usable nuclear weapon?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There are two aspects to that question, Mr. Chairman. One is the possibility—and I think that Secretary Cheney on Sunday and the President probably on Thanksgiving Day were referring to this possibility. As you will recall there was a research reactor that was provided by the French late in the 1970s. In 1981 that reactor, the Osiric reactor, was bombed by the Israelis. It was then under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The fuel for that reactor is still there, 27 pounds of enriched uranium. It is that, I think, that has been the center of attention, of speculation, regarding near-term achievement of a nuclear weapon, however crude, by the Iraqis.

As I mentioned, that fuel is under IAEA safeguards. The inspectors have regularly carried out their inspections. They had carried out one in April as part of the PR offensive. Saddam Hussein recently invited the IAEA inspectors to come back. I believe they have completed their inspection, that the fuel is still intact.

But if the Iraqis were to attempt to use that fuel, first we would detect it because of the failure to meet the inspection. But second, it would take them on the order of 9 months or 1 year minimum before they had weaponized that fuel.

As you also know, Mr. Chairman, and I think that this is the larger threat and this is the serious threat that provides some justification for our taking action, the Iraqis have been attempting to develop a serious production capability for nuclear weapons. They have been assisted in this quest by many of our allies, indeed, members of the international coalition who have sold them centrifuge equipment and the like.

It is estimated now that if the Iraqis get no additional such assistance from the outside world that it will be the end of the decade before they have in place the capacity to produce fissionable material and nuclear weapons in number.

If they continue by whatever means, direct or clandestine, to extract aid it is estimated that it will take roughly 5 years, 1995. So we are dealing with a threat down the road. There is no question about that. Urgency? I do not think so.

We may recall that in the days of flourishing communism in Moscow that it used to be said, "That is no accident, comrade." I think that it is no accident that last Tuesday the New York Times published a poll that indicated that the only reason that the American public supported going to war in the Middle East would be to eliminate Iraq's nuclear capability that has led to a number of comments since that time. We heard relatively little about the urgency of the nuclear threat during the first 16 weeks of the crisis since August 2.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Dr. Schlesinger, in conclusion on those remarks it was referenced that nuclear capability——

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear that.

Senator **Warner**. What about the delivery capability of any such weapon such that it could inflict damages, is that not a second part of the equation?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes, sir. The delivery capability of the Iraqis would be limited. The reason for that is that a weapon developed from the—one really should not call it a weapon—a weapon device developed from the fuel of the reactor would be a very large and cumbersome device, probably not deliverable by missile. Therefore, it would have to be delivered by aircraft.

The Saudis have a limited number of aircraft that would be capable of delivering such a device. And they would have to go up against very fierce air defense.

Senator **Warner**. You meant the Iraqis there when you represented the Saudis?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I am sorry, the Iraqis. They would have to go up against very strong air defenses.

Senator **Warner**. And we would have to take into consideration that if such a decision were made to try and implement the use of that crude weapon, it would be done without any testing?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. It would be a one-time use, is that not correct?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes. If they were to test it and announce that they had, they would have exhausted their stockpile.

Senator **Warner**. Therefore, they would be confronted with the possible retaliation of some form of weapons of mass destruction from a number of powers that are now confronting them in the Gulf, is that not correct?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think "possibility" may understate it, Senator. I think they would face the certainty of retaliation, and that they would understand that they faced that certainty.

For the last 40 years, roughly, we have deterred the Soviet Union, that had up to 25,000 nuclear weapons. Even if they were to develop such a limited capability—and I suggest that this is one of the reasons, the most powerful reasons, for our interest in Iraq to eliminate their move toward nuclear weapons—but even if they were to do so, there is little doubt that we can effectively deter them.

Senator **Warner**. Dr. Schlesinger, I had the privilege of serving with you in the Department of Defense during part of the Vietnam war. I would like to return to some of my opening observations.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. That was when we were building the 600-ship Navy, I believe, Mr. Secretary.

Senator **Warner**. Right, which we failed to achieve. I would like to return to some of my earlier observations about the responsibilities of the Congress.

During the period when you were Secretary of Defense, you had to depend upon the support from the Congress in terms of its exercise of the power of the purse. Many members are now calling for a session to consider a declaration of war, and I outlined earlier the full meaning of that term.

If you were Secretary of Defense now, what would you like to see the Congress do, and in what time frame?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Well, you mentioned the Vietnam period, Senator. That was a very painful period. The Congress did exercise the power of the purse because the Congress, or the majority of the Congress, disapproved of our continued involvement in Southeast Asia. That was, I think, a very sad conflict within the U.S. Government—the legislature pitted against the executive.

I hope that we will not see a repetition of that, and that we will certainly not see a repetition of that in the near term. The Congress and the President, the Congress and the executive, must come to a meeting of the minds rather than the power of the purse being used to strangle or limit excessively a war effort.

I would hope, Senator Warner, that the executive branch and particularly the Department of Defense, which rests under your jurisdiction, could come to a meeting of the minds with regard to war objectives if we come to that; that the Congress and the President would agree on what are the needs, the circumstances under which we should go to war.

In the absence of that, I would hope that this committee and the Congress would continue to provide good support to the Department, as it has to this juncture, and I should underscore that the military establishment of the United States has responded well to all of the directives that it has received from its civilian superiors to this point, and I expect that to continue.

I hope that was responsive to your question, Senator.

Senator **Warner**. It seems that you suggest that treating Iraq as an outlaw state which now must be dealt with will make the creation of a new world order more difficult, but I ask, is it not more important to create a new world order that permits the continued existence of Iraq as an outlaw state than it is to deal with that outlaw state now?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. That is a very difficult question, Senator Warner. If one has made the decision that this is a rogue state and must be dealt with now, because of its unwillingness to compromise in the face of international pressure, its pursuit of a nuclear capability, et cetera, then that could be absorbed conceptually within the new world order.

The problem with squashing Iraq is that the other nations that we hope to join with us in this new international order will not embrace the objective that we have just described—that is, to deal with Iraq as a rogue state—because most of them do not regard it as a rogue state. They regard it as a state, kind of in the traditions of power politics, that has stepped over a line and should withdraw behind that line, but they do not regard it as a rogue state.

We, if we are to establish that new international order, would have to get over the barrier formed by the fact that the way that we established it was by quashing Iraq, because we are unlikely—I hope that this is a wrong prediction—but we are unlikely to have much international support if that turns out to be the objective of our war policy.

Senator **Warner**. My time has expired.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Hypothetical war policy.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon, and we will now go to the 10-minute rule.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these hearings. Your opening remarks were so much along the lines of my opening statement that I would just ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be included in the record at this time.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Exon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for holding these important hearings on our Nation's role in the Persian Gulf crisis.

The escalating deployment of American troops to the Gulf combined with the administration's inflamed rhetoric has increased concern among the American people that we are drifting prematurely and mistakenly toward war in order to force Iraq from Kuwait. Troubled by the belief that the President is rushing to combat, Americans are looking to the Congress to exercise its constitutional check and balance on the executive branch before any such decision is made.

To be sure, President Bush has made a sudden and dramatic shift in strategy to emphasize offensive forces over defensive forces in the Middle East. Equally as disturbing, though, is the "Americanization" of the fight against Saddam Hussein's illegal occupation of Kuwait.

Up until recently the "American strategy" for halting Iraq and restoring the legitimate Government of Kuwait has been a "world strategy." Governments as disparate as Syria, the Soviet Union, Britain and Egypt have joined the United States' call to quarantine Iraq in accordance with a unanimously approved United Nations economic embargo. I can not recall an instance when world action was so prompt and universal against the actions of one nation.

With potential Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia deterred and economic sanctions solidly in place, the Bush administration has increasingly "Americanized" the fight. Though Arab States possess the military power to take on Iraq, American troops presently represent 57 percent of the ground forces in the sands of Saudi Arabia. By the time the President's call for 200,000 more deployed troops is realized, 3 of 4 soldiers facing Iraqi tanks will be American men and women.

On the other hand, nations economically dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf such as Japan, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have either refused to contribute military units or sent token forces. The Soviet Union and China—superpowers largely responsible for fueling the Iraqi war machine—are conspicuously absent from the international force facing off against Saddam Hussein.

I am convinced that if hostilities breakout, the United States will have to play the leading role in all areas of warfighting including casualties.

The administration seems to be busily seeking authorization from our allies for Americans to fight against Iraq instead of pushing for a more equitable commitment from them.

If this isn't enough to give Americans concern, Secretary of State Baker's outrageous comment that U.S. forces were in the Middle East to protect American jobs contributes to the confusion as to why we need 430,000 Americans in harm's way and further "Americanizes" the crisis to our allies.

I believe effective sanctions and the specter of a strong, truly international military force can weaken Iraq's resolve and force Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait. I do not believe war is inevitable, nor should it be thought of as such is the crisis is not resolved before the new year.

Yet, I worry that by using what were originally rotational forces as new forces to augment those presently deployed, the Commander in Chief has created a large, "use-it-or-lose-it" force whose effectiveness as a strike force may be limited to a shorter period of time.

I look forward to Dr. Schlesinger's testimony this morning and the testimony of all the excellent witnesses the committee has scheduled this week. The Congress, as well as the American people, will benefit from their counsel as we wrestle with the very real prospect of war in the Middle East.

Senator EXON. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you for being here. I have served on this committee now for 12 years. Time and time again we have asked you to come back as a very learned man with a true bipartisan approach, and you have been of invaluable assistance to this committee over the years. I cannot think of anyone outside of the administration that I would feel more comfortable with in coming here this morning and outlining your thoughtful remarks and suggestions. I welcome you very enthusiastically here this morning.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator EXON. Let me get into some of the questions that I have. I listened very carefully to your statement this morning. I read it as you went through it. Is it fair to say that the bottom line of your recommendation, as of now, is that you think that the embargo against Iraq, does indeed have a chance to work, and that the bottom line is that you would feel that at the present time, the administration and the Congress should give the embargo more of a chance to work before we turn to overt military action?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. I underscore, however, that for the embargo to work, its capacity to work is limited in that it may induce an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait but it is not going to lead Saddam Hussein to abandon power or to dismantle the military establishment, and that it will take time for the embargo to work.

Senator EXON. Dr. Schlesinger, on pages 9 and 10 you said, "I believe that the direct cost of combat, including that of the probable scorched earth policy in Kuwait, will be the lesser part of the total cost. The Middle East would never be the same.

"The sight of the United States inflicting devastating defeat on an Arab country from the soil of an Arab neighbor may result in an enmity directed at the United States for an extended period not only by Iraq and its present supporters, but ultimately among the publics of some of the nations now allied with us. To be sure, there are no certainties, yet the risk must be borne in mind."

Those are some of the things that I think we should all be reminding ourselves today as we discharge our responsibilities in this area.

In the first part of your testimony, while you did not designate your 1–2–3 items as to which was the most important, you started out with oil. I certainly believe that oil and the geopolitical structure of that very fragile part of the world is as much a driving force behind this whole operation as any other.

I would simply point out that while many of the nations that are giving us diplomatic "support" at this time are the greatest direct beneficiaries of the oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait—I would only cite, for example, that the prime importers of oil from Kuwait and from Iraq are the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, and Spain—as near as I am able to ascertain, none of those countries have committed or intend to commit any ground forces to protecting the oil supply that they currently receive.

Suffice to say, I am very much concerned that while the United States is getting a lot of diplomatic encouragement and diplomatic support, little military assistance is being provided by our allies.

To follow on along those lines, a major concern that I see right now is that we are following a very distinct parallel with regard to our involvement in Vietnam, and that was that we Americanized that conflict far more than we should. It was Americans taking the major casualties. It was the Americans making the major contributions.

Certainly with regard to the new forces that the President has announced, it is clear that the United States is going to represent more than the 70 percent of the ground combat forces that would have to wage this war.

You mentioned allies. Do you feel that the allies that we have there right now are playing their fair role, or committing their fair share of the ground troops that would have to be involved in combat, and is not the over-Americanization of this effort something that we might look back on in future years and say, why did we not expect more from others rather than cheers and rather than diplomatic support?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER.** I will evade for a moment the issue of fairness, Senator. Perhaps the best metaphor is Korea rather than Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, we did not have the support of the United Nations, whereas in Korea we had the support of others.

But the same point is clear, that other allied countries did not contribute very much. The British Commonwealth contributed a division, the Turks contributed a brigade, and that was about it. As for allied forces other than Koreans, it was basically American forces.

The same thing I think is developing here. As one knows, amongst the non-Arab countries, the largest contribution is that of the British. We have Arab support—Morocco, most notably Egypt, Syria, and of course the Gulf countries themselves, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council led by Saudi Arabia.

I would underscore that if we do not get much military action out of those Arab powers, that they are an essential part of this operation, and they are providing us with something that is essential; that is, providing us with an indication that this is not an action by the outside Imperialist world, that it is supported by the bulk of the Arab States that have deployed forces into Saudi Arabia, even if they do not contribute much in the way of combat capability.

I do not expect those forces to contribute much in the way of combat capability, Senator Exon. The Syrians have made very clear that they are not going to be engaged in any assault on Iraq. Indeed, they have been quite critical of the United States in the local press of late. President Mubarak has said that from time to time his position is subject to change, but he has indicated he would not assault Iraq, but his troops might be available for clearing out Kuwait.

I think that the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council would participate to the best of their ability, but I think that the American commanders may prefer to use those forces that they know.

This is a long way of saying the combat will be carried out primarily by the United States. That is unfair in some senses, but it is almost inevitable when the United States surges to the fore as the leader, deploys its forces, and makes the diplomatic initiative its own. I am not sure what that new international order will be like, but if the United States plays the principal role as policeman, the United States is going to provide the bulk of the forces and take the bulk of the casualties under those circumstances.

Senator EXON. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you very much.

My time is up. I just want to emphasize and I hope the American people understand that the statement you just made about Arab forces not being counted on is a fact, and I think it is a fact that is not understood well by the American people. At least this part of today's hearing has now brought that out. Whether that is good or bad, I hope there will be a better understanding of how all of our allies, especially those among the Arab nations, are not going to have a significant ground force in the case of combat. Rather, it will be Americanized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I reiterate, Senator Exon, that those Arab forces are essential to the international coalition. Otherwise, this would come to appear, instead of being an action that Iraq has taken disapproved by the bulk of the Arab countries, to be an action of the outside world against an Arab country. For that reason, those forces provide an essential element even if their combat role will be limited.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection I will take my time to make an opening statement, and if there is any time left I will propound questions.

Chairman NUNN. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you and Senator Warner in welcoming Dr. James Schlesinger to this open hearing on our Nation's policy on the Persian Gulf region. His counsel both as a Secretary of Defense and as a private citizen has always been thoughtful and influential. I expect his appearance today was equally well received and helpful in explaining to the American people our commitment to the nations in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for scheduling this series of hearings. I hope they will be a fair assessment of the administration's policy and that they will help our Nation in dealing with this crisis. The invasion of Kuwait is the first world crisis since the ending of the Cold War and, in my judgment, will set the precedent on how the nations of the world will react to future aggression.

It is ironic that in the additional views to the Armed Services National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991, the minority members of this committee stated, "Tensions in the Persian Gulf region remain high, making very real the possibility that U.S. forces may be called on in the near future to once again protect sea lanes in the Gulf. Now is not the time to further decrease our ability to respond to such a call."

Although none of us imagined just how prophetic those words were, I believe they were a realization that despite the demise of the threat in Europe, the military and political climate throughout the world still posed a danger; therefore, our military posture must remain strong and responsive to all contingencies.

I believe this crisis and the responsiveness of our men and women in uniform have proven that point. Had the cuts in manpower and funding in the act been implemented, I expect that our Nation's response to Saddam Hussein's aggression could not have been so decisive.

Mr. Chairman, I support the President's action in sending forces to the Middle East to prevent further aggression by Iraq. This was a decisive step we should all applaud. President Bush, Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney deserve great credit for their quick response to the August 2 invasion of Kuwait and for their success in uniting the community of nations in the common effort to force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Our forces, with the support of the allies, have prevented further aggression. They are enforcing the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq. All the indications are that these sanctions are beginning to have an effect both on the economy and on the military capability of Saddam Hussein's forces. The question now is how long will both this Nation and the United Nations be willing to support these sanctions?

The President deserves credit for bringing together a coalition of allied military forces to face down the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait. Despite the commitment by allies such as Egypt, Great Britain, and France, the United States still provides the vast majority of forces. As a world leader, our Nation should accept a reasonable share of that burden.

However, I resent comments by some of our allies which indicated they will not commit their forces to freeing Kuwait. Until we receive a firm commitment from the coalition that their forces will fight side by side with our soldiers, we cannot expect the full support of the American people. It is, therefore, essential that we have the support of the United Nations and our allies in the region before any attempt is made to liberate Kuwait.

While I am on the topic of support, I expect and will demand a greater share of the financial burden of this crisis be borne by those nations that would benefit from the sacrifices made by the American men and women currently deployed in the region. If the press accounts are accurate, we hear a great deal of talk but little action.

Finally, there is the issue of congressional involvement in the crisis. I believe the President should continue to consult with the congressional leadership, as he has done, before any grave action is taken. If it becomes necessary to commit our forces to combat, other than a defensive action, I would prefer that Congress be involved to insure that our forces have the support of the American people. Our soldiers must have that support to prevent a repeat of Vietnam.

In the event military action becomes necessary, we should strike a decisive blow to free Kuwait and minimize casualties. We should never again commit our fighting men in combat in a piecemeal manner as we did in Vietnam.

Our military leadership has learned its lesson. They have demanded and received the forces necessary to gain victory. I hope that Congress has learned its lesson, also, and will stop criticizing from the sidelines. Our President and his military leaders must have the latitude to make the tough decisions. However, I am also confident that Congress will have the opportunity to exert its will at the appropriate time.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to praise our men and women in uniform, both Active and Reserve components. They are the best forces this Nation has fielded in its history. We can be proud of their accomplishments and their commitments. Regardless of how our citizens feel about the particulars of the Middle East crisis, they are generous in their support of the men and women in uniform and their families.

Dr. Schlesinger, I have a few questions here, and I will proceed until my time is up.

Dr. Schlesinger, it seems that one of the administration's major concerns with regard to the Middle East crisis is that our citizens will not have the resolve to await the effects of the embargo to bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Is this a valid concern? If so, what should the administration be doing to maintain the support for the embargo, regardless of how long it will take to have the desired effect?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, that is a critical question. I believe that it is not only important that we have that resolve but that resolve be understood by Saddam Hussein, who has expressed regularly to outside visitors his skepticism whether this Nation can stay the course, any course.

He was reminded of the position of the United States in 1948 at the time of the Berlin airlift. Nobody believed that the United States would respond as it did in 1948 to the cecession of land traffic to Berlin by bringing aircraft from all over the world and moving not only food but coal to Berlin to sustain it, and that continued for an extended period.

The United States' record has demonstrated that it can stay the course, and I believe that it will stay the course. I do not think that this is an improper concern on the part of the administration, but I do not think that it is correct that we will not stay the course.

Certainly it is necessary for all to convey to Saddam Hussein how tenacious this country will be when it has set its mind on a particular policy goal. I think that the President and others must continuously point out, if we are to sustain the sanctions, even if the original estimate for the time involved before they really began to bite was 1 year, that we must be prepared to stay a year and that our forces will have to stay in the desert, not necessarily 400,000 but sufficient to deter and defend Saudi Arabia, and those requirements that go along with staying the course must be laid out repeatedly to the American public.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, the goal of the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq is to bring sufficient internal pressure on Saddam Hussein to force him to withdraw from Kuwait.

In your judgment, is Saddam Hussein sensitive to internal military or political pressure? If not, why not?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that he is relatively insensitive, but not totally insensitive, to opinions, and particularly opinions amongst those 20 people from the little town on the Tigris from which he comes and from which basically all of his principal advisors come.

And if they begin to believe that the price that Iraq is paying in terms of deteriorating industry, long-term destruction of, in effect, its balance sheet, and weakening military posture, are not worth hanging on in Kuwait, that will change Saddam's mind. There will be no mass upheaval. And I doubt there will be much effective pressure from the military establishment per se.

What we are working on is the mind of Saddam Hussein and those senior advisors who have been intimate with him for these many years.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond. Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me now add my welcome to Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Senator.

Senator **Levin**. Over the Thanksgiving holiday President Bush told our troops in Saudi Arabia that more and more, in his words, their mission is "marked by a real sense of urgency." This statement and others recently made by the President are very different from his earlier declarations and signify a change in direction in U.S. policy in the Gulf crisis.

This change in rhetoric has caused concern among the American people that the United States is headed toward war with Iraq. The naming of our recent training exercise, Imminent Thunder, was a Pentagon statement that war is imminent.

I supported the President's original policy goals and I still do. But I believe it is a mistake to change those goals and commit this country to imminent major offensive military action before fully utilizing economic sanctions.

Originally the goal of the U.S. military deployment to the Gulf region was to defend Saudi Arabia from attack by Iraq. When the President first addressed the Nation on the Gulf crisis, he said "Our forces are in a defensive mode and therefore it is not the mission to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait."

During a press conference on August 8 he further stated that economic sanctions would be used to pressure Iraq out of Kuwait. And that "If fully enforced, they can be very, very effective." Then he added, "Nobody can stand up forever to total economic deprivation."

So that while at first we were determined to avoid setting deadlines for sanctions to work, now we seem hell-bent on setting an early deadline.

Initiating a wide-scale offensive could result in the deaths of thousands of American soldiers. That course of action also risks destroying the fragile international alliance that is united against Iraqi aggression and making the situation in the Gulf one of Iraq versus the United States and further precipitous American use of large-scale force could bring about a broader short-term or long-term configuration in the Middle East with unknown results.

Instead of eliminating troop rotations and adding huge numbers of American forces, the President should be displaying American staying power for the long haul. It is American determination to make the economic sanctions work over a long period that is more likely to impress Saddam Hussein.

One final point. The President is properly seeking U.N. authority before he uses military force to drive Iraq from Kuwait. But he surely should seek congressional authority before initiating any offensive action as well. In the absence of congressional authority the President will lack the consensus that is essential to sustain public opinion and support of his actions.

I find it incredible that the President feels the need to obtain UN approval for a U.S. offensive, but will not commit himself to seeking congressional approval for such an operation. But like it or not, the President has taken that position. And congressional protestations are not about to change it.

Given the President's refusal to commit himself to seek congressional approval before initiating wide-scale offensive military action, Congress has been viewed as having three legislative alternatives.

First, the Congress could decide to do nothing legislatively. That amounts to acquiescence in whatever the President decides to do regardless of questions that members may raise or hearings that might be held.

Second, Congress could authorize a military offensive in advance.

Third, Congress could act to stop a broad-scale military offensive by using the power of the purse to prohibit obligation of funds for such an offensive.

None of these approaches are, in my opinion, desirable. The first one, deciding to do nothing in advance of a Presidential decision on an offensive, amounts to congressional abdication of its responsibility to participate in national decisions.

The second approach, saying yes in advance, amounts to a blank check.

The third approach, saying no in advance, would prejudge future circumstances and weaken the President's efforts to pressure Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait.

But while none of these approaches are desirable, the importance of congressional participation in forging a national consensus requires that the Congress look for and adopt other options.

So I suggest a fourth legislative approach. A moderate, but effective approach that would require that any funds be used for wide-scale offensive operations in the Persian Gulf only after a resolution is adopted by the Congress which authorizes the President to engage in such offensive operations. This approach uses the power of the purse to assure congressional participation before a wide-scale offensive military action is initiated without prejudging how the congressional power will be used.

No President can rule out a military response to a recognized provocation, nor should the President. No Congress or substantial percentage of American citizens would require this sort of handcuffing of the Commander in Chief. But if the President has established a short time frame, after which the economic sanctions will give way to large-scale military offensive, then he has changed course. And Congress should seek to restore our policy to its original goals.

Dr. Schlesinger, my questions relate to your very important testimony, particularly on page 6. It is your judgment that if we are satisfied with the original objectives that the probability that the economic sanctions will result in a satisfactory outcome is very high. And I consider that conclusion on your part to be a very, very significant nugget in this testimony. You have reached that conclusion.

You also then go on to say that the original estimate was that the sanctions would require a year. I am wondering as to whose estimate that was. Second, whether or not it is your estimate that they will require a year? And if it is not your estimate, what is your estimate as to how long they might require?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As I say that was an official estimate.

Senator LEVIN. It was what?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. An official estimate which you will hear more about at some subsequent juncture.

Senator LEVIN. Was that a public official estimate?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is not a public official estimate.

Senator LEVIN. Now what is your estimate as to how long?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I was concerned at the outset of this discussion in August, because I believe that many people at that time had the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein would cave quickly and, at the mere announcement of the sanctions, because of his miserable credit position, would bring him to heel in a month or even a matter of weeks, 2 months or less, something of that sort.

And I pressed very hard at that time that it would take 9 months or 10 months minimum. A year seems to me to be in the right ball park. It would take that long to begin to drain off the cash that is now sustaining the smuggling operations that bring in food. Smugglers have this way of wanting cash on the barrel head. Until that cash is gone I think that the borders will be moderately open.

The economy will be in severe difficulty in 10 months or a year's time. The problem is will that severe difficulty of the economy be translated into a change in policy on the part of Saddam Hussein, which goes back to Senator Thurmond's question. I think it may take longer than that to change the policy even though Iraq will be in dreadful condition.

Senator LEVIN. But that does not change your conclusion that the original objectives, which are to move Iraq out of Kuwait, can be accomplished through the economic sanction route, that the likelihood of that being accomplished is very high.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Right, with the proviso that we do not add on other things to it and that as Saddam Hussein told Primakov that until he has assurance that the sanctions will end and that there will be no military invasion, there is no incentive to leave Kuwait.

Senator LEVIN. Your statement on page 8 kind of summarizing alternative 1 is that we can, in effect, leave Iraq in isolation until it comes to its senses. Is that your personal recommendation at this point?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think I would follow that policy. Yes, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If I may add a word or two on that. It was a severe price that was paid to impose these sanctions in terms of the gyrations of the oil market, the tipping of many countries into recession, the uncertainties that have been created in financial markets and elsewhere. We have paid that price. Once we have paid that price, to turn to an alternative strategy and begin to pay an additional price for that alternative strategy merely adds to the total price.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I might say in terms of the holding of these hearings that I heartily support them. I believe that the President has a duty not only to inform, but to persuade.

We might remember that it was Senator Dole and Senator Lugar who called for a debate before the full Congress, not only a debate, but decision. But before that debate can begin there are a number of questions that have to be posed and answers to be given.

As I indicated not only does Congress claim certain power in this respect, it also has a concomitant responsibility. And that is not simply to debate this issue, but at some point in time to decide the issue.

A number of people have asked the question, what would be the impact of these hearings upon Saddam Hussein. After all he is apparently a devotee of CNN. And he gets his news and apparently sends foreign policy signals through that medium. There is a danger, of course, that these hearings will provide him with an opportunity to, perhaps, even lengthen his stay in Kuwait, that he will view debate as dissention. And dissention as a political defeat for President Bush.

Dictators, unfortunately, tend to view the world through flat eyes and they see diversity of opinion as a threat that warrants a bullet in the brain. And I think Saddam Hussein has carried that threat out far more successfully perhaps than many other dictators.

But I think it is far better that the President know whether Congress and the American people are going to support his actions before the shooting starts, then discover that he may command the military but lose his countrymen after the battle begins.

I might say that there is some question that has been raised here. If the President had first come before Congress to seek authority to wage war, I suspect that there would be critics who would argue that, having gone to the United Nations to seek sanctions, you should have gone to the U.N. to seek authority to wage war.

And his refusal, I might add, at that point might be seen as something less than a commitment to the rule of law. The President, I think, has made it very clear that he is seeking U.N. support not because he is required to do so, but because it is good policy to do so. With respect to coming to Congress, however, I am of the opinion he is required to come before Congress. He maintains a different viewpoint, but I think nonetheless it is good policy and politics to come before Congress to seek this kind of authority.

Secretary Schlesinger, you seem to have a much more sanguine view about the effectiveness of sanctions than many other people that I have been reading as of late. And you indicated that the psychological support for waging war seems to have peaked in September, just as our capacity or capability for waging war went up dramatically.

I do not know whether there would be an implied assumption that if military power declines in that region, psychological support for the imposition of sanctions might increase. I suspect that's not the case. But nonetheless, I'd like to focus——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me assure you that is not the case.

Senator **Cohen**. Well, I will come to that point in a moment in terms of having a credible military threat. Patrick Clawson has written on this subject of sanctions, and the issue of whether or not they can be effective in the long term. Right now they seem to be a very palatable alternative to war and a very attractive one.

Clawson has written that: "The U.S. Government, and even more forcefully, U.S. civic and religious leaders, have consistently criticized the use of starvation. There is no point, then, to the question can we starve out Saddam Hussein? The relevant question is, instead, can we force Saddam Hussein to accede to conditions he finds humiliating before Iraq receives humanitarian aid?"

I think it is a central question because, even as recently as yesterday, Saddam Hussein, in his rather cynical manipulation of the media, was parading the notion that now children are starving, are sick, in hospitals, deprived of medicines and medical facilities, and he is going to start in the not too distant future, we assume, to start parading out those sick and debilitated individuals.

And what will the world reaction then be? Do you maintain that the United States, the U.N., would say, "We're sorry that we're seeing children starve?" His soldiers will be the last to starve. We will see the Republican guard starve last of all. But what will the reaction of the United Nations and the Western world, who place a very high emphasis upon innocent civilians, be to seeing children forced to pay the penalty for Saddam Hussein's aggression?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Well, Saddam Hussein playing the role of humanitarian is a little bit hard to embrace.

Senator **Cohen**. Well, Willy Brandt has embraced it. Willy Brandt and a host of other former leaders have engaged in a rather, well, I will not characterize it, but a pilgrimage, at least, to Iraq to pay tribute to Saddam Hussein to shake his hand and to seek the release of their hostages. That has been a rather obscene process, I suggest.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I am not sure that they embrace him as a humanitarian. They embrace him as a fellow who has kidnapped their fellow citizens and may be propitiated. That is not exactly humanitarian. Anyone who has gassed his fellow citizens is not in a position, effectively, to portray himself as a humanitarian.

Now, the first point is to bring to an end all that is going on. Saddam has a very simple action that he can take: withdraw from Kuwait. And that that simple point should be driven home. Second, because world opinion is as queasy about the starvation issue as it is, the United Nations has established a set of operational safeguards in which food and medicine can move into Iraq to deal with the problem of children and so on. If the world is queasy, it does not have to rely upon the starvation route. What we see there is that there is a total cut-off of foreign exchange earnings, that the hoard of hard currency is dropping, that civilian industry has declined by 40 percent and will decline further, that his military capabilities respectively will decline. All of those should weigh heavily on the leadership of Iraq, even if there is not the pressure on food.

Senator **Cohen**. You seem to cite Mr. Primakov's efforts with some high regard, indicating that Mr. Primakov said what Saddam Hussein wants is a guarantee that if he withdraws from Kuwait that the United States presumably would not follow him into Baghdad, and number two, that sanctions would end.

Are you comfortable with the idea of Saddam Hussein back in Baghdad with his military intact, with his chemical, biological capabilities intact? Would he not remain a destabilizing force in the Middle East, and do you hold the opinion that international sanctions would be successful in bringing about a reduction in the capability of his military?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. To the first part of the question, no, I am not comfortable with that notion. I know that Saddam Hussein will continue to be a destabilizing force. The Middle East is quite unstable inherently. If Saddam Hussein were to be removed lock, stock and barrel, the Middle East will not be stable.

You will recall, Senator, the recent trip of Hafez al-Assad to Iran to see President Rafsanjani. I'm not sure that they spent their time discussing how to best help the Americans. I think that they were thinking about what comes in the wake. And we know that the reduction of Saddam Hussein's power will lead to other sources of instability; indeed, both Syria and Saudi Arabia indicate that they would not want to see Iraq destroyed as a military force, though they'd like to see Saddam Hussein, needless to say——

Senator COHEN. Is it your position, then, that the administration should have as its principal goal the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait back to Baghdad as such? And then what?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me finish. On the prior question, which deals with this question, I do not think that we should limit ourselves in the use of the sanctions necessarily to simply the announced original objections. I believe that we can bring pressure to bear on the nuclear issue.

Senator COHEN. But I raise that issue because you cited Mr. Primakov as saying that that is what Saddam Hussein wants.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think, I think Mr. Primakov is a source of information about Saddam Hussein's views. I do not regard him as a sage to guide our policy.

Senator COHEN. So you believe that we should try, through the use of sanctions, to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, then continue the sanctions to prevent him from acquiring nuclear weapons?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Simultaneously, we should press him to observe the requirements of the non-proliferation treaty, which I believe Iraq is a signatory.

Senator COHEN. But I thought you indicated that, if he were to possess a nuclear capability, that that in itself would not necessarily cause any more instability to the region, since there would be a deterrent against him ever using a nuclear weapon. Why would that be a major objective——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, no. The fact that we can deter does not mean that the existence of such a capability is not a source of instability. It forces us, amongst other things, to deter. For 30-odd years now, I have been pressing on non-proliferation policies. I think that they are important goals for the United States.

I earlier expressed the fact that he is not going to have a near-term serious nuclear capability, but we ought to be taking steps to head off that longer term objective that he has to be able to produce nuclear weapons. That is perhaps the most important goal before us of American policy.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join in welcoming Dr. Schlesinger back here.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. These hearings by the Armed Services Committee this week and the Foreign Relations Committee next week may well determine whether the United States goes to war in the next 2 or 3 months in the Persian Gulf. And that profound decision is not the President's alone to make. Congress has its own responsibility to participate in the decision on war or peace, whether President Bush asks for our participation or not.

When the founding fathers wrote the Constitution, they clearly recognized the danger that unrestrained Presidential power could lead the Nation into unwise wars which the people do not support. And as a result, they divided the war-making power between Congress and the President. Article 2 of the Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Article 1 gives Congress the power to declare war.

No one denies that President Bush has inherent power to respond to an attack by Iraq on American forces or to deal with other legitimate provocations. But the Constitution is crystal clear that he does not have the authority to go to war in the circumstances that prevail at the present in the Persian Gulf.

I know a point has been made earlier in the hearings about the numbers of times that there have actually been declarations of war, but we are not talking about Libya or Panama or Grenada. We are talking now about a very important and potential conflict that would involve the United States in a very dramatic way.

It is not enough for President Bush to go to the United Nations to get approval for the use of military force in the Persian Gulf. He must also come to Congress. And if he refuses to come to Congress, Congress must go to him by adopting our own resolution that spells out whatever authorization, if any, he should have to undertake offensive military actions against Iraq.

And so I welcome these hearings as the indispensable first step by Congress to ensure that the President obeys the Constitution. America is not a nation that goes to war lightly, but we do not resist the challenge when the cause is just, when the interest is vital, and when all peaceful alternatives have failed. We have never shrunk from our responsibility and we will not do so now.

The principal purpose of these hearings is to determine whether peaceful alternatives have failed, so that military action could now be justified. In my view, the case for force has not been made. Sanctions are not only working, but working well, and they should be given additional time to work even more effectively. The rapid deployment of 200,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf last summer accomplished two important short-run goals: deterring further aggression by Iraq, and preserving the world's oil supplies.

And the rapid implementation of comprehensive, international economic sanctions against Iraq has already achieved a third important goal: requiring Saddam Hussein to pay a heavy, heavy continuing price for his aggression each day the aggression lasts.

Iraq's oil export earnings, the lifeblood of Saddam Hussein's power, have dropped from $1.5 billion a month to zero. He has occupied Kuwait's rich oil fields, but they are worthless to him now. In addition, his assets abroad have been seized, he can no longer import equipment and technology for his war machines, his nuclear power plants, or any other purpose. Iraq's economy is declining at an estimated rate of 5 percent a month.

The goals we have already achieved are of immense value, not only to the United States but to the entire world community. And they continue to be achieved with unprecedented worldwide support and without bloodshed.

There is also good reason to believe that the current strategy of sanctions is the best means at the least cost to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions are also the most realistic policy for achieving the long-run goal of dismantling Saddam's present and future arsenal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ensuring that none of these weapons is ever used again.

To abandon sanctions now, while they are achieving these tangible successes and before they are clearly proved to have failed, is to risk tens of thousands of American lives unnecessarily. War in the Persian Gulf invites consequences that no one can foresee, but those consequences could well be catastrophic for the United States and for our future vital interest in the Middle East.

A war with Iraq could mean extremely high casualties, with thousands of Americans dead, even greater numbers wounded in a long and costly ground war. There is no guarantee that air power alone can do the job or that entrenched Iraqi forces will surrender quickly. A war would also put at risk the entire Arab and international coalition that has been indispensable to the success of our policy so far.

The present coalition supporting sanctions may be difficult to hold together over time, but a war could divide the coalition even more quickly, especially if U.S. air attacks inflict heavy casualties on the civilian Arab population of Iraq or Kuwait, or if Israel enters the war. A war could also do enormous damage to the world economy, sending oil prices twice as high as they are today, with potentially harsh and disruptive consequences for all nations.

Finally, one other point should be made. The Bush administration and other nations bear a heavy responsibility for the dangerous war machine that Saddam Hussein has assembled in recent years.

For the past decade, we have tilted toward Iraq because it was the enemy of Iran. We offered assistance to Saddam Hussein. We looked the other way while he used poison gas against Iran, and even against thousands of men, women and children in his own country. We largely ignored his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and on the very eve of the invasion of Kuwait, the administration was sending mixed signals to Iraq, signals that may well have convinced Saddam Hussein that he could occupy Kuwait with little protest from the United States.

We must not let the serious miscalculations of the past mislead us into even more serious miscalculations in the present. Our current policy of sanctions is working and it should be given adequate time to work. If ever there was a case for giving peace a chance, this is it. This is one search for peace that does not involve appeasement of aggression, and we should do all we can in Congress to stop this war before it starts.

Mr. Secretary, I took the conclusion of your thoughtful statement to be that we should give the sanctions more time to work, that the sanctions can succeed in forcing Saddam from Kuwait, and that the President has acted prematurely in turning to an offensive strategy.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the sanctions can work. Let me say a word about the President, though, in response to your suggestion that he acted prematurely.

The military option is part of the calculation of Saddam Hussein. The President, following Senator Levin's observations, is talking to many audiences. He is not only talking to the American people. He is talking to the United Nations. He is trying to convey to Saddam Hussein that he is prepared, if the need arises, to use military power. He is talking to the American people and the Congress. That is a very difficult and complex task.

So I do not know what is in the President's mind. I do not know that the President has turned to the military option; and, therefore, I cannot conclude that it is premature. I understand if he is attempting to convey to Saddam Hussein that he is serious, why is he saying what he is?

Senator KENNEDY. The point I would make is that I would agree with Senator Levin's assessment that the commitment of initial forces, as I made clear in the statement, was essential both to halt the potential of aggression down through Saudi Arabia. I do not know of many Members of the House or the Senate on either side of the aisle that had anything but support for the initial commitment and also for the galvanizing of the international community.

I think the point that was made earlier was that that commitment has altered and changed into more of an offensive mode, and it is to that aspect of the change of policy that I was addressing that question.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Quite right, Senator. I understood that. The President's policy is to convey that he might turn to offense as a way of bringing pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein. You see no need for that particular element of his strategy, and you would prefer to rely on the sanctions.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you. Given the makeup of the force structure that is gathered now and is planned to be gathered over the period of the next 2 months, what is your estimate of the percent of casualties that would be Americans, understanding what the various assault groups are in the various forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that it is quite likely that the percentage of the assault forces will be in excess of 90 percent American. If the casualties were comparable, that would be the outcome; but other forces are less well trained, and if they participate they might take disproportionately higher casualties, recognizing that they are smaller forces than the American. So that 90 percent or more figure might be watered down.

Senator **Kennedy**. So, you would estimate that 90 percent of the casualties there would be borne by America?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Roughly, yes.

Senator **Kennedy**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator McCain.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. It is always illuminating to have you with us over these several years.

First of all, I feel that, particularly in light of the apparently forthcoming endorsement of the use of force by the United Nations, it is entirely appropriate for Congress to return to a special session and either endorse the President's use of force or at least make their voice heard and be part of this process. In my view, I would hope that would be considered by the leadership of Congress as well as the White House.

Second of all, I would like to put to rest a certain myth that is being purveyed, for various reasons which are not clear to me, that the administration has changed abruptly and there has been a fundamental shift in our strategy in the Persian Gulf. That is patently false.

The President of the United States came before the Congress and the American people in August, and as recently as last week he said, "Our goals have not changed since I, the President, first outlined them to the American people last August: First, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; third, security and stability for the Gulf; and fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad." The President's goals have not changed, and it is clear to me and I hope it is clear to the American people.

Dr. Schlesinger, on page 5 of your written statement you said, "In time, the original objectives of the United Nations will be obtained. Already Saddam Hussein shows a willingness, if not an eagerness, to compromise. One no longer hears that Kuwait is for all eternity the 19th province of Iraq."

Well, we heard it the day before yesterday from Saddam Hussein. Perhaps I have missed something, and I thought I followed it pretty closely. Could you give me an indication of Saddam Hussein's eagerness to compromise?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I say quite clearly that he has displayed no eagerness to compromise.

Senator **McCain**. What does your statement say on page 5?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. It says he has shown a willingness to compromise.

Saddam Hussein quite obviously is playing for time, and he thinks that the coalition will alter or the steadfastness of our policy will alter, but his stance has changed in his discussions with former Chancellor Brandt, Yevgeny Primakov, Edward Heath and others. He has privately indicated a willingness to withdraw substantially, though not, I should emphasize, entirely from Kuwait in exchange for various adjustments of our policy.

These may all be hints, Senator. He may not have——

Senator **McCain**. Why does he not just communicate that directly to the President of the United States if he is serious, Dr. Schlesinger? I do not see where there should be any problem there if he is serious.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think there is a problem in the first place, because we have said that we are not going to have any communication with him, and, therefore, it is a little hard for him to communicate that directly to the President of the United States.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you mean that if he sent a message to the Senate that he is ready to withdraw from Kuwait, the President of the United States would not respond to such a message? I find that hard to believe.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. He quite obviously is interested in the associations of his withdrawal—I reiterate. Though he has thrown out these hints of being prepared to withdraw, he has made no public statement to that effect, and his hints may be simply teasers, teasers for these various people.

But if he is serious—and I think that his circumstances should make him serious—then he is interested in the accompaniments of such a withdrawal, and he needs to have certain commitments on our part about what would come in the wake of such a withdrawal.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, first of all, I have seen no willingness to compromise on his part; but again, perhaps I have missed something, and you have not comforted me at all. The fact is that he has not shown a willingness. He has played the same game that we have seen other people, including the Vietnamese during the Vietnam war, play where hints were dropped and then bombing pauses ensued, and the light at the end of the tunnel turned out to be a train.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is right, Senator, and I agree with your point. He has hinted at a willingness. How about that?

Senator MCCAIN. First of all, President Bush said there is a sense of urgency. I agree with him. There is a sense of urgency, and it is because of the fact that American citizens by the hundreds are being held hostage, some whose very lives are in danger and whose health is in danger. Nowhere in your statement do you address what I think is a very, very important, critical issue with the American people; that is, the continued holding of American citizens as well as thousands of other foreigners who are being manipulated in the most obscene fashion, in the words of my colleague from Maine.

Frankly, I think that it is a very crucial issue and one that should be addressed. Are you concerned about that issue, Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Of course.

Senator MCCAIN. As far as the issue of Mr. Primakov is concerned, I guess it has already been covered, but, again, I believe that Saddam Hussein could communicate his willingness to compromise directly to us.

On page 12 of your statement you mention that the additional goals have been hinted at or stated: the elimination of Iraq's capacity to intimidate her neighbors; removal of Iraq's military capability; removal of Saddam Hussein from power; the ending of Iraq's quest for nuclear capability, et cetera. The general effect is to paint Iraq as a rogue or outlaw state.

As you stated, Dr. Schlesinger, anybody who gases his own people, I think, is clearly a rogue or outlaw person, and I also think that those are issues which are of great concern to us and should be part of any overall settlement, particularly in light of the fact that Saddam Hussein threatened to exterminate half of Israel not long ago.

Are these issues not important such as chemical weapons capability, not development of but which he already has, and the means to deliver them some 400 miles?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Of course they are. These are, I think, rhetorical questions, and the answer is yes.

Senator MCCAIN. But according to your statement, they should not be part of the——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think I said that, Senator. I think that if you read the statement, what I said, for those who want to add on to the original objectives, these other elements, because they happen to believe, as you do, that Iraq is a rogue state, then quite obviously that is a perfectly valid thing to do, and the only alternative under those circumstances to achieve those objectives will be war.

You sure as hell are not going to change that by economic sanctions.

Senator MCCAIN. For the United States itself to enter into the negotiations would represent too much of a diplomatic retreat, so you pass over that. If Saddam Hussein announced that he was going to withdraw from Kuwait at that point, would it then be appropriate for the United States to enter into negotiations?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Once again, of course, the answer to that in my judgment is yes. It is the President of the United States who announced, Senator, that until such time as he had withdrawn from Kuwait totally, unconditionally and immediately, the United States was not going to have negotiations with him. That is the President's policy.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. Again, I regret that——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If we were to back off on that, of course, it would represent a retreat on our part. That is why I think that, despite different circumstances, the United States continues to refuse to negotiate directly with Saddam Hussein. We have put that withdrawal as a precondition.

Indeed, Saddam Hussein keeps hinting, in fact publicly stating, that we should start negotiations with him.

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, Israel is part of the negotiation process?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Foreign Minister of Yemen just yesterday said there should be direct negotiations with Saddam Hussein by the United States. It is the policy of the United States not to negotiate until such time as he has withdrawn. If you have objections to those policies, take them to the White House.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you disagree with him?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I beg your pardon?

Senator MCCAIN. You know how important the Foreign Minister of Yemen is, but do you disagree with him?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER.** I think I indicated in my statement, Senator McCain, that, given the position that the President has taken, for the United States to back off and begin negotiations would be a serious diplomatic retreat that I would not urge upon the President.

Senator **MCCAIN.** Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, I know that as we begin this hearing, many of my colleagues will focus on the role of Congress in reviewing the nature of our military commitment in Operation Desert Shield. I know that many will be concerned with the risk of war, with the separation of power, and even with the need to establish a political view or identity separate from that of the President.

I share what I know to be our common concern with the risk of war. I do not believe that any member of this committee has a greater desire than me to see a peaceful solution in the Gulf. But, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we must be extremely careful not to send the wrong signals to our Nation and the world. We must not give the impression that we are criticizing the fundamental rationale for our effort to fight Iraqi aggression, or for deploying military forces as part of Operation Desert Shield.

We are in the Gulf to fight naked aggression, not to deal with some minor border clash or petty military conflict. We have already seen conflicts in the developing world cost the lives of millions, and produce over 10 million casualties and refugees since the end of World War II. We know that if we do not resist actions like those of Saddam Hussein, we will drift back from the end of the Cold War into a world filled with lesser conflicts, and see that long-standing arms race in conventional arms become an arms race in weapons of mass destruction.

We are in the Gulf to defend vital strategic interests, not to change the price of gas. If Iraq's aggression stands, it will directly control some 20 percent of all the world's proven oil reserves, and roughly six times all the proven oil reserves in the United States.

We will see more than 60 percent of all the world's proven oil reserves come under the de facto control of a ruthless dictator. We cannot predict the precise consequences of such domination, but we know that they could mean trillions of dollars in added world oil costs over the coming decades, and that it would be a lasting threat to our ever more interdependent global economy.

We are in the Gulf because we are the only nation with the strength to project the necessary military power, not because other nations have abandoned their responsibilities. I must note that some 26 other nations support us, and that Britain, Egypt, France, Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, and Syria have made major military commitments. Further, many developing states—including states as poor as Bangladesh—have risked their economic futures by supporting the U.N. embargo.

We are in the Gulf because war may be necessary, not because we want war. President Bush has catalyzed more international action in support of peaceful alternatives to war in fighting aggression than any other leader in human history. He has sought support from the United Nations in using force, and I am confident he will receive it. He has given Saddam Hussein ample warning and ample time to withdraw. He has made no demands on Iraq other than demanding it give up its illicit conquests.

If we go to war, it will be because Saddam Hussein committed an unquestionable act of war on August 2, 1990. He is ruthlessly destroying a small and defenseless nation, is treating foreign citizens as hostages and human shields, is threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction, and is gradually confronting us with facts on the ground that leave us no other choice.

We must be equally careful, Mr. Chairman, not to let an insistence on congressional perogatives, and our desire to second guess our Commander in Chief, undermine either our efforts to force Saddam Hussein to retreat without fighting, or appear to undermine the credibility of our military options.

We in the Congress must not give Saddam Hussein any hint that he can wait one more day in surrendering his ill-gotten gains. We must not give other nations the impression that we are divided, or that we will not support our President—and our friends and allies—if Saddam Hussein forces war upon us. We must not return to the petty squabbles over consultation and War Powers that have characterized Congress in recent years.

By all means, let us listen to alternative voices. Let us all remember, however, that we are in the Gulf because we should be. The key decisions are being made by the President as Commander in Chief because he should make them.

Let us also remember the stakes. Our only choices now are success or appeasement. I hope that we will be successful without war, but we must be successful even if this means war.

Equally important, if we falter, Saddam Hussein and his ilk will succeed. We will face a threat to any stable world economic order that may last decades. We will see the same precedent established that shaped the disintegration of the world's hopes in the years before World War II. We will see the aggressor nations of the world follow in Saddam's footsteps, and race him to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We will leave Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and all our other friends in the region unshielded.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we must not forget our responsibilities as elected officials, but we must first remember our responsibilities as Americans. The issue is not perogatives, it is patriotism.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Senator Bingaman.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a procedural question for a moment? The Senator from Wyoming had to depart. May he submit written questions and we will ask the witness to respond at the earliest opportunity?

Chairman NUNN. We will be pleased to do that. We always appreciate the time of our outside witnesses and do not want to impose too many questions for the record which require homework, but I know Dr. Schlesinger will be glad to do that and I know that Senator Wallop's questions will probably be addressed.

Senator WARNER. I hope the record will show that Dr. Schlesinger is nodding his head in assent.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But not to the chairman's observations that I would be glad to do that. I will do it, however. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you for appearing today and for your thoughtful statement.

I agree with your basic recommendation that we should stick with economic sanctions and let them take effect, and I have written to the President on November 8 urging that same course. I would like your thoughts on how the setting of deadlines for the withdrawal from Kuwait plays into that strategy.

The United Nations resolution that is being considered as I understand it—and I support the adoption of that resolution, but I think it is being interpreted by many not as authorizing the use of force after a certain date, but rather as setting a deadline after which force will be used.

It strikes me as unwise for us to be setting a deadline after which time we are broadcasting to Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world that force will be used if, in fact, we are intent upon staying the course with economic sanctions and letting circumstances develop, so I would be interested in your point of view on that.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that your question covers all of the aspects of that. The statement authorizes the use of force when other alternatives have failed. It may create the expectation that force will be applied quickly thereafter. If Saddam Hussein believes that, well and good. It adds to the pressure on him, but there is no necessity, and I do not think in the part of many voting for it will there be an expectation that force will be used quickly; and of course if one is relying on the sanctions, they are going to have to run much beyond the end of February before they bring a change in policy.

Senator BINGAMAN. I wanted to ask you about your statement on page 8 that the oil market has now been brought into balance and that to sustain the embargo no further price must be paid. I guess my concern with that is my impression that the economy is going into recession and that the length of that recession and the depth of that recession will be directly tied to the price of oil over the coming months.

If, in fact, this crisis were to be concluded and resolved quickly, presumably the price of oil would return to more modest levels, and in that sense we have not yet paid all of the price of maintaining economic sanctions over the next year, as I would see it. I did not know if you wanted to clarify what you said there.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is correct that if we do not follow the sanctions route, which accepts the run up in the price, let us say, to the mid or high 20s and is premised on that, we will have to pay no further price above where the oil market stands now and its impact upon the economies of the various nations.

We could, as you indicate, if we had a settlement, have the stimulus to the economy and a reduction of the recession because the oil price falls back to the mid-teens, let us say, and you might add that if war breaks out there may be a temporary surge in oil prices modified by a possible decision of the President to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but there is likely to be a surge in oil prices that would augment the price that you see here.

Senator BINGAMAN. You also go on to another subject on page 8 and say that depending upon the military strategy chosen and the tenacity of Iraq's forces there could be considerable variation in the outcome.

My concern with the decision of the President to increase the number of troops and send the additional divisions to Saudi Arabia in the last several weeks, my concern with that I guess is heightened by my fear that it indicates something about the military strategy we might pursue. Do you share that concern or is that a subject that this committee should concern itself with?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think the committee should concern itself with that possibility. I do not think that it does reveal anything about the military strategy that we might pursue. What the military services have requested, since all options are open, is to have forces sufficient in the region to fulfill those requirements. I think that the President and his advisors will be quite concerned about holding down the number of casualties and that therefore the likelihood is that they will avoid the all-out assault, but they will have the forces there to do so, and that may therefore be of interest to this committee.

Senator BINGAMAN. As I understand your answer to some previous questions in your testimony here, it is your view that if sanctions were to work, and if Saddam Hussein were to withdraw his troops from Kuwait back into Iraq, we should accept that as a reasonable outcome and be willing to essentially go back to the previous position, withdraw our forces from the Middle East. Is that an accurate statement, or is that not correct?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. That is a largely accurate statement. I do not believe under those circumstances that we can withdraw our forces from the Middle East. The Middle East is basically an unstable area. There are a number of countries in the region that cannot stand up to Iraq or Iran or Syria, that they will continue to have a military edge and they will continue to be subject to intimidation under those circumstances. I believe that we will have to create a security system in that region whether or not Saddam Hussein departs.

One other exception, in talking to Senator Cohen earlier, I think that the issue of the movement of Iraq toward a nuclear capability is also an element that we should pursue, even if he is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait.

Senator **Bingaman**. Then you see a long-term need for substantial numbers of U.S. troops in the Middle East?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I have long been an advocate of the deployment of U.S. forces in the region, first, of course, as a protection against a possible Soviet move in the region during the 1970s and indeed during the 1980s, subsequently, as a guarantee against a move by Iran during its period of high aggressiveness.

These are States that do not have internally the capacity to resist their neighbors, and given the U.S. stake in the region I would have a deployment. Originally I suggested a brigade, so I do not know whether that is a substantial number.

I think that we should find ways of maintaining a force so that others in the region will recognize that they will cross the United States if they were to take aggressive action. If, indeed, if we had had such a force in Kuwait—and the Kuwaitis did not want it—the circumstances that we face today would not have arisen.

Senator **Bingaman**. Those are all my questions. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. I believe Senator Gorton is next. Senator Gorton.

Senator **Gorton**. Dr. Schlesinger, Senator Nunn in his opening statement set out two different sets of missions or goals I think with great accuracy, but because they were directed at different purposes I trust he will not object to my repeating them.

He said that last August the military mission which President Bush gave to the forces deployed in Desert Shield was: first, to deter further aggression by Iraq in the region; second, to defend Saudi Arabia from attack if deterrence failed; and, third, to enforce the United Nations' economic sanctions against Iraq.

I believe Chairman Nunn went on to say that that military mission has been accomplished. Whether he did or not, it clearly has been. We have deterred further aggression, we have so far successfully defended Saudi Arabia, and we have enforced the economic sanctions.

Chairman Nunn also pointed out a little bit earlier that as against the military mission for Desert Shield the goals of U.S. policy in the region and of U.N. policy in the region were the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. To this point, those policy goals clearly have not been achieved and in some respects seem no closer to achievement than they did early in August.

As a consequence, it seems to me that the question for each of us as individuals and for those of us who hold office and, most particularly, for the President of the United States is whether or not those policy goals can be achieved without a change in the military mission.

With all respect, Dr. Schlesinger, to you and to a number of members of this committee who have already spoken, there seem to me to be few, if any, signs that Saddam Hussein will accede to those goals without a change in the military mission.

President Bush, I believe, reflecting that reality, proposes a change in the mission involving at least two and I fervently hope and trust three elements. The first of those which he has already announced is the placement of armed forces in Saudi Arabia capable of destroying Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors' security and to cause its abandonment of Kuwait itself.

Second, which he is pursuing this week, is securing the authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations for the use of that force capability.

The third, which has been debated here, is securing a similar authorization from the Congress of the United States.

In that respect, I agree with the vast majority of the members of this committee, most particularly expressed by Senator Cohen, that for policy purposes and almost certainly from the perspective of the Constitution, such authorization is necessary. I hope and believe that the President will seek it before he commits American armed services there in the Gulf.

I would have to say that because Saddam Hussein's security, his personal and military security, is not now at this moment threatened externally, in all probability as much as a precipitous retreat is likely to threaten his position internally, he has little incentive today to abide by the will of the United Nations.

It seems to me that there is a realistic possibility of a solution without armed conflict only after the three elements which I have outlined are in place and perhaps in the last 24 or 48 hours before the expiration of a United Nations/United States deadline at the end of which force will be used. At that point and I believe only at that point is it likely that Saddam Hussein will back down and obey the decrees of the United Nations in whole or in part, and he may well do it in part with the view that we would not then use force.

It seems to this Senator, at least, that if Saddam Hussein will not back down and acquiesce under that kind of deadline, a deadline which threatens the destruction of his country and clearly of his own administration, obviously he will not do so under the lesser threat of long-term sanctions.

Now personally, I hope and believe that if we do come to conflict we are not going to take on Saddam Hussein's strength by a massive infantry-tank attack against his trained soldiers in fortified positions, but would utilize primarily those military fields in which we have overwhelming superiority, in the air and at sea, with the real hope that they would be successful in reaching our goal.

I have a question of you, Dr. Schlesinger, on another facet of this to which you referred in passing in the course of your testimony; that is, your justified discontent, the justified discontent of every member of this committee and, I think, of all Americans at the disproportionate American share both in manpower and in money in the defense of a set of principles which are certainly as applicable in Europe and in Japan, and in other parts of the world, as they are here.

We have been rightly discontented with the contributions from Germany and Japan, to name just two powers which 6 months ago were supposed to be our successors as world powers.

I have suggested on two or three occasions and have asked questions, to which I have not gotten satisfactory answers in the past, and I ask you this question. Would it not be appropriate for the United States now, as the protector of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, to urge with the greatest degree of urgency upon those allies their imposition of a very substantial oil tax against exports to those countries which are not contributing appropriately in the Persian Gulf and simply turn that money over to the United States as an additional contribution?

Are we not more likely to cause an appropriate contribution by Japan, for example, in that fashion than by depending on the goodwill of the Japanese Diet?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that the question of segregating some of the oil revenues through a tax or otherwise is a question that the Congress might well wish to consider. I think the use of such segregated revenues, not necessarily turning it over to the United States but some of those nations such as Turkey, Egypt and so on that have been very hard hit by these developments may be an equal or more appropriate use of any such segregated revenues.

Senator **Gorton**. While I appreciate your at least partial endorsement, I think I would have it perhaps more directed.

You have now mentioned a country which leads me to another question. We have, of course, been strongly supported by Turkey in cutting off a pipeline and as a NATO ally and as a place in which many of our air assets are based. Is it your view, that should force ultimately be used against Iraq, there is a high likelihood that Turkey might wish to take the opportunity to occupy some of the oil fields in Northern Iraq, and that they might be rather reluctant to leave those oil fields after the conflict was over?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think it is a possibility, but I do not think it is a high likelihood. I think that Turkey will be very reluctant to join in military operations because of the internal differences within the country.

Senator **Gorton**. And Syria?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Syria would like to help itself to the spoils. It has done so in Lebanon as a result of this crisis. I think that one should not think that Hafez al-Assad is a reformed character or that his appetite has been satisfied.

Senator **Gorton**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Gorton. I believe next is Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a short statement before I get to my questions.

While I have and continue to support the President's policies in the Persian Gulf, I believe the time has come to express a note of caution and my rapidly increasing concern before those policies are extended into timetable combat and before the embargo has had time to really bite, to be effective.

We have been going through a recent period of the administration's shifting rhetoric of justification for possible conflict, that I believe has done more to confuse than to clarify. We can never again get into a war that is not fully understood and backed by the American people, as happened in Vietnam.

It seems that discussion of real and important Persian Gulf policy issues is set aside for momentarily more catchy, attention-getting statements. We have to remember we are talking about war, and it must have more than "sound bite" justification. The important thing in going to war is not whether the President says, "I have had it," but whether the American people "have had it" and will support whatever action comes thereafter. That is a big order.

It is not just mistreatment of hostages or denial of important, or rather, embassy rights, important as they are. Declaring Saddam Hussein as "Hitler-like" and overstating the imminence of nuclear danger appeals to the emotions, if not real understanding.

The "naked aggression" charge against Iraq is absolutely true, but can anyone believe that we would have 400,000 troops in Saudi Arabia supported by U.N. sanctions and embargoes if, if Kuwait was a resourceless nation in a non-strategic, non-energy producing part of the world? Hardly.

There are real issues to be debated, pro and con, at these hearings, issues that more importantly, must be understood by the American people and either accepted or rejected as justifying offensive combat action, if that is to be proposed.

There are issues such as the potential control of 70 percent of the world's oil reserves that was obviously an Iraqi objective, and the reason for our initial response; the implication for long-term United Nations collective security actions; our future relations with Arab nations in the hopes for Mid East peace; the fact that Iraq already has chemical weapons of mass destruction, and has not hesitated to use them, and is developing a nuclear capability; and the interest of Israel in the area.

Now, at least these items need to be fully explained and examined before the American people can be expected to give their assent and committed support to military action.

Will the embargo work? We don't know yet. It's only been in operation for a comparatively short time, but let's give it a chance. Americans, more than most people around the world, are accustomed to near-instant gratification, and that's a problem. What we want, we want now. What we want to do, we want to do now. We establish an embargo, we want it to work now.

But embargoes take time, and certainly Iraq is an ideal embargo target. If the embargo ends in failure, we will still have the military option, and I may well fully support, in fact, probably would support that course at that time. I believe the Persian Gulf is that important. But to again loose the terrors of war and the thousands of lives that hang in the balance should not be a first resort.

Just saying that Kuwait was attacked or that hostages have been mistreated will not be of much solace if flag-draped coffins line up in the hangars of Dover, Delaware. The President must make his case to the American people as to what the real and long-lasting U.S. interests are, and I am certain most Americans would agree that they have yet to hear that clear and certain trumpet from the President on these issues.

Presidents do not go to war. It's the Nation that goes to war. And the people of this Nation must understand and support the decision if we are to avoid the disasters of the past. Mr. Chairman, if these hearings can add to that understanding, they may be the most important hearings we've held in many years. Thank you.

Now for questions. Dr. Schlesinger, it seems to me the President may have overextended or may be in the process of overextending our military deployment in the Gulf. Our force levels in the Gulf are approaching 430,000 troops. In terms of operational forces, the Army will have 34 percent of its Active operational forces in the Gulf, including 7⅔ of its 17 Active divisions. The Navy will have 6 of its 14 carriers. The Marines will have over 50 percent of Active operating forces in the Gulf.

Militarily, many questions arise as to our ability to sustain such a large force for a length of time. It will be difficult, just with the number of people required to rotate through there so that people aren't there interminably, to truly give the embargo time to work.

As an example, in Vietnam, we had 3.5 million troops on active duty during the 1969 peak to support a deployment of 543,000, or 15 percent of the Active duty force, and we had a draft at that time. Today we have 2 million on active duty to support a deployment of 430,000, or 21 percent of the Active duty force.

Now, in your view, have we gotten ourselves into a "use it or lose it" type force? In other words, what military options do we have at this point? What options would we have once the reinforced level is reached? And the key question, can we sustain this without a draft?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we can sustain this deployment without a draft. Whether or not in the longer run the engagement of recruits in foreign deployments in inhospitable places or the possibility or war will reduce the number of recruits so that we have to restore a draft is, I think, an open question.

Indeed, we are deploying a very large part of our forces. The intended deployment will be unsustainable over the long run without a change in policy.

Senator GLENN. You mean going to a draft?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I meant the change of rotation policy and that that issue comes up, I believe, on February 7, at which point the members of the 82nd Airborne will have been there for 6 months. Until that point, it is a hypothetical question. Then it becomes a real and practical question.

The President, as has been mentioned by Senator Gorton, at least, and I think some of the others, is attempting to convey to Saddam Hussein that he is prepared, after authorization, to consider recourse to military force before the sanctions begin to bite, in February. And if it is his intention to convey that impression, than the deployments satisfy that objective, and he does not have to

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reveal his true intentions until after February 7, or indeed beyond that date.

The phrase "use it or lose it," I think, is just too strong. We could, for example, begin the withdrawal of the 82nd Airborne. We could leave their equipments there. We could return them at some subsequent date if war were to come at a later date. We do not lose the option of going to war if we fail to go to war by February 7 or later in February. We do lose something of the fine edge of readiness, as the Senator's question does underscore.

Senator GLENN. We just started this year on this committee—and I'm chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee; Senator McCain is my ranking minority member on that—we worked very hard with the Pentagon to establish this downward trend of our military forces reducing by one-half million out to 1995.

With the down of about 100,000 per year, are we going to have to hold that in abeyance for a while, level it off at least or even reverse it and go back up again, in your opinion?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that you will have to revisit that question in the next budget year, Senator, and as you know, there is, as you know better than I, there is a Mid East supplement, as it were, to the budget that deals with the immediate requirements in the field. All of those things will have to be revisited as a result of whatever transpires in the Middle East.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. If we had more time, I was going to get into this area that you've been an expert in for so many years, in calling for a real energy policy for the country, that we need. Had we done some of the things that you have suggested in the past, and should have done in the past, we might not be as dependent on events in the Persian Gulf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. If I could just clarify one point, I think Senator Glenn's point on the number of forces, sustainability, and your answer, I'd like to add one other clarification. I gather from what you said that you believe it would be preferable for this administration not to rule out the possibility of rotation come January or February.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that there is no need to address that question at this time and therefore, there is no need, it is appropriate not to rule it out.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not express some concerns about the nature of these hearings, particularly in terms of the fact that it is my opinion that Saddam Hussein is counting on the fact that time is on his side, that it is going to be extremely difficult if not impossible for the United States to maintain the coalition of nations unanimous support against his actions, and that the public, the opinion of the American public will begin to unravel as time goes on and as the temperatures once again escalate in the desert, as the windstorms start.

Our troops are over there for an extended period of time. Therefore, I am concerned that our debating in public what our strategy is going to be simply plays into Saddam Hussein's strategy. And while I do not know that for a fact, I am concerned that that might be the case.

I do think it is important for the President to consult with the Congress on a regular basis, as I believe he has done. I also think it is important that we speak as one voice as a nation, if some of these options that are being pursued have an opportunity to succeed.

Having said that, we are here, and it seems to be that, at least the discussion this morning centers on whether or not economic sanctions can be effective in achieving what I think most of us agree should be the objectives relative to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

And Dr. Schlesinger, I would like to pursue that, even though it has been talked about extensively this morning, that essential question: will the sanctions work? And does it justify what I think is the very real risk of leaving a significant number of American troops in a very hostile environment, through a very hostile season to come, and, given the propensity of the American people to want quick solutions and not want to stay the course, and given the uncertainty that will exist in the oil markets, and the speculation and the cost to Eastern European nations, Third World nations, and other industrialized nations, including our own?

And, given the fact that Saddam Hussein's history, relative to hardships suffered by his nation and his people, does not suggest that a shortage of food on the shelves, jobs available for his people, resources available for the normal conduct of a nation's affairs, moves the man.

Is it realistic to think that it is the best course of action to take to "allow the sanctions more time to work?"

I will ask you that question first, before I go on to other specifics.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, those are all penetrating questions that go to the heart of the issue.

I think you are right that Saddam Hussein may be counting on the fact that time is on his side. He certainly is playing for time. I think he is wrong, by the way. Time is not on his side. Once the coalition authorized that naval blockade, there is no way of turning off the naval blockade unless we agree to it and we can sustain that blockade for 6 months, a year, 2 years—whatever it takes.

I agree with your concern that we have become an impatient people, but I think that history will record that when the necessity arises, there is nothing more tenacious than the American people. I mentioned earlier our performance in the Berlin blockade. That stunned the world. I might mention the airlift to Israel in 1973. That was an astonishing performance on the part of the United States, to provide supplies at a difficult moment.

That was not a long, sustained operation, but it required considerable political risk, and of course for 40 years we stood the Watch on the Elbe in order to protect Western Europe against the totalitarian threat.

I believe that this country will be quite tenacious and, as I pointed out earlier, that the costs to us of that tenacity have now already been absorbed.

But you go to the question, if we become impatient, would the sanctions work? Might we abandon them? That certainly is a possibility. I mentioned in my paper—I should stress this because of Senator Gorton's comments—that I believe that it is the military threat that to this point has been the only thing that has brought Saddam Hussein to show whatever hints of flexibility that he has. He is not responding and will not respond to a blockade as of now. You will see no sign of weakness from him until the very moment that he surrenders.

If you go back to the blockade that was imposed upon Iran in 1951, at the time of the seizure of the oil fields, it took 2 years to work. So the reliance on the blockade is certainly not necessarily a short-term option, but I believe that we have the tenacity to see it through if that is the center of the question. I might be wrong. I hope I am right. I hope in this case at least, Senator, that you are wrong, that we would not become impatient, that we would continue to impose these penalties.

Senator COATS. But can the military threat maintain any real viability if this panel or this Congress accepted your conclusion that we should give the sanctions at least a year? How viable is the military threat if Saddam Hussein watches these hearings and comes to the conclusion that it is merely that, that it is a threat, that it will never be used. The Congress has concluded that we should give sanctions a year or more to work. Does that not negate the military threat?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think it negates the military threat. It certainly postpones it. The suggestion that I am making is that we can achieve our stated objectives through the application of the sanctions. That could be wrong. I do not think it is wrong. I do not see how this society, which is already bleeding, can go on for an extended period with the application of the embargo, but I could be wrong. It may be that he is able to withstand it for some years.

Senator COATS. That gets to my follow-up question, because I am trying to get inside the mind set of Saddam Hussein and the people that rule with him and the Iraqis, a nation that has endured untold hardship in 8 years of war with Iran, a nation that has seen some of its own people brutally murdered through the use of chemical weapons, and yet I am just wondering——

You outline on page 6 of your testimony the fact that Saddam Hussein is being punished and punished severely. You talk about forfeiture of foreign earnings and his status among the Arab nations, and so forth and so on. You conclude by saying, "He has staked Iraq's position on a roll of the dice and lost. Only if he has a deeply masochistic streak can he regard himself as rewarded."

That raises the question with me as to whether or not this ruler is operating from a basis that perhaps we have trouble identifying with, not a rational basis; is operating on the basis of martyrdom.

There is a spiritual component, a religious component, a component here in terms of how he sees himself and his nation and his role, that in addition to using the option of chemical warfare on his own people and subjecting his own people to untold death and hardship in its war with Iran, would not flinch at the fact that schoolchildren were not getting adequate nutrition, or that the grocery shelves were no longer stocked, or that the bank accounts were depleted, or that his people were suffering untold economic hardship, yet saw himself, somehow, as a martyr or savior of a greater cause, and therefore I think it really draws into question whether or not we can realistically think that the naval blockade or economic sanctions can be effective.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Well, it does indeed draw that into question. Let me try and respond to that question, which is that that thought, which is I think a very important one—I mentioned Mr. Primakov in my testimony. Primakov believes that Saddam Hussein has a Massada complex. That is, that he is prepared to see—to accept the suicide of his nation, which is not exactly what you meant, I think, by spiritual, but it is an interesting aspect.

He certainly has the inclination, the desire to be the new Saladin, to be the leader of the Arabs. Once again, this is not spiritual, I think, in the sense you were using it, but it is an important part of it. Primakov has known Saddam Hussein for many years. As you know, before he became a Soviet official he was a journalist specializing on the Middle East.

There is no question—I do not think that spiritual suffering is something that Saddam is inclined to accept, certainly not for himself, but he is probably totally insensitive, or almost totally insensitive, to the sufferings of his fellow citizens, save unless those sufferings begin to impede the prospects for his rule, so all of those are good questions.

Going back to your initial comment that he believes time is on his side. He may. I think that, once again, he is wrong, but he may believe time is on his side for the very reasons that you subsequently suggest—that he is insensitive, that he is prepared to stay as long as he can—but his society is bleeding, and it is going to get worse with the passage of time.

I hope my statement indicates that I think some may decide that the military option is preferable to the sanctions option, and that is, given the pressures of time, and given, perhaps, different requirements in a political policy or ultimately a war policy, a perfectly valid judgment for a Senator or for a President to make.

Senator **Coats**. Thank you. I believe my time has expired.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. Senator Wirth.

Senator **Wirth**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you for being here.

It is my own view that in August the United States embarked upon the proper course to stop Saddam Hussein. President Bush chose to defend Saudi Arabia, impose major economic sanctions, as you so well discussed this morning, and to weave together a broad international coalition to isolate Iraq.

Since then, it has puzzled me why the administration has been uncertain about the course it had originally set. This is especially so when the best evidence we have is that this course has been working and we should stick to it.

The administration now seems to be preparing a case for offensive military action. In October, the administration highlighted the hostage issue with a great deal of rhetoric about this being a provocation. In early November—right after the election—the administration announced a significant troop buildup in the Gulf which, I believe, changed public support for our policy in the Persian Gulf and served to confuse millions of Americans. Just last week, the administration invoked the nuclear threat, apparently, as suggested in this morning's testimony, because it plays well in public opinion polls. As we meet today, the administration is working to achieve U.N. support for a resolution authorizing offensive action.

This has been called, properly I think, a "hold our coat" resolution. We ask others for permission to hold our coat while our young men go in to fight and die.

It is ironic that while it has been suggested that questions by Members of the Senate only encourage Saddam. In fact, it is the lack of consistent purpose in the administration that seems most puzzling to the American public. Support will "unravel" not because of public debate, but from lack of consistent message from the administration.

These hearings are very important for getting us back to that consistent message, getting us back to an understanding of what our national interests are, why are we in the Persian Gulf, and what are the long-term implications of the potential U.S. actions.

It is my own view that our goals in the Gulf are threefold: (1) oil; (2) Saddam's military might, and (3) Israel.

On the first point, we have protected the oil. World markets have steadied, and our goal there has been achieved.

Concerning weaponry, these problems were there before the invasion of Kuwait and certainly will not be dealt with by ground action led by the United States. With regard to Israel, it seems to me that U.S. military incursion has an enormous down-side for long-term stability. In addition we have made the situation more difficult by our unwise overtures to President Assad.

I applaud your testimony, Mr. Secretary. I find myself in substantial agreement with it.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WIRTH. I would like to ask you a little bit about energy policy, about which you are an expert with an enormous amount of experience.

First, were we to embark upon a military course of action, how might Saddam react against the oil producing and refining capability in the rest of the Persian Gulf, and what impact might this have on world supply and prices?

In response to Senator Bingaman, you said that you thought there would be a surge in prices. I think those were the words you used. The World Bank has said that there would be, they thought, a jump in oil prices to $65 per barrel if war broke out, but yesterday Secretary Watkins said oil prices would not climb steeply in the event of war.

The first question here is, who is correct? What would happen if there were war in the Middle East? What would happen to supply? What would happen to prices? Are you right? Is the World Bank right? Or, is Secretary Watkins right?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Perhaps we are all right. Let me start with Secretary Watkins. He said, I think, that oil prices should not climb, and I think that he is assuming—I suspect that he is assuming—that he will be authorized, as of the initiation of war, to open up the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Now, you may check with the Secretary on that. If that is the case, then loss of oil might be made up.

However, even then, as your question implied, there will, I think, be a surge in oil prices, and I see no reason why the World Bank is not roughly right. It will be modified by any release of petroleum from the reserves, but there will be fear, there will be a war premium, there will be a drive to find oil, out of the possibility that the oil producing capacity of the Middle East will be further damaged by oil.

Senator WIRTH. Also, part of this overall question is what means would Saddam have to attack, or cause major disruptions in, other Persian Gulf supply and refinery capability?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think the answer to that is that the normal military means probably have been severely constrained by the deployment of our forces, by the present deployment of our forces without further deployment, and by actions that have been taken by the Saudis.

I think that we should not take too much comfort from that, because the use of sabotage and terrorism is open to him. There are many vulnerable points in the logistics system that moves that oil. You will recall from your days in the House at the time of the fire in 1979 that reduced radically Saudi Arabia's production and a suspicion at that time of sabotage—denied, but that suspicion has never been driven away.

I think that there are many people in the Middle East, not only hardened terrorists, but the Palestinians, who have become increasingly desperate, who may be prepared to turn to sabotage, and therefore any comfort that we can take about our advanced preparations should not be entirely reassuring, or very reassuring to us, if one recalls the sabotage operations against our marines in Beirut some years ago.

Senator WIRTH. I think it is also instructive, Mr. Secretary, to think about the fire that occurred yesterday at the Denver Airport. At that fire a very sophisticated fire control system, with all of the capacity of every fire fighting unit in the area, could still not put that fire out for 48 hours. More than 2 million gallons of petroleum burned, and there was no way of putting it out. This is a minor incident compared to what could happen if one of those very fragile refineries in the Persian Gulf was ever hit.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. To go slightly beyond your question, as you know, the Iraqis have placed explosives on all of the Christmas trees on the wells in Kuwait. They have put some down-hole explosives. The main refinery has been carefully mined.

If war comes, I think the likelihood is that we will lose that capacity, prospectively for an extended period of time. Indeed, in light of the prospect of a scorched earth policy by Saddam Hussein during wartime, I am not sure that the Kuwaitis should be urging the military option rather than the starve-them-out option.

Senator WIRTH. Let me ask you a little bit about your views on pricing.

In your testimony, you talked about the fact that our economy had already absorbed a lot of the cost of increased oil prices.

There may be something of a silk purse in all of this. Having absorbed that price increase and knowing that long-term energy policy, is in large part, a function of higher prices—if you have higher prices, you encourage conservation, alternative energy programs and all the rest—might it be a good idea for us to consider using the current higher prices as a floor? I know a number of people have been suggesting that in the past. What is your view on that?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think the answer we should use is the President has an opportunity to do certain things. I believe that we should have a higher gasoline tax and perhaps other user taxes for petroleum products to limit demand coming from abroad, and I have long been an advocate of a floor price for oil and gas so that our producers are in a position to understand what their expectations are when they make financial commitments, and that they are not at the mercy of either the collapse of OPEC or wars within OPEC and so on. I think we should have a floor price, not necessarily at the present price of oil, however.

Senator **Wirth**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Dr. Schlesinger, I appreciate your being here.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my full statement and a set of other questions about long-term implications be included in full in the record, and thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

Chairman **Nunn**. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wirth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR TIMOTHY E. WIRTH

Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you and the ranking minority member, Mr. Warner, for calling the committee back to Washington to discuss and debate U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. This is an extraordinarily important set of hearing's, especially in light of the Bush administration's recent decision to nearly double U.S. deployments to Saudi Arabia.

In my view, the United States last August embarked upon a proper course of action in the Gulf: to stop Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia; to impose economic sanctions against Iraq; and to weave together a broad international coalition to isolate Iraq. In support of this policy, between August and October we deployed 230,000 troops to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. This policy and deployment were broadly supported by the American people.

However, the President has now decided to add an additional 200,000 troops to Operation Desert Shield. That decision will inevitably lead to a sharp rise in logistics, support, morale, training, and cultural problems that are already causing difficulties. I would point that these problems are inherent in the deployment of such a tremendous number of troops in a faraway land and not a reflection on our fighting men and women in the Gulf. Our troops are professionals. They are well trained, well motivated, and well equipped and our Nation should be proud of the sacrifices they are making for their country.

But I fear that with this decision the President has veered away from his successful August policy and toward one fraught with significant danger. It is not clear to me why the administration has seemingly chosen to cast aside the course it originally set, especially when the best evidence we have indicates that it has been working. Yet, in October the administration began drawing attention to the plight of the hostages, suggesting that their maltreatment might constitute a sufficient provocation for military action. In November, the administration decided to double our forces to ready for the "offensive option," which in turn changed the public perception of and support for our policy in the Gulf. And last week, the administration focussed on the Iraqi nuclear threat, a concern not coincidentally borne out in recent opinion polls.

Today as this committee meets, the administration is working to achieve United Nations support for offensive action against Saddam. This has been called—properly, I think—a "hold our coat" resolution: we ask others for permission to hold our coats while we send young Americans to fight and die in the Arabian desert. The President and others have spent countless hours describing our goals to other countries, and persuading various allies of the virtue of the administration's purpose. We have not had the benefit of this effort, despite the fact that the administration's authority derives from the people of the United States and from the people's Constitution.

We must know, for example, why the United States has apparently changed from a defensive strategy to an offensive strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General Powell, in testimony to this committee on September 11, focussed exclusively on defending Saudi Arabia and enforcing U.N. sanctions as the reasons for sending U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf. This was the military mission of Phase One; it was defensive in nature and the Senate overwhelmingly voted to support that defensive mission.

President Bush's decision on November 8 to augment our forces in the Gulf with another 200,000 troops represents a departure from that defensive policy. The forces now being deployed in Saudi Arabia are the very forces we were going to use to replace currently stationed forces as part of a troop rotation policy. Rather than sending a message about our enduring commitment to turn back Iraqi aggression, the President chose to set in motion momentum toward war in early 1991. We are further "Americanizing" the equation in the Gulf.

Why the apparent change of strategy? Iraq is now the object of the most comprehensive set of sanctions in history. The impact of these sanctions on the Iraqi military is already palpable, and continues daily to erode their military preparedness. Iraq is the object of unprecedented international opprobrium. Post Cold War diplomacy is at work and it is focussed on Saddam. Where is the evidence that our collective will to enforce sanctions is weakening?

Alternatively, the costs of offensive action are incalculable: How many lives will be lost? What will be the impact on oil prices? On the U.S. and world economy? Will Israel get drawn into a widening Gulf war? What happens to the forces of Arab nationalism when Americans begin killing Arabs? By initiating a conflict in the Gulf, we will set in motion unforeseeable—and potentially disastrous—consequences. Can the administration confidently say that a military solution will end this crisis in a predictable way and at a reasonable cost? The unknowns and the liabilities of the war option are far more troublesome to me than the problems of maintaining the international sanctions.

The most effective means of dealing with Saddam, the most effective long-range strategy for containing Iraqi aggressive potential, is through sustained international isolation of Iraq. Any other steps must certainly include close cooperation and involvement by United Nations forces; we cannot and should not be policeman to the world.

The U.N. Security Council may pass a resolution this week which will authorize the use of force against Iraq. That does not mean that the use of force early in the new year is wise, in our national interest or even useful in building the much-touted "new world order." A U.N. resolution is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the U.S. to go to war. In order to go to war we must have the support of the American people and a decision by the Congress. A U.N. resolution on the use of force is good politics, congressional approval is a Constitutional requirement.

I do not believe that support exists today for offensive activity. The American people have yet to be convinced that our vital national interests are sufficiently at risk in the Persian Gulf to engage American troops in combat. We have had a wide range of explanations from the administration about why we are in the Persian Gulf. According to the administration we may go to war: to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait, to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to protect Americans abroad, to provide regional stability, to enforce the sanctions, to assure a reliable supply of oil, to protect American jobs, to build a new world order, to destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, and all of the above.

I do not doubt for a moment the seriousness of the Gulf crisis, nor the imperative of a vigorous American response. I believe we have mounted such a response, and remain capable of taking military action if and when necessary, especially with devastating air and naval power. Rather than suggesting that time is on Saddam's side, we should make clear our intention to stay in for as long as necessary. At our presently planned troop levels—without a rotation policy—we cannot do that.

Finally, it is imperative that the administration formulate a clear set of goals in the Persian Gulf and that the President articulates those goals clearly and unambiguously to the American people. To date, the President and Secretary Baker have done an admirable job of fashioning a broad international alliance in the Persian Gulf. But they have spent much less time and far fewer resources explaining their position to the American people and to their representatives in the Congress.

We, of course, should not give the administration a blank check. Nor should we rush to give them authority they have not even requested. Rather, our responsibilities include raising questions, reflecting skepticism, and digging beneath the immediate gloss of patriotic action to force answers to difficult questions.

These hearings are important, Mr. Chairman, in giving us the opportunity to go back to basics: why are we in the Persian Gulf? What are our national interests in that important region? What are the long-term implications of alternative courses of action for the U.S. and the region?

While suggestions have been made that questions by Senators may only encourage Iraq, it is, in fact, the lack of consistent purpose that seems most puzzling to the American public. Ironically, support may "unravel" not because of public debate, but from the lack of a clear and consistent message from the administration.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would just note that, in my view, our genuine national concerns are threefold—secure energy supplies; Iraq's weapons; and Israel—and I am unconvinced that initiating military action would resolve those concerns predictably and satisfactorily. We have already protected the oil fields. World supply has steadied, and in this sense our goal has been achieved. The continuing security of energy supplies may require an ongoing international presence and commitment, but war poses great uncertainty.

Concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, this problem existed before August 2, and cannot be dealt with by military operations alone. The Osirak reactor was destroyed in 1981, but here we are once again debating how to deal with Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Finally, the Gulf crisis poses real risks to the state of Israel. War in the region holds untold dangers for Israel, militarily and politically, as does our unnecessary and unwise policy of support for President Assad of Syria.

It seems to me that the fundamental question in the Gulf is not whether or not Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator that deserves to be overthrown—clearly he is—but instead whether going to war with Iraq will put the United States in a better position to work in the Middle East over the long run. I believe that our primary national goals should be to promote long term stability in the Middle East and Gulf region. Given the administration's recent actions, I do not believe that we are currently approaching the Gulf crisis in this manner. In my view, an American initiation of war with Iraq is not only fraught with dangers in the short run, but would also lead to a destructive polarization in the Arab that will make long term U.S. goals in the region more difficult to achieve.

Last, I would point out that war in the Persian Gulf will put all the Western hostages in a very precarious position to say the least. Not only are many hostages located at strategic sites that will be likely targets of Air Force bombs, but it is difficult to imagine a man like Saddam Hussein sparing the lives of American and Western hostages while his own troops are fighting and dying. Patience is a virtue, it is not a vice: The wait may be difficult for the families of the hostages and it is certainly difficult for the hostages themselves, but it is preferable to war. I think that it is instructive to point out that it was a policy of patience, consistently applied over a long period of time, that brought every one of our hostages out of Tehran—alive.

I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking Republican, Mr. Warner, for holding these important hearings at a very critical juncture. As we enter these hearings, I have prepared an illustrative set of broad policy issues which I believe we must address, and I ask unanimous consent that these questions concerning U.S. policy in the Gulf appear following my remarks. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, should not any policy such as we have in the Gulf now be based on a sound thought process with a beginning and, hopefully, with a logical ending?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think so. Yes, sir. We always must recognize in this world that we face contingencies, but there certainly should be a logic behind what we are doing leading to achievement of our objectives.

Senator SHELBY. This is going to be hard to phrase, I guess. On a scale of 1 to 10, what are the chances for a diplomatic solution in this area at this time, in your judgment?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You mean what is the probability of that being attained, or what are the chances if we should work toward it?

Senator SHELBY. No. What is the probability that it will be attained, say, between now and February 1?

I know that is a tough question. In your judgment.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. By the end of February or mid-March, I think that the probability is about 15 or 20 percent, perhaps 25 percent.

Senator **Shelby**. How important, Dr. Schlesinger, is it for the President of the United States, whoever that is, to convey a clear and coherent policy or strategy in the Middle East to the American people?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that it is both important and desirable, but I stress, as I stated earlier, my sympathy for the President because he is dealing with many audiences and that he must simultaneously convey to Saddam Hussein that he is going to be tough as necessary while reassuring the American public, dealing with the international coalition and the Congress and that, therefore, given multiple audiences, clarity is not easily attainable.

Senator **Shelby**. When Secretary Baker as the Secretary of State speaking for the administration, I suppose, said, to paraphrase him, said it is about jobs, it is about oil in other words, then I feel that the message is not clear.

You know the President's first message, as we have talked about here today, was to deter the aggression that he and a lot of us thought, was headed toward Saudi Arabia. Now is that the same message? I would submit that it is not, and it is important because I see out in the countryside that the people do not see a clear message being conveyed by the President.

They see, as we have talked about here, American blood spilling if we go to war, with probably 90 percent of the casualties would be American; and American money being spent. You know, we went around and put our hand out for help but it seems to me when the Germans and the Japanese and the others who are going to benefit so much from American resolve have done so few things compared to our commitment to the Gulf. This bothers the American people who do not know where we are going with our policy.

The last question I would like to ask you is should a policy not only have a beginning as a strategy but an ending? War or no war, the Middle East is going to be different. What does this say about our future role in the Middle East, which is such a precarious region to begin with but also very strategic because of oil?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Senator Shelby, let me deal with the last question first.

Indeed, we should be thinking right now about that post-crisis security environment, irrespective of whether Saddam Hussein is there or has been removed, irrespective of whether there is war which will transform the environment or whether we merely have a withdrawal from Kuwait, leaving the situation as it was on August 2 save for the substantial bleeding, as it were, of Iraq.

If there is war, there is great difference of view with regard to what the outcome should be. Some—I suspect the Israelis would feel this way—want a total destruction of Iraq's military power because that would reduce the Arab order of battle and they would be a principal beneficiary of that. Others, notably Syria, Saudi Arabia and I suspect other Arab countries, are much more ambivalent about that. They would like to see Saddam Hussein go but they do not want to see Iraq removed from the balance of power.

Right now there is some sentiment in the United States that we should destroy the military capability of Iraq. I urge that we not do that before we have thought through the implications. We allied ourselves de facto with Iraq in order to block Iran during the period of Iran's aggressiveness. Indeed, when Iraq indulged in unprovoked aggression against Iran in September of 1980, all of us, I think, felt pretty good about that unprovoked aggression because it was directed against Iran.

We must remember, I think, that Syria and Iran will dominate the region, and neither of them has objectives that are wholly consistent with American objectives. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad until quite recently was higher on our list of rogues than was Saddam Hussein. Now we must think through the balance of power in the region without acting precipitously simply to achieve our current objective of inflicting punishment on Iraq.

Why are we out there, and what does that imply for other countries? We are out there to fulfill—and this is not intended as an invasion—the international obligations of the United States which include our obligations to provide stability, some degree of stability in the Middle East, our commitments to Saudi Arabia solemnly intoned by several Presidents of the United States. It is not jobs. That was an unfortunate attempt, I think, of Secretary Baker to bring this down, as he said, to the level of the American people. But it is not jobs.

We can get along. We can reduce, as Senator Wirth has indicated, our dependency on foreign sources of supply. Under most circumstances that oil will be available even if Saddam Hussein or someone else is there because that is beneficial to him. It is not jobs. It is our attempt to live up to our obligations as the principal power now in the world.

That does not mean we have to go to war. We are obligated, given the size of the United States, to attempt to play a stabilizing role, which the President did in the first week after the invasion.

These other countries that you mention are beneficiaries, no doubt. I do not think that we are likely to get much more in the way of resources from these other countries. In fact, I, myself, have a certain dislike, not ambivalence, to see our Secretary of State or our Secretary of the Treasury having to go around the world rattling the tin cup, asking for contributions. That is not a dignified position for the United States.

We must remember that those countries have joined with us in imposing sanctions, in applauding our decision to deter and defend Saudi Arabia. None of them outside the Middle East, aside from Mrs. Thatcher and the British, have been in favor of that. The Middle East includes several countries that advocate the military option.

The Japanese and the Germans are not advocating that we move 400,000 troops to the Middle East, nor have they advocated that we embrace the military option. They are prepared to authorize that. I do not think they are prepared to pay for it.

Senator SHELBY. Pay for it either way, diplomatically or through blood?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Certainly they are not prepared to pay for it through blood. They use, I think, unduly the excuse of the constitutions that were given to them at the close of World War II. They have paid a limited amount of cash, and they believe that their contributions are sufficient for deterrence and the imposition of the embargo.

I think that we would be stretching things if we were to ask other countries to pay for our rotation policies or for the magnitude of the forces that we have decided necessary that has gone beyond what they signed on for in August.

So I understand the frustration and the unhappiness of the American people seeing us pay not only so large a share of the troop costs, as it were, but the financial costs as well. I think that, aside from the question raised by Senator Wirth about the possibilities of segregating some of the enhanced oil revenues, we are just going to have to live with that.

Senator **SHELBY**. Mr. Chairman, I have one brief statement. I know my time is up.

The real cost is lives, is it not, because that is terminal? Is that right?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. Right. The real cost would be lives in the event of war, yes, sir. I think that in looking at this problem when we are indignant about the holding hostage of our people or the treatment of those hostages, we must bear in mind that the alternative that may be open to us—several thousand American troops dead, perhaps many thousands of American troops dead, others in casualties—are not particularly attractive. We ought to think in terms of remedies, not simply the points of indignation.

Senator **SHELBY**. Perhaps not attractive or acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I have an opening statement which I ask unanimous consent to be made part of the record.

Chairman **NUNN**. Without objection, it will be. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

[The prepared statement of Senator Shelby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome Dr. Schlesinger.

I would like to thank the chairman and ranking minority member for embarking on this set of hearings. I believe that it is vitally important that U.S. options concerning the Persian Gulf crisis be fully explored. It is only through a complete airing of our purposes and objectives in the Gulf that a consensus can be reached. The American people, the Congress and the President must be united—and must prove to Saddam Hussein that we are united and willing, if necessary, to use force to accomplish clearly defined objectives.

I have from the outset supported the President's Gulf policy. Last January I met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. He was cunning, crafty and tried to be charming. But even after this meeting and before his invasion of Kuwait, I felt that he was a man who could not be trusted. Whatever differences of opinion that I, or other Members of Congress or the American people may have over the current Gulf policy, we should not forget that it is Saddam Hussein who is responsible for this crisis.

It is my hope that U.S. objectives in the Gulf will be more clearly defined through this hearing process. I see U.S. policy objectives boiling down to two main ingredients. (1) Re-defining the Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf; and (2) Protecting U.S. and the world's oil supplies.

Before the war between Iran and Iraq no one power in the region was dominant. Now Iraq has become the bully of the Mideast. I believe that he must be stopped. He must be stopped because he invaded a sovereign independent nation and now threatens all other nations in this region. He must be stopped now, before he is in possession of nuclear weapons. It is my hope that this can be accomplished without the use of force. However, we must be careful that in our effort to stop Hussein we do not allow Syria to become the dominant force in the region.I am concerned that with the latest troop deployment and the upcoming United Nations vote we are moving closer and closer to war. If the United Nations votes to allow force, Congress becomes involved. The administration must understand that U.N. forces are not in the battle lines in Saudi Arabia, but there are American men and women on those lines. The President recently stated that their will be no more Vietnams. I hope he takes that statement to heart and consults fully with Congress and the American people.

It has to be made clear to the public that a U.N. vote means that U.S. troops will not be fighting alone. We must be assured that large forces of our Arab and Western allies are also involved. This issue is of primary concern to my constituents in Alabama. They simply do not understand why we will have over 400,000 members of our Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf when our allies, much more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States, send either token forces or no forces at all.

Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to this and the other hearings this week.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I ask that my statement be reproduced in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it will be.

Senator DIXON. Dr. Schlesinger, first of all may I thank you for your many generous contributions to this committee over the years. We are indebted to you, and I know I speak for the entire committee when I express our appreciation. Your contributions last year I think were very, very helpful. As a matter of fact, I borrowed from a great deal of what you said in successfully arguing for substantial troop reductions in Europe which were adopted on a bipartisan basis in this committee and ultimately adopted by the Congress as an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill.

So I hope the American public knows that when people like you contribute their valuable time and expertise it helps this committee, it helps the Congress, it helps the Nation, and we appreciate it.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DIXON. Dr. Schlesinger, basically I agree with what you have said in your statement. I wanted to see if I could clarify two points that I think remain still somewhat less than clear after all the questions that have been asked by almost the entirety of the committee.

Someone had referred earlier to your comments on the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6. I would like to visit with you a little bit about that to see if I can clarify what you are saying there, because you suggest that, if I may read from the bottom, "Nonetheless, if one avoids this list of additional demands"—in other words, Saddam Hussein standing trial, compensation for damage done, dismantling of the Iraqi military capacity—if one avoids this list of additional demands and is satisfied with the original objectives, the probability that the economic sanctions will result in a satisfactory outcome is very high.

I think no one would quarrel with the logic of that, but I respectfully inquire about whether in your view the American public or perhaps even the world at large, certainly probably the Congress, would be satisfied without at least demanding, I would think, restitution and repayment to Kuwait for damage done there, money stolen and other things. It would seem that is an obvious requirement.

I would think interruption of the Iraqi chemical capability is a matter of paramount concern. It is a matter brought to the attention of this Senator and I think others here in any town hall meetings back home. Then obviously the potential nuclear capability that the Israelis solved for us one time before but I suspect it was apparent sometime in the future, whenever that might be.

Can we really believe that we can bring this matter to some kind of a peaceful solution short of war in an acceptable way without having at least those demands complied with by the Iraqis?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Sure.

Senator DIXON. You think that it would be——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We can do that. We may not want to do that.

Senator DIXON. Would you want to do that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me add once again the point that I made to Senator Gorton. Beyond the original demands, I think that we should be sure that we treat on the issue of that nuclear capability.

Senator DIXON. Yes.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That the Iraqis should live up to the requirements of the nonproliferation treaty.

Senator DIXON. So that would be a condition you would add to what the President——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That I personally would add to that.

Senator DIXON. What about the chemical capability, Dr. Schlesinger, which is clearly there?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that I would not add that. I think the role of chemical weapons has been more to inspire terror than to provide an important military capability. It did not much affect the Iran-Iraq war when the Iraqis had the opportunity to use it directly against the Iranian forces. They have had some savage pleasure in destroying Kurdish villages, but as a military capability it is quite limited. It was not used in World War II because, among other reasons, it just is not militarily effective. Even though it is desirable, therefore, I would not add that to the list.

The question you raise about the compensation for the money stolen from the Kuwaiti Central Bank, that is certainly legitimate to throw in.

Senator DIXON. Could we go to page 13 for a moment?

Chairman NUNN. Would the Senator yield? I am not sure I understand the answer. He said on the question of compensation that that is legitimate.

Does that mean that you would or would not add that to the list?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that if you get to this stage, Senator, you are just going to see what the bargaining situation is. We can have that on the list of initial requests, as it were. Would I go to war as an alternative to accepting less than my initial list? I would probably not go to war for that purpose.

Senator DIXON. I thank you for that, because that is what I now want to pursue in a most respectful way, Dr. Schlesinger.

If we could go to page 13. I seem to find myself differing from the majority at least in what I have been saying publicly about the solution to this problem. We talk about the two alternatives: the military policy on the one hand, which obviously all of us or at least certainly a substantial majority of us do not at this point want to embrace; and then we talk about the sanctions.

What troubles at least this Senator is the view that, with all due respect to a great many fine opinions given by a great many fine people, the probability in the view of this Senator, at least, that there is some question about whether sanctions coupled with all this tremendous force in the region ultimately will prevail and bring about a successful resolution of the problem.

So then we face what you refer to on page 13, do we not? We will not have any direct communication with Iraq until it has left Kuwait. Now that has been discussed a lot. Some others have asked questions about it. At one point in time in your testimony today I think you suggested that you would not recommend to the President that he alter that policy of sticking to his guns and we are not going to talk until they get out of Kuwait.

May I say to you just for the purpose of a discussion, because I would like to have your response, in another life I was at one time a successful trial lawyer, and I settled a lot of lawsuits in my time. It occurs to me that we are there in great strength. We are dominant on the sea, always have been, and overwhelmingly dominant in the air. Now we have 430,000 people on the ground, and with our technological superiority, our optical superiority at night and a variety of other things I would argue that without question we are the power.

We have these sanctions in place that are working, and you have correctly pointed out that in time they will work even better. I suggest even then we may fall short of the desired result.

Now what is the matter, in view of being there in strength and in view of all of our obvious power in the region, to undertake through some sources, whatever they might be, the U.N., the Arab League, other ways through other foreign countries, however it might be done, with initiating talks? It occurs to me that that would be a face-saving device by virtue of which Saddam Hussein ultimately might yield and might remove himself from the region, restore the legitimate government, pay reparations and do all the other desirable things we want done?

I must say respectfully, Dr. Schlesinger, and I may only be a minority in the country when I suggest this, that I think we are impaled on a dilemma here concerning the fact that we say you have to get out of Kuwait and the fact that Saddam Hussein may say I cannot save face with my Arab brethren if I pull out of Kuwait before we talk. I think we have here the problem.

I respect you. I would like to have your answer.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think you are absolutely right. We have a problem.

Senator DIXON. I know we have the problem. I am trying to find the answer. I know the problem.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that your experience as a trial lawyer is quite relevant here.

I am not sure that I would have made that commitment to not have any discussions until such time as the withdrawal from Kuwait had taken place, but that is the statement of the President.

Senator DIXON. May I interrupt, Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is the commitment of the United States, and for us to appear to back down on that I think would lead to a set of psychological reactions on the part of other countries that would not be beneficial. I hope I would be wrong under those circumstances.

I see no reason, going on with your question, why we are not—I am sure that we are listening quite carefully to what the Soviet, French, Italian and various Arab suggestions might be. I think that, given the circumstances if there is to be a negotiated settlement, it probably is better negotiated with others as intermediaries rather than directly. As you know from your experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes intermediaries can achieve more than direct negotiations.

Senator DIXON. I do appreciate that comment.

The Chair has advised me that my time has expired, but if I may indulge one moment longer, may I simply say this. I truly believe that ultimately there must be talks. I truly believe that we will not resolve this ultimately without those talks, and the sooner that we get about the business of accomplishing that finite result I think the better it will be for the country and for the folks that are there and just for everybody in the world that is concerned about this problem.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There must be communication. That is certainly clear. Other than the possibility of war, the facts associated with a withdrawal must be understood by both sides in advance or there will be no withdrawal.

Senator DIXON. I thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today the former Secretary of Defense and Energy, James Schlesinger. I look forward to his testimony.

I would like to digress a moment, however, to express my dismay and to say that it is extremely disconcerting that the present Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff refuse to appear this week before this committee to discuss with the Congress and the American people the Gulf crisis, especially since this week of hearings was especially and specifically set aside solely to accommodate them. I understand their refusal to testify based on the fact that the United Nations Security Council is debating a resolution authorizing force against Iraq. To the best of my knowledge it is the United States Congress that declares war for the United States—not the United Nations. Perhaps the administration's priorities are slightly misplaced.

I am deeply concerned, as are the American people, about the direction the crisis in the Gulf appears to be taking. I do support the President's policy of placing U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and his policy of pursuing a resolution of the crisis through an embargo. However, his recent bellicose and belligerent statements—coupled with his never-ending major ground force build-up in the Middle East are very disturbing. It is important to have adequate forces in the region, but I think we are about to cross a dangerous threshold.

I want to make it very clear that it is incumbent upon the President to obtain congressional authorization before he initiates offensive action, or takes steps that, in fact, introduce us into a state of war. The President must stay in a defensive mode, with an embargo in place, until such time as he comes to the Congress and obtains approval for further action.

I am not satisfied that the President has yet exercised every option to seek a peaceful resolution through diplomatic initiatives either through the United Nations or the Arab League, or any other productive means.

I believe that any offensive actions are premature at this time. However, I do think that Saddam Hussein should be aware that when we are discussing the President's actions, debate does not necessarily mean that we disagree with the President.

I feel very strongly that Iraq must not do anything to stop the United States or England from resupplying our respective Embassies in Kuwait!

Congress and the President must work together to achieve these objectives through peaceful means if possible, while dealing from a position of strength. Iraq, likewise, must realize the seriousness of our intent and our determination to do what is right for the world at large in the face of their naked, unwarranted aggression.

I look forward to hearing Secretary Schlesinger's views on these concerns which vitally affect all of us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Senator Gore, I know you came a long distance to be here today, and we appreciate it very much.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I appreciate you and Senator Warner scheduling these hearings. I look forward to the entire week of hearings. I look forward to the closed session this afternoon as well. I look forward to next Monday's hearing when representatives of the administration will be here. In many ways, I think it is going to work out better to have a long run-up to the session with the representatives of the administration.

Dr. Schlesinger, you have already been complimented to the skies here by everybody this morning, but let me add my warm words of gratitude to you as a visiting expert again and also as a friend. We really do respect your advice and appreciate your willingness to come.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. You have been articulate on this subject over the last several weeks and months. I heard you say a few minutes ago that you were sympathetic to the President. I would like to identify with those sentiments as well.

We all here understand that it is an awful lot easier to ask questions than to answer questions. The President, having initially won rave reviews and plaudits from practically everyone for his handling of this crisis, changed the terms of debate dramatically on November 8 by signalling, with his doubling of the deployment, an intention to go on the offense and to abandon the policy of containment.

Just before that move there were many questions that had begun to be asked, and so I do want to identify with the sentiment that you expressed.

I also want to note for the record, and I do not know that there are any official numbers to back this up, but it is my belief based on my own analysis that my State of Tennessee has had more Reserves and Guard units called up for active duty in the Gulf than any other State. That has been reported in the press in Tennessee, and I want to say that to honor those men and women from Tennessee and those from elsewhere who are doing so well in their role there.

Now some have questioned the role of Congress in this debate, and obviously there is a conflict between Article I and Article II of the Constitution. That conflict led to the War Powers resolution. The conflict was easier to see in situations like Vietnam and Korea than it is here where we clearly anticipate the offensive use of force. After the deployment of 400,000 men and women in a foreign land, there is no ambiguity in the Constitution.

The meaning of the Constitution is clear, and it is important to remember in that regard that our sense of national purpose is itself a strategic asset. Consensus is itself a strategic asset. That lesson was ignored at times in the past and should not be ignored during this period of time.

You addressed in your opening statement in your very first point the initial reason given by President Bush for this mission in the Persian Gulf. In the heady atmosphere which followed the collapse of communism and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, there was the hope that collective security might be a realistic organizing principle for the post-Cold War era and that naked aggression, to use the phrase which has been used throughout this century and before, might be prevented through the building of an international consensus that would punish the aggressor once and for all.

You say in your statement—and I think it is a very important point—that you believe that those hopes were then and are now simply unrealistic. Why do you believe that such a fervent hope and prayer is beyond our ability to attain?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, Senator, in order for collective security to work there has to be agreement, which may be forthcoming. There has to be a force that must be contributed. That force will be contributed only by those who feel that there is something substantial at stake. Agreements of that sort are only brief and ephemeral.

For example, if we look back over recent decades, we can see naked aggression, if that is what it is, of India against Goa; some would say India against East Pakistan; Indonesia against East Timor; and clearly and most dramatically naked aggression of Iraq directed against Iran in 1980, which we cheered.

I think that the record is quite clear that unless the powers have something substantial at stake that they are likely to denounce that aggression but not to take moves to reverse it.

Senator GORE. Now the principal alternative you suggest is a scaled-down version of the strategy which has just proven successful in the Cold War; that is, a kind of containment with an embargo and a naval blockade lasting for an indefinite period of time, designed to wreak economic havoc on Iraq and gradually convince that nation to abandon its designs for expansion in the region.

This was the initial course recommended by President Bush as well. When I hear the President's spokesman responding privately and sometimes publicly to the question why do we not stay with that, one of the answers they give is that our coalition will not stay in place for the length of time required to make this strategy work. You challenge that in your statement.

We have devoted enormous effort in the West to maintaining a diverse alliance against communism for 45 years. What is it that makes the administration believe this alliance will not last through a sustained policy of containment and a sustained embargo?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me say at the outset that I was expressing skepticism about a new international order. To the extent that we can have collective security as we have in this case, that is quite welcome.

This is purely speculative, and I hesitate to try to assume what is in the minds of the members of the administration in looking at the past history of economic sanctions, virtually all of which have been colossal failures. We talked about collective security. One goes back to the League of Nations and Mussolini in 1935, and nobody had a serious interest in doing more than condemn Mussolini's action. To take the risks of seriously opposing him was not in the blood of any of the members at that time.

Looking back at that long history of failure, this administration attempted to bring Noriega to his knees by economic sanctions. That was a failure. We have attempted to bring Nicaragua over the years to its knees by economic sanctions, as well as Rhodesia, more recently South Africa. The record is spotty at best, and I think this may be in the mind of the administration.

This is a different set of circumstances. What we have is a collective authorized blockage authorized by the United Nations, and that blockade can come off only if the United Nations were to reverse itself and I believe—I am not a lawyer—that would require American concurrence because the United States still has the veto within the Security Council.

We have international authority to maintain that blockade until Saddam Hussein yields to those international obligations. I do not think that the administration may appreciate the full strength of our position.

Under these circumstances, if the members of the international coalition flake off and decide we do not like that anymore, that is not going to end the efficacy of these sanctions because the blockade is in place and is authorized.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I will just say in conclusion that, like all of my colleagues, I have many, many other questions. Fortunately, we will have many days and quite a few witnesses with whom to explore those questions. I think you made a wise choice in selecting this witness as our leadoff participant.

Again, my thanks, Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Schlesinger, I have just two more questions in wrapping this up and whatever follow-up my colleagues may have.

One is we, of course, know that we have American Embassy officials in Kuwait in the Embassy. I believe the British have the only other Embassy where there are indeed diplomats remaining. We also have other Americans who are not necessarily diplomats who have taken refuge in the Embassy. That has loomed very large in a number of considerations. At some point they will run out of food. Certainly that will be in a matter of weeks rather than months.

What observations do you have on this situation; i.e., do you believe the United States should consider the use of military force in that respect to relieve that situation?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think that we should use military force for that purpose. I do not believe in introducing military force unless we have substantial wartime objectives. I would consider the use of military force under circumstances to achieve objectives that we want more generally, and that would include the use of air power against specified targets in Iraq.

We could, if those circumstances arose, use air selectively. However, the notion of sending some marines in to rescue the people in the Embassy I think is likely to result in more losses than gains. I think that one must bear in mind our failures as well as our successes. Desert One comes to mind, in which we suffered greater losses than we had counted on.

Chairman NUNN. One other question.

We'll have former Secretary of State Kissinger with us tomorrow afternoon, I believe at 1 o'clock. He had an article in the Washington Post, at least I believe it was the Washington Post, this last weekend, where he stated many things. One of the key points that was highlighted was, quoting him: "By the time it is apparent that sanctions will not work, it will be too late to use military force." I believe that is a quotation. If not, it's close.

Do you have a response to that, because that's a serious question that I'm sure we'll be pursuing with him?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I don't know the exact context. He may be adding to the original set of objectives that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait, et cetera, other objectives, that he dismantle his military establishment, that he change the balance of power in the region, and so forth, which I do not think sanctions are likely to force Saddam to accept.

Incidentally, sanctions may work. You will recall that in 1953, the government of Premier Mosadegh was thrown out in large part because of the efficacy of the sanctions that had been imposed upon Iran in that period.

I think that the sanctions can work to achieve our initial objectives. Dr. Kissinger might have been saying that the sanctions were not assured of working, rather than that they were assured not to work.

Chairman NUNN. How about the point about not being too late to use military force?

Do you believe we're going to reach a point in the spring, or early summer, that it will be too late to use military force?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not believe that that is the case. Dr. Kissinger has been concerned that if we withdraw our troops, that that will be seen by the people in the region, if we reduce our number of troops without using them, that will be seen to be a humiliating withdrawal.

I do not think, and I do not necessarily ascribe this view to Dr. Kissinger, that those who have argued that because the United States has deployed its forces in the region, that not to use those forces would be a humiliation, are arguing something that is incorrect. The ultimate logic of that is, even if we have maldeployed forces, that we must use them. I do not think anyone will accept that view.

In my judgment, you are looking at the probabilities of success. I think that the probability of success of the sanctions is very, very high if we stay with the original objectives.

Chairman NUNN. One final question.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But—and excuse me, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead.

Dr. SCHLESINGER [continuing]. But those who are advocating war, and that may be an alternative that we are forced to come to, tend to argue about it in terms of the objectives that they would like to achieve, and they do not necessarily tote up the costs associated with achieving those objectives through war.

I think that it is necessary to face up to the entire range of costs of a recourse to war, particularly if one has some confidence that those objectives can be achieved, that most of those objectives can be achieved without war.

Chairman **NUNN**. Would you believe it to be advisable for us to begin behaving as if time is on our side and that we do, as a nation, have the patience to see this through?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. If I were to criticize the administration, it would be because it did not continue to express confidence in what it started in the summer. We were on a correct course. There were many indicators that we were doing better than we had anticipated. The coalition was holding together firmly. In the President's words, the coalition has been "unwavering." Saddam Hussein's attempt to appeal to the Arabs peaked there early in September, and have been on the decline. You have not seen all that restlessness, even in countries with some degree of sympathy for him.

We were doing very well, and, under those circumstances, even if the President wanted to add the military option, I would have been inclined to express confidence in the course, more confidence than he expressed in the course that he was on, and not to give those expressions of impatience that he revealed.

Senator **GORE**. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Senator **WARNER**. Mr. Chairman, may I follow on at that point?

Chairman **NUNN**. My time has expired. Let me yield to Senator Warner, and then he would be able to yield to you from his time.

Senator **WARNER**. I think, Dr. Schlesinger, if I were reporting this session today, I would say that you have strong and great confidence in the sanctions; and you didn't set a timeframe, but certainly you have expressed an endorsement.

I have listened carefully to all my colleagues in a very constructive dialogue. Let's see if we can get a tight question and a tight answer, because you just about led up to it in your last frame of response. But I think we can tighten it.

I think the President has shown tremendous leadership. He has put together a coalition of nations. He has gone to the United Nations. He has done his best to try to explain his case to the American public, and I addressed that earlier.

You said he was on the right course. I think what you intended to follow on and say was that he made a decision to augment his military forces, to give absolute, unquestioned, credibility to the option that if force becomes necessary, then he has the assets there, not only to deliver a successful blow, be it in response to an act by Saddam Hussein, or in response to whatever decision is made, but also to protect the American soldiers, airmen and sailors who are there. You don't want to go in with half a force. We have learned that that does not work.

So my question to you is this. Given that the sanctions are the best policy and that time is required, did he enhance the sanction course or detract from it by his augmentation of the forces here several weeks ago?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. As I think I indicated in my testimony, I think that the additional deployments get through to Saddam Hussein.

Therefore, the deployments themselves were a token of America's continuing commitment.

Senator **Warner**. So that would mean it enhanced the opportunity for the sanctions perhaps to be effective.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. But that doesn't say we have to have 422,000 in there. But an additional deployment at that point probably drove home the issue to Saddam Hussein effectively and enhanced the commitment.

Senator **Warner**. It increased the likelihood of the course of sanctions working?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. That's the key that I wanted to hear.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Now, the point I was making a moment ago, when I expressed some impatience with expressions of impatience, is that we have come on a winning strategy. In this world of contingencies, it does not always work out that way. And when we've come on a winning strategy, we should be prepared to say that we have a winning course. Indeed, we can say that we're going to win anyway, that we're going to win on any one of these three strategic alternatives. The choice for us is that which is most beneficial and least costly.

Senator **Warner**. But it is the actions of the President to date that have put us on that winning strategy.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. I have great concern, as do others and as I am sure you do, about the hostages. I was somewhat taken aback by your very precise answers to this question. I think we have to be cautious as we explain the options that might be there.

We do have the humanitarian one. You have basically two categories. One, you've got embassy officials who were ordered there by the Secretary of State in the course of the performance of their duties. They may have put in the chit that they wanted to go there. But they are there by virtue of their responsibilities as U.S. officials.

Then you have the business persons and others who are there for various reasons.

Those persons in the Embassies are being stretched to the limit right now, and I hope that your responses would not preclude some humanitarian effort to get them food and other necessities to stay there, be it by air drop or something.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. No, it doesn't. I think the earlier question referred to military actions.

Senator **Warner**. But we might have to use some various types of aircraft to get food there.

Last—and this will be my final question, Mr. Chairman, America, in the June–July-early August timeframe, was beginning to address the peace dividend. While this committee was doing its best to try to bring about a very—I would say careful—reduction in forces and military spending—and I think we achieved that in our last budget cycle as best we could—all of a sudden that peace dividend has been eclipsed by this action.

Over and above that peace dividend, a greater portion of our GNP is going to be diverted into this situation.

I'm asking what is the benefit, then, to our two principal trading adversaries, Japan and Germany, by virtue of this problem that faces America today and its drain on its resources?

After this is over, we have to go back and resume that competition. We have been diverted in our R&D efforts and cash flow here at home, and otherwise, to solve this problem, which we had to do as a nation that is a leader in this world. We must lead.

Dr. **SCHLESINGER.** I agree with your concern, Senator. When I closed with my remarks about diversion of attention and focusing on the Gulf, the preoccupation with the Gulf, we have forgotten, we have too much forgotten about that need to improve our position as an economic competitor. One of the members of the committee stated some 6 months ago that Japan and Germany were supposed to be superseding us as the leader of the world. The answer is to whatever extent they were superseding us because of their economic capabilities, those have been reinforced by the diversion of our attention to the Gulf, a diversion away from the issue of economic competitiveness, and the economic burdens that the activities in the Gulf have entailed.

Senator **WARNER.** I thank the Secretary for his appearance today. It has been a very profitable one for all of us.

Chairman **NUNN.** Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon.

Senator **EXON.** Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have two questions that I'm going to ask.

I appreciate very much your being here for a most enlightening session, Dr. Schlesinger. I, for one, appreciate it very much.

Earlier, I intended to get into the matter of the geopolitical structure of the whole region. I think you very wisely have pointed out that maybe we have been a little bit shortsighted in this whole area.

Let's assume for a moment that, either through combat or surrender of one sort or another, that Saddam Hussein and Iraq would be basically eliminated as the key player that they now envision themselves at the present time, that one way or another they are eliminated.

Who, or what nation, do you believe, looking at the whole geopolitical structure, would then emerge as the leader of the Arab world?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER.** Well, I would like to say first that I think Iran is likely to become, once again, the principal, if not the dominant, power in the Gulf itself, Iran not being an Arab country.

I think that under those circumstances, Egypt, which has had a long-term rivalry with Iraq, would be the principal Arab country, but that Syria would represent immediately the challenge to Egypt's leading position in the Arab world. Egypt, under President Mubarak, would have chosen correctly in the present Gulf crisis, and, if there is no resentment against the consequences of war, it should be in a good position; if there is war and resentment, that might erode the support for the Egyptian Government's policy.

Senator **EXON.** Don't you believe that President Assad would see himself as the new leader of the Arab group?

Dr. **SCHLESINGER.** I think he certainly would, and we must be very careful to understand the nature of a very unstable region of the world. I think that we were quite right in supporting Iraq when Iran was the aggressive power. But we did not have to fall in love with our agent.

I think that the President, quite rightly, has included Syria in the present coalition. But we should not romanticize, as it were, President Assad, who continues to lead a country that we describe as terrorist.

Therefore, we ought not to assume that these relationships are anything but ephemeral. Americans tend to develop toward other countries loyalties that extend over too long a period, given the instability of the underlying political relationships.

Senator EXON. Dr. Schlesinger, my last question may be a bit rhetorical. But I do think we should take a look at this so that the people in the United States have a clear understanding.

You made quite a point of the fact, and I certainly agree with you, that nations only act militarily if there is enough at stake in their view to protect their vital interests.

My question is why don't the Arab nations get their act together much more than they have?

I don't know what your answer is to this question. But I anticipate what it will be in that the nations immediately surrounding that area, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, possibly don't see—and I don't quite understand why they don't see it—the threat that Saddam Hussein represents.

I just did a few little calculations here. Collectively, the armed forces of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Turkey possess 6,000 more battle tanks than Iraq. They have about 4,800 more aircraft, about 235 more helicopters, about 1 million more combat troops than Iraq.

It seems to me that this is the potential quicksand that we are involved in over there. It seems to me that we have concluded here today, and all of the information that I have and I think that most of the members of the committee have, the fact that those forces, as potent as they are, at least on paper, are not going to be mobilized or used. Instead it is going to be an American action if combat breaks out.

My question is why do not the Arab nations feel compelled to be more forthcoming than they have been thus far, or are they simply laying back and saying that it would be better for the Americans to do it?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that the latter is certainly part of the calculations.

There is a mystique about Arab nationalism. For an Arab nation to go to war with another nation, another Arab nation, has been difficult. One of the shocks that Saddam Hussein administered by invading Kuwait was that this is one of those rare circumstances in which an Arab nation would go to war with one of its neighbors.

Quarrel? Yes. They agree on very little. But, actually to go to war is a rare event.

Now, Turkey is in a very special position, and it is not an Arab nation. But it ruled the Arabs up until the end of the Ottoman Empire. There are great differences within Turkey. There is a view, I suspect, in the military establishment that this is not their war and they don't want to have any casualties. There is the political view that it just means difficulties with their Arab neighbors, who have never quite ceased their resentment of Turkey, going back to Ottoman days. Turkey has, of course, the bulk of the forces that you referred to.

I think that any intrusion of Turkey into the Arab world would excite some of the same worries that Iranian intrusion did, and, indeed, in a different context, the current intrusion of Western forces.

The Arab countries I think collectively tend to feel that there should be an Arab solution to this problem because they don't like the intervention of outsiders. But they have not been able to come up with an adequate solution. And, therefore, they must tolerate the intervention of outsiders.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to follow up on two points just briefly. First, on the questions just asked about Assad, isn't it true that both Saddam and Assad as young men came out of the same ideological movement in different countries, but both were initially motivated and inspired by the Arab Baath movement?

Is that not correct?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Gore**. There has been a lot of talk about how inappropriate it is to compare Saddam Hussein to Hitler. And I agree. But if one did stretch that analogy, just as Hitler and Mussolini, though in different countries, were part of the same ideological movement, which inspired them to violence and aggression, in that same way, Saddam and Assad, though in different countries, are part of the same ideological movement which has, at various times, inspired both of them to terrorism and aggression.

Would you agree with that analysis?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Well, I'm not sure that I would blame their proclivity for terrorism on the Baathist movement, which was originally an idealistic movement. I think that that reflects the circumstances in which they live and their personal characteristics, more than Baathism.

But the other points that you make, about the emergence from the same kinds of culture, is quite relevant here. The Baathist movement was a secular movement. It tended to break down into a degree of personal and national rivalries that has split the Baathist world. One can find little comparability in Europe for that degree of antagonism.

Senator **Gore**. Well, I don't claim expertise in the area. But my understanding is that from its idealistic beginnings, an aversion of it became twisted into an overtly blood thirsty expression of what had begun as a very different set of ideals.

Second, to follow up, you said that the initial strategy was successful because our allies had been remarkably patient and supportive of the embargo.

Obviously, the Kuwaitis are not patient, and one can not only understand but empathize with the horrors there loved ones are going through and understand what they are feeling.

What about the Saudis? Would you characterize them as patient with the strategy of an embargo? Or would you characterize them as restless for the kind of change in approach that we have seen from the President beginning on November 8?

I have heard some mixed signals. There was a statement from the defense minister that many felt went too far toward opening the door to negotiation. But there have been many, many other expressions. You know yourself that privately there have been a lot of expressions that tend to give the impression, overall, that Saudi Arabia is not patient with the strategy the alliance was following prior to November 8.

How do you analyze that one?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that what you refer to as mixed signals is quite correct. I think that there is, understandably, a fair amount of ambivalence. There is a desire to get this thing over with, to get it over with preferably before Ramadan—it's not going to occur—or before the Haj, to just get it through.

On the other hand, there is an understandable fear of the consequences of war and a desire to avert that. There is also a tendency to say that the Americans will determine ultimately the strategy and to get in resonance with that. And so, as our emphasis changes, there tends to be a change in emphasis in that country.

I would worry, if I were the Saudis, of the consequences for themselves of the destruction of Iraq being wreaked from their own soil by a Western power.

Now, the tendency, I think, is to believe that the use of military force will be applied moderately and that Iraq will not be seriously, that seriously damaged. There is a proclivity reflected in the press some weeks ago to avoid the damaging of Iraq as an element in the balance of power in the Middle East.

All of these things are stirring, and I do not think that one can have a clear and unequivocal Saudi view, any more than I think this morning's hearings have suggested that there is not a clear and unequivocal American view.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the afternoon closed session, which I think starts in 15 minutes.

Chairman NUNN. We are going to slide that to 2:30. We will have an intelligence briefing this afternoon at 2:30. It will be a closed session.

The full committee will meet tomorrow morning in open session at 8:30 in room 253 of the Russell Building. We will then hear from two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe and General David Jones.

Dr. Schlesinger, let me say your testimony has been very, very helpful today. You have been a unique and invaluable public servant, and you are now a unique and invaluable public citizen. Though you are not being compensated for your efforts, I know that you continue to have just as much interest in the security of our Nation as before.

We thank you very much for your testimony and your patience.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, the gratitude of this committee is compensation enough.

Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. From what I have heard of your rates, I'm delighted with that answer. [Laughter.]

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Malcolm Wallop

Senator Wallop. Secretary Schlesinger, you appear hopeful that the trade embargo and sanctions are working, and suggest that we may achieve our policy objectives in the Gulf conflict short of open warfare. But no one has defined what "working" means. In your view, what constitutes success of the embargo? How will we know when the sanctions have worked?

Dr. Schlesinger. The phrase "working" can, of course, be used in two senses. At this stage, to say that the sanctions have worked more effectively than we anticipated, refers to the *economic impact*. Exports (and hard currency earnings) have been virtually eliminated, and imports have been very sharply reduced. The consequence has "been a sharper drop in industrial production more rapidly than anticipated—and a rise in prices accompanied by shortages in selected goods. In this respect, I believe that no one would question the "success" of the embargo.

A second meeting of "working"—both more subtle and more significant—is whether these unquestioned economic hardships will bring *policy adjustments* in Iraq, whether by decision of the present regime or by its replacement. On that question the only evidence to date is conjectural. Quite clearly the economic burdens of the blockade are ones that no government would want to endure, if it regards the alternative as reasonable. I believe the probability of success of the embargo in inducing Saddam Hussein ultimately to depart from Kuwait is very high. However, if one adds additional objectives such as his removal or the elimination of Iraq's military power, then the probability that the sanctions will persuade Saddam Hussein himself is quite low. (Even then, however, there is always the possibility of replacement of the present regime.)

In my view success of the embargo is primarily based on whether or not the United States achieves its political objectives (which it should carefully define). There is, of course, some element of "success" in the severe penalties that we are imposing on Saddam Hussein for his actions, but ultimately success should be judged on the basis of whether or not our policy goals have been achieved.

Finally, we must recognize that in this later sense we will never know whether or not the sanctions have worked until the last moments of the confrontation. Saddam Hussein will not indicate that he has any inclination to yield, until he finds the continuing cost of not doing so to great to be tolerated.

Senator Wallop. You suggest that a shooting war risks alienating the entire Arab world and harming U.S. relations with present Arab allies. But are there not greater risks in doing nothing, or in prolonging the stalemate? Might not the same negative impact on U.S.-Arab relations occur if Saddam Hussein emerges from the crisis with his military power intact due to our inaction?

Dr. Schlesinger. There would of course be great risks, indeed greater risks in doing nothing, as you say. However, turning Iraq's economy into a basket case can in no way be defined as doing "nothing". As you suggest, there are substantial risks in prolonging the stalemate. A lengthy stalemate imposes substantial political strains on the international coalition—and it creates "sociological" problems with respect to American and other deployments in Saudi Arabia. Such risks may be alleviated, but they cannot be eliminated.

It is a matter of judgment whether the risks of a stalemate are greater or less than the risk of a shooting war. In my judgment, if we are content with the original objectives of the United Nations, the risks to the United States would be less the continued application of the blockade. Why? The costs to the United States of attempting to reconstruct the Middle East after the war, the difficulties of establishing a suitable balance of power, the formidable task of bringing stability to a notably unstable portion of the world would seriously tax our society and our ingenuity over an extended time. If we could avoid such burdens, I would do so. I should add that the costs and risks of combat itself, significant as they are, may be substantially less than the cost of post-crisis reconstruction.

Finally, the likelihood of Saddam Hussein emerging from the crisis with his military power "intact" is slight. Cut off from external sources of supply, his military position will ultimately erode. (Once again one cannot describe the imposition of a successful blockade as "inaction".) Nonetheless, you are quite right that there would be a negative impact if the United States is seen by the Arabs (and by others) to have lost in this confrontation. I do not regard this as a likely outcome, but surely it is one that we should guard against. Continued application of the blockade (the most effective outside of wartime that can be recalled) surely does not constitute "inaction," nor is it likely to make Saddam Hussein's position over time an enviable one.

Senator **Wallop**. You assert that the Arab members of the coalition show little inclination to "embrace the sterner objectives" of our Gulf policy, and that they implicitly fear the use of force. But would you not agree that this reluctance may stem from Arab doubts about U.S. resolve and the clarity of our goals? And if our commitment to defeating Saddam Hussein is in the slightest doubt, are they not justified in holding back somewhat? After all, they have to live in the region, under the shadow of Iraq, long after U.S. forces have gone.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. The reason that the Arab States are reluctant to embrace the "sterner objectives of policy," which includes the destruction of Iraq's military establishment and damage to civil targets and civilians in Iraq as well as many fatalities, is, as you suggest later in the question, because they will have to go on living in the region—and they would like to minimize any possible roles in the devastation. They do not "fear the use of force". Many would like to see the use of force—applied by the United States and other outsiders. They prefer, understandably, not to participate in the use of force, because they will have to go on living in the region.

Many of the Arab States would like to see achieved one of the "sterner goals of policy"—to wit, the removal of Saddam Hussein. However, most would not like to see the destruction of Iraq's military capability. They regard Iraq (preferably without Saddam Hussein) as an important element in the region's balance of power. Syria, for example, looks to Iraq's military forces for backstopping against what is regarded as the military threat of Israel. The Saudis and others would not like to see a vacuum in Iraq that would be filled by Syria or Iran. Israel and Iran may have the desire to see the destruction of Iraq's military capabilities, but (with the probable exception of Kuwait itself), not the other Arab States.

Quite independently of their valid reasons not to want to participate in the use of force and not to wish the destruction of Iraq's military capability, you are quite right that the Arab States aligned with us are concerned about U.S. resolve and concerned about the clarity of our goals. As you suggest, to the extent that these doubts exist, the Arab States will understandably straddle on certain issues. We should attempt to minimize any concern about our resolve to deal firmly with Saddam Hussein. This, incidentally, requires an end to all the expressions of doubt that the American people or the American society are too impatient to stand the strains of the blockade or to maintain forces in Saudi Arabia for as long as they are necessary.

If the Arab States anticipate a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces before resolution of the issue, we should disabuse them of any such concerns. Indeed, I myself would station U.S. forces in the region as long as they are needed, and I believe they will be needed for an extended period. Consequently I do not concur in the phrase (that you may have accidentally employed)—"long after U.S. forces have gone". If the United States is to play its role of stabilizing power, we must be prepared to stay the course—and give no indication of any eagerness to bug out prematurely.

[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:35 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman), presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Byrd, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats.

Also present: Senator Dodd.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; and Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Richard E. Combs, Jr., Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and William H. Smith.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Corts, Mary J. Kampo, Melissa Ann Ramsey, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn and Nancy E. Soderberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; C. Richard D'Amato, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Lee E. Whittaker, assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott; and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning to continue our hearings on the United States policy in the Persian Gulf region.

Yesterday the committee received testimony from Dr. James Schlesinger and received a classified briefing in the afternoon from the intelligence community concerning the Persian Gulf region.

Our witnesses today are well known to the committee and the American public. We are very fortunate to have two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with us today. Gen. David Jones served as Chairman from June 1978 to June 1982. Adm. William Crowe served as Chairman from October 1985 to September 1989. I should also note that Admiral Crowe served as Commander, Middle East Force, a command base in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, from June 1976 to July 1977.

As I stated on February 2 of this year on the occasion of their testimony before this committee concerning the effects of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Nation is fortunate that these outstanding Americans have continued to participate in many public service-related endeavors like this hearing, and we are fortunate they are here this morning to give us the benefit of their views on national security issues particularly relating to the Persian Gulf. Each of them continues to make a real difference in terms of our national defense, our national security and our foreign policy.

As is the case with our other witnesses, we have advised both General Jones and Admiral Crowe that the committee will be examining U.S. goals and interest in the Gulf as well as alternative methods and associated costs of achieving these goals. The committee will be looking closely at our military strategy and deployments in the region, our long-term goals, and the capability of the United States and our allies to carry out this strategy.

This afternoon at 1 o'clock the committee will receive testimony in this hearing room from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming these distinguished individuals. They continue in the service of their country now as actively, I think, as when they wore the uniforms of their country.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the letter from the President of the United States directed to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate dated November 16, 1990 be admitted into the record at this point.

Chairman **Nunn**. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

LETTER TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE PERSIAN GULF

November 16, 1990

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

There have been a number of important developments in the Persian Gulf region since my letter of August 9, 1990, informing you of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the spirit of consultation and cooperation between our two branches of Government and in the firm belief that working together as we have we can best protect and advance the Nation's interests, I wanted to update you on these developments.

As you are aware, the United States and Allied and other friendly governments have introduced elements of their Armed Forces into the region in response to Iraq's unprovoked and unlawful aggression and at the request of regional governments. In view of Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, defiance of 10 U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding unconditional withdrawal, and sustained threat to other friendly countries in the region, I determined that the U.S. deployments begun in August should continue. Accordingly, on November 8, after consultations with our Allies and coalition partners, I announced the continued deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region. These Forces include a heavy U.S. Army Corps and a Marine expeditionary force with an additional brigade. In addition, three aircraft carriers, a battleship, appropriate escort ships, a naval amphibious landing group, and a squadron of maritime prepositioning ships will join other naval units in the area.

I want to emphasize that this deployment is in line with the steady buildup of U.S. Armed Forces in the region over the last 3 months and is a continuation of the deployment described in my letter of August 9. I also want to emphasize that the mission of our Armed Forces has not changed. Our Forces are in the Gulf region in the exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against Iraq's aggression and consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Iraq's on-going occupation of Kuwait. The United States and other nations continue to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis. We and our coalition partners share the common goals of achieving the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection of the lives of citizens held hostage by Iraq both in Kuwait and Iraq, and the restoration of security and stability in the region. The deployment will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals.

In my August 9 letter, I indicated that I did not believe that involvement in hostilities was imminent. Indeed, it was my belief that the deployment would facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I also stated that our Armed Forces would remain in the Persian Gulf region so long as required to contribute to the security of the region and desired by the host governments. My view on these matters has not changed.

I appreciate the views you and other members of the congressional leadership have expressed throughout the past 3 months during our consultations. I look forward to continued consultation and cooperation with the Congress in pursuit of peace, stability, and security in the Gulf region.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

Note: Identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Robert C. Byrd, President pro tempore of the Senate.

Senator WARNER. I should like to read one paragraph.

The President stated, "I want to emphasize that this deployment is in line with the steady buildup of the U.S. Armed Forces in the region over the last 3 months and is a continuation of the deployment described in my letter of August 9.

"I also want to emphasize that this mission of our armed forces has not changed. Our forces are in the Gulf region in the exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against Iraq's aggression and consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Iraq's ongoing occupation of Kuwait.

"The United States and other nations continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis. We and our coalition partners share the common goals of achieving the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection of the lives of citizens held hostage by Iraq both in Iraq and in Kuwait, and the restoration of security and stability in the region. The deployment will insure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals."

I think this is reflective of the view of the President that his policies have been consistent throughout. During the course of the hearing I will ask that view of our witnesses.

I thank the Chair.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

We will proceed on the normal schedule this morning. We will hear first from General Jones and then Admiral Crowe, and then we will have questions with the usual time limit. General Jones, we are pleased to have you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I have a brief statement that I would like to make before responding to questions.

Chairman NUNN. We have all the time that you need, so do not feel in any way pressed, either of you, on your statements. Whatever you would like to say.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, members, I look forward to the opportunity to meet with you today and to share my perspectives on what I consider potentially the most dangerous crisis yet in the Middle East. I hope these hearings will both sharpen the Nation's understanding of the stakes involved and produce constructive, cohesive actions that will further the chances of resolving the crisis successfully.

I want to begin by stating my unqualified endorsement for the President's swift and adroit response to the invasion of Kuwait in August. I am absolutely convinced that his decisive action prevented a wider aggression which would have been enormously more difficult to reverse, much less contain.

I believe his decision to deploy U.S. forces to the region, his initiative in mobilizing the international coalition to oppose Saddam Hussein, and his leadership in eliciting United Nations resolutions showed a high degree of skill and courage. The early measures conveyed a reasoned and implacable determination by virtually the entire international community not to condone the theft and plunder of a weaker nation by force of arms.

The speed, strength, and extent of the international response clearly surprised Saddam Hussein and disrupted his designs for wider control. Most important in my view is that our stance enabled us to seize the high moral ground, standing with most of the nations of the world in condemning Saddam Hussein's aggression and thereby discrediting his attempts to cast the conflict as a U.S.-Iraqi confrontation over oil.

Clearly, oil played an important role in the international response but was not in the narrow and superficial sense of risking war to keep gas prices low. Rather, it was imperative in a strategic sense to prevent an aggressor's gaining a grip on half the world's proven oil reserves, the energy jugular for every industrialized and developing nation on earth.

In sum, I believe our initial policies and activities were logical, appropriate, legitimate, and well executed. They were the right actions at the right time for the right reasons.

Moreover, contrary to predictions of some observers, both the international alliance and our domestic consensus regarding the need for some action has remained encouragingly durable. As the oil markets have stabilized, the feared fraying at the edges has simply not occurred. In fact, if the increasing stringency of the successive U.N. resolution is any barometer, the international cohesiveness has become firmer with time.

I stress this point because I consider the solidarity of the coalition and the domestic support for U.S. policy to be indispensable ingredients for a successful resolution of the crisis whether by diplomatic or military means. Any cautions I have, therefore, about the direction of our present policy are focused on three interrelated aspects of that cohesion.

The first deals with the fabric of the international coalition itself. As with any common enterprise involving sovereign states, the degree of cooperation is directly proportional to the common interests the parties share. From the very beginning, there has been a solid core of shared interests and objectives that bound most of the international community together:

A. Condemnation of the ruthless invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent looting of the country even among those who conceded some legitimate grievances by Iraq;

B. Commitment to Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the former government even among those who considered the Kuwaiti leadership less than democratic;

C. Consensus on deterring further aggression, including committing military forces and, particularly noteworthy among the modern Arab nations, accepting a sizable American military presence; and

D. Preference for diplomatic and economic measures over offensive military action with particular sensitivity about attacking Iraq itself.

If U.S. policy attempts to expand these minimum objectives or interpret them more broadly—for example, to include reparations, tribunals, dismantling of chemical and nuclear production facilities—we run the very real risk of exceeding the tolerance of some members of the coalition.

Personally, to the minimum list of the United Nations I would add the requirement that Saddam Hussein and Iraq not gain a nuclear capability.

But a corollary risk of adding all of these objectives is that we solidify Saddam Hussein's intransigence and foreclose a nonmilitary solution, for I foresee no circumstances in which Iraqi's leader would accept such conditions, except at the point of a gun.

This does not mean that any nation in the United Nations who signed up for the sanction should have a veto over U.S. action. However, we have properly observed the sensitivities of our partners up to this point in the crisis and should abandon that course only under the most extreme need and after the most careful assessment of the costs and consequences.

No matter how emotionally satisfying it might be to launch a punitive campaign against Saddam Hussein, it is difficult to balance the presumed gains against the risks of unilateral action. We must do whatever is necessary to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but we should do everything in our power to assure common ends and means, especially among the leading Arab as well as non-Arab nations.

The second aspect of cohesion about which I am concerned centers on the domestic consensus. It is at least as important, probably even more important, for the President to maintain support at home as it is to hold on to a united front with our coalition partners.

The Nation has supported the administration's policies with caution but with understanding up to this point. The impact on the economy, the budget, and personal finances, have been accepted as necessary. Even the disruption caused by active duty and reserve force deployments has not caused widespread complaints.

My reading of the public mood is that they back the President, but they want to know what they are in for. This means that the administration must be prepared to set out a convincing case for the range of actions to which we could be committed.

In return, I think the Nation, and specifically the Congress, should devise some vehicle to express to the world at large, both friend and adversary, that the United States is patient, but its patience is not inexhaustible, that we are determined that aggression against neighbors shall not be condoned, that we speak with a single voice on the essential elements of policy, and the terms of the United Nations' resolutions shall be carried out by whatever means are necessary.

This could not be considered a bank check, and certainly would not constitute a declaration of war, but it would strengthen the President's hands considerably in the critical weeks and months ahead. It would help to establish that time is not on Iraq's side, as Saddam Hussein manifestly wants to believe.

I hope this committee will seriously consider sponsoring such a resolution after a full and careful deliberation on the range of reasonable alternatives. Obviously, any such resolution would hinge in part on the size and direction of our force deployments, the third and defining aspect of both international and domestic cohesion.

In this area, I must confess to a nagging concern about the means and ends. By calling for an "offensive military option" and increasing the projected Desert Shield force levels, the President has clearly decided to send a strong message to Saddam Hussein about the seriousness of the U.S. resolve.

This high risk tactic might succeed in forcing an acceptable political resolution to the crisis, or if combat is unavoidable would give us the forces needed to prevail alongside our coalition partners. If so, I would applaud the President's nerve and foresight.

My main concern with this latest scheduled reinforcement is not that we might choose to fight, but rather the deployment might cause us to fight perhaps prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily. I would stress that this is a risk, not a certainty, but one that ought to be taken seriously.

One often looks for historical precedents to lend context to dramatic events, and the press has been full of comparison between Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia prior to World War II. No analogy is perfect, but the current course of events strikes me as more reminiscent of World War I than World War II.

In 1914, the contending powers set in motion a mobilization and deployment juggernaut that soon achieved a momentum of its own.

Each side's reaction to the other's growing force levels and troop movements became in itself the rationale for war and the terrible slaughter that followed.

There are disturbing parallels as we escalate our force levels in the Middle East. A smaller force can maintain deterrence, and if properly configured can also inflict painful interdiction virtually indefinitely. It is also less obtrusive in a radically different culture such as Saudi Arabia. Support problems are not trivial for a protracted deployment, but with troop rotation they are manageable.

As we build to 400,000 troops, however, the support, morale, training, cultural and readiness problems rise sharply the longer the troops remain in forward garrisons. I would stress that these problems are systemic and in no way reflect on the superb men and women of our active duty and reserve components serving with distinction in Operation Desert Shield. They are well-equipped, well-trained, well-motivated and well-led, from their commander on down to the junior platoon sergeant.

They cope with the discomfort, boredom and natural apprehensions of their circumstances with disciplined professionalism and a distinctly American brand of G.I. humor. They know they may soon be in a fight and that it could be bloody, but they are confident and ready for whatever happens.

They are an extraordinary group of Americans, and the country should be proud of them and seek to minimize the problems and risks that accompany their growing numbers.

With a limited U.S. rotation base, a force of that size cannot readily be exchanged, cannot easily be sustained, and cannot be withdrawn without political liability. Thus, the risk is that the problems inherent in maintaining the "offensive military option" could create irresistible pressures to initiate combat irrespective of the progress of the U.N. sanctions. This would be unfortunate, for there are indicators that the embargo is having the predicted effect on about the predicted timetable. Secretary Schlesinger detailed some of the economic indicators for you yesterday.

In the area of military hardware, we and our allies can repair and replace our equipment as needed, while time works against the Iraqi armed forces. On balance, adding such a large increment of forces to the theater at this time might add decisive political leverage, but at substantial risk that their very presence could narrow our options and our ability to act with patient resolve.

I would like to conclude this brief overview with a few thoughts on the longer term implications of the current crisis. Whether you believe the post-Cold War world will revert to power politics or Balkan conflict, or will have collective security or some other model, it is clear that the world will draw enduring lessons from the way this crisis is resolved.

There will surely be other problems to solve in this world of the future, ranging from nuclear proliferation to economic warfare to armed aggression. Since the dawn of civilization, mankind's court of last resort has been the use of force. That course may again be needed in this conflict, although, like everyone else here, I hope further bloodshed can be avoided.

If the leading nations of the world can work together under the legitimizing influence of international institutions and wield non-military instruments of power to compel a political solution, potential aggressors and potential victims cannot fail to look at the future differently.

However, even nonviolent crisis resolution is a poor substitute for dealing with conflicts before they lead to violence. The Middle East is a laboratory case study in the inevitability of eruption when fundamental problems are left to fester.

Given the longstanding and well-recognized regional combination of energy dependence, the Palestinian impasse, disparities of wealth and resources, conservative versus radical religious and political discord, and the proliferating high technology weaponry, the only surprise about the invasion of Kuwait was that anyone was surprised that something would happen.

It would have been hard to predict the date and precise issue that would once again convulse the region, but the conditions were there for all to see. Until those conditions can be resolved through negotiations and international supervision, we can expect that violence will remain a permanent feature of the Middle East landscape.

I submit the United States, working with the Soviets and other interested nations, can play a powerful leadership role to help search out constructive solutions to many of the regional problems. However, this leadership role, indeed, the influence we will exert in the region for many decades to come, will depend heavily on the outcome of the current crisis. I submit that we should consider this reality most carefully as we attempt to decide in the days ahead what constitutes success and victory.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my remarks.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

Prepared Statement of David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.)

Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SASC Middle East Crisis Hearings

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today and to share my perspectives on what I consider potentially the most dangerous crisis yet in the Middle East. I hope these hearings will both sharpen the nation's understanding of the stakes involved and produce constructive, cohesive actions that will further the chances of resolving the crisis successfully.

I want to begin by stating my unqualified endorsement for the President's swift and adroit response to the invasion of Kuwait in August. I am absolutely convinced that his decisive action prevented a wider aggression which would have been enormously more difficult to reverse, much less contain. I believe his decision to deploy US forces to the region, his initiative in mobilizing the international coalition to oppose Saddam Hussein, and his leadership in eliciting the United Nations resolutions showed a high degree of skill and courage

The early measures conveyed a reasoned and implacable determination by virtually the entire international community not to condone the theft and plunder of a weaker nation by force of arms. The speed, strength and extent of the international response clearly surprised Saddam Hussein and disrupted his designs for wider control.

Most important, in my view, is that our stance enabled us to seize the moral high ground, standing with most of the nations of the world in condemning Saddam Hussein's aggression and thereby discrediting his attempts to cast the conflict as a US-Iraqi confrontation over oil. (Clearly, oil played an important role in the international response, but it was not in the narrow and superficial sense of risking war to keep gas prices low. Rather, it was imperative in the strategic sense to prevent an aggressor's gaining a grip on half the world's proven oil reserves, the energy jugular for every industrialized and developing nation on earth.)

In sum, I believe our initial policies and activities were logical, appropriate, legitimate and well executed. They were the right actions at the right time for the right reasons.

Moreover, contrary to the predictions of some observers, both the international alliance and our domestic consensus regarding the need for some action have remained encouragingly durable. As the oil markets have stabilized, the feared "fraying at the edges" has simply not occurred. In fact, if the increasing stringency of the successive UN resolutions is any barometer, the international cohesiveness has become firmer with time. I stress this point because I consider the solidarity of the coalition and domestic support for US policy to be indispensable ingredients for a successful resolution of the crisis, whether by diplomatic or military means. Therefore, any cautions I have about the direction of our present policy are focused on three interrelated aspects of that cohesion.

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If the US policy attempts to expand these minimum objectives or interpret them more broadly (for example, to include reparations, tribunals, dismantling of chemical and nuclear production facilities, etc.), we run the very real risk of exceeding the tolerance of some members of the coalition. The one objective I would add is the need to insure that Saddam Hussein does not develop a nuclear capability. A corollary risk is that we solidify Saddam Hussein's intransigence and foreclose a non-military solution, for I can foresee no circumstances in which Iraq's leader would accept such conditions except at the point of a gun.

This doesn't mean that any nation in the UN who signed up to the sanctions should have a veto over US actions. However, we have properly observed the sensitivities of our partners up to this point in the crisis and should abandon that course only under the most extreme need and after the most careful assessment of the costs and consequences. No matter how emotionally satisfying it might be to launch a punitive campaign against Saddam Hussein, it is difficult to balance the presumed gains against the risks of unilateral action. We must do whatever is necessary to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but should do everything in our power to ensure common ends and means, especially among the leading Arab and non-Arab states.

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This means that the Administration must be prepared to set out a convincing case for the range of actions to which we could be committed. In return, I think the nation--and specifically, the Congress--should devise some vehicle to express to the world at large, both friends and adversary, that the United States is patient but its patience is not inexhaustible, that we are determined that aggression against neighbors shall not be condoned, that we speak with a single voice on the essential elements of policy, and that the terms of the United Nations resolutions shall be carried out by whatever means are necessary.

This could not be considered a "blank check," and certainly would not constitute a declaration of war, but it would strengthen the President's hand considerably in the critically risky weeks and months ahead. It would help to establish that time is not on Iraq's side, as Saddam Hussein manifestly wants to believe. I hope this Committee will seriously consider sponsoring such a resolution after full and careful deliberation on the range of reasonable alternatives.

Obviously, any such resolution would hinge in part on the size and direction of our force deployments, the third and defining aspect of both international and domestic cohesion. In this area, I must confess to a nagging concern about means and ends. By calling for an "offensive military option" and increasing the projected Desert Shield force levels, the President has clearly decided to send a strong message to Saddam Hussein about the seriousness of US resolve. This high risk tactic might succeed in forcing an acceptable political resolution to the crisis or, if combat is unavoidable, will give us the forces needed to prevail (alongside our coalition partners). If so, I will applaud the President's nerve and foresight.

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There are disturbing parallels as we escalate our force levels in the Middle East. A smaller force can maintain deterrence and, if properly configured, can also inflict painful interdiction virtually indefinitely. It is also less obtrusive in a radically different culture such as Saudi Arabia. The support problems are not trivial for a protracted deployment, but, with troop rotation, they are manageable.

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With a limited US rotation base, the force of that size can't readily be exchanged, can't easily be sustained, and can't be withdrawn without political liability. Thus, the risk is that the problems inherent in maintaining the "offensive military option" could create irresistible pressures to initiate combat, irrespective of the progress of the UN sanctions

This would be unfortunate, for there are indicators that the embargo is having about the predicted effect on about the predicted timetable. Dr. James Schlesinger detailed some of the economic indicators for you yesterday. In the area of military hardware, the allies can repair and replace equipment as needed, while time works against the Iraqi armed forces.

On balance, adding such a large increment of forces to the theater at this time might add decisive political leverage, but at substantial risk that their very presence could narrow our options and our ability to act with patient resolve.

I'd like to conclude this brief overview with a few thoughts on the longer term implications of the current crisis. Whether you believe the post-Cold War world will revert to power politics, Balkan conflict, collective security or some other model, it is clear that the world will draw enduring lessons from the way this crisis is resolved. There will surely be other problems to solve in the world of the future, ranging from nuclear proliferation to economic warfare to armed aggression. Since the dawn of civilization, mankind's court of last resort has been the use of force. That course may again be needed in this conflict although, like everyone else here, I hope further bloodshed can be avoided. If the leading nations of the world can work together under the legitimizing influence of international institutions and wield non-military instruments of power to compel a political solution, potential aggressors and potential victims cannot fail to look at the future differently.

However, even non-violent crisis resolution is a poor substitute for dealing with conflicts before they lead to violence. The Middle East is a laboratory case study in the inevitability of eruption when fundamental problems are left to fester. Given the long-standing and well recognized regional combination of petroleum dependence, the Palestinian impasse, disparities of wealth and resources, conservative vs radical religious and political discord, and proliferating high tech weaponry, the only surprise about the invasion of Kuwait was that anyone was surprised! It would have been hard to predict the specific date and the precise issue that would once again convulse the region, but the conditions were there for all to see.

Until those conditions can be resolved through negotiations and international supervision, we can expect that violence will remain a permanent feature of the Middle East landscape. I submit that the US, working with the Soviets and other interested nations, can play a powerful leadership role to help search out constructive solutions to many of the regional problems. However, this leadership role--indeed, the influence we will exert in the region for many decades to come--will depend heavily on the outcome of the current crisis. I submit that we should consider this reality most carefully as we attempt to decide in the days ahead what constitutes "success" and "victory."

Mr Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I'd welcome any comments or questions from the members of the Committee.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Jones.

Admiral Crowe, we are delighted to have you here.

Admiral Crowe, of course, is our most recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I must say that he came in during the period of time of tremendous change. He also was responsible as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for implementing something that had been sought after for many, many years, including certain recommendations that General Jones made, and that was the overall Goldwater-Nichols bill which reorganized our military forces and streamlined our chains of command. I am sure that a lot of those changes are very much in play now in terms of our force structure in the Persian Gulf.

So Admiral Crowe, we are pleased to have you here today. Although we will have many other questions to ask you, at one point before this is over I want to talk a little bit about those things that the media is not interested in but which are the heart and soul of what we do in the military; that is, the chain of command in the Persian Gulf. We will get into that subject at a later point.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I was leaving home this morning, my wife said I thought you were retired. When are we going to actually retire around here?

Given U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf and Saddam Hussein's brutal takeover of Kuwait, I strongly believe that the subject of U.S. policy in the region is of utmost importance to all Americans, and I applaud these hearings, Mr. Chairman.

Due to the press of time, my preliminary remarks will concentrate largely on the impact of the crisis on the Gulf region itself. As you have implied, sir, I assume, of course, the question period will range over a great many other considerations.

You would think that we would have a decent interval to celebrate the end of the Cold War and the vindication of our policies and values, but the recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated at least to my mind that the globe is still a very dangerous place and that new threats may very well replace the U.S.-Soviet contest which we lived with for so long.

Our difficulties with Iraq certainly suggest the type of challenge that the post-Cold War era may confront. The most distinguishing feature of the agreement or disagreement, I believe, is that the Soviets are not backing Saddam Hussein. For the first time in 40 years, we are confronting a major international crisis and not working at cross-purposes with the Kremlin. We should not overlook the importance of that fact. This development has given the President an unprecedented latitude for maneuver and, in turn, has severely constrained Baghdad's options. This is the first time that a post-war president has had such a luxury.

In turn, President Bush has taken full advantage of the newfound maneuvering room. He acted quickly and, in my opinion, correctly to constrain Hussein militarily, to defend Saudi Arabia, and to clamp a tight economic quarantine on Iraq.

Some of the most important early achievements were one that the President had a large hand in himself, I understand even on the telephone: for example, gaining access to Saudi Arabia for our forces was a previously unheard-of concession and one that we never received throughout the Persian Gulf convoying operations; forging a rough political consensus among the leaders of NATO, the U.S.S.R. and Japan; and encouraging a pan-Arab military effort in support of Saudi Arabia.

We are for the time being witnessing a rather remarkable display of collective political and financial support which is unprecedented in the post-war era. President Bush deserves full credit for this achievement, and I believe that the country has extended it to him.

Militarily, the United States has mounted an impressive deployment with air, sea, and ground forces. I would submit that no other nation in the world could have in 60 days moved this size force 8,000 miles and put it in the field, not to mention the rather trying climate and topography in which it must operate. On balance, the original deployment went extremely well.

As for the economic embargo, it is the first time we have been able to mount truly unified sanctions; consequently, I do not believe the previous analogies are too applicable today. No embargoed material is moving into Iraq by sea, and the air blockade is proving relatively effective. Undoubtedly there is some leakage, modest I would hope, probably on the ground from Jordan and Iran, but I know of no significant breaks in the encirclement.

I strongly believe it is important to recognize what has been achieved thus far. Some pundits contend that Saddam Hussein's primary goal is to control the bulk of the Middle East oil and to dictate the price of crude to the West. If that is correct, any such design has been frustrated. He has been served clear notice that he will not be allowed to capture the Saudi oil fields either now or in the future. A definite line has been drawn constraining him and his inflated ambitions.

The increased oil income Saddam had in mind has not materialized. In fact, Baghdad has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings per year. As Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, this figure would be $30 billion at the current oil price. In a country the size of Iraq, that is not chopped liver.

Moreover, it has been graphically demonstrated that the West can live rather well without Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil after we had survived the initial shock. Granted, some special areas of refined products are strapped, but these deficiencies are not having a heavy impact on the industrial nations. The price swings we see have been generated as much by psychological factors as by supply and demand.

The embargo is biting heavily, in my judgment. Given the standard of living Iraq is used to and the increasing sophistication of

Iraqi society, it is dead wrong to say that Iraq is not being hurt. It is being damaged severely. That also, I believe, goes for the Iraqi military, which depends on outside support.

I will not elaborate. Secretary Schlesinger discussed this with you in some detail yesterday. I would say, though, it is the most effective peacetime blockade that I have personally witnessed. Granted, the embargo is not working as rapidly as many would prefer, but if we wanted economic results in 2 or 3 months then a quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts I note, however, do believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of 12 to 18 months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

Ultimately, these trends will translate into political pressure. I generally believe we have already seen the first subtle hints that Saddam Hussein is seeking a way out; in other words, a face-saving way to withdraw. While he did not intend it originally, I believe he has laid the groundwork for a long-term alliance structure to contain Iraq. When I say long-term, I mean beyond the term of this crisis. He has legitimated in some form for the long term a U.S. military presence in the region. I do not know the shape or the disposition of it, but I really believe that.

Moreover, the logistic support that Iraq used to enjoy will never return to the past levels of generosity, if at all. Hussein has excited the resentment, contempt, and suspicion of the nations he historically depended upon. In essence, under no circumstances can he return to the world he left on August 2. When the dust clears, I hope that we will make vigorous efforts to reinforce that outcome.

In sum, the President's initial moves have already achieved a great deal. The argument that Saddam is winning and being rewarded I believe is both weird and wrong. Obviously this fact is often overlooked by those calling for more direct action.

It is true that the trauma is by no means over. I believe the burning question now confronting the President as well as our public is what next. This is no mean question, nor is it an easy one. In its most extreme form, we are talking about deliberately initiating offensive military operations; in other words, war.

War is always a grave decision and one which deserves both deep thought and wide public discussion, and I suspect that is the primary purpose of these hearings, Mr. Chairman.

If Saddam Hussein initiates an attack on Saudi Arabia or U.S. forces, we have no choice but to react vigorously and to use force to bring Iraq to heel. It is imperative once we engage that we bring it to a successful conclusion no matter what it requires. It would be disastrous to do otherwise. I believe such a response would be defensible and acceptable to all constituencies, domestic and international.

For that reason alone, it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein will initiate further military action. Certainly everything we see to date suggests he is hunkering down for the long haul. If that prediction proves correct, President Bush will be confronted with some very painful choices.

If deposing Saddam Hussein would sort out the Middle East and permit the United States to turn its attention elsewhere and to concentrate on our very pressing domestic problems, the case for initiating offensive action immediately would be considerably strengthened. The Middle East, however, is not that simple. I witnessed it firsthand. I lived in the Middle East for a year.

Put bluntly, Saddam's departure or any other single act I am afraid will not make everything wonderful. In fact, a close look at the Middle East is rather depressing. While we may wish it otherwise, the fact is that the region has been, is, and will be for the foreseeable future plagued with a host of problems, tensions, enmities, and disagreements.

For instance, the Arab-Israeli dispute is alive and well. To say the least, the Palestinians have been irrevocably alienated by the Israeli Government's policies. There will never be true stability in the area until this dispute is sorted out ultimately. As Henry Schuler phrased it, "Neither the feudal monarchies nor the oppressive dictatorships enjoy the stability of an institutionalized popular mandate of political participation." This suggests that political maturity and, in turn, stability is still a long way off.

Income differences on both national and individual levels are a constant source of tensions and envy throughout the region, and I witnessed this friction at close hand when I lived in Bahrain.

Moslem fundamentalism is spreading, and the process highlights the cultural, religious, and ethnic differences that abound in the area as well as the widespread distrust of the West.

Boundary disputes are legion and have been a part of the region for many years: Qatar versus Bahrain; Abu Dhabi versus Oman and Saudi Arabia; Yemen versus Saudi Arabia; Kuwait versus Iraq; and many of the Emirates versus Iran.

United States links to Israel and the dominant position of American oil companies have turned large segments of the Arab world against the U.S. in particular. The American public is well aware of this, of course.

The current crisis has divided the "moderate" Arab states for the first time. For example, Saudi Arabia has now split with its traditional friends, Jordan and Yemen. Incidentally, Yemen is now the most populous state on the peninsula—some 10 million plus. This does not bode well for the causes of stability or pluralism, both of which are also U.S. interests.

These frictions, singly or collectively, have resulted in a succession of explosions, assassinations, global terrorism, coups, revolutions, embargoes, and full-scale war on occasion. Secretary Schlesinger summed it up when he said, "The noncombat costs of recourse to war will be substantial."

Like it or not, the process of bringing stability to the Middle East will be painful and protracted with or without Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the United States, both as a leader of the free world and as the world's number one consumer of crude oil, will be integrally involved in the region politically and economically for the foreseeable future, just as we have been for the past 40 years.

That conclusion may not make us comfortable, but frankly I see no way we can avoid this burden. It comes with our affluence and global reach. This reality suggests that anything we do in that part of the world should be consistent with our past policies and our future role as an international leader.

Put another way, today's problem is a great deal more complex than merely defeating Saddam Hussein. In my view, the critical foreign policy questions we must ask are not whether Saddam Hussein is a brutal, deceitful, or as Barbara Bush would put it, a dreadful man—he is all of those things. Whether initiating conflict against Iraq will moderate the larger difficulties in the Gulf region and will put Washington in a better position to work with the Arab world in the future, is in my estimation, the more important question.

I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long term is our primary national interest in the Middle East. May I repeat it: that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long term is our primary national interest in the Middle East. It is not obvious to me that we are currently looking at the crisis in this light. Our dislike for Hussein seems to have crowded out many other considerations.

In working through the problems myself, I am persuaded that the U.S. initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited and perhaps further polarize the Arab world. Certainly, many Arabs would deeply resent a campaign which would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers and force them to choose sides between Arab nations and the West.

From the Arab perspective, this fight is not simply a matter between bad and good. It is a great deal more complex than that and includes political and social perspectives deeply rooted in their history. The aftermath of such a contest will very likely multiply many-fold the anti-American resentment which we already see in the Middle East. In essence, we may be in a certain sense on the horns of a no-win dilemma. Even if we win, we lose ground in the Arab world and generally injure our ability to deal in the future with the labyrinth of the Middle East.

I firmly believe that Saddam Hussein must be pushed out of Kuwait. He must leave Kuwait. At the same time, given the larger context, I judge it highly desirable to achieve this goal in a peaceful fashion, if that is possible. In other words, I would argue that we should give sanctions a fair chance before we discard them. I personally believe they will bring him to his knees ultimately, but I would be the first to admit that is a speculative judgment.

If, in fact, the sanctions will work in 12 to 18 months instead of 6 months, a tradeoff of avoiding war, with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties, would in my estimation be more than worth it. A part of this effort, however, must be a strong military posture, both to underwrite our determination and to give effect to the embargo. Secretary Shultz used to say our military provides the umbrella underneath which all our diplomatic cards are played.

Incidentally, it may be necessary in this case to return to a rotation policy to sustain our presence. If the sanctions do not live up to their promise, or if they collapse, then a military solution would be the only recourse and we will be well placed if we continue our policy to mount such a campaign.

In any event, I am convinced that such an action will be much better received if we have visibly exhausted our peaceful alternatives. If we elect a military option—and I know that many are advocating that—I have utter confidence that our forces can prevail.

It will not be cost-free, of course. Casualties and the time schedule will depend on our innovativeness, our military objectives, as well as Iraqi determination. I do not believe that we can assume that Iraq will roll over, although many hope that it will.

Let me say a word about objectives. It was my experience as chairman that in such crises to get decision-makers to settle on specific military objectives was difficult, at best. There is a strong tendency, in these circumstances, to talk in generalities when contemplating combat, but frankly, that is not satisfactory when you make a decision of that moment.

In this case, what will we expect our commanders to do? Drive to Baghdad, occupy Iraq, free Kuwait, destroy Iraqi forces, eliminate their nuclear capability, or all of the above, et cetera? The character of your objectives influences the whole operation and your tactical plans, so they must be specific. The more ambitious the goals are, the less likely a peaceful solution can be found, the greater the casualties, the lengthier the campaign, and the more difficult post-war reconstruction.

If we come to that point, I would strongly advise that our combat objectives call for an intense air campaign aimed at disrupting his war-making industry, including nuclear installations, his chemical warfare and biological weapons facilities, a subsequent ground campaign designed to take advantage of the air operations, a subsequent ground campaign to cut off Kuwait and subsequently free it, and to destroy the effectiveness of the Iraqi forces both in Kuwait and on the southern border of Iraq.

At that point, I would strongly recommend reassessing the situation before continuing further operations. Also, instituting a vigorous post-war crisis effort to maintain allied unity and to control war material to Baghdad for the future

I recognize that some would consider these objectives too limited. I disagree. These goals, if achieved, would deal Saddam Hussein a crushing political and military blow, and dispel any further ambitions he might have to dominate either the Middle East or the global oil market. The point is to succeed with minimum effort, casualties and political cost that we can engineer.

I understand that many believe our troops, our people, and our allies do not have the necessary patience to wait out the quarantine, or for that matter the necessary patience to do anything for a long period of time. Militarily, we have already lost the element of surprise. Saddam Hussein knows we are there. He knows what strength we are in.

I believe our relative military position improves every day. It is curious that some expect our military to train soldiers to stand up to hostile fire, but doubt its ability to train them to occupy ground and to wait patiently.

I am aware, of course, that there is sincere concern about the task of holding the domestic and international consensus together. While there will be grumbling, I am sure, I believe—and I get this sense from my speaking, and I speak widely around this country—I believe the bulk of the American people are willing to put up with a great deal to avoid war and to avoid casualties a long ways from home. In fact, in my judgment, we are selling our country short by jumping to the conclusion that we cannot stare down our opponent.

Similarly, I cannot understand why some consider our international alliances strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution. As General Jones mentioned, I see no indications that there are cracks, significant cracks, coming in our alliance structure. Actually, I sense more nervousness among our allies about our impetuousness than about our patience.

In closing, I would make a few observations that perhaps we should keep in mind as we approach this process. Using economic pressure may prove protracted, but if it could avoid hostilities or casualties, those also are highly desirable ends. As a matter of fact, I consider them also national interests. I seldom hear them referred to in that fashion.

It is curious that just as our patience in Western Europe has paid off and furnished us the most graphic example in our history of how staunchness is sometimes the better course in dealing with thorny international problems, a few armchair strategists are counseling a near-term attack on Iraq. It is worth remembering that in the 1950s and 1960s, individuals were similarly advising an attack on the U.S.S.R. Would not that have been great?

Time often has a way of achieving unexpected results. Already there are reports that the Palestinians in Kuwait, having witnessed Saddam's cruelty and having been abused themselves, are turning away from him, and that others in Jordan are also having second thoughts. We should not forget that autocrats often have a talent for alienating even their friends and supporters. I am reminded of how time changed the Panamanian population's view of Noriega.

Mr. Chairman, it may be that Saddam Hussein's ego is so engaged that he will not bend to an embargo or other peaceful deterrents such as containment and we will have to take further action, which I would support strongly. But I believe we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that that is in fact the case and that hostilities would best serve our interests before resorting to unilateral offensive action against Iraq.

It would be a sad commentary if Saddam Hussein, a two-bit tyrant who sits on 17 million people and possesses a gross national product of $40 billion, proved to be more patient than the United States, the world's most affluent and powerful nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe follows:]

STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN (RET)

Mr. Chairman,

Given U. S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Saddam Hussein's brutal takeover of Kuwait, the subject of U.S. policy in the region is of the utmost importance to all Americans.

Mr. Chairman, I do have some preliminary remarks I would like to make. Due to the press of time these will not deal with al aspects of the subject, but concentrate largely on the impact of the crisis on the Gulf region. I assume, of course, the question period will range over the entire spectrum of considerations.

You would think we would have had a decent interval to celebrate the end of the Cold War and the vindication of our policies and values. But the recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated that the globe is still a dangerous place and that new threats may well replace the U.S.-Soviet contest.

Our difficulties with Iraq certainly suggest the type of challenge the new world may confront.

The most distinguishing feature of our disagreement with Iraq is that the Soviets are not backing Saddam Hussein. For the first time in 40 years we are confronting a major international crisis and not working at cross purposes with the Kremlin. This development has given the President an unprecedented latitude for maneuver and, in turn, severely constrained Baghdad's options. This is the first time a post-war President has had such a luxury.

President Bush has taken full advantage of the new-found maneuvering room. He reacted quickly and, in my opinion, correctly, to constrain Hussein militarily to defend Saudi Arabia and to clamp a tight economic quarantine on Iraq.

Some of the most important early achievements were ones that the President had a large hand in himself, e.g., gaining access to Saudi Arabia for our forces (a previously unheard of concession), forging a rough political consensus among the leaders of NATO, the USSR and Japan, and encouraging a pan-Arab military effort in support of Saudi Arabia. We are, for the time being, witnessing a remarkable display of collective political and financial support which is unprecedented in the post-war era. President Bush deserves full credit for this achievement.

Militarily, the United States has mounted an impressive deployment - with air, sea and ground forces. No other nation in the world could have in 60 days moved this size force 8,000 miles and put it in the field - not to mention the rather trying climate and topography in which it must operate. On balance the original deployment went extremely well.

As to the economic embargo, it is the first time we have been able to mount truly unified sanctions. No embargoed material is moving into Iraq by sea, and the air blockade is proving relatively effective. Undoubtedly there is some leakage - probably on the ground from Jordan and Iran - but I know of no significant breaks in the encirclement.

It is important to recognize what has been achieved thus far:

- Some pundits contend that Saddam Hussein's primary goal is to control the bulk of the Middle East oil and to dictate the price of crude to the West. If that is correct, any such design has been frustrated. He has been served clear notice that he will not be allowed to capture the Saudi oil fields either now or in the future. A definite line has been drawn constraining him and his inflated ambitions.

- The increased oil income Saddam had in mind has not materialized. In fact, Baghdad has forfeited 20 billion dollars of foreign exchange earnings a year and as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, this figure would be $30 billion at the current oil price. In a country the size of Iraq that is not chopped liver.

- Moreover, it has been graphically demonstrated that the West can live rather well without Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. Granted some special areas of refined products are strapped, but those deficiencies are not having a heavy impact on the industrial nations. Frankly, the price swings we see have been generated as much by psychological factors as by supply and demand. We have been impacted by these oscillations, but fortuitously the bill has already been paid as the market has adjusted. Iraq cannot make that claim.

- The embargo is biting heavily. Given the standard of living Iraq is used to and the increasing sophistication of Iraqi society, it is dead wrong to say that Baghdad is not being hurt; it is being damaged severely. That goes for the Iraqi military as well, which depends on outside support. Yesterday Secretary Schlesinger elaborated on these impacts. Iraq's civilian production has declined by 40%, exports earnings have sharply dropped, and economic flexibility is rapidly disappearing.

Military industry will likewise be hit. It is the most effective peacetime blockade ever levied.

- Granted that the embargo is not working as rapidly as many would prefer; but if we wanted results in two or three months, clearly a quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of twelve to eighteen months.. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work, but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

- Ultimately these trends will translate into political pressure. I genuinely believe we are already seeing the first signs that Saddam Hussein is seeking a way out - a face-saving way to withdraw.

- Moreover, the logistic support that Iraq used to enjoy will never return to the past levels of generosity, if at all. Hussein has excited the resentment, contempt and suspicion of the nations he historically depended upon. In essence, under no circumstances can Iraq return to the world it left on August 2 and when the dust clears we must reinforce that outcome.

In sum, the President's initial moves have already achieved a great deal. The argument that Saddam is winning and being rewarded is both weird and wrong. Obviously this fact is often overlooked by those calling for more direct action.

It is true that the trauma is by no means over. The burning question now confronting the President (as well as the public) is what next? This is no mean question nor is it an easy one. In its most extreme form, we are talking about deliberately initiating offensive military operations - in other words, war.

This is always a grave decision and one which deserves both deep thought and wide public discussion.

If Saddam Hussein initiates an attack on Saudi Arabia or U.S. forces, we have no choice but to react vigorously and to use force to bring Iraq to heel. I believe such a response would be defensible and acceptable to all constituencies, domestic and international. For that reason alone it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein will initiate further military action. Certainly everything we see to date suggests he is hunkering down for the long haul. If that prediction proves correct, President Bush will be confronted with some painful choices.

If deposing Saddam Hussein would sort out the Middle East and permit the U.S. to turn its attention elsewhere, and to concentrate on our domestic problems, the case for initiating offensive action would be considerably strengthened.

But the Middle East is not that simple. Put bluntly, Saddam's departure or any other single act will not make everything wonderful. In fact, a close look at the Middle East is rather depressing. While we may wish it otherwise, the fact is that the region has been, is, and will be for the foreseeable future plagued with a host of problems, tensions, enmities, and disagreements. For example:

- The Arab-Israeli dispute is alive and well. To say the least the Palestinians have been irrevocably alienated by the Israeli government's policies. There will never be true stability in the area until this dispute is sorted out.

- As Henry Schuler phrased it, "Neither the feudal monarchies nor the oppresive dictatorships enjoy the stability of an institutionalized popular mandate of political participation." This suggests that political maturity, hence stability, is still a long way off.

- Income differences on both national and individual levels are a constant source of tensions and envy throughout the region. I lived in the Gulf in 1976 and 1977 and witnessed this friction at close hand.

- Moslem fundamentalism is spreading and the process highlights the cultural, religious and ethnic differences that abound in the area as well as the widespread distrust of the West.

- Boundary disputes are legion: Qatar vs. Bahrain, Abu Dhabi vs. Oman and Saudi Arabia, Yemen vs. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait vs. Iraq.

- U.S. links to Israel and the dominant position of American oil companies have turned large segments of the Arab world against the U.S. in particular.

- The current crisis has divided the moderate Arab states for the first time, e.g., Saudi Arabia has now split with Jordan and Yemen (now the most populous state on the peninsula at 10+ million) over their support for Iraq . This does not bode well for the cause of stability or pluralism - both of which U.S. interests.

These frictions - singly or collectively - have resulted in a succession of explosions, assasinations, global terrorism, coups, revolutions, producer embargoes, and full scale war on occasion. Secretary Schlesinger summed it up when he said the non-combat costs of recourse to war will be substantial.

Like it or not, the process of bringing stability to the Middle East will be painful and protracted with or without Saddam Hussein.

Moreover, the U.S., both as a leader of the free world and as the world's number one consumer of crude oil, will be integrally involved in the region, politically and economically, for the foreseeable future - just as we have been for the past forty years. It may not make us comfortable, but there is no way we can avoid this burden; it comes with our affluence and global reach.

This reality suggests that anything we do in that part of the world should be consistent with our past policies and our future role as an international leader. Put another way, today's problem is a great deal more complex than merely defeating Saddam Hussein.

In my view, the critical foreign policy questions we must ask are not whether Saddam Hussein is a brutal, deceitful or dreadful man - he is all of those things - but whether initiating conflict against Iraq will moderate the larger difficulties in the Gulf region and will put Washington in a better position to work with the Arab world in the future. I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long term is our primary national interest in the Middle East.

It is not obvious to me that we are currently looking at the crisis in this light. Our dislike for Hussein seems to have crowded out many other considerations.

In working through the problems myself, I am persuaded that the U.S. initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited and further polarize the Arab world. Certainly many Arabs would deeply resent a campaign which would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers and force them to choose sides. From the Arab perspective this fight is not simply a matter between bad and good; it's a great deal more complex than that and includes political and social perspectives deeply rooted in Arab History. The aftermath of such a contest will very likely multiply many fold the anti-America resentment in the Middle East. In essence we may be on the horns of a no-win dilemma, even if we win we lose ground in the Arab world and further injure our ability to deal with the labyrinth of the Middle East.

I firmly believe that Saddam_Hussein must leave Kuwait. At the same time given the larger context I judge it highly desirable to achieve this goal in a peaceful fashion, if possible. In otherwords, we should give sanctions a fair chance before we discard them. I personally believe they will bring him to his knees, but I would be the first to admit that is a speculative judgment. If in fact the sanctions will work in twelve to eighteen months instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would, in my view, be more than worth t.

A part of this effort, however, must be a strong military posture both to underwrite our determination and to give effect to the embargo. Of course, it may be necessary to return to a rotation policy to sustain such a presence. If the sanctions do not live up to their promise or if they collapse, then a military solution would be the only recourse, and we would be well placed to mount such a campaign. In any event, I am convincd that such an action will be much better received if we have visibly exhausted our peaceful alternatives.

If we elect a military option, I have utter confidence that our forces can prevail. It will not be cost free, of course. Casualties and the time schedule will depend on innovation, our military objectives and Iraqi determination. We cannot assume that Iraq will roll over.

Let me say a word about our objectives. It was my experience as Chairman that to get decision-makers to settle on specific military objectives was difficult at best. There is a strong tendency to talk in generalities when contemplating combat, but that is not satisfactory. In this case, what would we expect our commanders to do - drive to Baghdad, free Kuwait, destroy Iraqi forces, eliminate his nuclear capability, or all of the above, etc. The character of your objectives influences the whole operation and your tactical plans. The more ambitious the goals are the less likely a peaceful solution can be found, the greater the casualties, the lengthier the campaign, and the more difficult postwar reconstruction. I would strongly advise that our combat objectives run along these lines:

- an intense air campaign aimed at disrupting his war-making industry - including nuclear installations, conventional warfare, and biological weapons facilities.

- a subsequent ground campaign designed:

-- to cut off Kuwait and subsequently free it and

-- to destroy the effectiveness of the Iraqi forces both in Kuwait and on the southern border of Iraq.

I recognize that some would consider those objectives too limited. I disagree. These goals, if achieved, would deal Saddam Hussein a crushing political and military blow and dispel any further ambitions he might have to dominate either the Middle East or the global oil market. The point is to succeed with minimum effort, casualties, and political cost.

I understand that many believe our troops, our people and our allies don't have the necessary patience to wait out the quarantine. Militarily we have already lost the element of surprise; Saddam Hussein knows we are there. I believe our relative military position improves every day. It's curious that some expect our military to train soldiers to stand up to hostile fire, but doubt its ability to train them to wait patiently.

I am aware, of course, that many are concerned about the task of holding the domestic and international consensus together. While there will be grumbling, I believe the bulk of the American people are willing to put up with a lot to avoid casualties a long way from home. Similarly, I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution. Actually, I sense more nervousness among our allies about our impetuousness than about our patience.

In closing, I would make a few observations that perhaps we should keep in mind as we approach this process:

- Using economic pressure may prove protracted; but if it could avoid hostilities or casualties those are also highly desirable ends. As a matter of fact, they are also national interests.

It is curious that, just as our patience in Western Europe has paid off and furnished us the most graphic example in our history of how staunchness is sometimes the better course in dealing with thorny international problems, armchair strategists are counseling a near-term attack on Iraq. It is worth remembering that in the '50s and '60s, similar individuals were advising an attack on the USSR - wouldn't that have been great?

Time often has a way of achieving unexpected results. Already there are reports that the Palestinians in Kuwait, having witnessed Saddam's cruelty, are turning away from him and that others in Jordan are also having second thoughts.. I am reminded how time changed the Panamanian population's view of Noriega. Autocrats often have a talent for alienating even friends and supporters.

Mr. Chairman, it may be that Saddam Hussein's ego is so engaged that he will not bend to an embargo or other peaceful deterrents such as containment. But I believe we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that that is in fact the case and that hostilities would best serve our interests before resorting to unilateral offensive action against Iraq. It would be a sad commentary if Saddam Hussein, a two-bit tyrant who sits on 17 million people and possesses a GNP of $40 billion, proved to be more patient than the United States, the world's most affluent and powerful nation.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Admiral Crowe and General Jones. These are two of the most powerful statements I have heard in my 18 years here. I think you have rendered a real service and given us a great deal to think about.

I have really only one question, and we are going to rotate it around, with two parts. I will ask it of both of you.

In an interview that the Atlanta Journal and Constitution printed on October 28, General Schwarzkopf, who is our Commander in the field, head of our forces in the Middle East, is quoted as stating with respect to the sanctions that, quoting him:

"Golly, the sanctions have only been in effect about a couple of months. . . . And now we are starting to see evidence that the sanctions are pinching. So why should we say, okay, gave them 2 months, didn't work. Let's get on with it and kill a whole bunch of people? That's crazy. That's crazy. You don't go out there and say, okay, let's have a nice war today. God Almighty, that war could last a long time, long time and kill an awful lot of people. And so we've just got to be patient."

Two questions to both of you. Do you generally agree with General Schwarzkopf's sentiments expressed in that interview of October 28?

General JONES. I do. I said that we had a great commander, and that reaffirms it.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think he perhaps overlooks the difficulty of this question. It is a serious question.

On the other hand, as I said, I counsel patience, and it is true, and I think this is implied in what Schwarzkopf said, war is not neat, it is not tidy, and once you resort to it it is uncertain and it is a mess. You should be sure the stakes justify what you are doing before you voluntarily jump into a mess.

Chairman NUNN. Do either of you know anything that has occurred in the last month since about that period of time that would have a major change on that general assessment and counsel of patience and letting the embargo work? General Jones.

General JONES. I think the discussion on nuclear weapons has been brought to the forefront in the last few days, but other than that I see no change.

Chairman NUNN. Do either of you have any observations on the nuclear question that has arisen? I think both of you indicated that would be an important part of your long-term goals.

General JONES. I think it is a long-term issue. I do not think it is a justification to attack Iraq today just for that purpose; but over the long term, we have to do more about nuclear proliferation. We have not done very well. The Soviets are worried about it. We are now more worried about it. It is a problem beyond Saddam Hussein, but it is very important in this crisis to address it. We ought to recognize it. It is a fundamental problem involving many nations of the world.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Crowe, do you have any observations on this nuclear question now?

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Chairman, one of the advantages of retiring is you can say what you want, and one of the disadvantages is you do not have a staff to keep you up to date on what is going on, to bring you in to all these things. I have tried very hard to look at the nuclear question by consulting my friends who are in that business and who know something about it.

I am not privy to the latest intelligence, but everything that I derive from my own queries is that these recent reports of near-term development are not exactly right, they are exaggerated. The people in the business, while they often overestimate the time it has taken, which they admit, still believe it is unlikely that he will have a nuclear weapon in quite some time. Even the report this morning I think was referring not to a weapon but a device, a very crude device.

I think it is interesting to note that the Discriminating Deterrent Study which was done by a distinguished out-of-government group under Fred Ikle's sponsorship, when I was the Chairman, concluded that in the next century some 40 nations will probably have the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. It did not say they would but that they would have the capability to do so, and the study predicted that we would see widespread proliferation. It recommended a strong effort to avoid that, but it was not very optimistic that we could do so.

That is food for thought.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in saying that these were very outstanding contributions to the work we are undertaking. I particularly want to commend both of you for citing the superb performance of our troops. As their former commanders, I think that will be a very heartwarming message coming out of these hearings, and I am sure many of them are following these hearings.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, the Marines are doing great.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. General Gray will appreciate that.

Also, I do not know whether my time will allow it, but maybe subsequently in this hearing we can deal with the question of the disproportionate number of minorities. In the judgment of the professionals here, we have the best armed forces we have had since the closing days of World War II. Although the composition reflects a certain disproportionate profile of our cross-sections in America, they are performing and performing well.

General Jones, the key parts of your testimony suggest that perhaps there was some error in judgment in the augmentation of the armed forces as directed by the President here in the last month or 6 weeks. Let us go back to the beginning of this conflict when he sent over the initial forces in August and September. There was a time when we really had inadequate forces to deal with the military capabilities of the Iraqi forces. Am I not correct on that?

General JONES. Clearly in the first few days and even up to the first few weeks while we were getting our initial forces over there, from a military standpoint we were in a quite vulnerable position.

Senator WARNER. But that is a risk that the Commander in Chief took and the troops accepted, and we got away with it.

General JONES. Well, we had no choice. We could not get there any faster.

Senator **Warner**. Well, we could have perhaps resorted to certain types of air power for a while before we got into the ground buildup.

General **Jones**. Yes, we could have. We did a great job of getting the forces there during a vulnerable period.

Senator **Warner**. Now I have to believe and, indeed, I have met with General Schwarzkopf and talked extensively with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this buildup directed by the President was predicated on the best professional advice that he could achieve from his military advisors; namely, your successors.

Do you have any reason to disbelieve that?

General **Jones**. No. If you set out the objectives of defer and defend, I think the recommendations on that were right on line. If you set out that you wanted offensive capability and you want that offensive capability to succeed with very high probability, then the recommendations of 400,000 I think were valid. So I have no quarrel with the military recommendations as to the force levels.

The question is what should be our objectives and what sort of risks we are willing to take. There is no risk-free action in this crisis.

Senator **Warner**. Let me refer to a recent Newsweek article in which the President set forth the objectives. "Our goals have not changed," I am reading from this article, "since I first outlined them to the American people last August: First, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; third, security and stability for the Gulf, an important national interest to the United States since the time of Harry Truman; and fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad."

Do you see any departure from those goals?

General **Jones**. I would like to have what is meant by "security and stability" in the region defined. Does this mean that in order to achieve stability we have to bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein? Does that mean we have to go into Baghdad? Does that mean we have to destroy his military capability? I think that is the question.

On one hand, there is a discussion about tribunals and reparations and all the rest, and it is unclear as to what is or is not included in these objectives under this broad term "security and stability" in the region.

Senator **Warner**. Do you feel that the military buildup gave greater security to each service person that was there or is there now? In other words, the more forces that are brought in gives a greater security and survivability to the forces that were there?

General **Jones**. Obviously the more forces you have if you take offensive action the better you can do. If Saddam Hussein attacks—and I am convinced that after the first few days that was out of his mind——

Senator **Warner**. Yes, but you are convinced this is an irrational man who has gone to extraordinary extremes——

General **Jones**. I do not think he is irrational. I think he has made some bad mistakes. I think he is ruthless. He has been surprised.

Senator **Warner**. He has gassed his own people.

General JONES. He has gassed his own people. I would like to say every bad word about him, but I think he is very calculating in what he does. I do not think he has a suicidal complex, but I am unsure on that.

Senator WARNER. It is beyond this Senator to examine his psyche.

General JONES. Mine, too.

Senator WARNER. All right. We agree to that. If you were advising the President, therefore, it would seem to me would you not advise him to take every precaution necessary to protect the men and women that you have deployed in that region and to build up those forces to where you can give them the most protection possible?

General JONES. I would want our troops to be well protected. I think they are well protected today with the 200,000 plus. They would be more so at 400,000.

The protection of the troops is not only in the event that Saddam Hussein does some wild act of attacking, which I think could be suicidal on his part, but also whether or not we are proceeding on a course that allows a peaceful solution to come about or embarking on a course that is inevitably going to lead to combat.

Senator WARNER. Do you feel, then, that the President's augmentation of these forces was a shift in our basic policy?

General JONES. I am not sure it was a shift in the basic policy because I am unsure just what the policy was to start with. I thought it was a defensive one with some limited offensive operation. I think the increase, though, limits our options considerably. There are advantages to having the 400,000 troops there. There are risks to having the 400,000 troops there.

To put it in very simple terms, I think that if we have limited objectives, the basic ones which the President outlined initially—Iraq out of Kuwait, free the hostages, the government goes back into Kuwait, and as an additional one we talk about the nuclear issue—then I think there is a very good chance that with patience we can succeed. If we add in all these other objectives, I think war is inevitable.

So to me, we ought to decide on what the objectives are and then decide on a course of action and unify the country about one or the other courses of action.

I would like to have had the debate on objectives take place before the troops decision was made, and if in that debate it came out that these objectives were legitimate and proper for the United States and we could get at least part of our allies to go with us, then I would be in full support of going in that direction. If not, then we should go in the other direction.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately my time is up. I cannot pursue this line further, though I would like to.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We will have further time in the next round. I believe Senator Levin is next, but he has agreed generously to yield to Senator Exon his time.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you, Senator Levin.

General Jones and Admiral Crowe, I have been associated with this committee for 12 years and I have worked very closely with you and other military leaders. I just want to take a brief moment this morning to associate myself completely with the excellent remarks that you both delivered to this committee. No one could have said it better.

I think at critical times like these we ought to express the pride that we have and that the Senator has in the forthright, well-thought out statements that you both presented here this morning. You have clearly indicated the resolve of the United States of America. Most importantly, you have rung the bell, and I hope that the signal will be sent around America and around the world that two of our most distinguished military leaders came before the Armed Services Committee this date to express some thoughts that I could tell came right from the heart, and I am prouder than ever of both of you and the military that you so faithfully represented.

Thank you for being here.

General **Jones**. Thank you, Senator.

Admiral **Crowe**. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my voice of welcome. It is great to have both of you back. I was an admirer of both of you when you were chairmen, and I must tell you my admiration has even deepened over the years.

You have made very powerful and strong statements here this morning. I think they will have an effect on the policy and direction of this country. I hope they do. I hope that not only will the American people have a chance to consider what you say, but that the administration will listen to the voice of wisdom and the voice of caution which we hear here.

It is also a voice of strength. Let there be no doubt about it, both of you have believed in the strength of this country and of our military, but you have always felt that strength must be exercised with wisdom, with caution, and with consensus.

You both have sensed, I believe, that there has been a shift in American policy in the last month or so. It started out basically as a determination to stop an aggression against Saudi Arabia and to try to use economic sanctions to succeed in moving Iraq from Kuwait. It has now shifted somewhat to a greater inclination to use offensive military capability in the short term against Iraq.

That is the shift which some of us have felt and are concerned about, and which I believe both of your statements reflect. It is that concern. You both have indicated we ought to let the sanctions have an opportunity to work over a longer period of time than just a short-term deadline, such as the January 15 deadline which is in the United Nations resolution.

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, could I say one word about that?

Senator **Levin**. Sure.

Admiral **Crowe**. I detect that many people advising the President do that, but I have not detected any change in the President's policy.

Senator **Levin**. What change have you sensed?

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, my statement was speaking to the general discussion and the general debate. We all like to advise the President. It seems to be in our souls.

Senator **Levin**. How would you describe the change that you sensed in the last month, that shift? Put it in your own words. We started out on a course, and there seems to have been a shift in rhetoric, perhaps. Maybe it is not technically goals and objectives, but how would you describe that shift in the last month?

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, certainly in the public debate I think both sides have firmed up their position, and you are seeing the clash now directly over whether we go short-term or we decide to exercise more patience and try and make the quarantine work. Within the Government and within the councils of Government I am not competent to speak. I just do not know.

Senator **Levin**. In terms of the public statements of this administration, how would you describe it?

Admiral **Crowe**. The public statements? It seems to me the bulk of what we have seen this month has been working on the international support consensus, in particular the U.N. resolution, and also firming up our Arabic alliances, and I repeat, I think Senator Warner read a statement today, a letter from the President, that indicates his own policy has not basically changed.

Some, of course, are interpreting the recent augmented deployment as a change, but I think until we have better evidence we have to go with what the President said his policy is.

Senator **Levin**. General, how would you describe the shift that you sense?

General **Jones**. I am not sure the President has shifted in policy.

Senator **Levin**. What has changed? What has changed in the last month in terms of the administration?

General **Jones**. I think the biggest change was the announcement of the decision to put additional troops over there, a large increase. That may not have been a policy change by the President as to objectives. But it triggered questions in the minds of the American people. What is the purpose? Where are we going? So I think the country perceived a change in objectives when the decision was made to deploy.

Senator **Levin**. Do you perceive a change in the rhetoric in the last month in the administration?

General **Jones**. There has been some, yes.

Senator **Levin**. You have added an additional minimum objective, General, and that is eliminating the nuclear capability. Do you see any way to eliminate that nuclear capability without military action?

General **Jones**. I would hope that if we show patience and the sanctions work that somehow we can strengthen the international safeguards. I do not think we have to go in and destroy their production facilities at this time. We ultimately may have to, but I would like to try to strengthen international safeguards very sharply, particularly with regard to Iraq and as a prelude to tightening them around the world.

Senator **Levin**. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, General Jones, I want to join the Chairman and Senator Warner in welcoming you to this hearing on our Nation's Persian Gulf policy. You both served with great distinction as line officers and as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your testimony and counsel will have a significant impact on both this committee and the American people. We thank you for your appearance.

Admiral Crowe, in an August 1990 interview you were asked what the chances were of avoiding fighting in the Persian Gulf. Your answer at that time was that the prospect for avoiding hostilities are improving. How would you answer the same question today?

Admiral CROWE. To be candid, Senator, my judgment on whether we are going to war or not oscillates from week to week. I am trying to figure out what is going on. I am not too successful at it, and I am not always terribly confident of my own judgment, because I think it is a very near and a very tough question. I do not think I would be as optimistic today as I was then.

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, would you comment on the military capability of the Iraqi forces? In particular, I would like your opinion on what to expect if the sanctions begin to have a significant impact. Will the Iraqi military lash out against our forces in the region?

General JONES. It is hard to predict, Senator Thurmond. What is likely is a slow deterioration of their capability. Clearly they will follow the orders of Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein's people of the Ba'athist party around him who are equally ruthless. I do not think it will be a decision by the troops to move out, but it would be a decision by Saddam Hussein.

I believe, and again this is a risk, one way or the other, that he would at that point be willing to withdraw and to meet certain objectives. I think that is the most likely course, but I cannot guarantee it.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, you forcefully stated that the embargo is working. What specific indicators do you have to support your position?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I naturally have to rely on reports, Senator, what I read in the newspapers and so forth about industrial production, the earnings and the effectiveness of the quarantine. I think it is inevitable, as long as the sea quarantine and the air blockade are as tight as they are, that it is having a significant impact.

Now, Mr. Schlesinger quoted some statistics and figures yesterday which, as far as I can determine, are relatively accurate. The question in my mind is whether we can keep it up, and I believe, if we work as hard at doing that as we do some other things, that we can and that its effect will be inevitable, particularly given the sophistication of the society that he has built.

We are not talking about an Arab culture or a desert culture like they came from. We are talking about an emerging society that inevitably depends not only for food but for spare parts, for industrial parts, for raw materials, et cetera, for a great deal which he just plain is not getting now. In income terms alone he has not only lost the funds that he wanted to—the increased funds that he wanted to get, but the funds that he was used to in his daily life, and he has lost it for quite some time. I just cannot see how that could not impact him heavily.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, the Soviet Union's influence on Iraq in terms of military and political support has always been significant, yet during this crisis they have little if any influence. Why is there such a dramatic turnabout?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, there has been a dramatic turnabout in the Soviet Union. I think this is one of the great misjudgments that Saddam Hussein made. He did not predict, I believe, that the Soviet Union would come out so emphatically against him, or would deny him all Soviet support. I am sure that he considered that a cold water shock.

The Soviet Union, of course, has its own advisors there, ones that we have been trying to dig out of there for quite some time. Incidentally, I think the Soviets themselves are trying to get them out of there with mixed success, and it has just turned out that, given this ambivalent attitude of the Soviet Union, that it is bound to have an impact on their influence over Saddam Hussein.

One other consideration which I believe is important, I think the Soviets still have in mind that in the crunch phases of this crisis that they might be mediators. They want to keep their channels and their avenues open to Saddam Hussein, and this has softened their approach and how vigorously they are challenging him. They just do not want to see those lines severed. That is speculation on my part.

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, when all of the deployments are completed, the United States will have over 400,000 men and women deployed in the Persian Gulf region. How long can we sustain these forces, considering the operations tempo and the harsh climate?

General JONES. Senator, I think from a purely military standpoint we could sustain them for a long period of time, and we could keep the troops over there for years, just like in World War II. We have equipment that we could replace. Not that it would not at a great cost. It would be at a cost of morale, cost of dollars, cost of equipment, but I think physically we could sustain.

I question whether politically we can sustain it. The impact on the culture in Saudi Arabia is going to be very great with 400,000. But it is better to go the course of trying to sustain our capability than it is to prematurely use the force. We ought to look at how well we can sustain our forces. Is there a way we can have some rotation? Is there some way we can ease the burden on the troops that are over there?

Senator THURMOND. I believe my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. I believe Senator Kennedy is next. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to express appreciation and respect for these two extraordinary individuals. Public service is usually associated, rightfully or wrongfully, with elected officials, and I think we have seen two extraordinary examples of public service here today, and I join with those who express the appreciation for their service to the country.

I remember when I first came on to the committee and talking with General Jones about the service on the committee, and how helpful he was. I remember also my discussions with Admiral Crowe before going over and spending Christmas with the troops in the Persian Gulf 3 years ago, also before my visit to the Soviet Union last spring. His insights into arms control, and the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship were enormously valuable.

Just following up on Senator Thurmond's question on the issue of readiness, could we keep this amount of force in the Gulf area without there being some diminution in terms of their effectiveness and their readiness over a period of time?

As I understand from what General Jones has said, he believes with a rotation policy that the troops' readiness and their capability would not be diminished. Am I correct?

General JONES. I think there would be a mixed input. In certain areas we would improve. We would learn more about how to live in the desert, how to operate in the desert, learn more about the Iraqi forces. We could make some improvement in capabilities. We have some new hardware that we could deploy. We could improve some of our command and control. We could have some improvement in capabilities.

I have no doubt there would be some down-side in morale—equipment wearing out in the desert, and so forth, and the great difficulty of rotating people. I think it is essential that the troops there know the purpose that they are there and can see a light at the end of the tunnel one way or the other, either through conflict or through rotation.

Senator KENNEDY. But they would be able to still carry on any function that they would be called on for? There would not be a sufficient reduction in readiness to limit their capability in carrying out any of those purposes?

General JONES. I think that is true. There would be pluses and minuses.

Senator KENNEDY. What is your own sense of whether that kind of policy would be perceived as the Americans backing down? We are over there now, and now we are going to have a large force over there. If we move toward a position of rotation and it looks like we are going to stay in there for whatever period, the year or the 18 months, while the sanctions would work, do you have any feel, as individuals—Admiral Crowe has lived over there—who have spent a good time in the area? Would that be damaging?

General JONES. I believe with many people it would be seen as a strength that we could stay, we could persevere, we could be patient, we could keep isolating Saddam Hussein. He is suffering every day. We would have some problems, but they would be minor compared to the ones of Saddam Hussein, so I would see it as a strength, rather than a weakness.

There would be some that would call it a weakness that we deployed the force and we received the authority under the United Nations that on January 15 we could go ahead with combat. Therefore some would say we were not resolute. But I believe most of the world would look at it as a strength of America to be able to stay some place and be able to look at the long-term interests rather than the immediate crisis.

Senator KENNEDY. One of the aspects of the economic sanctions is the internationalization of that effort. Concerns have been expressed by members of this committee—myself and others—about the Americanization of a conflict should a conflict take place.

Dr. Schlesinger yesterday, when I asked him about what percent of the casualties would be American, estimated up to 90 percent. I wonder whether you have any opinions about that approximate percentage of casualties and the Americanization of the conflict?

Admiral CROWE. I watched you on C-Span last night, Senator, when you asked him that question. No, I cannot quarrel with the answer. I should tell you, however, when I speak probably the second or third question I am asked, no matter where I am, is that, and why do we not see a greater contribution?

As a matter of fact, the question is usually phrased, it has great economic—this area, this situation has great economic impact on the United States, but we are fifth or sixth down the list. Where are the other four or five, and why are they not there in greater strength? We are not talking about symbolically, we are talking about in real terms. I think it is of great concern to the American people.

Senator KENNEDY. So your approximate estimate is that 90 percent of the casualties would be American?

General JONES. I think the percentage could range up or down substantially, depending on what type of conflict and whether he went after Iraq or the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. I think one of the problems is that we see, from the military standpoint, the best way to fight is to go against Iraq. Mubarak and some of the other Arab leaders have said they will not go after Iraq, they will only go after the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

So you have the question of command and use of the various forces, because from a military standpoint the least desirable U.S. action is to go in and dig the Iraqis out of Kuwait. They have been reinforced. So in certain types of conflicts the Egyptians may not get involved especially if we do not mount an invasion of Kuwait.

Senator KENNEDY. I see that my time is up, but on the issue of a nuclear device that was referenced earlier, from a military point of view if you were commanders over there would you be more concerned about the potential of a nuclear device that might be developed within, best estimates are I imagine, 8 or 9 months possibly under the best of circumstances with a good deal of uncertainty, or would you be more concerned with the other capabilities of the Iraqi military, their various chemical warfare capability and missiles?

General JONES. I think if they had a device it would have more of a political impact than a military impact.

Admiral CROWE. I would be more concerned with the chemicals, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. I believe Senator Cohen is next.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, an observation. Saddam Hussein has clearly been engaged in a pattern of extortion, holding and then releasing hostages to purchase goodwill or at least institute a form of peace train running from all points of the globe toward Baghdad.

According to this morning's news, China apparently is using the threat of a veto or an abstention from voting in order to purchase goodwill; namely, an adjustment of their trade status. This is extortion by another name, in my opinion.

I do not know what price, if any, was promised to other nations relative to the resolution of the so-called Israeli-Palestinian conflict to which Admiral Crowe referred, but this is one price the United States cannot afford to pay. I would simply say that if China does not support the use of force to roll back aggression on its merits, it should receive no payment from the United States to relieve its conscience for not understanding the importance of international order.

Now General Jones, I would like to clarify something. In your statement you basically use the same language that Secretary Schlesinger did yesterday about the United States expanding its demands or objectives with regard to Iraq. You indicated if you add these other objectives—namely, denouncing him as a war criminal, holding him responsible for reparations—war is inevitable.

I would like to just state for the record those particular recommendations came not from the Bush administration but from a colleague of ours, Senator Moynihan, a former Ambassador to the United Nations. He was the first one, and I was with him at the time, to call for the denunciation of Saddam Hussein as a war criminal and to call upon the United Nations to seek war reparations against him. Senator Moynihan, to my knowledge, is not in favor of using force at this time. He, in fact, is in favor of seeking sanctions.

So I do not think that one should merge the two and come to the conclusion that because the administration has initiated various proposals in response to Congressional suggestions that they are seeking to make war inevitable.

Yesterday in the United Nations there were a number of horror stories being told by Kuwaitis in terms of what is happening to their country. Admiral Crowe, General Jones, you have both suggested that it may take a year to 18 months to let the sanctions run their course.

The question I have is, what will be left of Kuwait after being what I would call being "Saddamized" for 18 months? Admiral Crowe.

Admiral CROWE. I think it has already happened, Senator.

Senator COHEN. Well, then the question is what will Kuwait look like, what will be left of it, what will it take——

Admiral CROWE. It is going to be a great deal different.

Senator COHEN [continuing]. To restore it to the status quo ante? You will have mostly Iraqi citizens parading around with credentials identifying them as Kuwaitis or some other nationality. One does not know.

What is there to be restored 18 months from now?

Admiral CROWE. Probably very little. Of course, he has already raped the country. He has mined the wellheads, he has mined the refineries, and mined the beaches.

Senator COHEN. So why do we place such a premium on getting him out of Kuwait if there is nothing left for Kuwait to be restored to?

Admiral CROWE. Well, it can be restored. It is just going to complicate the problem.

Senator COHEN. Could I ask both of you whether you think it is a mistake for the United States to seek support from the United Nations and for the United Nations to grant the use of force to extricate him from Kuwait?

Admiral CROWE. I am sorry, I did not get the question.

Senator COHEN. Do you think it is a mistake at this time for the United States to seek support in the United Nations for the use of force?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe it is a mistake. I do not know what they are going to do in that regard, but setting a time limit might be a problem. I do not think the general campaign is a mistake, no.

Senator COHEN. So in other words, you think it is satisfactory and desirable for the United States to seek authority from the United Nations to use force against Saddam Hussein?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. Now, I do not interpret it as some do that that means not only a mandate to use it but that we must use it, a compulsion. I would not interpret it that way.

Senator COHEN. Do you agree, General Jones?

General JONES. I agree. I think it is a very wise move to get the United Nations resolution through, and I would hope China would act in a responsible way.

With regard to your question on Kuwait——

Senator COHEN. Let me come back to that in a moment, and let me ask you a further question.

Would it be appropriate for the President of the United States to come before the Congress and ask Congress' support for the use of force to extricate Saddam Hussein in the event that sanctions prove unenforceable, unproductive? In other words, if you agree that it is wise to go forward to the U.N., do you think the President should come before the Congress and ask for the same authority now?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, you are getting me and General Jones in a legal fight here, a sovereignty fight.

Senator COHEN. Forget about the constitutional issue. I am talking about the policy. You think it is a wise policy to go to the U.N. to ask for the use of force to extricate him from Kuwait. Do you think the President should——

Admiral CROWE. Well, let me speak to that. I am not so sure you should or should not do that, but I can tell you as a career military man—and I think that I speak for most military people in this regard—that we always would appreciate any effort that will develop or generate public support for what the military is being asked or required to do. That is a legacy of Vietnam. I am a victim of my experience. If it would help in that regard, yes, he should do it.

Now that is a political judgment. Whether that would help or if the pulse of the country would be affected by that, you are a better judge than I.

Senator COHEN. From a political point of view, if the President were to come before Congress you would think it would be wise for the Congress to indicate its support for the use of force?

Admiral CROWE. Well, that depends on a great many things.

General JONES. I pointed out in my statement that I believe it is very important for the Congress to come forth in support of the President with a clear understanding as to what these words mean. Will the sanctions work? You can have a thousand different variations as to whether or not they will work and whether or not they are working, but I think that, clearly, we ought to be unified.

I would like to make just a point on the Kuwait situation.

Senator COHEN. My time has expired, but please go forward.

General JONES. Clearly, what is going on in Kuwait is a human tragedy. There are a lot of human tragedies around the world going on right now, whether in conflict, starving, or whatever. We abhor what is going on, and we ought to try to do what we can, but I question whether or not the people of Kuwait are better off if we invade Kuwait to get rid of the Iraqis, especially considering what the Iraqis will do to the remaining Kuwaitis during that invasion.

It reminds me of a Bill Mauldin cartoon in World War II where two soldiers were standing in the middle of a city in rubble saying we sure liberated the hell out of this place.

Senator COHEN. The historian Tacitus also made the same observations. They made a desert and they called it peace. Unfortunately, the Kuwaitis happen to feel right now, at least the leadership, that the restoration of their country is important to them whatever the price that has to be paid.

I will not impinge upon my time.

General JONES. Those are the Kuwaitis that are not in Kuwait. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, let me just try to summarize what I think you said and ask you if I properly understood it.

Your point was that building the troop level to the new figure that the President has announced, this latest announcement on deployment, does provide us greater capability to pursue a military option at this time. But in doing so it raises the risk that we would be prompted to pursue a military option prematurely.

I am not sure that you said the second thing, but I want you to clarify, it makes more difficult the job of staying the course with these economic sanctions that we have in place in the sense that our ability to rotate troops in and out is diminished. The logistics and morale problems are greatly complicated.

Is that a fair statement or a paraphrase of what you said?

General JONES. Yes. I think we can. But I pointed out that I think there would be great difficulty to support 400,000 troops militarily. Politically it is a question of whether or not we will be welcome or unwelcome by the Saudis in a few months at that level. I do not know.

Senator BINGAMAN. So your point is that it would be easier to pursue a long-term strategy on the economic sanctions if we stayed at the lower troop level?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask Admiral Crowe on the point that you just made, I think in passing, but it is an issue that I raised with Dr. Schlesinger yesterday.

I also support the idea of going to the United Nations to get authorization for military action, if necessary, in the future.

I have been concerned that putting a deadline on this or putting a date certain by which this authority comes into play is being misinterpreted or is being perceived or will be perceived as essentially a deadline shortly after which we would be expected to pursue a military action and that our failure to do so at that time, then, is perceived again as a threatening action and not following through.

Do you have some concerns about the setting of a date or a misunderstanding of what the United Nations might have in mind by setting a date for military action?

Admiral CROWE. I think many people do interpret it as you have just outlined it, Senator. I am not so sure that there are great numbers of them that do. And I am not so sure that it is necessary that be done as long as it is well explained and we devote some energy and effort into increasing understanding among the American people of exactly what the administration has in mind.

I do not think the American people have come down one way or the other on whether that is good or bad. They are drawing conclusions on their own that can be dispelled with a clear elucidation of what we hope to achieve and what it means and what it does not mean.

Senator BINGAMAN. I think the concern, perhaps, is heightened by the fact that the President announced a substantial increase in the troop strength, which is to be completed early next year as I understand it.

You have a United Nations resolution now which is likely to be adopted tomorrow that is going to say, effective the 15th of January the use of force is authorized. It begins to look like something is going to happen right after the 15th of January.

That is totally inconsistent with what you are recommending here as I understand it in terms of giving these economic sanctions time to take effect.

Admiral CROWE. It seem to me a graphic example of the dilemma that all politicians, all presidents, all diplomats face. In other words, you want to take a step that will impel Mr. Saddam Hussein to do something. You want to scare Saddam Hussein. But you do not want to scare the American people. So what you have to do is make a statement. And it means different things to different people. That is hard to do.

I really sympathize with the President in that regard. Politicians do that better than most people. [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. At least some do.

Senator BINGAMAN. I was going to say you have to be able to take a strong stand on a lot of sides of each issue in order to stay around here.

Admiral CROWE. That is essentially right. [Laughter.]

General JONES. I would hope that the country would use this time as a breathing spell to define the issues and objectives and risks and make clear that we have an option on January 15.

But it is an option that has not been picked up. And it may or may not be picked up, depending on the circumstances at that time, but as a breathing spell to address the issues and to get the

American people to support whatever course of action takes place after January 15.

Senator **Bingaman**. Admiral Crowe, you said, I believe, in your statement that one of the effects of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is that it has legitimated a long-term military presence for the United States in the region. I think that is what you said.

Admiral **Crowe**. That is my personal opinion, yes.

Senator **Bingaman**. Could you elaborate on the extent of that? When you went through your list of potential or long-standing boundary disputes there and then indicated a long-term military presence in the region, I get a little nervous about how many of these potential disputes that are likely to arise there are going to require us to pursue a military response and what level of troop strength you anticipate we would need to maintain after this crisis?

Admiral **Crowe**. The simple answer is that I do not know the specifics of what our presence will look like, either the shape, the configuration, or the disposition. But I believe that Saddam Hussein's upset of the area will, as I said, legitimate some kind of arrangements where the United States will keep some kind of forward presence greater than it had before. It may not be ashore. It may be ashore in a modest way. But if not ashore, it will be at sea, more force than we have had now.

I might say in that regard that when the British left the Gulf in 1972 the Arabs themselves who participated in these boundary disputes—I lived in Bahrain, which has been engaged in an historical dispute with Iran and Qatar—it was the general consensus of all the countries in the area that they did not want to see those forces leave. Not because they settled disputes or they fought over disputes, but they mediated and they tamped down the emotionalism. They were a general force for promoting stability.

I think you will see that same attitude develop in the wake of this crisis about American presence. I know when I was a commander of the Middle East force I had many people tell me that your being here just helps the resolution of our problems and brings stability to the area. Whether you do anything or not is another question.

I believe we now have greater inspiration for a presence in that part of the world.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you. My time has expired.

Senator **Kennedy** [presiding]. Senator Wallop.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think both of you have quoted today former Secretary Schlesinger who yesterday gave three rather specific reasons—which we could rank in ascending or descending order by which I took to mean that all of them were equally valid for our expression of U.S. national interest in the Persian Gulf.

He then went on another 25 minutes without referring again to those national interests or what would serve them. I detect a certain amount of that today. One of the things that was stated explicitly by Secretary Schlesinger is that there is uncertainty amongst our Arab allies in this alliance as to what their role would be. And I would suggest that until there is certainty as to what our role will be, that uncertainty will remain because they live there. And if we should falter, I can guarantee you that they have yet to deal with Saddam Hussein.

Which brings me to the point, Admiral Crowe, you suggest. I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long-term is our primary national interest in the Middle East. But then you talk about waiting for sanctions to work. And then you give us combat objectives, with which I thoroughly agree and which I think are reflective of those objectives which the President has stated.

My question to you is, can we achieve those objectives that you state as combat objectives—to cut off Kuwait and free it and destroy the effectiveness of Iraqi forces, both in Kuwait and on the southern border of Iran—through the use of sanctions, which would be disruptive to his war making industry, including nuclear installation, conventional warfare, and biological?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly I would not pretend that by sanctions we could implement all of the objectives that if we went to war and that combat scenario, as vague and superficial as it was, would have achieved.

On the other hand, I firmly believe that, as I said, no matter what we do we are going to have big problems. We are going to be involved and we have to manage the area. I think we will be in a better position to manage it if we can avoid combat. But that is not going to make the world wonderful. Mr. Saddam Hussein is still going to be a thorn and we have to keep our alliance solid with sanctions. I think if we continue our policy of keeping our alliance, our embargo, and confronting him, we will never again trust him. We will never again let him do what he did before.

Senator WALLOP. But how are we going to do that? You stated and then restated that our primary national interest was posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long-term.

Admiral CROWE. That is correct.

Senator WALLOP. Now supposing Saddam Hussein said in the morning, oh, my goodness, this was a bad mistake. I have got to get out of Kuwait. I am really very sorry. He goes back with his military force intact, his credible use of it yet intact.

Admiral CROWE. That is a force that under the embargo is getting less intact every day.

Senator WALLOP. But presumably after he gets out, the embargo goes away.

Admiral CROWE. Oh, no. I would not suggest that, not on military material.

Senator WALLOP. General Jones suggested that if we do not do that, he will not get out.

General Jones, let me take specific issue with your statement that only the Kuwaitis outside of Kuwait wish to be liberated. I think that is offensive to the people in there who have been asking to leave and who have been escaping and have been releasing information about it.

By the same token I think that one could have said that only General DeGaulle was interested in freeing France because he was outside of France. That is not a fair statement of human relations, I do not believe.

General **JONES**. Clearly, a lot of people in Kuwait would like to be liberated, but I am unsure that they are thinking through the course as to what would happen during that liberation.

Senator **WALLOP**. I suspect that if they are suffering what they are suffering, they know quite well what the consequences would be.

Be that as it may, he gets out, and the government, the Emir goes back. Would it not be the case that Kuwait and the rest of the countries of that region would exist then by Iraqi sufferance?

Admiral **CROWE**. We certainly would not want that, and I think we can prevent it.

Senator **WALLOP**. How?

Admiral **CROWE**. One of the ways we can prevent it I have just suggested, where he has legitimated a long-term U.S. presence in the area.

Senator **WALLOP**. He may have legitimated it. I am not certain that other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, would.

Admiral **CROWE**. Well, let me tell you about our experience with the Persian Gulf convoying, Senator. When we started, a lot of countries resisted our going in there.

Senator **WALLOP**. Convoying is not an occupation.

Admiral **CROWE**. I understand that, but let me finish. When we tried to get out, countries who resisted us coming in did not want us to leave. We were in there a long time after the military mission had disappeared.

Senator **WALLOP**. I have to say that it seems to me——

Admiral **CROWE**. He will not return to the world he left on August 2. He could never return.

Senator **WALLOP** [continuing]. That our combat goals ought not to be inconsistent with the sanctions goals. One of the things with which I agree, General Jones——

Admiral **CROWE**. I do not agree with that.

General **JONES**. I do not agree.

Senator **WALLOP**. General Jones, you said that there are many definitions of what constitutes "working". Well, I think that one of the problems we have is we need to know what our fundamental national interest is served by. I think you stated it correctly. Long-term stability is our primary national interest there, which serves the other three that Secretary Schlesinger mentioned.

You cannot have a variety of means by which that is achieved, in my opinion. I think you have to be consistent on both sides.

Admiral **CROWE**. But you have to think in long-range terms, Senator.

Senator **WALLOP**. I am trying to, and that is what I am trying to get at. I do not believe it is served by that.

Admiral **CROWE**. I am not so sure that war fits into this long-range pattern between us and an Arab State. We may not have a choice. We may have to do it, and we will live with the consequences if we do. I am all for that if we have to.

If we have a choice, however, I would think that we would try to prevent that because it will fit in better with not only our past policy but what we are trying to achieve in the future in the Arab world.

Senator **WALLOP**. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Wallop. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, may I first say that I think we have here two great military leaders who have made very powerful and persuasive statements concerning their views about what is happening in the Mideast. I want to observe that these two gentlemen represent, as I recall, two of the last three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs prior to General Powell. They are here in retirement, free to state their mind and their own views about this, and I am indebted to them.

I would like to walk through this a little bit, if I may, briefly.

Admiral Crowe said war is a mess. I take it you both agree with that?

General Jones. [Nodded affirmatively.]

Senator Dixon. From that, you have gone on to where I think both of you recommend to the American public and the Congress patience. I think you both suggest that we are there in massive strength, and I think you both suggested that this embargo and these sanctions are working but it will take time and the American public, the Congress, and the administration need the patience to let it work. Is that a fair representation of what you both said to this committee?

Admiral Crowe. I would like to see the sanctions fairly tested.

Senator Dixon. Yes.

I want to go a step further now about the numbers on the ground. I think we would all agree we are there in massive strength on the sea and overwhelming strength in the air. The question, I suppose, is the numbers on the ground.

One of the things I wanted to refer to is what you said, General Jones, on page 3 of your statement. "My main concern with this latest scheduled reinforcement isn't that we might choose to fight but, rather, that the deployment might cause us to fight perhaps prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily." And I see that point.

As you both know, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support. I guess the question here is what are the proper numbers over there on the ground to do what you both suggest is the right thing; i.e., exercise our patience, let the sanctions and the embargo work?

That is to say, having in mind we want to use a useful rotation policy, those men and women are there in a country, it is not too comfortable to be there, it is a different lifestyle than they have enjoyed in the United States and perhaps even in Germany or other places. Obviously you have to bring them home on a rotation policy if you want to stay there a while and use patience and let it work.

You know, this augmentation in numbers I do not think bothers the American people so much as the bellicose and belligerent statements of the President and others in the administration saying we must use force. It is what Admiral Crowe said. We are sending out this tough message, and that same tough message is being heard by the Congress and the American people.

What is the right number? Can you say?

General Jones. I am not sure there is a precise right number. I would say what we have there now, with possibly a little augmentation, would be adequate. The determination would be what can we really sustain under reasonable circumstances, which I think ultimately includes rotation and so forth.

Senator DIXON. Oh, absolutely.

General JONES. Also, we ought to recognize, we have a very good offensive capability there now.

Senator DIXON. I understand that.

General JONES. We have it in the air units which are based on land and sea.

Senator DIXON. May I interrupt, General Jones? With the augmentation at 400,000 plus, taking into account the logistical problems and rotation and other things, is that number too large?

General JONES. I would have stayed with a lower number until we had given the sanctions a little more time to work.

Senator DIXON. Okay.

General JONES. And if they were working I would have given them a little more time. If they were not, I would go ahead with the 400,000 or whatever was necessary.

Senator DIXON. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know the number, Senator. I can tell you what I would look at, though, if I had to determine it. I would look at the sustainability, whether our current machinery can support it, what changes have to be made to support it, what the manpower situation is in the rest of the world, whether we can keep this up comfortably and for a long time or not.

Also, from a military standpoint obviously it is prudent if you want an offensive option to get the necessary people over there to give yourself an offensive option.

Senator DIXON. But I want to limit for now, Admiral Crowe and General Jones, my questions to the case that you both make so eloquently here and that this Senator supports: Patience, be there in strength, and try to see that embargo and those sanctions work and see if we can get the result that way without war. Nobody wants war.

So I guess my question is as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, I know there is no magic number but what is the number we can deal with on rotation, logistics, and other things that is an adequate number on the ground with the overwhelming strength in the air and on the sea to keep us there in place and to follow that policy?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I will repeat. I do not know, Senator. It is a terrible answer. I do not know. As I said earlier, I do not have a staff giving me that kind of analysis.

Senator DIXON. But can we support logistically, can we support with a rotation policy 400,000 plus?

Admiral CROWE. I think it remains to be seen.

Senator DIXON. With our end strength and force levels and so forth?

General JONES. It would be very difficult.

Senator DIXON. Do you agree?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

General JONES. But it could be done.

Admiral CROWE. Incidentally, it will probably involve more reserves.

Senator DIXON. Say that again, Admiral.

Admiral **Crowe**. It will probably involve more reserves.

Senator **Dixon**. But would it require a draft in time to support this at this level?

Admiral **Crowe**. I do not know.

Senator **Dixon**. With a volunteer force such as we have now and the numbers we have now, forgetting about the reductions even in force levels that we passed in the last DOD authorization bill, assuming present numbers of 2.1 million.

General **Jones**. I think we could get by quite a while without a draft, but we already have some people that you could say who are not volunteers who are supposed to be discharged from the service and have been extended. So you have that type of nonvolunteer, people that are remaining.

I think you could go quite a while without a draft.

Admiral **Crowe**. I agree with that, Senator. I do not see it.

Senator **Dixon**. Could you go a year?

General **Jones**. Yes.

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes.

Senator **Dixon**. 18 months?

General **Jones**. Yes.

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes.

Senator **Dixon**. You both suggested you think in 18 months this could work?

General **Jones**. Probably. Maybe a year.

Senator **Dixon**. I thank you. I thank the Chair.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today the former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe and General David Jones. Both gentlemen have had exceptionally distinguished military careers and have served our Nation well during a period when the crisis was the possibility of global thermal nuclear war. I am sure both Admiral Crowe and General Jones will provide invaluable insights to the military situation in the Gulf and be a tremendous asset in resolving the crisis at hand.

Some areas of concern that I hope to address are Iraqi provocations which would warrant allied military force, casualties resulting from all-out war, sanctions, chemical and nuclear threat just to name a few.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Dixon. Next is Senator Gorton.

Senator **Gorton**. Admiral Crowe, you cover the waterfront, it seems to me, adequately from both a policy and a tactical and strategic point of view. You have been asked a number of questions about policy. But you do make certain comments about what an appropriate set of goals would be if we use a military strategy. And your confidence that we can prevail, though not without cost.

Simply to repeat them for my colleagues, you say that you would strongly advise, if there is a military option, an intense air campaign aimed at disrupting Iraq's war making industry, nuclear, conventional. Did you mean chemical in that?

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes, I did. That was misspelled in your draft.

Senator **Gorton**. And biological weapons facilities. And a subsequent ground campaign to cut off Kuwait and free it and to destroy the effectiveness of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and along the southern border of Iraq.

Those, of course, are limited goals. Let us assume that your recommendation under those circumstances were accepted. What is the level of your confidence in our ability to reach goals of that nature? And what is your rough prediction of time and cost and casualties if that were to be the goal of the United States and its allies?

Admiral CROWE. I am not very good on those kinds of figures. But I would think that we could do that in a reasonable timeframe, 30 to 45 days. The casualties depend a lot on our imagination, whether we use maneuver, which I am sure we are contemplating.

We are going to look for ways to use our strengths against his vulnerabilities, use our air support, our air superiority. I think we will use our night fighting capability to reduce those casualties. I have looked with some care at Israeli casualties, actually we use those as planning figures when we estimate casualties in our own campaigns and so forth. There will be casualties.

Senator GORTON. Now let me ask you about your confidence in our ability to succeed by the use of the sanctions, which both you and General Jones have counseled some degree of patience with. And yet, so far today all of our talk about the effectiveness of sanctions has been somewhat imprecise.

Perhaps both of you will comment on this. To give you a chance to do so in detail, I will ask just one question at several levels and each of you can take a stab at it.

What is your confidence that sanctions ultimately will result in at least a partial withdrawal from Kuwait on the part of Saddam Hussein?

What is your confidence level that sanctions will cause a full withdrawal from Kuwait on the part of Saddam Hussein?

What is your confidence that sanctions can end Iraq's threat to its neighbors and most specifically its ability to develop and use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons?

And what is your confidence that sanctions would ultimately cause it to pay reparations for the damages which it has caused to Kuwait and to the United States?

And, finally, if at the ultimate effect of sanctions, do you believe that we will be able to withdraw ground forces totally from the Arabian Peninsula?

General JONES. I doubt if there is much difference between the probability of partial withdrawal versus total withdrawal. It is hard to say, but it is worth giving some thought to it. It is hard to put a percentage and probability on it, but it is better than now saying sanctions will not work. Therefore, let us go to combat.

I doubt if sanctions will go so far as to provide for reparations and repatriation and so forth and a payback of all it cost us and the Saudis and Kuwaitis.

One thing I think is wrong in trying to estimate the effectiveness of sanctions is to use food supply as the criteria. That is not, to me, the important measure. It is its industrial capacity, the fact that Saddam Hussein is losing $20 billion to $30 billion in hard currency per year, that he is not getting military supplies. It is the fundamentals of his country as opposed to the food.

And as his hard currency dries up, the smuggling will dry up. The smugglers want hard currency. So it is in the basic structure of the country where I think the impact will be, including the military. As opposed to whether or not there is chocolate candy in the stores of Bagdad, which people tend to use as a judgment of how much the sanctions are hurting.

Senator GORTON. The only part of my question that you missed is, do you think that there is any possibility that sanctions can succeed in reducing or eliminating his threat to his neighbors or his ability to develop nuclear chemical and biological weapons?

General JONES. I believe sanctions, combined with other actions, can thwart the nuclear capability. And I think it definitely reduces his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Senator GORTON. If we stay there.

General JONES. It ought to be clear, and I think we can work it out with the Soviet Union and hopefully the Chinese and some of the other countries, that we are just not going to supply military hardware to Iraq in the future.

Senator GORTON. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I think that first of all, it is important to understand the distinction between the Iran-Iraq war and the current sanction problem. Iraq suffered great attrition in the Iran war and a lot of suffering. But they did not suffer the embargo that we now are talking about.

In other words, throughout that conflict they bought billions of dollars worth of arms from around the world. Their industry was going full blast and it had a lot of outside support, including from the United States. They have not had that kind of deprivation before.

In fact, I read the other day that every day of the Iran-Iraq war the race track opened in Bagdad. That is hardly deprivation. They had food. They had all kinds of things.

Now, they were suffering tremendous casualties. And that was a source of discontent in Iraq proper. But the situation there is completely different than they are confronting now in the embargo, particularly with time. They have never done this before. This society he has built has never had to run without oil from a lot of other places. And I do not mean crude oil, I mean lubricating oil, which he just plain is not getting.

So I think it is important to bear that in mind that he is under a different kind of pressure now than he has ever been before. Granted, we just do not know how long he can live with that and how strong he is. We are going to find out, I guess.

I think Senator Wallop's point is a good one that we are not going to achieve just with the embargo the same ends that we would achieve with combat. One of the great advantages of combat is that there is something final about it. Once you have destroyed something, you have really destroyed it. Like I said, you have got a desert when it is through.

On the other hand, with or without combat, the world is not going to be easy. We are in for a miserable time in that part of the world. And the way we achieve our ends, if we get him out of Kuwait with sanctions, means we will have to continue to worry about him. We have to continue to try and manage him, try to contain him. And we have got to continue to press our alliances to worry about Iraq.

That is the reason I say he cannot go back to his old world. He is never going to do that unless we let him. And I would not counsel that we let him. I do believe that we will be permitted, in some fashion, if we engineer it right, to keep a presence in that part of the world. And I believe we will probably have some arrangements where we can deploy force back quickly. We would never permit him to get those Saudi oil fields at any time. Not only today, but any time in the future.

I think after he returns from Kuwait, and this may be the reason he will not do it, he will have his own set of problems. It will be quite a defeat for him, both in his own country and in the region.

Senator GORTON. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gorton. I believe Senator Glenn is next.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if the racetrack is still open today?

Admiral CROWE. I think maybe it is.

Senator GLENN. I have checked a lot of things with the intelligence, but I have not seen that one on any of the reports we have had so far.

Chairman NUNN. It is classified, Senator Glenn. We cannot talk about it.

Senator GLENN. Oh, it is classified. I see. [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. Do you go to the races a lot, Senator?

Senator GLENN. No. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. In particular, I do not want to go to that track right now.

Both of you have made very strong statements counseling restraint. Restraint not because of weakness but restraint from a position of vastly superior strength, because I think you two more than most around here are very mindful of something that I think too many people forget, and that is that while war in the abstract may be glorious, war up close is hideous. I agree very strongly with your counsel that we exhaust other means before we really go into an attack mode.

I am concerned about how we maintain the strength we have now over there, though. Senator McCain and I are on the Manpower Subcommittee, so we work with these numbers and problems frequently. Presently, we are on a track of a 100,000 reduction per year for the next 5 years. We have worked this out over a long period of time with the Pentagon and we have it all phased in.

You were a little ambiguous here about what you think about a draft. Do you think that we are going to be able to maintain that kind of reduction, or should we plan right now, knowing what we do, to not plan that kind of a drawdown of forces, if we are going to maintain forces over there and let the embargo work?

Admiral CROWE. I certainly would not go down further at this juncture.

Senator GLENN. Would you go back up?

Admiral CROWE. I would contemplate it. I would look at it very closely.

Senator GLENN. General Jones?

General JONES. I think you have time to decide in the next few months, as you debate the bill, the defense authorization bill. Obviously, if we are in that same posture a few months from now, it is a new ball game and we ought to change what is going on. It ought to be a period of studying what you do and making the decision a few months from now.

The Army has already taken the action of not discharging people. I am sure the other services will do it the same, at the time it is needed, so for a few months I do not think it is a critical issue.

Senator GLENN. There is a recent report that recruiting is falling off now. I can understand that. The Army apparently is having some recruiting difficulties, so they have said. If we are going to have about 430,000 people over there, in terms of operational forces, the Army will have 34 percent of its active, operational forces in the Gulf.

It will have 7-2/3 of its 17 divisions. Sixty-eight percent of all combat units will be overseas when this deployment is completed. The Navy will have 6 of 14 carriers in the Gulf. The Marines will have well over 50 percent of its active, operating forces in the Gulf.

In Vietnam we had 3.5 million troops on active duty, compared to 2.1 million that we have had now, during the 1969 peak to support a deployment of 543,000, or 15 percent of the active duty forces, and at that time we had a draft.

Today we have 2 million, a little over 2 million on active duty, to support a deployment of 430,000. This deployment nears 21 percent of active duty forces. How are we going to do that without a draft, if we are to wait this out and let the embargo work?

General JONES. I believe in the short term, if we talk about an embargo for a year or a year and a half, I do not believe we will have to go to a draft. We would not have to go to complete rotation. But if we are talking about beyond that, then I think you have to look at the whole manpower problem, and maybe go to a draft.

But I believe you have some time to make that decision as to what the manpower requirements will be, but most important is to decide what our objectives are, and are we going to go to the 400,000, and are we going to have the patience to keep them there. Do we want the sustainability to keep them there, or will the problems that you raise in difficulty of staying prompt people to want to use the force prematurely? If you do not use it and it is hard to sustain do you lose your window of opportunity? It is a good subject for discussion.

Senator GLENN. I was over there in late August, early September, with a small Senate group, and they are operating under very harsh conditions, particularly during the summer months, and there is no R&R to Bangkok, there is no liberty, no place to go. Everything is internal.

What kind of rotation policy is there? Admiral Crowe, you know what happens aboard ship. You figure about 6 months, and then the efficiency of the average ship goes downhill pretty drastically over that period of time. Is this going to be the same thing on the ground over there? Are we going to have to figure out a 6- to 8-month deployment?

Admiral CROWE. If we are going to keep it for a long time, I think we have a terminology problem here, Senator. General Jones put his finger on it. A year to 18 months is probably not long-term, but if you were going to go longer than that, why yes, we will have to do some dramatic things that we have not done. We will have to solve the problem. That is our business.

Senator GLENN. Can we do this with the reserves that we have now, without a draft, do you think?

Admiral CROWE. I would think so, but it depends on the readiness of those reserve units and how much training will be involved.

Senator GLENN. Well, we know from the past and some of the war games, and I was privileged to sit in on one of those with you back some time, and the combat support—Reserve combat service support units were not what they are supposed to be.

Admiral CROWE. That is probably the biggest single problem we have.

Senator GLENN. And the medical. We are way behind on the medical.

Admiral CROWE. I think we are doing pretty well on medical in this crisis. Maybe I am wrong.

Senator GLENN. Eighty percent of combat medical is assigned to the reserves, and they are still 71 percent short of doctors, 66 percent short of nurses, and that 80 percent is assigned to the Reserve. We are not ready in that area.

Admiral CROWE. Well, those are the two vulnerabilities.

Senator GLENN. They are big ones.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, they are.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. I am sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here, General Jones and Admiral Crowe.

Let me just make sure that we are singing from the same hymnal here. Is the current build-up prudent and necessary in your view?

Admiral CROWE. Well, let me talk about it in phases, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Remember that I only have a few minutes.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think first of all the first deployment was capable or sufficient to deter and defend. If we are trying to build, which I think we were, a prudent offensive capability, we need more. So the question then is, do you want offensive or do you just want to stay on the defensive.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, given the uncertainties in this situation and in your statement, it is a speculative judgment as to whether the sanctions will be effective or not. Is it not prudent to have a valid war-fighting option?

Admiral CROWE. From a military perspective I have no quarrel with that, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree with that?

General JONES. I do not have any quarrel with that, in isolation. If you just look at it from a purely military standpoint, the more power we have over there the better off we are.

Senator McCain. Well, I am talking overall. Do you have any uncertainties that—do you think we need a valid war-fighting option there?

General Jones. I believe what we have over there today gives us a deterrent and a defense capability with a very significant offensive capability. That is adequate for the time being. If the situation does not improve and the sanctions do not work, then we can augment, and augment quite rapidly. We can have the capability that is projected with of the 400,000, but not have any substantial risk during the intervening time period.

Senator McCain. This afternoon Mr. Kissinger will testify before this committee. He is in significant disagreement with you. I quote from his statement: "American objectives have included fulfillment of stated U.N. goals of restoration of the status quo ante in Kuwait, as well as the unconditional release of all hostages, but to contribute to President Bush's objective of stability in the Gulf, any solution to the crisis must also provide for reduction of Iraq's offensive capability which now overshadows its neighbors."

General Jones. We would end up with a reduction in his capability. We do not disagree with that.

Senator McCain. You would? His nuclear capability and chemical capability?

General Jones. Chemical does not bother me as much as nuclear in the long term, and in the short term the nuclear device does not bother me a great deal. I think it is more of a political threat. Number one, his military capability has deteriorated already, and as Admiral Crowe so eloquently said, he has been punished and there will not be resupply of the billions of dollars of equipment, so his military will degrade over time. The question is whether you degrade it by military action, by combat and the loss of lives, or you do it through patience and sanctions and embargo.

Senator McCain. That brings us to Mr. Kissinger's next point, where he says—sanctions or military actions: he says, "The two approaches have been presented as if they are successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive, because by the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist."

I happen to think that there is some validity to Mr. Kissinger's statement, particularly when talking in your terms of 18 months—a year to 18 months, and, in your words, Admiral Crowe, "with speculative judgment."

Admiral Crowe, on page 5 you say that Saddam Hussein is seeking a way out, a face-saving way to withdraw. Mr. Schlesinger said that yesterday. I seem to be missing something here that is going on. I get the briefings and watch CNN and all of the other programs, but I do not see this seeking a way out, a face-saving device.

Admiral Crowe. I know the exchange yesterday that you are referring to, Senator. He certainly is not seeking a way out in our value system.

Senator McCain. What good does it do us?

Admiral Crowe. What good does what?

Senator McCain. What good is it, if he is seeking a way out? What benefit is it to us if he is seeking a way out, unless it is of benefit to us?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think it should be of benefit to us, but it cannot be of benefit to us if we do not attempt to sound it out or to test it or do anything else. It will not be of any benefit to him. It will not be any benefit to us.

I think, though, given the way the Arab world looks at mediation, the way the Arab world looks at subtleties, and the feelers that he has put out—first of all I would advise you from my own experience that when an Arab leader says the kinds of things he does, he does not necessarily mean the demands he makes.

He is going to make inflated demands. There is not any question about that. The fact that he says he is willing to talk is a significant move, and in the Arab lexicon, in the Arab context, that is the way they have done their business for hundreds of years.

Now, granted we look at the world a little differently, and I appreciate your point, which I think is a very good one. We have got to get some benefit out of this. But nevertheless, I think in his context, he considers himself and so do his Arab friends, that he is looking for a way out.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, the statements that I have heard indicate that he is willing to talk as long as the settlement of the Palestinian issue is a part of it.

Admiral CROWE. He is bound to say that, and he is always going to say that.

Senator MCCAIN. So in your view, is that meaningful?

Admiral CROWE. No, I do not think it is meaningful. Well, I think it is meaningful on the overall context, but I do not think we have to pay any attention to it. We are not going to give it to him. We can open up something, though. We can probe it. We can sound it out.

Senator MCCAIN. I would like to get back into something you said that I think is very important domestically. You mentioned that when you are asked about the United States participation, lack of allied participation, that we are about fifth or sixth on the list, I believe you just said.

Admiral CROWE. That is what people say. It is a perception. It may not be right, but it is their perception.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, how should we respond to that feeling on the part of the American people? Should there be all British troops there, or all Egyptian? Should the United States have taken the lead in this crisis, or should we have called upon those others?

Admiral CROWE. I think the United States should take the lead, but I think we ought to get the pressure up to get a more substantive contribution from those people. I am quite disappointed with some of our allies.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you support a Japanese military involvement?

Admiral CROWE. I would support some kind of contribution, yes. It does not necessarily have to be combat, but it has got to be something. Of course, I would support combat forces from Japan. I would support them from Germany. I would support them from Italy.

Senator MCCAIN. Surely, Admiral, you know what message that would send throughout the Pacific if the Japanese remilitarized?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I am very familiar with the Pacific, Senator, and I am not so sure I agree with you on that.

Senator McCAIN. We are obviously in disagreement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, Admiral, let me add my word of thanks to those you have already heard. These were truly very powerful statements that both of you delivered here this morning. Others have attempted to summarize what you have said. I would summarize it by saying that you both believe we should give the sanctions an adequate time to work before deciding to launch an offensive military capability.

Second, you are both advising the country not to miscalculate the ability of the coalition to remain patient and intact for the period of time necessary to test the viability of a sanctions policy. Would you go along with that summary?

Admiral CROWE. I think that is essentially right, sir.

General JONES. I think it depends on how we act as to whether or not we can keep the coalition together. I think we can keep it together, but we have to work very hard to do so.

Senator GORE. Now in the question and answer period afterwards, you both cast some doubt on whether or not the decision of November 8 to double the deployment in the Persian Gulf coupled with the diplomatic offensive at the United Nations and the statements coming out of administration spokesmen about offensive force together represented a clear shift in tone and emphasis that points the Nation toward an offensive move there.

The impetus for your powerful statements this morning, however, seems to be precisely that, a conclusion that we were moving in that direction. Do you doubt that we are moving in that direction?

General JONES. In the direction of foreclosing options?

Senator GORE. In the direction of an offensive move.

General JONES. I think that is the perception by a lot of people, whether or not it is what the President intends.

I believe they realize now it would have been a lot more useful to think through the whole issue of getting 400,000 troops there and whether you could sustain them. I believe it was a blow to the morale of the troops to say we are going to rotate you and then immediately say no rotation and now say, well, we may have a rotation.

It should have been all thought through as to our objectives and the issues discussed with the Congress and discussed with the American people rather than have an announcement come as a shock: We are going to send 400,000 and we cannot rotate.

So the decision may have been the wise decision, but I wish the whole issue and the long-term implications and how we would sustain it and so forth would have been addressed before it was announced.

Senator GORE. Admiral, you perceptibly point to the difficulty any president encounters in trying to speak to the different audiences with the same words and——

Admiral CROWE. This is another example, Senator. This deployment was another example.

Senator Gore. I personally do not have the feeling that the President is bluffing. I do not have the feeling that he is attempting to merely send a message. I have a feeling that we are genuinely moving toward an offensive move, and that is why your statements here this morning have added power.

If I had to focus on one area of disagreement between what the two of you are saying and what I hear the administration saying, it is their assessment of the coalition's stamina for an extended period of sanctions. It seems to me that they have a different sense of how volatile the situation in the Gulf is during the time we would have to sit still for the embargo to work.

Now both of you are saying, well, maybe so, but we are military men and we have a pretty clear sense of how volatile an offense strike would make the resulting situation.

The administration seems to feel that if we had to wait for as long as a year or 18 months that unpredictable events and increased tensions, many of which you have pointed to in your very perceptive statements, would introduce a dangerous set of variables that might make it impossible for the embargo of policy to work.

How do you respond to what they seem to be saying about that?

Admiral Crowe. I think there is no question that many people share that view. Many people do question the ability of the alliances that we have formed to remain staunch. As a matter of fact, we hear so much about it and we talk so much about it, it may be self-fulfilling if we are not careful.

I believe if we work hard at it—I mean, the President has had remarkable success. Frankly, aside from the commentary, I see no signs of real fissures or chinks in the masonry of our alliance. We have some disagreements. We are going to have one on the U.N. resolution, the date they set and so forth and so on; but that is not a fundamental problem. As a matter of fact, I think it is quite remarkable not only that he was able to form this coalition but that it has held together as well as it has.

I think with vigorous diplomacy and statesmanship—as I said in my statement, many of those allies worry more about our impetuousness than they do about our patience. I think with the proper kind of effort and engineering, we can keep our alliances together because most of them are not too warm and enthusiastic about starting a war over there.

Senator Gore. One final question. My time is running out here. You talked about the difference between a nuclear device and a nuclear weapon. Obviously if we are dealing with a timeframe that extends for 5 to 10 years—and we should deal with that timeframe—then we have to do a lot of things, including export controls, an enhanced nonproliferation regime and the rest.

But in the short term, 6 months to a year, the period of time during which the administration has recently said we may have to worry about a nuclear device, if they had something that was the size of a house trailer and much heavier and could only be delivered to its target or objective by a very large, cumbersome vehicle, as military men are you telling us that that is not something that should drive our policy choices during the 6-month to 12-month to 18-month time period?

General **Jones**. I would not let it drive our decision. I would not ignore it, but I would not let it drive. I would not let that implied threat intimidate us.

On the 12 to 18 months, we are talking that the clock started a few months ago, so it is not 12 to 18 months now.

Admiral **Crowe**. I would agree with that. I hear the words that he is irrational, but I do not think Saddam Hussein is invulnerable or contemptuous of deterrence. We have been in the deterrent game quite some time, and we have faced a much more imposing nuclear opponent than this. If he challenges our deterrent posture regarding nuclear weapons, it will be the end of his country.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Gore. I believe Senator Lott is next.

Senator **Lott**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your presence and your very fine statements. I am going to ask you some brief questions that I hope I can get brief answers for if at all possible with regard to the success so far or effectiveness of the embargo or the blockade we have in place.

Admiral Crowe, is there something more we could be doing in that area? Obviously some materials are still getting through probably on the ground, as you suggested in your statement, through Jordan and Iran. I just wonder if there are ways we could tighten it up more and what are the prospects of some sort of secondary blockade that could perhaps be applied to an offending country that may be violating this embargo.

Admiral **Crowe**. I would like to see us wipe his merchant marine off the map.

Senator **Lott**. Now?

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes.

Senator **Lott**. Is that an act of war if you do that?

Admiral **Crowe**. You got me, Senator. [Laughter.]

Admiral **Crowe**. I do not know how you determine acts of war. Its seems to be an argument that is currently raging here.

Senator **Lott**. Yes, a 200-year-old argument.

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes. I am not privy to the intelligence I would have to have to answer that question in detail.

Senator **Lott**. General Jones, you made reference to the fact that if something did occur, an incident, a provocation and a development where we needed to increase our forces substantially, that we had the capability to augment our forces rapidly. My question is, do we have that capability?

I would like to come back to you, Admiral Crowe. For instance, it is obvious that we have had some problems with our sealift capability. I am under the impression that to move another 100,000, 150,000 troops into the area, even if it is for rotation, takes weeks. How rapidly could we move?

General **Jones**. Well, it depends on what you move. First, we can preposition some additional equipment and put it in cocoons so the sand does not hurt it. You do not need all the people there right at that point.

Realize that in use of the ground forces it is unlikely that on day one, if there is combat, that they will be heavily engaged. The strategy ought to be one, as Admiral Crowe has talked about, of interdiction, knocking out the Air Force, the command and control, and interdict what is going into Kuwait. We do not need to start large armored divisions moving into Kuwait at least in the early days.

So we would have some degree of risk, but we have some offensive capability. You could get more air in there rapidly especially if we preposition some equipment. Maybe the thing to do is to go to the larger number in forces with some of the units being held in reserve. All of the people do not have to be there.

Senator LOTT. Are you advocating, then, that we go to larger numbers? Is that what you just said?

General JONES. I am saying that is one option, if you are going to larger numbers, is not to try to have them 100 percent equipped and consider that some of them are reserves, because you can get people there in hours. It takes weeks to get tanks there.

Admiral CROWE. I think one of the merits of the larger deployment is it will force us to put a logistics support system in place. Once it is in place, you can keep that there whether you have people there or not. If you go to a rotation system or you choose some other mechanism, then you can close up rapidly, very rapidly.

Senator LOTT. We have some problems with our lift capability. In testimony before this very committee in this very room we have asked you questions about that very point, and both of you have always said that we have some shortcomings there. We did nothing about it.

General JONES. I commend this committee for taking the lead in putting $600 million in last year's defense budget for fast sealift. Unfortunately, it was not spent.

Senator LOTT. We clearly need to do that.

Admiral CROWE. This crisis again highlights what anybody in the merchant marine business has known for many years, Senator; that is, we have some real problems in our merchant marine, and it handicaps us when we get into a crisis like this very definitely.

Senator LOTT. Let me shift to another area. You know, it has been the policy for quite some time that we would have a total force composed of a mixture of active duty and reserve components integrated into the total force concept. Yet, reserve components were not mobilized at first. Some of them have been called up and will begin to expand their training national guard or reserve components around the country.

What I want to ask is this, are these National Guard and Reserve components ready to fit in with the regular units like the First Cavalry almost immediately? If not, what does it say about the whole idea of the total force concept? Is it good; are we going to use it or not?

Admiral CROWE. This crisis suggests we are going to use it whether we like it or not because we have put ourself in that situation. I think the answer to your first question is some are, some aren't. We have to do it better.

I see Senator Glenn has left.

It is even more important now than ever because I suspect in the next few years we are going to go back to a general mobilization philosophy as opposed to a deterrent posture, and that means you are in the reserve business no matter what, and you have to do it better than we are doing it.

Senator LOTT. General, do you want to comment?

General JONES. We have some crackerjack reserve units and some that lack equipment, lack personnel, and lack training. I believe the Reserves so far have done a magnificent job. They have been able to provide in units and to fill in with individuals. We can be proud of what the Reserves have done, but we have to do a lot more with them in the days ahead.

Senator LOTT. I may have a little more time.

Let me ask you, just going back to the beginning now to the embargo. In your conclusion, Admiral, you say that it may be that Saddam Hussein's ego is so engaged that he will not bend to an embargo or other peaceful deterrence such as containment. What worries me is that I wonder if we are going to be able to bring him to some sort of change in his conduct to withdraw or whatever in view of his personality, his past record.

He is a dictator. He is a tyrant. He is not going to care if the people begin to go hungry. Now I realize at some point that maybe it will begin to affect his military capability.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, and his ability to govern, not only his military. Even tyrants have to have some kind of support or countries do not function.

People keep referring to his past record and so forth, and General Jones said earlier he is not so sure he is irrational. Neither am I. I think by his standards and his lights he has done a lot of rational things. He has made some terrible mistakes. But I hark back to the way he faced reality with Iran early in this crisis when he said I have to get that off my back and made a very rational, very hardheaded decision to give Iran everything that they had asked for in the peace negotiations. He gave away Al Faw, which he fought over vigorously. There were tremendous casualties on Al Faw.

General JONES. I do not think his move into Iraq was irrational in his mind. I think——

Senator LOTT. You mean into Kuwait.

General JONES. I mean Kuwait. I think he calculated that we would go in and get some U.N. resolutions but no forces, and Saudi Arabia would be intimidated and would not let the Americans in. He would be condemned but he would take over Kuwait and maybe then be willing to make some sort of compromise in the area. So I think he badly miscalculated. He was not irrational.

Senator LOTT. He said he would invade, and he did. He said he wanted higher oil prices. He has them. He said he wanted more water access. He has it. He said he would be leaving Kuwait in 2 weeks, and he has not.

Admiral CROWE. I do not understand the water access, Senator.

Senator LOTT. He does have some access there.

Admiral CROWE. He is not getting anything by the sea that we do not want him to get.

Senator LOTT. I mean he has access to it if we did not have him blocked off.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, but we are there. He wanted increased income. He did not get that. He not only did not get increased income, he lost the income he had on oil.

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Lott. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you both for your very powerful and very compelling statements. Let me assume for a moment that we follow your advice and that of Secretary Schlesinger and wait for the embargo to bite more deeply. Assume then that Saddam just hunkers down and tries to wait us out, hoping that our resolve is going to falter, or the coalition is going to fall apart, and then we decide 6 or 9 months from now to invoke the military option.

At that time, would the embargo—in your judgment as military people—have bitten so tightly in terms of spare parts, tires, lubricants, and the other things that military action would be significantly less costly than it would be today in terms of the duration of the war, number of casualties, number of body bags, and so on?

General JONES. He would do some things to increase his military capability, dig in further and so forth to improve his forces. But I believe overall his military capability will deteriorate in the next 9 to 12 months, not to the point that it will not be a very capable force, but it will be less capable than today.

Senator WIRTH. Then we would incur fewer casualties were we to pursue the embargo for 9 to 12 months?

General JONES. I think the likelihood is yes.

Senator WIRTH. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that. Our relative military position, I am convinced, will improve. I do not know about the specific products and things. For example, he does produce artillery shells, which is his main killing weapon. He has a large order of battle, especially artillery. That probably will not deteriorate so much. But his sophisticated weapons systems—his electronic systems, his radars, his aircraft—they will deteriorate. I do not think there is any question about it.

Now, one other thing, Senator, that is going to happen, and I know this from my own family and so forth, our readiness and our ability to fight in the desert is improving every day.

Senator WIRTH. Then presumably——

Admiral CROWE. I am talking about just the individuals.

Senator WIRTH. I understand. Presumably, then, if you follow the option that you all are suggesting, of attempting to have the embargo work, if that option does not work, then that would seem to be in a better military position 6 or 9 months down the line. Either way we win by continuing a very tight embargo program?

General JONES. Yes. I think it is an understandable concern as to whether or not, if 6 to 9 months went by, this country would be willing to initiate combat. I believe that is a valid concern that should be discussed, but not necessarily be overriding.

Admiral CROWE. In that part of the world, Senator, nothing is all ups.

Senator WIRTH. Of course, I understand that.

Let me jump to another question. As I observed the sense of the public soon after the election, something quite dramatic happened in terms of the public perception of our role in the Persian Gulf. From August through October was very broad support for the policy we were pursuing, which was defending Saudi Arabia, employing the embargo and developing the international coalition as successfully.

That changed sharply when our strategy and mission changed. I would quote from the chairman, who I think very accurately yesterday said, "“On November 8, our overall strategy and the military mission of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region changed abruptly. On that day, President Bush announced the deployment of additional U.S. military units that would double the current U.S. level of forces in the region to more than 400,000.

“Secretary Cheney made it clear that these additional deployments would not replace or rotate the forces there now but would be in addition to the U.S. forces already deployed in the region. The purpose of these additional deployments was to create, in President Bush's own words, ‘an adequate offensive military option to carry out our goals in the region.’ ”

The Chairman went on, “the President's announcement was a fundamental shift in the mission of our military forces. After just 3 months, the administration has gone from the original military mission of deterring further Iraqi aggression, defending Saudi Arabia, and enforcing the embargo, to a military mission of liberating Kuwait.”

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I am sorry, who made this statement?

Senator WIRTH. This is from Chairman Nunn yesterday morning.

Admiral CROWE. I am sorry, we have so many chairmen.

Senator WIRTH. But it is the only chairman that we are concerned about.

Senator COHEN. President Nunn. [Laughter.]

Senator WIRTH. I believe that the administration has sensed—since November 8—this erosion of support and has been searching for ways of shoring it up. That is where the discussion of the nuclear threat came from. This was new rhetoric from the administration in the last week. It alarmed Americans and has become an issue that people are deeply concerned about.

What I find perplexing is why this issue has been raised now, in November, and how it fits our overall strategy in the Persian Gulf area.

I have two questions for you: first, does the addition of 200,000 troops and a move to an “offensive military option” give us a means to deal with his nuclear capability?

Second, we have known about this capability for some time. The Israelis destroyed the capability in the early 1980s, for example. Whether or not Saddam had gone into Kuwait, we would have had to deal with this issue, and if there is a peaceful resolution of the current crisis, the problem is going to remain, here and in many other countries, as you both pointed out this morning.

How would you advise that we deal with this nuclear proliferation in Iraq, and can this become a case study for how to deal with the problem elsewhere? We are concerned about North Korea and many other areas as well.

So (1) does the movement toward this offensive military option and a ground option have any impact on our ability to solve the nuclear problem? That is the more narrow question. The broader one is, how would you advise that we begin to look at this broader nonproliferation issue?

General **Jones**. I am not sure that a movement to 400,000 really has any great implications with regard to the nuclear capability.

I am not particularly concerned, from a military standpoint, about the so-called device that might be available in a number of months. It can be a terror weapon but not much else.

It does bother me that Saddam Hussein is proceeding to get a nuclear capability, but there will be another Saddam Hussein tomorrow and the next year around the world, and therefore it is a more fundamental problem, and we have to address it with Saddam Hussein, but we have to address it with the world. Now is the time to start working on it with the nations of the United Nations who have agreed to act against Saddam Hussein.

Let us work the broader issue of control of nuclear materials, and our people who are technicians, and so forth, but I would not let this device dominate our decisions in the next few months with regard to Kuwait.

Senator **Wirth**. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, first of all I would think the increase in troops, if that is your sole mission and overriding mission, to destroy all of his nuclear capability, it puts us in a better offensive posture, and obviously if you want to do it physically we would be better able to go and get it.

General **Jones**. Yes.

Admiral **Crowe**. But the wisdom of doing that is another question.

As for the long term, if our interests are as great in the area, and I think they are high, as we have certainly discussed this morning, the very fact that we are there in such force and that we have disrupted our lives to this point suggests the importance of that area. I would think in the aftermath of this we extend our nuclear umbrella to our friends and allies, et cetera, and that we apply deterrence to Iraq like we have in certain other parts of the world.

Then we continue to work on nonproliferation, which I am not very optimistic about—it is a very difficult problem—and we continue to exert our statesmanship and our influence and to manage affairs and events clear across the board, one of which would be Iraq's nuclear capability.

That is not a pleasant life. In fact, that is miserable, but it is not any more miserable than going to war, and it is a misery we have learned to live with and do pretty well, Americans do, as witnessed by 40 years of standing off the Soviet order of battle.

Incidentally, Iraq's nuclear capability is a pimple alongside what we faced in the Soviet Union, and still do face, so I think these events have to be put in perspective, and in our overall context, and we will just continue to work real hard to keep them under control. I think we can do it.

Senator **Wirth**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Wirth. Senator Coats.

Senator **Coats**. I'm sure this has been expressed to you many times, but I for one appreciate the distinguished service you've both given to the country and your remarks and I wanted to take the public opportunity to say thanks for many years of significant contributions.

—

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you.

Senator COATS. I'd like to pursue a line of questioning that I pursued yesterday with Dr. Schlesinger. To me it's the essential question that has to be answered. There has been the assertion, the implication that sanctions are a no-lose deal for us. Win, win, as Senator Wirth said. But I want to examine that and question that contention because it does seem like the easy way out and if it does result in the achievement of our objectives without the use of force or make the use of force at a latter time much more effective and less costly to the United States, then it clearly ought to be an option that we should follow.

But I'm wondering about the effectiveness of sanctions in changing Iraqi policies at least in a term short enough that would allow us to maintain a credible force in the Middle East should we need it at some future point and maintain support from Congress and the American people. Because sanctions appear to be in the abstract pretty easy. But I'm wondering what the response of the coalition is going to be and the American public is going to be next spring and summer when the wind storms are howling across the desert, when our nightly networks' news shows are counting the days that American troops have been over there without relief, when the temperatures are climbing into the 120s and the 130s, when Dan Rather and others are interviewing Iraqi mothers who say, my babies—I can't get medical help. My children are starving. What impact is that going to have on our resolve? How effective is that going to make sanctions?

Second, can we expect rational Western behavior from a man like Saddam Hussein who has demonstrated in the past what we would consider mysterious behavior from Western standards of morality, engaging his people in a brutal 8-year war which probably affected nearly every family in Iraq, using chemical weapons against his own people, murdering—or causing to be murdered—relatives, close advisors, and associates to maintain his position in power. Suggestions of potential messianic complexes, martyrdom, being seen in the Arab world as someone who is a champion of anti-Western evil influence, satanic influence type of Western thought and action.

Given all that, isn't there a significant risk, a down side to the sanction option and aren't we deceiving ourselves in thinking this is just a painless, simple, easy way out and that all we need is patience?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I would never suggest that there are no down sides to sanctions. And I did not imply that or at least I hope I didn't imply that in my statement. In fact every question we're investigating in this crisis and in this area of the world is difficult. My father used to say, get a one-armed lawyer, because if you don't, he'll say on the one hand it's this and on the other it's—the other hand.

I think the case in the argument——

Senator COATS. I'm glad you didn't use the word, Admiral, but I think it would apply very aptly.

Admiral CROWE. The case for sanctions is not a no-lose case. The case for sanctions is balancing out. Is it better on balance than the other thing. It's against something. There's no question that sanctions, as Senator Wallop said earlier, sanctions are not going to achieve all the more extreme objectives we have. They're not and it's still—after it's over, it's going to be a mess in that part of the world. But that part of the world is going to be difficult no matter how we do it. We are going to be involved for a long time and our life is going to be—that's the burden of international leadership.

Senator COATS. So it could be a lose-lose instead of a win-win.

Admiral CROWE. Well, it may be a lose—you're comparing two things that are lose-lose. I actually said in my statement we may be in a no-win dilemma at least in terms of our long-term prospects in the Arab world. So I wouldn't say sanctions are a no-lose. I just think we're going to be better off—better able to deal with that part of the world for the coming 2 decades if we don't engage in a war with one of the Arab countries. Maybe we can avoid it. Maybe the circumstances won't permit us to.

Senator COATS. What about the question of U.S. resolve?

Admiral CROWE. U.S. resolve is a very tough question and obviously many, many people would support that argument. On the other hand, I think we undersell our people. I think we undersell their patience. The one study that I know of that has been done on the American people's reaction to war says, there's a very consistent pattern over the last 100 years. And when our impatience really begins to rise is not with war or commitment, it's with casualty lists. That's when American impatience rises up out of the hustings. And a lot of American people are willing to put up with a lot if they can avoid war I'll assure you. But you have to work at it. The leaders have to work at it. American political leaders have to work at it instead of saying, oh, my goodness, we're going—our resolve is going to flag, so that's not an option. It's not an easy thing to generate. It requires explanation. It requires articulation. It requires clarifying and it requires persistence. And it requires explaining why in the long run you're better off doing that than you are something else.

Your comments on rational Western behavior I would echo completely. I think that's part of the problem. I read an article the other day about the background of President Bush, vis-a-vis the background of Saddam Hussein. They are completely different and in many respects, passing in the night. They don't understand what each other is talking about.

I lived in the Arab world and I witnessed this at first hand. They do not think like we do necessarily. They do not have our value system. They do not have our perspectives, nor our history. I think we should spend more time trying—and that's the reason I said earlier that I think that we are seeing some hints from him that he wants to get a solution, that he does want to look at ways to save his face and get out of there. But it's in the Arab context, not in the U.S. context. I would like to see much more—and I hope that, Mr. Chairman, you're going to examine with our Arab experts in this country, this very problem.

Incidentally, on chemical weapons, I hear an awful lot about Mr. Hussein using chemical weapons against his own people. I think that's terrible and it's deplorable, but it's not a lot different than using guns against your own people and we've had government leaders do that for centuries and we've had it just in the last few years, a few weeks, a few months, in the Far East where a government clamped down on its people with guns. Usually the difference between chemical weapons and guns is that a lot of people survive the chemical weapons and don't survive the guns. They don't come home to still be witnesses.

Senator COATS. Although in fairness, use of chemical weapons can be completely indiscriminate.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, so can guns.

Senator COATS. Yes, guns can, but——

Admiral CROWE. So can bombing.

Senator COATS. But guns can be pointed.

Admiral CROWE. We're seeing starving children on our television and then we suggest we go bomb them instead. I don't know that I follow that.

Senator COATS. I'm not suggesting that in any sense.

Admiral CROWE. I know you're not, but I have heard this argument made——

Senator COATS. The point I am trying to make is that guns can be pointed. It's at the discretion of that—the person firing.

Admiral CROWE. If they choose to do that.

Senator COATS. If they choose to do so, whereas chemical weapons cannot be. It's dispersed to whomever happens to be in the area—women, children. Those involved. Those not involved.

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely, very tough to be discriminant with them.

Senator COATS. For that reason there has been an abhorrence. And there ought to be an abhorrence to the use of any weapon but there's a special abhorrence to the use of chemical weapons, which is why the United States and others have engaged in treaties outlawing chemical weapons and gotten consensus for that where we haven't in——

Admiral CROWE. That's a very emotional issue in the world, not just in the United States, in the world.

Senator COATS. Right, and because it's so emotional, it clearly has an impact in terms of the kind of—your assessment of the kind of leader who would use that.

General JONES. Senator Coats, may I add that I don't think there is a good solution to the Middle East in the sense that it's win-win. We are looking at the least undesirable. The sanctions are not an easy route. We're going to see suffering in Kuwait. We'll see it with innocent people in Iraq. It's going to be hard to keep our people unified and the morale high. It's going to be hard to keep the coalition together. No question about it. The question is whether or not we let sanctions have some opportunity to work or going to combat shortly. But you're absolutely right, we may not be able to maintain the option 9 months, or a year, or 18 months to go to war even if the sanctions aren't working. But I don't think that speculation should prompt the decision today to initiate combat on January 16.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Coats. In response, Admiral Crowe, your suggestion about getting people here that are expert in the Middle East, we're going to try to do that on Thursday afternoon. We have two panels and we also will be hearing from some more people on the nuclear side of that. On Friday morning we'll hear from Bill Odom who used to be, as you well know, in the intelligence end. He's going to address some of those issues. We also will defer to our colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee. I see Senator Dodd here. We're delighted to have you this morning, Chris. And next week the Foreign Relations Committee will be having hearings and I hope that we will be going into some of these areas that they will not be able to reach, particularly the whole issue of fundamentalism and Islamic issues that come to play here that have to be part of the picture. So your suggestion is well made.

I believe next is Senator Byrd.

Senator **BYRD**. Admiral Crowe, I have had the pleasure of hearing you before. Perhaps not of hearing you, General Jones. Your statements today are more refreshing than usual, Admiral Crowe.

I do not know whether to attribute that to the fact that you are retired and can now speak your mind, or whether you are short of staff, as you have explained. But whatever it is, what you have said today has been good.

Admiral **CROWE**. Some of my staff is right there.

Senator **BYRD**. Whatever the cause, you certainly have brought a trenchant and clear message today and as far as I am concerned, I agree with it. And my agreement does not come from being an expert in modern warfare or ancient, for that matter, but from the wisdom that sometimes is found assembled around a pot-bellied stove in a country store on a cold day in December. And you are voicing what my people are saying. You are urging patience, the virtue of patience.

I have heard some comments today with respect to Saddam Hussein, about his being irrational. Senator Cohen mentioned Tacitus, a Roman historian. Whether it was Cornelius Tacitus or Levi or Xenophon, I think if we study them as well as Edward Gibbon, we will find that the people in that part of the world have a mindset that is quite different from ours, a set of values that is very different from ours, and a history that goes back many thousands of years.

We might, as General Jones has said, draw a lesson from history in order that we might place today's events in the context of the lessons of the past. Valens, that Roman emperor of the East, was impetuous. And without waiting for the arrival of the supporting forces of the emperor of the West, Valens threw his Roman army into the Battle of Hadrianople. And he lost 45,000 men in one day, and lost his own life as well.

There are other examples that can be drawn, as General Jones has mentioned, from World War I, from Hitler, Mussolini, and others. But Saddam Hussein reflects this history of thousands of years, the values or the lack thereof, the different standards from ours. And I daresay that we should approach with care any denominating of him as being irrational.

I share your view that time is on our side, not on his. I also share your view that it requires leadership on the part of us politicians, leadership on the part of the administration, so that our people will know full well why we are there, so that it will be clear to them the reasons why we are there in such force.

I support the President in his efforts thus far. I think he has done a magnificent job of marshaling the support of many of the nations in the United Nations. In his actions in going in quickly, we were the only country that was in a position to do that and prevent Hussein from marching into Saudi Arabia. But I think that our people have serious questions as to what we are doing there, in such force, really have been confused.

Let me just ask a few questions. One would deal with spare parts. I read recently that we are being faced with a shortage or a potential shortage of spare parts and ammunition in the Persian Gulf. I also heard you say that Saddam is going to have his own problems with spare parts, and I believe that.

I think that is a very important point. It may not loom large at the moment, but the lack of a spare part was the reason that the horse lost his rider. And it may mean the savings of lives, many lives of American fighting men and women, the fact that Hussein's spare parts are dwindling, that he, too, has to cannibalize his equipment. But we can cannibalize ours and flesh them out again.

How do you see these things? Saddam's ability to flesh out the cannibalized equipment, his ability to counterattack, the fact that he has certainly thrown up massive barriers of barbed wire and concrete and trenches, and that the possibility of our being able to outflank him probably is not good.

I understand my time has expired, but I'm entitled to a little more time than you normal Senators around here.

Chairman NUNN. You see, Admiral Crowe, that is the big chairman right there.

Senator BYRD. Sometimes it takes me a long time to get to my point. I am concerned about whether or not we are prepared to withstand a counterattack. Let me ask this question in order that it might help me. What is the normal ratio with respect to offense versus defense, recognizing that the ratio will change with topography, circumstances, air power, sea power, and all that?

What might we take as a given here, with respect to the relative strengths needed for defensive purposes, let's say, on Saddam's part, and offensive purposes on ours?

And while you are commenting, comment on my question about spare parts, whether or not you think we are prepared to withstand a counterattack, and whether or not it is unreasonable to think that the Iraqis, if driven to desperation and once we launch an offensive, might be well-prepared to launch a counteroffensive and we may not have the concrete bunkers and the trenches to prepare us for that kind of an assault.

General JONES. First, Senator Byrd, on the spare parts, I think the spare problem will hurt Iraqi military and weapons problems more than it will hurt us, for a number of reasons. They embargoed, with no resupply. They were very dependent on foreign sources for their spare parts and their weapons.

And they are going to have to use 100 percent of their force. Whatever we put into the Middle East, it is not going to be 100 percent of our force. So if we have to cannibalize, it will be cannibalized airplanes that are in Langley, Virginia. I am not trying to minimize our problems, there will be some. But I believe in a relative sense, we will be better off.

Normally, throughout history, people have written about a 3-to-1 offense-defense number, but that never really tends to be valid in specific cases. We can, if we decide to attack Iraq, for whatever reason, we can wipe out most of his air force very rapidly. I do not mean in 1 day or 2 days, and he may put some of his aircraft in bunkers, and he has a lot of bunkers. It is harder to destroy them, but if the aircraft are hidden in bunkers, they are not being used.

We have superior air capability, the AWACS does a marvelous job of controlling our air. He does not have a comparable system. That does not mean that he might not have some airplanes that survive that could be used to do something rash or maybe some missiles with the chemicals or whatever.

But in a relative sense, we could do much better in the air. And then we could move in to interdict him, the support of his troops in Iraq and others. One of the rash things he might do is come out of Kuwait, across the desert toward Saudi Arabia. However, it is much easier to destroy a tank out in the open than one that is dug in. So I doubt if he will be rash, to try to come out of there with his tanks. If he does, I think we have a good air and land capability to destroy them.

So I think in a relative sense, we are very well off being able to deter or defend, with a fairly substantial offensive capability now, clearly. And I support what the military recommendation of the President was, 400,000, if you want a complete offensive military capability in place to defeat Saddam Hussein completely.

To defeat his military and get him out of Kuwait, then we need the force that is projected to be there in Saudi Arabia. We have a good force there now for a more limited objective.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I trust you will forgive my presumptuousness for taking extra time. From what I hear, I cannot conceive, within my limited military understanding, of our being able to, with 400,000 men—if I hear that there must be a ratio of 3 to 1 or 2 to 1 or 1½ to 1.

General JONES. That is not a valid ratio, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I beg your pardon?

General JONES. I said I do not believe that a ratio applies at all in the area. He could have 1,000,000 and we could have 400,000. And I would rather have our 400,000 than his 1,000,000.

Senator BYRD. Well, I would rather have our 400,000, too, back home. I am not sure I would risk 400,000 against his 1,000,000 battle-tested veterans in that desert.

But be that as it may, Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be very, very careful about urging military action at this point. It may come to that. And if it comes, in due time, I think the American people will support it. And I will support it under the circumstances, if we have taken the time to let the sanctions work.

I do not think they can work in 2 months or 3 months. And it would seem to me that we would be very well advised to wait a year if it takes a year, or a year and a half. The American people have shown their ability to sustain sacrifice over long periods of time—for 40 years in dealing with the Soviets and the Cold War. And who are we to say that their patience and their stick-to-it-tiveness will not hold out for a year or a year and a half if necessary?

And of course, the networks on the evening news are going to be counting the days. But that is better than counting the bodies, which they will also do. And when we view grandmothers and grandfathers who have lost not one, but two or three grandchildren, and they feel that we took the action too hastily—I think we are all going to have time then to be sorry.

The American people are willing to sacrifice, but the cost is going to be staggering. We are up against a foe there that has withstood 8 or 9 years of terrible war with Iran. Of course, the Iranians did not have the air power and the sea power that we can bring to bear. We already have a $3.2 trillion debt. The deficit is going to be in the $300s of billions annually, now that we have taken Social Security off budget.

And as the savings and loan bailout costs mount, and with the interest costs on our national debt—$189 billion a year, now—I think we ought to go a little slow about urging haste in taking military action. Let us give these sanctions time to work.

And as our two witnesses have very properly said, I think, the international community would probably welcome patience rather than impetuousness.

I compliment the chairman and the committee on excellent hearings. And I compliment our witnesses. I was not here yesterday, so I have taken my 10 additional minutes today from yesterday.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. Next is Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I said at the beginning, gentlemen, the great pride that I had in your testimony today, your forthrightness. Let me, if I can, explore an issue or two that I do not think that has been taken up today—in any great detail, at least. And that is the whole geopolitical picture that we have to look at over the horizon.

I think the President has done a very good job in many areas, however, I hope we do not get carried away in some of this spin control. We hear different versions of the situation with regard to our present military strength over there. We have heard it called an alliance, we have heard it called a coalition. We have heard it frequently referred to as our allies.

I guess in all of military history, this is one of the stranger alliances or coalitions that has ever been put together. It is not like any other alliance or coalition that we have seen previously.

I need only site the fact that the four countries that rely primarily and most heavily on oil from Kuwait and Iraq as a percentage of imports—namely, those countries are number 1, the Netherlands; number 2, Japan; number 3, Italy; and number 4, Spain—all four of those countries have a vast interest in what is happening in the Persian Gulf today. But each of those nations have zero troops involved in the region.

Likewise that can be said for others who are playing a key role in what action is taken, namely the Soviet Union, China, Germany, Greece, and Canada. No combat troops, nobody to carry out the will. Nobody there to enforce what they are very likely to do in the United Nations in the next day or so. And that is to say force can and should be used.

Is that not quite a strange alliance, certainly as we generally describe the term "alliance," at least a la World War I and World War II. Would you agree?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, Senator. Of course in the area of this alliance—this cooperation we are witnessing—it is unprecedented.

Senator EXON. General?

General JONES. I am delighted that we have enough unanimity around the world in what we are doing. I think that is a great plus.

On the minus side are the points that you mentioned that a lot of countries are not pulling their fair share. But we are so much better off than we were 5 years, 7 years, or 10 years ago, when the world was badly divided.

Senator EXON. Let us look at the potential combat situation because I think there has been general agreement around this table that none of us is ruling out the combat possibility. In the end, that option has to be there. There would seem to be at least a degree of consensus here that this is not the time to be moving aggressively toward an offensive strike as some would like us to move.

It seems to me that you have pointed out in your answers to questions, and in your opening remarks, the very fragile situation that we have over there. Probably Americans as a whole lack an understanding of the fragility of the situation over there.

I speak primarily with regard to the concerns about the Arab nations. And, as was pointed out in the hearing yesterday, the Arab nations were shocked, most of all I suspect, at the fact that one of their brothers—in this case Saddam Hussein—did indeed launch an attack against one of his Arab brothers, Kuwait, such an act is generally considered an unforgivable sin.

Do you believe from the knowledge that you have that the Arab forces that are there as part of the coalition are planned to be used as a part of the assault forces if an assault becomes necessary to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait or to attack Iraq itself?

We hear continuing reports that, at least as far as the American military is concerned, they are not relying primarily on Arab forces being significantly involved in any kind of assault. Is that a concern or not in the view that if we are we are going to have to be forced to some kind of military action, it would be much better, at least from the standpoint of the future, regional balance of power not to have Uncle Sam be the sole leader of an attack.

Arabs fighting Arabs would at least take off some of the pressure with regard to the feeling that Uncle Sam is over there throwing his weight and muscle around.

Admiral CROWE. I think the American people would agree with that, Senator. The answer to the question as to where they will be in the attack, I do not know the answer to the question.

It is instructive that right now, in our current static deployments, that they are right on the border. They are up front. They are in the van, our forces are. But I do not think we will have the kind of answers you want until something happens and the governments make their final decisions as to how involved they will be and what they will permit or not permit.

Senator EXON. General Jones?

General JONES. I do not want to speculate on the war plans, but I am concerned, for example, Mubarak said he would not use troops against Iraq, so in any plan there, we would have to use them against Kuwait—the Iraqi troops in Kuwait. And if we decide to take that on, we would not want just the Egyptian troops doing it.

I believe the whole command and control situation is much improved, but we should not assume that all of the problems are solved. Under the best of circumstances it is tough to work out command and control problems with the two dozen nations with forces in the area.

Admiral **Crowe**. I agree with that.

General **Jones**. It is a very loose coalition, at best.

Senator **Exon**. It is a very loose coalition, at best. I wanted to see what you would say.

General **Jones**. And there is a disproportionate burden on the United States.

Senator **Exon**. And with the new troops that we are sending over there under the latest commitment from the President, it is very clear that Americans are going to represent about 71 percent of ground forces in Saudi Arabia which again, is disproportionate in the form of an alliance, I suggest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Exon. We have about 12 minutes left. I promised Admiral Crowe we would finish by 12 noon. He has a previous commitment, and he has been very generous of his time. General Jones has been also. Senator Shelby, that will give you time to get your full round in. I have committed to Senator Warner to close out the questions with the emphasis that we need to give our witnesses a chance to be excused at 12 noon. I have to meet the 12 o'clock commitment, but we will divide it as best we can. Senator Shelby.

Senator **Shelby**. General Jones, Admiral Crowe, I want to join the line here and thank you for your testimony here today. I believe it has been quite instructive. I got out of it instructions, if you want to call them that, to be patient and to be cautious, because of the overriding factors in the Middle East.

I wonder what kind of advice the President is getting down the street. You are not down there now. I do not know if you have advised him, or if he has talked with you or what, but I hear the war drums beating. A lot of people do over there. You hear the war drums beating.

As General Jones said, events—in his testimony he was analogizing to 1914. Events drive things, and as we build up, and as we get permission, so to speak, to use offensive forces in the Middle East, are we going to the offensive option, and can President Bush really wait, politically? I know he can, but will he?

What are the chances—I will ask both of you—in your judgment, of us being in a shooting war in the next 6 weeks to 2 months. General Jones? Looking at events in a cold-blooded, realistic way.

General **Jones**. I was asked early on did I think we would end up in war, and I said I thought there was about a 60-40 chance that there would not be conflict. I still stay with that, but I am less sure of the time period. I still think in the near term there will be enough patience shown.

I want to point out that some of the concerns I raised are not inevitable. It is not inevitable that this is a repeat of 1914, but we have to learn from history and think about history. We have to be careful that the events do not pull us in a way we really do not want to go because we have closed off so many options that may have been preferable.

Senator **Shelby**. But you see parallels though, at times?

General **Jones**. Possible parallels, yes.

Senator **Shelby**. Admiral Crowe?

Admiral **Crowe**. My estimates have changed, Senator. I think the prospects are higher than I had originally estimated I would have said a month ago, and the reason I put in my statement some rhetoric to talk specifically about the military option, I think the prospects of having to use the military are high, at a very minimum 50-50.

Senator **Shelby**. If we use our military option precipitously, is it perhaps a good parallel to say we could win the battle and lose the war, looking at the aftermath of the Middle East, looking at the pan Arabism?

Admiral **Crowe**. I actually used in my statement the word that we may be in a no-win dilemma. We win and we lose.

Senator **Shelby**. General Jones?

General **Jones**. That is a possibility.

Senator **Shelby**. Gentlemen, I hope the President is listening to you today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby. Let me ask Senator Warner and Senator Cohen to confer about how much time, but I would like to meet a 12 o'clock deadline.

Senator **Warner**. Fine, we will do that, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, this has been an excellent hearing with a good exchange of views by the members of this committee, all of whom have a very active interest. I think it is a constructive step forward in what I think both of you said, a necessity to better explain this situation to the American people and to the world. I feel that we have accomplished that today.

Your views—as you said, Admiral Crowe, there are many audiences, but your views will have perhaps the most profound influence on the most important audience, and that is the men and women serving in the Armed Forces. You are one of them. You have got credibility among them, so I am going to put a tough question to you on that.

I would like first to say that we have talked a lot about patience today. I do not have time to put this in a question, but our President is working with the United Nations. On Thursday we are about to get another resolution allowing the use of force, in their own language, of all necessary means, and so forth, but it is to implement Resolution 660, which is right here (indicating).

If you read 660, it says "demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally." It may well be that when he structured these forces he had these orders—these are the standing orders, the U.N. resolutions. They may have been in mind.

When I hear comments to the effect that well, perhaps we should not have built these forces up, I say to myself, that means either the President was getting the wrong advice from the JCS, or he disagreed with the JCS, but we will not go back and revisit that question.

So, let us talk about the young men and women in the desert, who are listening to the reports from this hearing. As I summarize what you have said, I do not see any fundamental difference that either of you have with the steps taken to date by the President of the United States. You may have some professional judgments, but no fundamental differences.

My question to you, then—we understand fitness reports. Has the President made the right decisions to date, or if he has made a mistake, what is it? Admiral Crowe?

Admiral CROWE. I come down on the right side, that he has made the right decisions. I am very worried, though, about letting the sanctions play out. Obviously, that is the heart of my statement.

Senator WARNER. General Jones?

General JONES. I think that expresses my views very clearly. It is whether or not, with all of the decisions that have been made, and I think the President has acted in a superb manner of getting the world together, is where do we go from here? That is the main concern.

Senator WARNER. I thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I will try to be very brief, but as a follow-on to what Senator Warner was asking, Admiral Crowe, earlier in response to a question you indicated that if the United Nations were to grant the use of force to the President—he is now seeking it on Thursday—that any affirmation that would be granted would be of use to our Armed Forces in terms of their morale. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Affirmation? I do not follow you.

Senator COHEN. In other words, if the United Nations were to authorize or give its approval for the use of force in that region, that would be seen as a positive signal by our Armed Forces. I believe you indicated that earlier.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I said I thought it was a wise thing to do in the political context of the United States. Frankly, I think the Armed Forces will follow it. They are going to do what their country wants them to do.

Senator COHEN. But you think it is a wise thing for the President to go to the United Nations to seek authority to use force?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, from a political perspective, I do.

Senator COHEN. From a political perspective. You just disagree with the date that might be chosen? In other words, January 15, January 30?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I hope we make it clear whatever we have in mind by inserting a date in there.

Senator COHEN. The next question is, if the President were to go to the United Nations to get approval, the question of whether he has to do it remains. It is one we will not talk about right now.

But now the President, for political reasons, not constitutional reasons, he makes the decision to come to Congress and says, now that the United Nations has granted me the approval to use force, I would like to have the same grant from the U.S. Congress to show that the Congress is behind the policies that I am pursuing, including the use of force. Would you agree that he should do that?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I am going to cop out a little bit here, Senator. I want to go back to what I said in your original question. As a military man, I would hope that the President of the United States and the Congress can arrive at a consensus which tells the armed services and the people that are in the field what they expect and they have got some unified support for what they are doing there.

Senator COHEN. Let me ask you this: assuming the United Nations grants the use of force, the potential use of force sometime this week and the President comes before the Congress and seeks the same authority and Congress says, based upon the testimony we have heard from a variety of witnesses, including two former distinguished Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is the Congress' belief that we ought to pursue the current course, stay the course for another 18 months with sanctions and no use of force, what would be your assessment in terms of what the reaction would be on our forces and upon our so-called allies in this relationship?

Admiral CROWE. Confusion.

Senator COHEN. So you think that that would be really a poor result, as such, or one that is certainly not desirable?

Admiral CROWE. I have a lot of faith in our people. I mean, Washington is confused a lot of times. This is not the first confusion that I have seen in Washington. [Laughter.]

Or that we are going to see. The troops will cast it aside very quickly and they will do their job.

Senator COHEN. I am curious as to why you think it is a responsible course of action for the President to seek the use of authority through the United Nations but that it would be a responsible course of action for Congress to simply authorize a continuation of the sanctions and no force, so that you in essence are inviting the kind of confusion that inevitably is going to result. Should the President not go to the United Nations and not seek the use of force? That is what you are advocating in coming before the Congress this way.

Admiral CROWE. In a sense you are very right, Senator. Of course, I feel that the effort to get a consensus from the United Nations is very important for our alliance-building and for the future construction of our alliances. Whether the President comes to the Congress or not has to do with a great many things more than just building a policy here. It has to do with some constitutional problems. It has to do with the controversy over the War Powers Act.

Senator COHEN. Forget the Constitution.

Admiral CROWE. That is between you and the President.

Senator COHEN. The President is going to come because of a policy consideration or a political one, not on a constitutional requirement. I think he is required, but let us assume he disagrees he is required, but he says as a policy matter, now that I have gone to the United Nations, I have gotten their approval, I am now coming to the Congress for political reasons to get their approval. Now, you think that would be a mistake for Congress to authorize the use of force which has just been authorized by the United Nations. Is that it?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know whether it would be a mistake, but I repeat, I think it would be best for the two of you—I do not like to tell the President or the Congress what they should be doing, but the President and the Congress to work out some kind of consensus as to how they are going to go about their business in this time of very genuine crisis. Now, how you do that——

Senator COHEN. I think what you are doing—and I assume, General Jones, you agree with what has been stated to date, that we have a real disconnect here. On the one hand, it is a positive statement for the President to go before the U.N. to get this kind of consensus on the potential use of force. It is clear from your testimony that you do not think that is a wise course of action for Congress to follow.

General JONES. No, I did not say that.

Senator COHEN. What did you say?

General JONES. I think it would be wise for the President to come to Congress and to ask for authority.

Senator COHEN. To do what?

General JONES. Under certain conditions to be able to use military force.

Senator COHEN. What do you think those conditions should be?

General JONES. I think there ought to be consensus among the leadership of the Congress and the President, not the precise terms, but the general approach in using such authority. I do not think the Senate would vote for it unless the members had an understanding. As I say, not the specifics of what date or anything, but what are the objectives and what is the basic strategy. That would be great for the country if we could have the Congress and the President unified, because I believe then the public would be unified.

Senator COHEN. But it is your testimony that Congress should not vote for it under the circumstances because you believe that we need another year or possibly 18 months.

General JONES. No, no. I do not foreclose it. My preference would be for the President to come over and say I think we ought to give sanctions a chance. It would strengthen his hand to get the congressional approval——

Senator COHEN. To use force.

General JONES [continuing]. To use force——

Senator COHEN. 18 months, a year from now.

General JONES. Well, if the sanctions are not working——

Senator COHEN. A year from now.

General JONES. I would not necessarily even put a date in it.

Senator COHEN. You think that Congress is going to authorize the President at some future time, indefinite time, as he solely decides whether the sanctions are working or not?

General JONES. No, but I am saying I have no problem with him coming to Congress and asking for authority. If that authority can be given to him in a way that shows a majority of the Senate, hopefully an overwhelming majority, support it, I think that is a wise move because that gets it together.

Mr. Chairman, we are 1 minute late. May I send a message to Saddam Hussein?

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

General JONES. CNN is on, and CNN is watched in Baghdad. I hope his people looking at this will report to him that we are unified. He will not succeed. His troops will not stay in Kuwait. The hostages will be released. But he is going to be hurt, and his country is going to be hurt. The only debate is when and how fast and how hard.

How badly he is hurt is his choice. If he gets out of Kuwait and releases the hostages now, he will be hurt, there will be damage, but it will be nowhere near what it would be if he refuses to do that over a reasonable period of time and we are required to take military action. If we take military action, we are not going to stop in Kuwait. We are going to Baghdad, and he will no longer be in power, and Iraq will no longer have this military capability.

It is his choice as to how much he will be hurt. We are unified in our basic policy. It is just how fast we go in that direction and the specifics of it; but we are not divided on the fundamentals.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Jones. I agree with that assessment. I think there is unity on this committee from one side to the other with every Senator being in favor of enforcing the United Nations' overall mandate for Iraq to get out of Kuwait. There is no difference on that. The question is how much pain we administer and how quickly and whether we do it with the embargo or the use of force.

There is no disagreement about the overall goal. I think this committee, Democrats and Republicans, stand with the President on the overall goal. We are talking about the tactics and the way we go about it, and we are exercising the debate over here that is part of our system of government.

Let me make just one other closing observation. I think that there is a fundamental difference in what the United Nations is debating and what we are considering here. The U.N. is debating whether to authorize the use of our forces by us. We are deciding whether to authorize the use of our own forces. There is a fundamental difference, and I think that we need to keep that very much in mind.

Admiral Crowe, do you have any closing comments?

Admiral CROWE. I have one, Mr. Chairman, but it has nothing to do with higher politics. It has to do with our people in the field. I think they are absolutely marvelous. They have done us proud, and I appreciate the support this committee has given to our military men and women. I appreciate deeply the support that the entire country has given to them.

My family is now in the process of putting together a Christmas package for our son's company. Let me tell you, the stuff is coming in from every direction, and we are very grateful.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with you. We are very proud of them, and we are very proud of you two. We appreciate your being here today.

We will have another meeting at 1 p.m. today in this room with former Secretary of State Kissinger. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m. this same day.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman), presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Byrd, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, Wilson, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats.

Also present: Senator Dodd.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; and Richard DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Richard E. Combs, Jr., Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and William H. Smith.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Corts, Mary J. Kampo, Melissa Ann Ramsey, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Nancy E. Soderberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy, John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; C. Richard D'Amato, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Lee E. Whittaker, assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott; and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony from Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose credentials as a thoughtful and informed student of international affairs, as a former national security advisor and a former Secretary of State are impeccable and well known to all of us.

Dr. Kissinger, we greatly appreciate your willingness to appear before us today, as you have in the past. I know that you have a very busy schedule. But you are always a reservoir of good, sound advice and we are looking forward to your testimony here today.

Dr. Kissinger's agreement with the Chairman was that we would have him out of here by 3 o'clock. He has already rearranged his commitments to be with us this afternoon.

So we will proceed now with his testimony, after Senator Warner has a word of greeting, and then we will take a 5-minute break at 2 o'clock, after which we will come right back and go until approximately 3 o'clock. Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome you, Mr. Secretary. Let us get underway.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. **Kissinger**. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in order to leave the maximum amount of time for questions, I will not read the statement that I have submitted, or even summarize it. But I would like to raise a number of questions, as the chairman did yesterday in his opening statement, that seem to me to be at the heart of the problem of the Gulf.

These seem to me as follow: One, will sanctions work? Two, what do we mean by the sanctions "working"—that is, by what process will we know that they are working? Three, how much time will it take? Four, is that time frame compatible with the deployment we have in the area?

Five, if we find out that sanctions are not working, does the military option still exist? Six, if a decision is made to resort to military operations, what strategy should we pursue? Seven, what are the consequences of an American withdrawal from the area without having achieved the stated objectives? And finally, of course, what are the objectives?

These are the issues with which I have tried to deal in the various articles I have written and in the statement that I have submitted. And they seem to me to be influenced heavily by the decisions that have already been taken, by the deployment that already exists, and by the consequences of an unsuccessful deployment.

With this, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to speak to you today. To save time I would like to submit for the record the following adaptation of articles published in The Washington Post on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th as a basis for discussion.

Objectives

American objectives have included fulfillment of stated UN goals of restoration of the status quo ante in Kuwait as well as the unconditional release of all hostages. But to contribute to President Bush's objective of stability in the Gulf, any solution to the crisis must also provide for a reduction of Iraq's offensive capability which now overshadows its neighbors. Without addressing this fundamental imbalance, a solution will only postpone, and probably exacerbate, an eventual resolution of Gulf instability.

Were Saddam suddenly to accept the UN terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would represent a huge loss of prestige for him. Iraq would still retain its chemical and nuclear capabilities. Its large standing army would still preserve the capacity to overwhelm the area. Many nations in the Middle East might adjust to the perception that the mobilization of forces from all over the world cannot be repeated every few years.

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important if US forces are to be substantially withdrawn from the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temptations of a military vacuum.

Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal burden.

The Administration concluded that anything other than a leadership role for the United States would have ended with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and would lead to the collapse of the moderate governments in the region including Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role, President Bush made another crucial decision. The American military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if necessary.

In short, early in America's involvement there was some argument as to whether American vital interests justified a massive deployment in the Gulf. That debate has since been overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

The perception of American failure would shake international stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of radicalism and fundamentalism.

Sanctions or Military Action?

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle East crisis where a choice must be made between a course relying on sanctions or, as a last resort, on a military course.

The two approaches have been presented as if they were successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive because by the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist.

To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least five hurdles must be overcome:

- The sanctions must bite.
- They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.
- Once the UN terms are achieved, arms control objectives must be addressed.
- The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and diplomatically during the entire course of the negotiations.
- There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

To state these hurdles is to set forth the practical obstacles to clearing them.

For one thing, upheavals in the Middle East are a way of life. In one recent week, the second highest ranking official in Egypt was assassinated, Syria battled Christian forces in Beirut, and 21 Palestinians died in Jerusalem.

If the sanctions do bite within a time frame relevant to political processes, Iraq is more likely to offer to negotiate than to yield.

In that case, pressures to ease the sanctions will be difficult to resist. Which democracy will want to be responsible for starvation in Iraq and Kuwait once negotiations are under way?

The fundamental dilemma is that the UN terms leave no real room for negotiation--except perhaps the staging of the Iraqi withdrawal. Thus all so-called diplomatic solutions effectively dilute the UN objectives while maintaining Iraq's war-making potential and thus confirming Iraq as the supreme military power of the Middle East.

For example, even if Saddam accepts the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted--and Soviet presidential aide Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed--that he would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the Shatt el-Arab. And President Mitterrand has stated that only agreement in principle to withdrawal is needed to bring about a negotiation.

Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military pre-eminence or restore Kuwait completely.

If they conclude that they will be condemned to live with a dominant Iraq, they will begin their own negotiations. Recent remarks by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan suggest that the haggling may already have begun.

But will the psychological basis for a military option still exist after months of such inconclusive maneuvering? And without a realistic military threat, how can the US/UN objectives be achieved?

And having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

A Regional Security System?

Many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations recognize that sanctions will not be able to achieve a balance of power in the Gulf. They propose to protect a settlement by a new regional security system based on a significant American military presence in Saudi Arabia.

I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large expeditionary force, a regional balance of power could not be reached, no Gulf state would easily entrust its fate to a long-term American presence.

The often-heard argument that America proved its staying power in Korea and Europe misses the point. The issue in Arabia is not American staying power but the host country's domestic stability.

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once Iraq has faced down US and UN terms, such a force would sooner or later become hostage to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran and events substantially out of our control.

Nor can the restoration of the military balance in the Gulf be left to subsequent arms control negotiations. For having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

In short, the route of sanctions and the military option can be pursued up to a certain point simultaneously. At some point, however, trying to pursue both courses will turn into an evasion incompatible with reaching what should be our objectives. At that point the US must choose a strategy appropriate to its objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever policy we are willing to implement.

What Military Strategy?

If war proved unavoidable it is to be hoped that military strategy remains related to realistic political objectives.

Outsiders should not play field marshal. But America has no national interest in weakening Iraq to a point where it becomes a tempting target for covetous neighbors.

If war does prove unavoidable, our objective should be not to destroy Iraq, but rather to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to unacceptable levels while reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors.

The destruction of the Iraqi military complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces, would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

Such a strategy would rely on air and naval power and use ground forces primarily to overawe a response. As the government of Iraq, which is after all a military dictatorship, sees its principal source of power erode, a negotiation more compatible with stated US objectives could result.

Even if one of the compromises sketched above came eventually to be adopted--a contingency I would regret--the setback would be eased by the reduction in the Iraqi military threat. I am extremely skeptical about a full-scale ground assault.

Conclusion

In the process of overcoming the current crisis, the United States must not emerge as the permanent defender of every status quo. But the path to peace and progress resides in success in the Gulf.

Afterwards the United States, together with its Arab partners, can demonstrate the benefits of cooperative action in promoting the well-being of the Arab peoples.

Too, the United States should then seek energetically to make progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now that looming disaster might have brought all sides second thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable participants in peace negotiations. But such a move cannot be linked to the resolution of the current crisis for to do so would turn Saddam into a hero in the Arab world.

It is to be hoped that a united America can find a way that avoids both a military strategy of total destructiveness and a diplomatic strategy committed to amassing UN resolutions--the progressive disregard of which will at some point demonstrate the UN's impotence rather than an international consensus.

But whatever our destination, we must arrive at it by design rather than as captives of circumstances.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. We appreciate your being here. I would like to address some of the questions you have posed.

One question that comes from your previous writings on the subject, and I think I have read most of what you have written, concerns the point that you reiterated just a moment ago, that by the time we discover that sanctions are not likely to work, it will be too late to use the military option. Could you elaborate on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. It may be too late. I am certainly not saying that it is absolutely so. But I think it will probably be too late. First of all, to understand my view, one has to understand what we mean by the sanctions "working"?

I do not believe that we will see the day when the Iraqi leader will send us a letter saying he has accepted our terms. The much more likely result is an offer to negotiate, which will, if past experience is any guide, in itself lead to a protracted effort.

Then we have to be prepared to meet a variety of hurdles during the negotiation. These are as follows: First, of course, is that the sanctions have to be effective. Second, that they must be maintained throughout the negotiations. And once U.N. terms are achieved, I think we have, in addition, to address the question of military balance in the area. Third, the military option must remain intact throughout this entire period, and fourth, there should be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to undermine allied cohesion.

I believe it will be very difficult to meet all these conditions in anything less than an extremely extended period of time. There will be pressures to lift or certainly to ease the sanctions. There will be negotiating proposals to ease our terms. And, finally, there will be pressures to withdraw our forces, both in the U.S. and finally in the region.

I have the most serious doubt as to whether it will be possible to maintain the present military deployment in Saudi Arabia for an extended period of time. And I would be interested to see an intelligence estimate—to which I have no access—of whether we believe that the present level of deployment can be maintained during the pilgrimage and much beyond Ramadan.

I believe that the longer this large American deployment in the area is maintained, the more the pressures against it will multiply.

Chairman **Nunn**. Do you believe, Dr. Kissinger, that we have deployed too many forces, that we are working against our own interests by having that large a force in the area in terms of being able to have a patient policy?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out yesterday, the presence of a large force puts a certain pressure on Saddam Hussein. But it also makes it more difficult to sustain it for an indefinite period of time.

And this is why we will come to a point of decision, in my view, some time in the next few months, where we will have to choose between the military option and the sanctions option. I would prefer for the sanctions to work. But I do not believe it likely that the two can be kept in harness.

Chairman **Nunn**. What would be your measuring points for the use of military force, if you were advising the President? When would you decide that and what would be the grounds for it?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, I would hope that when the President has to make that decision, he has access to more intelligence information than I do, and that I would not be asked that question.

But I would say, that it would be at the point where it has become apparent that American forces will have to be withdrawn in increasing numbers, and where we then face the problem that our moderate allies in the area find their position fundamentally undermined—the inevitable result of an American withdrawal following an unsuccessful action.

At that point, the President will have to decide whether a military operation becomes less dangerous than the consequences of upheaval in many of the moderate governments in the region. That will be the point of decision.

Chairman **Nunn**. It sounds to me as if you are saying that the size of the deployment, the logistics, sustainability, and the political fallout from the size of the deployment is a major factor in pushing us toward that point of decision. Is that a fair reading?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I have said from the beginning that the size of the original deployment is what must dictate the pace of subsequent diplomacy. That that deployment was not challenged by anybody at the time, does not now give us the option of going back and debating what we might otherwise have done.

Chairman **Nunn**. Well, of course, it is not too late for the President to decide, when January comes around, that we would rotate some of our deployed forces. There will be a period of overlap there for 2 or 3 weeks, which gives us both the old forces and the new forces that pose an offensive threat, a ground threat.

I think we have had an offensive air capability in the region for a long time. I am not one who believes we have to put a military force of 400,000 in to have an offensive threat, because I have always thought that the air threat was the best U.S. strength——

Dr. KISSINGER. So do I. I do not favor a ground strategy, no matter what decision the President makes.

Chairman NUNN. Are you concerned about the size of the ground forces we are building up, for all of these reasons? Do you think that the President might be wise to consider some type of rotation, at least of some of the ground forces, to expand our option and our flexibility?

Dr. KISSINGER. From the beginning, it has been my position that if military action becomes unavoidable—whenever that may be—that the preferable strategy would be to rely on our air and naval power and to use our ground forces to prevent a response, rather than to launch a large-scale attack.

But in response to your specific question, Mr. Chairman, I would say that I am also profoundly concerned about the impact of something that begins to look like a substantial American withdrawal on the countries with which we are associated in the area. Because that might in turn start a rush toward accommodation that would undermine all moderate governments in the region.

I am deeply concerned about this and think it has to be taken into account by anybody taking a position on this issue.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying you think it may be too late for the President to announce a rotation policy?

Dr. KISSINGER. "Rotation," as you say it, is a technical issue. And I do not want to get into the technical issue of rotation.

But any Presidential statement that implies we are, in fact, reducing our forces and that this is a process that may continue, would raise grave questions among the countries with which we are associated.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. My time has expired. Of course, if we have 230,000 there now and we announce a rotation policy, and we end up with 250,000 instead of obligating 400,000 on the ground, we are not reducing our forces. We could, in effect, even be increasing them somewhat, could we not?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have no fixed idea about the right level of forces since, from the beginning, I was not wildly enthusiastic about the original level. But I do not want to leave you with the wrong idea. I was always in favor of reinforcing the blockade with air action if it was necessary to bring our enterprise to a conclusion, at whatever level of ground forces we had.

Chairman NUNN. All right. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, it is nice to see you again. I appreciate your appearing. Dr. Kissinger, later this week, perhaps as early as Thursday, the United Nations will provide another in a very long and historic series of resolutions, which will address the use of force and possibly designating some time frame in January as when that resolution will become effective.

Now, we have received a great deal of testimony with regard to the President exercising patience, patience within which time, hopefully, the sanctions can be successful. Yet, the resolution which is to be adopted on Thursday will incorporate the original resolution, number 660. This resolution demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all of its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

Is there any conflict, in your judgment, between the exercise of patience and the deliberate and repeated use of the word "immediate" in these resolutions?

Dr. KISSINGER. There is no doubt that the U.N. resolutions call for immediate withdrawal and, if I understand the counselling of patience, this addresses what we should do about it. My experience with U.N. resolutions would seem to indicate that when the deadline approaches, unless Saddam Hussein is very unskillful, we will be faced with the yet further decision of whether or not any progress has been made.

I find it hard to believe that the Iraqis will simply let that deadline go by without some maneuver. And that brings us right back to the question we are debating: has time run out? Is Saddam Hussein fulfilling the demands? I do not believe he will accept the resolution unconditionally, and I do not think he will reject it entirely either.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Kissinger, I happen to believe that the President has enunciated the goals for which we have deployed our forces very clearly and consistently.

And after a meeting with him and other leaders and members of the Congress at the White House, I made the statement to the effect that, upon his return, he will report to the people on his Gulf trip, and then we will have the action in the United Nations, which we are expecting later this week.

And then after that, the leadership of the Congress should determine, together with the President, the advisability of bringing Congress back—or not bringing Congress back—to address this issue. In my judgment, it seems that we should, as a legislative body, enunciate our goals. Hopefully, they will be consistent with those of the President.

But in any event, we should, at some time, and I think the earlier the better now, make very clear to the President, to the American people, what our goals are. Do you agree that we should first decide on goals and then begin to decide on the methods to achieve those goals?

Dr. KISSINGER. My impression is that there is substantial agreement as to goals. I noted that the Chairman, in his opening statement yesterday, endorsed the objectives of the President. It seems to me that the disagreement concerns the means to achieve these goals.

If there is disagreement, and I do not know whether or not it runs along party lines, it has to do with whether or not we should add to the U.N. goal the requirement that the Iraqi military capacity be brought into some sort of balance with that of its neighboring states.

After everything that has happened I believe that is a clear necessity. At any rate, if we could get a bipartisan response as to both the objectives and the means, I think that would be highly desirable.

Senator **Warner**. Well, the Chairman, of course, said we will address that perhaps later in this hearing. But in his statement yesterday, I think he made the allegation that there has been a fundamental shift in policy by the President. To me, that provides some inconsistency and we should address that at an appropriate time.

Chairman **Nunn**. I wonder if I could just clarify that. I think I made it clear what I said was not policy, but the military mission. As we heard this morning from both chairmen, the military mission is separate from the overall policy.

The policy includes economic, political and other goals. The military mission is specific. What I have said is, the President changed the military mission, but I have not said he changed the overall policy or objectives.

Senator **Warner**. Dr. Kissinger, in reviewing your statement, is it fair to say that you believe that U.S. goals in this present situation must include not only the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the reinstatement of a Kuwaiti government, and the release of hostages, but also the reduction of Iraq's military capabilities so as to promote stability and security in the region?

Am I correct that you believe this fourth goal is as important to the United States as are the other goals?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Correct. I do not believe, however, that it is necessary to destroy the Iraqi military capability totally, because we should keep in mind our experience with the Iran-Iraq war, and we should not tempt the neighbors of Iraq into rash ventures.

But I also believe that the reduction of Iraq's offensive military capability is essential in the light of all that has happened.

Senator **Warner**. And that's offensive military capability——

Dr. **Kissinger**. Correct.

Senator **Warner** [continuing]. Which we understand to mean not to eliminate completely, everything they have.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Correct.

Senator **Warner**. Now, if we cannot attain any one of these goals without resorting to the use of military force, should we forsake that goal as a nation rather than use military force to attain it?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, that is probably the way the issue will finally resolve itself. I mean, it will come down to a decision of this type. But it is very difficult to know, or to answer that in the abstract.

As a general proposition, I believe that if Iraq emerges out of this crisis in any way in which it can say it faced down the united world that had confronted it, then the effort would have failed. Moderate governments in the area would find themselves in the severest jeopardy, and a huge crisis down the road would be nearly certain.

It is very hard to define what that point is, unless we discuss specific terms. But I should think that, significantly, these objectives have to be reached.

Senator **Warner**. All of them?

Dr. **Kissinger**. All of them, though I consider the most important of those to be reducing the Iraqi military offensive capability. Only then might there be some latitude in other negotiations.

Senator **Warner**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Dr. Kissinger, I want to welcome you here and echo the words of the Chairman. We are just delighted you came to give us your thoughts and advice on what most of us feel is one of the most difficult policy matters that we have ever been involved in.

Mr. Chairman, I have had a chance to briefly thumb through Dr. Kissinger's prepared statement. He recited some of it. Has this document been accepted as part of the record?

Chairman NUNN. It will be without objection, and it will be placed after his opening remarks.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much. I did want to get that in before I referenced a question that I had with regard to statements made in his prepared statement on page 5.

Before I get into that, I suspect Dr. Kissinger, as I listened to the answer to the questions raised by Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, you know, about where we are going to go and how we are going to resolve this situation, I suspect that the best of all worlds would be if we could in some way get Saddam Hussein to remove all of his forces from all of Kuwait and then begin to move out our troops and others that are in there. Would not the best of all worlds be a United Nations force that would move in and take the place of the forces that are there now?

Dr. KISSINGER. After Saddam Hussein has withdrawn from Kuwait, yes, I think that that would be a desirable outcome.

Senator EXON. That is what I, as one Senator, have been hoping that we could achieve.

Dr. KISSINGER. Also, as I have repeatedly stated in public, I really do not believe we can keep substantial American forces in Saudi Arabia for an indefinite period of time. Therefore, I do not believe that a permanent American military establishment in Saudi Arabia can or should be part of the security arrangements of the area.

Senator EXON. Could you place a range on that phrase that we hear so often, "indefinite period of time"? In your view, is that 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, 24 months? What is the period of time that you think we can sustain those forces?

Dr. KISSINGER. Again, I am speaking as an outside observer for I do not have access to conversations that undoubtedly are taking place. I am nervous about the period that begins with Ramadan, the month of fasting. My nervousness increases with the beginning of the pilgrimages in June, when hundreds of thousands of outside visitors come into Saudi Arabia, and the government may fall under attack by radicals in the region as needing infidels to protect the holiest places of Islam. So these are the time limits I have in my mind emerging from the conditions in the region.

You gentlemen are in the position to judge the tolerance of the American public. And there is the third problem, which I am very nervous about, and that is having a very large American ground establishment in a region in which Iraqi forces are in the front of it, Iranian forces at the flank of it, and political instability all around it—because we could so easily become the subject of totally unpredictable events and become drawn into things that were not part of our original mission. So for all of these reasons, I would like to see our military presence concluded and its responsibilities, except perhaps for air and naval power, turned over to others.

Senator EXON. Let me pursue that point a little further, if I might, by quoting from your statement on page 5: "The United States is approaching the point in the Middle East crisis where a choice must be made between a course relying on sanctions or, as a last resort, a military course.

"The two approaches have been presented as if they were successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive, because by the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist."

To try to zero in on this a little bit, I suspect, then, you are telling us that you think that time frame is between now and when Ramadan begins. Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. More or less, yes. I could be swayed on this, but it is essentially the time frame I have in my mind.

Senator EXON. That fits in very well, then, with the January 15 proposal that the administration is attempting to get authorized by the United Nations, does it not?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. I agree with what the administration is attempting to do in this regard.

Senator EXON. Are you then saying that you do not believe that the sanctions can work beyond February 1?

Dr. KISSINGER. I, Senator, am heavily influenced by the American experience in the Korean and Vietnam negotiations. I do not exclude, in fact I regard it as highly probable, that around the time of the deadline of the U.N. resolution or shortly thereafter, Iraq will offer some sort of negotiation.

Then its strategy will be to drag us into a protracted process in which it can never be shown that success is impossible, but in which at the same time success can never quite be reached. Previous experience with American negotiations under such circumstances shows that a consensus will develop around the idea that the use of force is less and less credible, with greater resistance to any attempt to bring to bear military pressure, until we get ourselves into another vicious circle.

In other words, I do not believe that a clear-cut point will ever be reached at which we can tell whether sanctions are or are not working and if he is at all skillful, it will most certainly be Saddam Hussein's strategy to put us into that position.

Senator EXON. Just let me finish my first round with this question. I am somewhat confused, then, because if we were forced to make a decision between January 15 and February 15, then it would mean that we would likely be forced to take military action in that time frame because sanctions would not have been given time to work.

If your appraisal is an accurate one, which I am not saying it is not, then certainly on August 6, when the President made the announcement that he was moving in with defensive forces and would give the sanctions a time to choke off Saddam Hussein, certainly the administration could not have been very realistic to think that the sanctions could have worked between early August and January 15 or February 15, the time frame that we are talking about now.

Dr. **Kissinger**. I have been a strong supporter of the objectives of this administration, and of its diplomacy and general strategy. I have always believed, however, that there has been a reluctance to face the reality which I am seeking to describe here, namely that at some point sanctions and military operations will become alternatives to one another, and not successive phases of a single policy.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. That is what all of us are trying to figure out here, also.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. And we thank you for taking your time to share your views on the Persian Gulf crisis and our Nation's response.

I've had the opportunity to read several of your articles on our involvement in this crisis and I want to commend you on them. In your usual style you have been incisive and presented a realistic evaluation of the issue facing our Nation and the administration.

As I indicated yesterday I support the President's actions and hope that we can reach a diplomatic resolution of this difficult situation. However, as you pointed out in an August 19 article in the Washington Post, and I quote, "The ability to cause a worldwide economic crisis is not the sort of power to be left in the hands of a ruler who has attacked two of his six neighbors, is engaged in moral conflict with two others, and has used poison gas against his own distant population."

So one way or another we must force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. If sanctions do not have the desired effect, then another option should be considered. We cannot back away from that reality.

Dr. Kissinger, it appears that the administration will get an agreement through the Security Council which will authorize offensive action if Saddam Hussein does not pull out of Kuwait by a specified date. How will this resolution be seen by the Arab nations and will the resolution be sufficient to ensure the participation of the Arabs in any offensive action against Iraq?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, one has to ask, which Arabs. I believe that President Assad of Syria does not need a U.N. resolution to be encouraged to take offensive action against Iraq because he considers Iraq and Saddam Hussein his mortal enemies.

Saudi Arabia and all these Arab nations will maneuver to avoid the charge that they are engaged in aggressive action. I think Saudi Arabia will support us and that in the end Egypt will support us, no matter what is being said right now, because the Arabs do not yet know whether we will act at all, and they do not want to give us a commitment to a course of action which we may not take ourselves. So I do suppose we will have some key Arab countries supporting us.

I only say that this is my impression. I have not actually talked to any of them.

Senator **Thurmond**. Whether we have a diplomatic or military resolution to the crisis, what road do you see for the United States in the Middle East?

Dr. **Kissinger**. We have to take into account the medium-range future and the long-range future. From the long-term point of view, we are in a transitional period. I would think that over a period of 10 years, many of the security responsibilities that the United States is now shouldering in the Gulf ought to be carried by the Europeans who receive a larger share of the oil from the region.

But we are still caught in a period in which we still have a postwar, global role and the military force capable of exercising it. So over a 10-year period I would think the balance of responsibilities must shift. But in the interim, the United States remains the key stabilizing factor in the area. It is the one country that can promote negotiations so its credibility is of the greatest consequence. Therefore, the outcome of this crisis for the next 5 years is of the greatest consequence for peace in the Middle East and, in the long term, for peace for us.

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Kissinger, although we're all concerned over the political impact, and the outcome this crisis will have on the United States, I expect it will also have an impact on the United Nations. If Saddam Hussein can stand up to the embargo and the Security Council resolutions, what message will this send the world with regard to the United Nations' influence in the post-Cold War world?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Of course, its most immediate impact would be in the Middle East itself, but I believe that all the moderate governments that joined in the U.N. action would be under tremendous strain and either become overthrown or shaped in a more radical direction. And any nation with a powerful neighbor that might have need to rely on United Nations support would clearly be discouraged, so, to the extent that the United Nations is a stabilizing influence, it would be weakened.

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Kissinger, it appears to me that several countries, among them Japan, have greater economic stake in this crisis than the United States, yet their contribution is minimal. Should the administration demand a greater financial if not military contribution from these countries?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I think one lesson of this crisis is that the time to make demands is before you make your commitment, because afterwards your bargaining position is not as great as it might be. In an ideal world, the other nations should be making a greater contribution than they are. Regrettably, many of them are figuring that we are now already so deeply committed, whether or not they make a contribution, we have no other choice but to proceed. And they are probably right.

I am not saying that they are morally right; rather that they are right in practical terms.

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Kissinger, how concerned should the United States be with regard to an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I have seen the conflicting statements as to the imminence of a nuclear weapons capability. I would think that the acquisition by Iraq of nuclear weapons in addition to chemical weapons and Saddam's demonstrated ruthlessness in using force would give Iraq an increasingly dominant position in the area.

If they had not taken Kuwait, if they had not taken 10,000 hostages, if there were not a record of using poison gas against their own people, I would not have said 6 months ago that the Iraqi nuclear capability justified American military deployment in the area. But now that we are there, to leave without having dealt with the problem and with the certainty that we cannot, or at least should not, return very soon, seems to me quite another issue.

But now that we are where we are, now that there have been thousands of hostages from nations all over the world, I feel that the opportunity should be taken to restore the balance of offensive capabilities in the area.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, my last question. The fact that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait shows that he's not concerned about the diplomatic consequences of his actions. If my evaluation is correct, why should we place much credibility on a diplomatic solution to this crisis?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think we can. I would not trust a solution that depends on Saddam Hussein's word, so one must judge any so-called diplomatic solution by the enforcement guarantees that accompany it. It cannot be grounded on the unsupported word of the Iraqi leader.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, I do want to join in welcoming Dr. Kissinger to the committee. Dr. Kissinger, if I understand your positions: one, you believe that sanctions will not work, and if they begin to cut in, the various countries in the area will make their own deal; two, even if they do work, they are not going to deal with the chemical and nuclear capability of Iraq; and third, if there are efforts of negotiations, given your own kind of experience, if Saddam Hussein is a clever politician and I think all of us grant that he is at least clever and wilely and cunning, that negotiations will basically undermine our will to involve ourselves in conflict.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would be delighted to be proven wrong in any of those assumptions.

Senator KENNEDY. All right, but that assumption, I do not think you can get away from the basic premise, that you are advocating that the United States go to war, and go to war soon with massive kinds of air intervention.

If these are the points of reference, and whatever is done has to be done before Ramadan which is in the middle of March next year, and if you take Dr. Schlesinger's estimates that any kind of war might last up to 3 to 4 months, I do not see how you can reach any other conclusion to the kind of testimony you are giving here today.

Dr. KISSINGER. I am prepared, I think we should give sanctions——

Senator KENNEDY. You said yourself, even you give them the chance——

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Up to the absolute limit. But if you ask for my evaluation of what is likely to be the case, I do not believe we can maintain 400,000 troops there much beyond the spring of next year, and therefore our overall position will be influenced. Yes, we will be driven to that decision.

Now, though I agree with the fundamental statement that has been made—that an initially smaller deployment might have given us more staying power—that is not where we are now, and I am assessing the situation in terms of where we are now.

Second, I have never advocated a massive air attack, and I really have great difficulty understanding the position of so many of our military leaders who for decades have been asking for discriminating capabilities. If there is military action, it should consist of the selective destruction of specific military targets relevant to the military capability of Iraq. That would speed up the process of sanctions and could restore the offensive balance in the area. I do not have in mind an all out, massive population attack.

Senator **Kennedy**. All right, we will accept that, but we have to recognize that in World War II against Germany, where we had air superiority for 3 years and it ended up in a ground war. It was true we had air superiority over Japan and it was a ground war; air superiority in Korea, and it was ground war; air superiority for 15 years in Vietnam and a ground war.

So in every past recent history, where we have had air superiority, it has ended up in a ground war. Yet you believe that a ground war might be avoided now.

Let me just come to this point. You talk about no massive air strikes. We had surgical strikes in North Vietnam, as you are familiar with—52,000 civilians killed in surgical strikes in North Vietnam.

Now what is your assessment of the political impact that that will have on our public opinion, when we find out that the casualties that are going to be experienced over there are going to be overwhelmingly Arab if we go into the kind of surgical strikes, even as we had in the Vietnam period which turned out to be unsuccessful?

Dr. **Kissinger**. First of all, with respect to your first point, Senator Kennedy, if it is true that any kind of pressure must eventually lead to a ground war, then that would also be true of sanctions because, to me at least, it does not make much sense to say that an air attack cannot succeed because it must be followed by ground attacks, but that sanctions could succeed without a subsequent ground attack because the end result is supposed to be the same.

Now with the surgical strike—unfortunately it is a term I coined, and which I regret having used—the basic point is that it was presented not as an alternative to sanctions but as an alternative to large ground operations.

I also think that in Iraq the problem is different than it has been elsewhere. What we need is something that would speed up the process of sanctions if we conclude that sanctions are not going to work.

Senator **Kennedy**. And you believe that is conflict and war?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Probably. I would not have put this many troops in to begin with, but they are there now and I think our national interest is at stake.

Senator **Kennedy**. Earlier, we had Admiral Crowe who talked about, when he was asked about the casualties that might be experienced, he referenced the experience of Israel in their past wars in the deserts. You were obviously in office in the last Middle East conflict in the 1973 war in which Israel suffered over 11,000 casualties in 20 days with approximately the same 300,000 that we are facing with Saddam Hussein.

That war involved both air and obviously ground forces. The best estimate in terms of the casualties and who is going to bear them is 90 percent. Dr. Schlesinger said it and it has not been disputed by others, depending upon the ground strategy.

Now if you give 11,000 casualties in 20 days, the overwhelming portion of them Americans, Dr. Schlesinger talked about 3 months, you are getting up now into 30,000 to 35,000, overwhelming American casualties. You balance that against what we had this morning from Admiral Crowe who says, "I am persuaded that U.S. initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited and further polarize the Arab world."

Then he continued, "I sense more nervousness among our allies about our impetuousness rather than our patience." Now do you not think it is wise that we move along the line of trying to give at least these sanctions a reasonable period of time with the ultimate option of reaching alternative means if that comes into becoming a necessity?

Dr. **Kissinger**. The deadlines that I gave, Senator, were arbitrary. There must certainly be people out there in much better positions than I to determine for how long we can sustain our deployment in the desert without war, and for how long we can retain the military option while sanctions are operating.

Certainly I favor the maximum period of time. When that point is reached, whenever that is, the President will have to weigh what you just put forward, and he will have to weigh it against the consequences of a collapse of all moderate regimes and another war 2-3 years down the road in which we will have lost many of our supporters and in which we may then be involved under worse circumstances and with heavier casualties. That, really, is the equation the President will have to draw.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you, Doctor, my time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Cohen?

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, we had testimony from two former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a number of the members were surprised, I might say even astonished at the scope and strength of the convictions that were expressed by both of those gentlemen.

I have read a book written by a former National Security Advisor who said that: "High military officers must always strike a balance between their convictions and their knowledge that to be effective they must survive to fight another day. Their innate awe of the commander-in-chief tempts them to find a military reason for what they consider barely tolerable, and contrary to some of the public methodology, rather than challenge the commander-in-chief, they seek excuses to support, not to oppose him."

That has been apparently your experience when you were serving in that capacity.

Dr. **Kissinger**. It is a well written passage.

Senator **Cohen**. I am sorry, it is a relevant passage?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I compliment the author.

Senator **Cohen**. I thought you would recognize your own words in that, and the reason I raise this is because some of this panel question the testimony coming from our two former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that sanctions should be pursued for at least another year, possibly 18 months. Questions have risen, if not vocally, at least privately, "What kind of military advice is the President getting?"

Is it your experience that if the President makes it clear that he would like to seek a military option, that his military advisors, including the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman are inclined to support that even if they have doubts?

Dr. **Kissinger**. That is certainly one of the pressures on them but I think, at least since Vietnam, yet another pressure on the military is to be sure to be in a position that if anything goes wrong, it can never be accused of not having asked for enough, shifting the responsibility for any conceivable failure on to the political leadership. It is my impression, as an outsider, that when the President said he wanted to defend Saudi Arabia, he was told that if he wanted to do it, he should not do it in a half-baked way; and that every conceivable contingency that might occur was taken into account, and that in the process we were brought into a situation which may present itself as a defensive one, but in which the dividing line between offensive and defensive operation was eroded from the very beginning.

Nor do I fully agree with the Chairman's distinction, though it is based on what has been publicly said, because I think once we put the large initial forces in, there was no exit but to prevail. And I further believe that its origin was that the military did not want to be accused again of having followed too slavishly a political instruction.

Senator **Cohen**. Secretary Kissinger——

Dr. **Kissinger**. But you can get better testimony than mine on this, and it is of course difficult to testify without a single administration spokesman here who can speak authoritatively.

Senator **Cohen**. If the United Nations were to grant the use of force to the United States, and the President were to come before the Congress to seek the same authority, and Congress should come to the conclusion based upon testimony presented to this Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, that sanctions should be pursued for another 18 months and declines to authorize a specific use of force at this time, what would be the consequences in your mind?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, naturally, I do not think the President should go before the Congress to ask for such a grant unless he is sure that he can get authority. Because the refusal by Congress of a public request by the President for this authority would lead to an American debacle in the Gulf.

No one could be sure that at the end of 18 months the same procedure might not be repeated; and long before those 18 months were over, we would be in a position of having to negotiate the exit of our forces with a new government.

Senator **Cohen**. Can I reverse that then? Should the President make a determination as to whether he has the support of Congress first before going to the United Nations or do you have a reverse debacle take place, in which the U.N. authorizes the use of U.S. troops fighting in the desert but Congress says no?

Should the President find out first whether he has the support here before going to the U.N.?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the President should make quite sure that he has congressional support before he goes very far down the road toward military conflict. Whether he should do that by going to a joint session or by informal consultation, is for better experts than I to assess.

Senator COHEN. Admiral Crowe indicated that Saddam Hussein is seeking a face saving way out of the mess that he has created in Kuwait, and he indicated for example he had considerable experience in dealing with Arab nations. He spent some time in Bahrain, and believes that the Arab world feels that Saddam Hussein is trying to find a "face saving way out."

You have written that saving Iraq's face is exactly the opposite of what is needed, that it would enable Hussein to claim some gain from his aggression, while the goal of Gulf strategy has to be to demonstrate its failure.

Dr. KISSINGER. It depends. You see, it is easy to throw all these slogans of a face-saving formula around. But if a face-saving formula is one that permits Saddam Hussein to claim success from his actions, and if he can make a plausible case for it, then he can also claim to have faced down not just the United States, but the whole United Nations structure.

Are there other possible actions that would possess another set of adjectives other than "face-saving?" I would have to hear what they are, and I would be glad to give my opinion on each of them individually.

Senator COHEN. I believe you have also written in the past that any agreement which provides, allows both sides to claim victory is a success.

Dr. KISSINGER. In the abstract that is true. But when a nation has annexed a neighbor, expelled half its citizens, looted the country, taken 10,000 international hostages without penalty and without adequate outcry, and then comes out of it claiming a victory, I cannot say I would apply that rule to it.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. At this point we have said we will take a 5 minute break and we will come back here promptly at 2:05, when Senator Bingaman will be recognized.

[Recess.]

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order. We will recognize Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, let me follow up on some earlier questions that were asked. I understand, let me first clarify my understanding of your testimony.

You indicated that in your view we cannot maintain a troop level of 400,000 or so in that range, much past next spring, and that given we will be driven to essentially pursue a military option at that time or sometime between now and then. Is that accurate so far?

I guess my question is whether, we have 230,000 troops there now, as I understand it, or something in that range. If the President were to determine to keep the troop level more in that range, rather than at the 400,000 plus range, does that give us additional options and give us more time to pursue other options and take the pressure off of us to pursue a military option or do you not believe that that would be the case?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think that after announcing a higher level one has to weigh the consequences of announcing a lower level so soon after and that is what would influence my decision.

The second point is that there seems to be an assumption in the previous testimony here that within 12 to 18 months the sanctions will work. That in itself requires careful examination. I am not sure that that is true.

I do not know that it is not true, but at the same time I have not seen any evidence that it is. And one has to consider how long it will be possible to maintain this economic blockade on the present broad basis. Past history would indicate that it will not be possible indefinitely.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me bring you back to the question that I was, and I understand the point you made that it would be an embarrassment or difficult to explain a reversal of the decision to go to a higher troop level——

Dr. KISSINGER. More than an embarrassment, it would probably undermine our strategic and political position at this time.

Senator BINGAMAN. But if in fact a decision of that type were taken and we kept our troop strength at the lower level, would that in fact give us more opportunity to let sanctions work and more opportunity to pursue other options and take the pressure off of us to pursue this military solution?

Dr. KISSINGER. In the end, one of the reasons for the deployment is the threat of a credible military option, as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out yesterday. So again one would have to weigh the perhaps greater sustainability with the reduced threat against Saddam Hussein.

I believe in an article of August 19, which was quoted here, I said that the Rubicon was crossed when we put in 250,000 troops. That was my view then, and that is my view now. I do not see such a huge difference between the sustainability of 250,000 and 400,000.

Senator BINGAMAN. So you think even at the level that the President had committed to, the level of troop strength the President committed the country to before November 8, we were in a position where we would be forced to pursue a military option sometime this next spring, if not sooner?

Dr. KISSINGER. Probably.

Senator BINGAMAN. You also said that now that we are there, we should pursue action to, and I think these are the words you used, restore the balance of offensive capabilities in the area.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator BINGAMAN. Now I understand that with regard to the military threat that Saddam Hussein may pose in the future. I guess my question is, would that also apply to the nonmilitary, the conventional military capability which he has amassed and which he maintains in a million man army? Are you suggesting that part of what we have to accomplish in order to succeed in this enterprise is a drastic reduction in the level of his military forces?

Dr. **Kissinger**. No, I am talking primarily about nuclear, chemical and biological capability and perhaps the offensive missile forces.

Senator **Bingaman**. So if we were to deal with the nuclear, the chemical, the biological and the missile capability, you think that would be adequate?

Dr. **Kissinger**. That would meet the objectives as I have outlined them in my mind.

Senator **Bingaman**. Okay. This morning, Admiral Crowe made the statement that he believes Saddam Hussein's action in invading Kuwait had legitimized a long-term military presence by the United States in the Middle East. I believe that was the statement he made.

Your statements seem to contradict that or take a different view as I understand it. You take the view that the United States cannot maintain a large permanent capability, at least in Saudi Arabia.

What is your, maybe you can elaborate on what you think the long-term presence is——

Dr. **Kissinger**. I support the Carter Doctrine, as reiterated by President Reagan and again by President Bush; that the domination of the Gulf by a hostile outside power affects vital American interests. So I would support a naval presence and perhaps even a small air presence.

I believe that a substantial ground presence in the region makes us hostage to unpredictable political developments and may wind up with us as physical hostages as well. I think it will create more psychological and political problems than it solves, and I do not favor a security system that depends on American ground forces to maintain it.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you very much, my time has expired.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator McCain?

Senator **McCain**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us this afternoon.

It is always an enlightening experience.

First of all, as far as the issue of what Congress should do, I am of the view, Dr. Kissinger, that if Congress does not support the President, for example, in the fashion of the United Nations resolution, which, I understand, is about to be passed, then I think the American people should know that right away. I don't think there is any reason for delay and confusion to the point where perhaps action is contemplated and then we find out that it would not be supported by the Congress and the American people.

I think it would be very relevant if Congress came back into session and voted on this issue some time in the near future, so that we can be sure. And if the Congress chooses, as some of my friends on the other side of the aisle, to say that military action is not called for, then so be it. But I think the worst of all worlds is for the President to contemplate a course of action for which he cannot gain Congressional support.

One of the things I regret more than anything else is, whenever we hear there is a chance of conflict or the possibility of a conflict, we always revisit the Vietnam War as some sort of role model. In fact, the model of the Vietnam War is exactly what not to do in the conduct of war, including actions on the part of Congress.

But to say that there was, "52,000 casualties in the surgical strikes of North Vietnam" is just darn foolishness. The fact is, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, that, in 1972, for the first time, there was significant bombing, which was not constrained by either Congressional or Presidential mandate, which virtually brought that nation to its knees, with a minimum of casualties, despite the hue and cry over one bomb that hit one hospital, and which seemed to be the biggest attack in the history of warfare, and which still angers me. The Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese themselves have stated that there were minimum casualties in the Christmas 1972 bombing raids. And to purvey the idea is that somehow air power failed in Vietnam because air power was not capable certainly is an insult to the experience and intelligence of those of us who served there.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you just yield for one second?

Senator MCCAIN. I would not yield, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Since I was the one to use the figures, as a point of personal privilege, I would like to say that that figure was provided to me by a former Chairman of the National Security Council. I just wanted to have that on the record.

Chairman NUNN. That will not come out of your time, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, isn't it true that the reason why the North Vietnamese came back to the bargaining table in Christmas 1972 was because they were virtually brought to their knees by the bombing of North Vietnam?

Dr. KISSINGER. They certainly agreed after the bombing to things which they had not agreed to before and were very eager to settle. Yes, I believe they were brought back to the bargaining table.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that 52,000 casualties over a seven or eight year period is some kind of exorbitant number of casualties?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have no independent knowledge of that figure one way or the other, although it sounds credible to me.

However, it is you gentlemen, more than I, who must have been briefed for years about the smart bombs we are developing, and the capacity for selective bombing. Certainly every time people wanted my support for the military budget, they make a point of explaining how conventional, discriminating, bombing could stop the Soviets in Europe.

So why should it not work in an area where there is relatively little air defense and relatively few targets needed to fulfill the criteria I have established? I just do not accept the proposition. Either a lot of money has been spent for nothing, or we really do have the capability that has been the subject of briefings which you gentlemen must have heard more of than I.

Senator MCCAIN. Clearly, Dr. Kissinger, I agree with you. We have the capability to carry out not "surgical" strikes, but strikes which would be concentrated on military, air defense, command

and control and communications, which I think would go a long, long way in carrying out the mission which we seek.

Both witnesses, Dr. Kissinger, in the last day have said that Saddam Hussein has "showed willingness" showed willingness to negotiate.

Do you have any indication of that?

Dr. KISSINGER. All I know is what people like the Soviet envoy, Primakov, have been saying. If I understood his position correctly, it is that Saddam Hussein would at some point say that he is willing in principle to withdraw from Kuwait; that at that point a side deal is made in which the Arab nations take the responsibility for turning over to him the two islands and maybe the Ramallah oil field; that then the United States withdraws, and the Arab nations turn the islands over to him, rather than the United States doing it.

To me, that would mean that Saddam had achieved significant progress at the end of a period that brought 400,000 Americans into the area, in which thousands of hostages from all over the world were taken, people with no conceivable relationship to their governments, and certainly with no conceivable relationship to what was going on, and that he got away with it.

I think that would have disastrous consequences to the stability of the area.

These are the only examples of willingness to negotiate that I know about, unless there are others that have not been revealed. But I am not sure whether the other witnesses would know them any better than I do.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, in light of your concerns about the size of the U.S. military buildup, do you think that, conceivably, part of our reaction could be to the sizable increase in troop strength and tanks that the Iraqis have moved into Kuwait? My understanding is that they have gone up to about 250,000 people, with about 3,500 tanks in the area.

Dr. KISSINGER. I know this is not exactly your question, but with every passing month Iraq is changing both the demographics and the reality of Kuwait. They have already stripped the country of all movable equipment. They have thrown out about half of what were technically Kuwaiti citizens, and have moved in hundreds of thousands of their own people.

I understand why the President moved in the troops. But my argument has been from the beginning that one cannot combine the benefits of every course of action. If one goes down a certain road, at some point one has to face the consequences which that road implies.

The more forces we have over there, the greater our threat to Saddam and the shorter our staying power. That is a fact of life. I don't say this as a criticism. For I see the arguments that have brought the President to this point.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I believe that Senator Dixon is next.

Senator DIXON. Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for your very valuable contributions to the deliberations of this Committee. Very early in your remarks, not your prepared text, but your earlier, extemporaneous remarks—and I am going to paraphrase this; if I am not entirely accurate, I know you will correct me—you said something like this: that, while you felt the embargo and the sanctions were taking some effect, you did not see a case in which Saddam Hussein would eventually send the President a note and say okay, I give up, I'm getting out; that you thought ultimately that would have to be resolved through negotiations.

Now I think that is a fair characterization of what you said.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct. It is a fair statement.

Senator DIXON. I agree with you entirely.

Now, here is what bothers this Senator, and I talked about it yesterday in the course of my discussions with Dr. Schlesinger.

The administration takes the position that they will not talk as long as Saddam Hussein is in Kuwait. He has a face-saving problem, I take it, about that position by the President.

It occurs to me that the United States of America, the one great superpower in the world today, in my view, is there in great force. We're dominant in the air without question. I'm sure you'll agree. We're dominant in the sea without question. I'm sure you will agree. We are going to be there in tremendous numbers with all of this technological advantage, the optical advantage for night warfare and other things. We are powerful, and we are there with power.

I ask you, sir, as one of the great negotiators of our time, why we cannot somehow find a way to begin talks to resolve this situation short of war, given those facts?

Dr. KISSINGER. You certainly know how to get to me, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator DIXON. I'm trying, Dr. Kissinger, I'm trying.

Dr. KISSINGER. You know, if one studies almost every conflict in which the United States has been involved, there is always a period during which talk seems to become its own objective, the negotiations taking on a sort of life of their own, like some detective story to which all the clues are out there and you have to go and find them.

In my experience with negotiations, however, you usually know whether the other side is willing to settle. You may then have a miserably tough negotiation in coming to an agreement.

In this case, I don't see that any framework for a negotiation exists. If a framework with a plausible outcome could be created, even if we have not yet agreed on what it is, I could understand a negotiation. But to send somebody to Baghdad or Geneva to initiate a discussion with Iraq would, in my view, start a panic in all the other Arab countries that are associated with us and we would learn very little.

They can send us a message through so many channels that would enable the President to judge whether or not there is any utility in pursuing it.

Senator DIXON. And could not talented men like you, with your vast experience, and others similarly situated be in a position to discover that in a variety of ways? I suggest to you, sir, that the problem we have here is that so many witnesses talk about the two alternatives, you know, patience and the embargo and sanctions with our strength, and then the suggestion from you and others, which I think is either expressed or implied often, that, in the end, that probably won't quite do it, or war.

I suggest to you that there is this other alternative and that talented people, who are good negotiators, could find that opportunity somehow if we sought it.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think that for somebody to appoint himself a free-lance negotiator, unasked by the administration——

Senator DIXON. Oh, I don't ask you to do that.

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Would only confuse the issue. I am very uneasy about some of the leading figures from Britain, Japan, and Germany who have gone to Baghdad to negotiate on their own. I think that can only strengthen the determination of Saddam, and it gives him a way to use the hostages which I find revolting.

But you have not suggested that one talk about hostages. You have suggested one talk about peace.

Senator DIXON. I have suggested that one explore in the world community in a variety of ways that would best be known to people of the expertise of our witness here how we develop the opportunity for talks, given the fact that we are there in strength.

You see, it does not impress me that it is a sign of weakness for us to try to resolve this conflict by negotiations in view of the fact that the whole world knows that we are the power in the region. I see nothing about that that bothers this Senator. You know, when you are in a position of strength, I see nothing the matter through common sense to find a method of discussing through the artful powers of communication a way to resolve this problem, short of war.

Dr. KISSINGER. Short of war and compatible with the fundamental objectives on which I think everybody here has agreed.

Senator DIXON. Of course. Yes, positively.

Dr. KISSINGER. If it can be done, that would surely be preferable to war.

It is not evident to me from what I have read and heard that such a framework exists right now.

Senator DIXON. Are you of the opinion the administration is seeking that framework in some way?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am of the view that nothing would please the President more than an honorable way out of this crisis, but that he would define "honorable" as that which is compatible with the U.N. objectives.

Senator DIXON. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

I don't want to interrupt anyone, but we have approximately 30 minutes and we have at least 6 or 7 more Senators with 6 minutes each. So the arithmetic doesn't work unless everyone sticks exactly to the time and we get perhaps 5 minutes of grace from Secretary Kissinger.

Senator Gorton.

Senator GORTON. Dr. Kissinger, you very kindly abbreviated your written statement in order that more of us be able to have questions.

I have read it. I don't know that it has been totally outlined by any speaker here. I think it included five or six points which I would like to paraphrase and see whether or not I am getting the message that you want to leave with us.

First: dependence on both sanctions and military action after an extended period of time are not only not consistent but are mutually inconsistent as a course of action to follow.

Second: sanctions, standing alone, are unlikely to gain our objectives if we include in those objectives the end of both the desire and the capacity on the part of Iraq to dominate the Middle East region.

Dr. KISSINGER. That point is not correct. That was Mr. Schlesinger's point. It is not mine.

Senator GORTON. Do you think that sanctions might regain the goal of removing their ability to dominate the Middle East?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would like to believe what so many here believe, namely that the sanctions will work. Realistically however, I am of the opinion that the furthest sanctions will get us is to the opening of negotiations, but that we will not even gain a full withdrawal from Kuwait through negotiations without at least the threat of military pressure.

Senator GORTON. That is the way I understood what you said, that the most we can get from sanctions is negotiations and a partial withdrawal.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator GORTON. Next: the military option is not going to last as a practical matter indefinitely, or perhaps even past next spring, because of internal conditions in the Middle East itself.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct, and maybe internal conditions here.

Senator GORTON. Yes.

Next: any diplomatic solution almost by definition will leave Iraq as the dominant power in the Middle East and will undermine moderate regimes in that area.

Dr. KISSINGER. Unless the diplomatic solution includes a concept of arms control that reduces Iraq's offensive capability.

Senator GORTON. Next: an attempt to parallel the Middle East to Western Europe and to Korea is erroneous; we cannot keep large numbers of troops there for an extended period of time; cultural and religious differences between Saudi Arabia and the Middle East and even Korea simply make that a totally invalid comparison.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator GORTON. Next: if we must pursue military goals, those goals should be limited, that is to say, they should not attempt to destroy Iraq as a society, and the means by which we attempt to gain those limited military goals must in themselves be limited and relatively low cost, i.e., not major tank and infantry attacks across a fortified border.

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely correct.

Senator GORTON. Thank you.

Now, for a question. Do you believe that the course of action being followed by the United States in the United Nations and similar authority from Congress and a deadline date would increase or decrease the chances of our being successful without the use of force; that is to say that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to back down in the way in which we wish him to back down unless he sees no alternative to that other than that or a military defeat?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the course of action we have followed so far is the one most likely to cause him to back down, provided we understand its implications, one of which is a foreshortened time span.

Senator GORTON. I think that is about 6 minutes, Mr. Chairman. I have the answer that I wanted, so I thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton.

Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Kissinger, it is a great pleasure to have you here today. I have enjoyed listening to your statement.

You have made the point that if we continue the policy of sanctions on the assumption that the military option can then be employed at a later time, we may find the military option will disappear after a certain number of months.

That is the most powerful point that I hear you making. There are many others that you make as well.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is my view.

I really would like to make one general observation, which is this.

We are discussing a very anguishing problem to which nobody really knows the answer. And we are all operating on the basis of assessments we cannot exactly prove correct. It is the President's problem, it is the problem of this committee, and it is my problem.

So, no matter how dogmatic I may sound, what I say should be taken in the context of our talking here for everybody, of "51–49" types of decisions.

Senator GORE. I respect that. The President is in the same position. Everybody in our country is trying to see a way through to a successful conclusion to this matter.

One of the reasons it has been so dangerous from the beginning is that it has been extremely difficult to look into the future and see a successful resolution of it.

But I want to explore with you your reasoning on this central point, what I take to be a central point of your statement here.

I will refer to the prepared text that you gave us, and it is consistent with what you have said orally.

You support your assertion that a military option will fade the longer we pursue the sanctions policy with several assertions. The sanctions have to bite, and you question whether they will. They have to be maintained throughout any negotiations. The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically, diplomatically, during the entire course of the negotiations, and there must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

Now, when I boil those assertions down to their essence, what I think you are really saying—and correct me if I am wrong—is that you believe the military option will disappear because during the time we are waiting for the sanctions to work, something will happen. Circumstances will change and the coalition will fall apart. Resentment within Saudi Arabia will build, there will be a new aggressive tone to the Intifada that will poison the relations between the Arab world and the United States.

Dr. KISSINGER. Any number of things.

Senator GORE. Any number of things.

Dr. KISSINGER. Plus the fact that many countries will become less and less willing to support the sanctions themselves and will begin trading again with Iraq; plus the fact that Kuwait will by then be so *de facto* incorporated that the demand for its liberation will no longer make any sense.

These are all factors that contribute to my judgment.

Senator GORE. All right. But, basically, what you are saying is that you think that the risk of continuing the policy of sanctions is too high.

Dr. KISSINGER. Especially after the statements that have been made and the deployments that have been undertaken.

Senator GORE. What do you mean, "especially after the statements that have been made?"

Dr. KISSINGER. Because there is no way now that we can sustain this effort. In my view we will have to start withdrawing troops if we are going to go into a long siege.

Senator GORE. All right. But that, it seems to me, is a different argument.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is a subsidiary argument.

Senator GORE. Yes. I agree with those who have said that this is not Vietnam and it's not World War I. It's not any previous war. It is a conflict unique in our history.

There are some parallels with past conflicts. One of the lessons of Vietnam, for example, that I think does apply is that the Congress should be involved and we should respect the fact that domestic consensus is itself a strategic asset.

Another lesson is that we shouldn't launch an offensive move only because our forces are there.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree.

Senator GORE. It seems to me that to argue that because we have deployed, we then have to use the forces in a particular way is an unwise argument. You use that as a subsidiary argument and I am uncomfortable with that.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, no. I am assuming the forces are there because there was an underlying strategy to putting them there. To abandon that strategy now is different from never having adopted the strategy in the first place.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gore, if we are going to complete one round of questions, I am going to have to interrupt because otherwise somebody will get left out altogether. I hate to interrupt. I know you have a line of questioning going. Perhaps we will have time to get back to it.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I just have one question in the interest of time. It may require somewhat of a lengthy answer and it is a little bit of a lengthy question.

We talked earlier here about and have discussed for two days now the consequences of U.S. engagement in an armed conflict in terms of relations within the Arab world, post-conflict relations, the perception of the United States and so forth, and U.S. casualties and the direct impact there.

But I wonder if you would elaborate on your answer to Senator Kennedy in terms of consequences to the United States and to the world if we do not engage in armed conflict, if we do end up in some type of protracted negotiations in which Iraq is perceived to be somewhat of a winner, and if their military remains intact.

What are we looking at 3 years, 5 years, 10 years out in terms of consequences to the world, the United States, and potential casualties?

Dr. KISSINGER. Incidentally, I want to say to Senator Gore that I am not arguing we should use the forces simply because they are there. I am really addressing the question which you put, Senator Coats, namely what are the consequences of our withdrawing these forces without having achieved the objectives that were enunciated by the United Nations, as well as the arms control objectives which I believe are necessary?

First of all, I don't believe that there can be a very orderly withdrawal under these circumstances because at some point radical governments will emerge in certain of the Arab countries presently allied to us, or even among some of the governments now in power, which will surely try to burnish their credentials by accelerating our withdrawal once it is clear we cannot achieve our objectives.

I believe that radical governments or policies would then emerge in many of the countries now associated with us.

This would lead, first of all, to a much larger share of the oil revenues of the region going to Iraq, which would accelerate its capacity for a military buildup and the threat to its neighbors.

This will, sooner or later—and I think sooner, in fact, very soon—lead to a high possibility of conflict between the remaining moderate Arab nations and the radical nations, as well as the near certainty of an Arab-Israeli conflict in which there is a high possibility that this time nuclear weapons might be involved. If we recall that in every previous one the United States got itself into a confrontation with various other nations, I think we could find ourselves in an extremely uncomfortable position in a very brief period of time.

Senator COATS. And you would define that brief period of time as what?

Dr. KISSINGER. You know, it is hard to predict. I would think less than 5 years. Perhaps 2 to 3 years.

Senator COATS. And would it be possible for the United States not then to intervene in such a situation? I assume we're talking about massive destruction of the world oil supply or prices.

Dr. KISSINGER. We faced an oil embargo during the last conflict in the region, when some Arab nations were still fairly sympathetic to us. Under the scenario that I have outlined, we could find a massive disruption of oil supplies and some very difficult choices with respect to friendly governments.

Senator COATS. Israel being one.

Dr. KISSINGER. Israel being one.

Senator COATS. And Saudi Arabia being another.

Dr. KISSINGER. Saudi Arabia and maybe Egypt.

Senator COATS. How do you compare that potential consequence and casualties that might result with the consequences and casualties of a limited attack, such as you described now, to deal with this situation?

Dr. KISSINGER. If I were not convinced that there is a high probability of this, I would never say anything that would support the possibility of military action.

Senator COATS. And you are convinced that it is a high probability?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is my conviction.

Senator COATS. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Coats.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger, we all respect your opinions and, although you might not be getting all the intelligence briefings every day, your knowledge of the world is very important to us here on the committee.

Dr. Kissinger, what real options, just in a nutshell and just in a minute, does the President of the United States have here, if we accept your basic testimony that, as I understand it, long-term options and long-term military commitments over there are basically a contradiction in terms?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, as I have indicated, back in August I probably would have recommended a different strategy than the one that was adopted, although I respect the President's courage in adopting it and I strongly support his objectives.

Now that we are down this road, the ideal would be if a united country helped him create the impression that he is prepared to go and do what he has said repeatedly he would do. I think that is most likely to generate a negotiation. Then we can have a debate on whether the terms of the negotiation are adequate for us to step back from where we are.

We are in danger of sliding into a position where we get neither the benefit of a blockade policy nor the benefit of the buildup we have undertaken and which was, after all, undertaken without anybody's public opposition, including mine.

Senator SHELBY. How important is it—we know it is important, but on a scale of one to ten, how important is public opinion of the American people, the backing of the President on the Gulf and his policy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Oh, I think it is extremely important. Obviously everybody has a responsibility toward that.

Senator SHELBY. Do you believe that the President of the United States, President Bush, has properly—"properly" is not the word—has adequately communicated to the American people why we are there, what his options are, in a satisfactory way?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, he is caught in the usual dilemma of a chief executive; that if he spells it out too precisely, he may give away what he is planning to do.

I think at some point well before the deadline of January 15 he will have to explain not just why resisting aggression is important but why resisting this aggression at this place is important to the national interests of the United States.

I am convinced that he will do this, and I think that he has handled the crisis with courage and skill.

Senator **SHELBY**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Shelby. Senator Glenn.

Senator **GLENN**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was interested in your article in the Washington Post, where you were critical of the administration for just going along with the three purposes: expelling Iraq from Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government, and releasing of hostages, but not critical in establishing and explaining what the vital American national interests are in that area.

I find this a crucial area, because so far it seems to me we have had "sound bite" justifications for why we are there. We have had the "I've had it with Saddam Hussein," we have had the mistreatment of hostages, the embassy rights, "Hitler-like," the overstating of our nuclear danger, and the naked aggression. Now I agree with naked aggression. But surely no one could think we'd have 400,000 troops over there in the desert right now if there weren't other reasons there, too.

There are lots of borders that get crossed and lots of aggression in the world and we don't throw in 400,000 troops to take care of it.

I think, in following up on Senator Shelby's comments, the American people have to really understand why we are there and fully understand our vital long-term interests, if we are not just to repeat Vietnam. In Vietnam we were forced out of an action by the public's disenchantment with the conflict. With this in mind, we must fully understand that our present national interests remain tied to Saddam's potential control of 70 percent of the world's oil, implications for a long-term U.S. collective security, our long-term relations with the Arab nations and hopes for a Mideast peace, the fact that Iraq already has chemical weapons and is trying to go for nuclear, and the interests of Israel. These are all things that I think the President should be explaining to the American people. Otherwise, we are just going to get ourselves into a situation where we wind up with the public not supporting whatever the action may be, be it embargo or the war that we might get into.

I don't understand yet, though, why you think we cannot maintain 400,000 people there. You made in your statement the differentiation between that and the 350,000 or so that we had in Europe for 45 years, the fact that they were domestically stabilizing in Europe but are domestically destabilizing in the Persian Gulf area.

Is there any evidence that the Saudis are beginning to not want us in the region?

Dr. **KISSINGER**. Well, the first time we will notice it is when it is already too late.

This is a question of judgment, Senator Glenn, and something I cannot prove to you. My gut feeling is that the presence of such a large American force in a highly traditional society like Saudi Arabia's is, in the long term, incompatible with its domestic stability.

If I am wrong about this, then, of course, many conclusions are also wrong.

Second, I believe that such a large American force—with Iran on one side of the Gulf, an unbroken Iraq in front of her, and potential upheavals foreseeable in the Emirates, in Jordan, and many other places—renders us in a way hostage to developments we cannot control. It is for all these reasons that I feel it is this immediate issue that should be resolved. At any rate, it is too dangerous to keep such a large American force there indefinitely.

But these are all, obviously, questions of judgment.

Senator GLENN. Do you mean because of internal Saudi stability?

Dr. KISSINGER. Because of internal Saudi stability, stability in the region, the degree of support we can expect to get from the international community if we decide to be there indefinitely, not to mention the huge humiliation that would be inflicted if we suddenly were asked to leave.

Senator GLENN. I am also a little bit vague here as to why you think the embargo will not work. As far as I am aware, this is the most perfect embargo situation that has ever existed in modern times. Iraq is a land-locked nation. The whole world is united for the first time against it. The U.N. is united. We have the embargo on. It appears that already it is beginning to bite some.

Why do you think it will not be effective over the long haul?

Dr. KISSINGER. I will make two points.

Point one is that I noticed a number of commentators pointing out that the nuclear issue arose in Iraq just at the time that public opinion polls showed there was some concern with it.

Senator GLENN. 54 percent of the American people.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have also noticed that, as these hearings evolved, suddenly a lot of people from whom we have not heard for months began to claim that the sanctions were working in a definite timeframe.

I have no independent opinion on the subject though I am not saying the sanctions will not work. What I am saying is that the best the sanctions will do is to initiate a negotiation. And at that point, we will face a whole new set of hurdles. Will we maintain the sanctions during negotiations? Will we maintain our terms during a protracted negotiation? Will we maintain our military option?

These are the obstacles.

I think that sanctions would eventually get us to a negotiation. But they will not, in my view, get us to our objectives.

Senator GLENN. But you also felt that if the sanctions took a lengthy period of time, we would not be able to sustain our forces over there——

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator GLENN [continuing]. For that period of time.

Dr. KISSINGER. You know, it depends on how you define "a lengthy period of time."

I would be astonished if we could maintain our forces there, say, 18 months from now.

Senator GLENN. Do you mean just because of American public opinion or physical inability?

Dr. KISSINGER. Because of the circumstances—first the local circumstances I described, and then again because of American domestic opinion.

But I am no expert on American domestic opinion. You gentlemen are in a better position to judge that.

Senator GLENN. Well, I wouldn't necessarily agree with you on that.

Thank you. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. You have my welcome, Dr. Kissinger.

I would like to pursue a line of questioning that many of us have talked to you about relative to the sanctions working and pick up where Senator Glenn left off.

You said that sanctions, even if they work, would not get us to all of our objectives properly. That's number one.

Number two, you don't believe that it's likely that we'll be able to maintain our forces there long enough so that sanctions will even get us to that point.

Is that so far pretty much what you think?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I think we can maintain our forces long enough to get us to a negotiation. I expect a negotiation early next year.

Senator LEVIN. Now, if it proved, as events unfolded and it appeared that we could maintain our forces there for a year or two, and that your prediction was wrong in that regard and internal events in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arab world and here and in Europe and so forth indicated that we could maintain our forces there for a year or two, would you recommend that course of action?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would prefer for the sanctions to work as long as we commit ourselves to achieving all the objectives I outlined, and as long as we do not start jettisoning them as time goes on. And if we make the assumption that all of this can be achieved, then I would prefer sanctions to war.

Senator LEVIN. I'm not talking about maintaining an assumption. If, as events unfold, it appears that we can maintain our forces there for a year or two——

Dr. KISSINGER. If we can maintain the coalition and maintain the willingness to maintain sanctions, and if we can look ourselves in the eye and say we are going to maintain all these conditions, then, of course, I would prefer it.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. You would prefer that course?

Dr. KISSINGER. Certainly.

Senator LEVIN. So we could reach a judgment in January, February, or March, for instance, that maybe events will prove that course to be possible. We should not commit ourselves now, then, to a course which would not make that outcome possible.

Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. We need not commit ourselves to war right now.

Senator LEVIN. Or to a deadline?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. But I should think the administration, in its own internal thinking, needs to have some criteria.

Senator LEVIN. Maybe criteria. But should we commit ourselves to a deadline, externally?

Dr. KISSINGER. Certainly not to any artificial deadline. If we can maintain all of your conditions, Senator, and really mean it without using it just to waste time, then we need no deadline.

Senator LEVIN. In response to Senator Cohen's question, you indicated that you believe that the President should find out if he has congressional support before he goes very much further down this road.

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

Senator LEVIN. How should he do that?

Should he seek a Congressional authorization of some kind? If not, how would he seek that support?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not really thought this through, but I think he needs an issue that can be expressed in some operational terms.

I don't think he can go to Congress and ask for general support for his policy because that would be like a parliamentary vote of confidence.

But if, for example, the U.N. passes this resolution, it ought to be within the wit of man to formulate a proposition that the Congress make the same kind of authorization, or at least express its support for that resolution or something of that nature, I think that might become one way of doing it.

Senator LEVIN. Somehow or other he should seek——

Dr. KISSINGER. But it should be a concrete, operational decision. It should not be a vague, philosophical statement of whether to support or not support the President, because that will not prove much.

Senator LEVIN. But with that one limit, that it ought to be a specific action that is supported, he should seek Congressional support?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Having had to wind up a war we inherited, which we did not even start, I can tell you that it is a nightmare without congressional support, and it should never be attempted again.

Senator LEVIN. And when you say "congressional support," you mean authorization?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. Well, I do not know what the legal terminology is. But it should be something the public can understand as a clear statement of congressional view and which will not permit Congress afterwards to say that it didn't understand what was being done.

Senator LEVIN. You indicated that you would have placed fewer of our troops there.

Can you tell us why you would have placed fewer troops there?

Dr. KISSINGER. My instinct would have been to put just enough troops there to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia and then to let the sanctions operate. But I must also tell you that my instinct would have been somewhere along the road of taking out the offensive military capability by air power because that would have created a new negotiating reality and we would then not have been in a situation where we had to accomplish everything at once.

So I might well have been willing to take some military action earlier, but I would not have relied so much on a ground operation.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Dr. KISSINGER. But all of this is off the top of my head. This is not something that I have had a chance to study fully.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

This completes our first round of questioning. We have miraculously done it, Dr. Kissinger, within the timeframe that we had committed to you.

First, I want to thank you for being here. You are always very helpful. You provoke our thinking. You make us think in a lot of different directions, and you stimulate our overall questions and give us a lot of good answers.

The one thing that I have difficulty with in your logic is this. You paint a very gloomy picture of the Middle East as to what will happen if we withdraw our forces without accomplishing our objectives. I don't think anyone is proceeding on the basis of that assumption. I don't think anyone is counseling the withdrawal of forces without achieving our objectives.

The one thing that I think all of us agree on is that we are committed and that we ought to see it through. Where we differ is on the question of tactics, on how long we should test the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

There is no disagreement, though, that I know of on this committee and very little that I have heard of in the Congress as to whether we ought to start withdrawing without achieving our objectives.

There are many of us, though, who share your apprehension about the size of the force that we are putting over there now. I think that the force is much too large to be able to be sustained politically and perhaps even logistically. I have felt that for some time and, as a matter of fact, said that in August. I've said it publicly a number of times.

So there have been people speaking out on the subject of the size of the force.

Another thing I would pose for your consideration is this. If you have 230,000 forces there now and you end up in January, February or March with about the same number by adopting a rotation policy rather than an augmentation policy, then you have not withdrawn forces. You have not diminished the level of forces you have now.

The final point I would make—and I think you and I would be in agreement on this—is we do not have to get to some 400,000 forces to have the kind of offensive capability that you believe is applicable and necessary.

Dr. KISSINGER. But then, can you use your influence to keep our generals off television announcing that we no longer have an offensive capability?

Chairman NUNN. Well, we might bring General Duggin back for that purpose. [Laughter.]

Dr. KISSINGER. They should not say one thing or another.

Chairman NUNN. But there are a lot of people who feel—and I think you and I would agree on this—that we have had an offensive capability, a very substantial offensive capability, air capability, since early October. So the question of having to go to 430,000 troops to be able to say we have an offensive threat is one that no one has yet answered for me.

I also would say, and I know you probably would concur in this, that the Joint Chiefs usually do not come in and say we're giving you the mission, Mr. President, and here is how many forces we need to carry out that mission. It works the other way. The President gives them the mission and then they say how many forces. When they went to the level of some 400,000, that was after they were given a new military mission, which was, indeed, to be prepared to liberate Kuwait offensively. That is a different mission, and in response to that, the Chiefs then came in and said they needed a whole lot more forces.

That, to me, is a distinction of some importance.

I would give you any chance you want to respond to that, but I did want to give you that view.

Dr. KISSINGER. My basic view, Mr. Chairman, is that the President's perception of the issues involved was correct; and, that his general strategy was correct.

As for the level of forces, that is an implementation question. If Congress committed itself to maintaining 250,000 for the period of time Senator Levin mentioned, I would have no fixed number of required forces. But what we need to have a nation united on is that the objectives that have been put forward, together with the reduction of Iraqi military offensive capability, is in our national interest and that we will certainly do what is needed to achieve it. Then we can be much more relaxed about the methodology.

If that can be achieved through these hearings, it will be a very great contribution, and I would thank you for giving me a chance to participate.

Chairman NUNN. We thank you, Dr. Kissinger, very much. You have been very helpful.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. I would just ask for one point of clarification.

The Chairman has indicated that there was no disagreement by this panel or this committee and the witness that we should not withdraw our forces before our goals are achieved.

As I listened to the testimony, Dr. Kissinger said that any reversal of the decision to send 400,000 would be perceived as a reversal of policy and undermine the credibility of the administration; that you might not have made that determination; but, once having been made, a reversal of that, meaning keeping the same level of forces we currently have and rotating them on a regular basis, would be perceived by others as being a reversal and defeat.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen, I think you have made a good point. But if he had said that, I thought he walked away from it——

Senator COHEN. I'm trying to bring him back to that.

Chairman NUNN [continuing]. Because if you have 230,000 forces there now and you end up with 230,000 forces there and then say to the world you have withdrawn forces, that does not figure into my arithmetic.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just complete this——

Chairman NUNN. Sure.

Senator COHEN [continuing]. I think that is what Dr. Kissinger indicated before, that the President, having made the decision to add another 200,000, to reverse that position now and maintain the current level would be seen as being a retrenchment and retreat on the part of the administration. That's point number one.

Point number two—and this, again, is unclear on the basis of what Dr. Kissinger just said—my understanding is that you indicated assuming that you could keep 230,000 or 250,000 American forces there for an 18 month period of time, over that period of time there are likely to be destabilizing activities taking place. So, even if we were committed to keeping 250,000, in your judgment, based upon your prior statement, that probably is unlikely, no matter what the consensus here in Congress is, that the political reality is such that Saudi Arabia and others would probably be jeopardized by their very presence, even though we are committed.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think, Mr. Chairman, that if the President had not added forces in November, I would not have written an article urging him to do so. On the other hand, if he now reversed it, we would have the consequences which Senator Cohen described. So if the level of forces we could reach over a period of months, were the only issue, I would agree strongly with the summary of Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. I'm just summarizing what you have said.

Dr. KISSINGER. You have summarized me correctly.

From the point of view of American domestic politics, that might be a stable situation and one to which I would not object. I would be nervous about a very large American ground establishment in the Middle East for any extended period of time and I would need a lot of persuasion that the surrounding circumstances make that safe.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with you on that point. I have felt for a long time that we have built too many forces over there. But we have changed strategy, too, in terms of military mission.

In any event, Dr. Kissinger, you have been a great help to us today and we are getting you out of here approximately on time. We hope that we will have enough credibility with you on the time clock to get you to come back.

Dr. KISSINGER. You always do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room SR-253, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committe members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, and Gorton.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director, Andrew S. Effron, general counsel, Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel, Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority, Claire M. Kelly, special assistant, Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Corts, Mary J. Kampo, Cindy Pearson, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon, Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin, William J. Lynn, and Nancy E. Soderberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy, John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman, Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon, Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn, Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth, Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby, Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen, Anthony H. Cordesman assistant to Senator McCain, Thomas G. Moore, assistant to Senator Wallop, Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton, Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott, and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order. The Armed Services Committee meets again today to continue our hearings on U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region.

This morning we will hear from a panel of three highly respected military strategists and experts whose opinions are widely sought and always valued by this committee.

Mr. James Webb, formerly Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs during the Reagan administration, as well as a highly decorated Vietnam combat veteran, and I might add a noted author.

Mr. Richard Perle, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Reagan administration. Richard is, of course, well known to this committee for his long and distinguished service both in the Department of Defense and even before that as a Senate staffer working for our colleague and great friend, Senator Scoop Jackson. Richard has been before our committee many, many times and has always been of assistance to us in deliberating.

Dr. Edward Luttwak holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ed is widely published and recognized and a preeminent scholar in his field. He has also, as all the witnesses have, been of great help to us over the years.

Senator Warner is on his way.

Senator Thurmond, do you have any opening statement you would like to make?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, the announced purpose of this series of hearings is to get as clear a view of the Persian Gulf crisis as possible. This morning's panel is in keeping with this objective in that each of the witnesses brings with him a unique perspective of how the Nation should respond to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished panelists and want to thank them for taking the time to share their views with us.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I believe Mr. Webb is going to lead off this morning followed by Dr. Luttwak. Mr. Perle will be batting clean-up this morning. We look forward to hearing from all of you. Then we will have questions for the panel. Senator Dixon?

Senator DIXON. May I respectfully inquire, I have only the one statement? Are there statements from the other witnesses as well?

Chairman NUNN. I do not know. With the short notice we have given our witnesses for this hearing, we have not insisted on having advance statements. We try to be flexible because we have imposed on all of them. If they have statements, I am sure they would be delighted for them to be given out. But I have not required that.

I understand that Secretary Webb has his statement and when we xerox it we will pass it out.

Senator DIXON. I thank the Chair.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Webb, we are delighted to have you.

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES WEBB, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I would like to express my personal appreciation to this committee for holding these hearings. I think it is vitally important, particularly with the timing of events in the Gulf that we fully air these issues.

I would also like to express at the outset my continuing admiration and faith in the people who are actually carrying out this policy in the Persian Gulf. And nothing that is said here today by me, particularly, is meant in any way to impact negatively on the performance that they are giving our country. And at the outset I would like to remind the committee that despite our focus on Iraq and Saddam Hussein this crisis is not occurring in a vacuum. This is a region known for its ephemeral alliances and enduring hatreds. It is no small irony that yesterday the two former Joint Chiefs of Staffs who testified before you were gentlemen whose greatest crises occurred in the Gulf with Iran, not Iraq, as the principal antagonists, and whose years spanned the alpha and omega of a tilt by our government toward Iraq.

If we go to war with Iraq it is not inconceivable that the end result would be yet another cycle of ancillary confrontations, including an Arab-Israeli war, Iran reestablishing itself as the dominant regional power, and the Soviets emerging as the intermediary of choice in the region. This alone counsels our caution as we reach toward a solution to the crisis of the moment.

I will limit my opening remarks to three areas: the drawbacks of a military strategy based on the commitment of large numbers of ground troops; the odd, at least to me odd, political strategy of gaining international support for the use of force prior to putting the issue before the American people; and the need for the administration to clarify its goals in resolving the crisis.

I will then briefly outline my view of the two clearest options that are available to our government at this time.

With respect to military strategy, by sending such a huge commitment of ground forces and at the same time escalating the rhetoric of confrontation, the President has placed himself and our troops in a doubly unfortunate situation.

First, the so-called logic of war and the danger of our country losing its credibility makes it difficult to reduce or adjust these ground forces, since we might be perceived as backing down without having forced the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

Second, since a majority of the U.S. Army is now overseas and since two-thirds of the operational forces of our Marine Corps will soon be sitting in the desert, we cannot maintain the size of our commitment for much longer without running into problems of human endurance. Nor can we develop a rotational base for deployed units without decreasing the size of this commitment.

In other words, the size and structure of our military commitment, rather than external events, risk becoming the dominant factors in whether force should be used. This, coupled with the fact that weather conditions favorable for attack will hold only through March provides the temptation to use military force. Testimony regarding religious observances that begin in March and other such conditions are, in my view, minor considerations or perhaps red herrings.

Does anyone really believe that we can launch an attack in January, then secure, occupy, and stabilize Kuwait and withdraw from Saudi Arabia by March? And does anyone truly believe that the forces still in Saudi Arabia during these religious observances would be less at risk in the immediate afterwash of a war where infidels launched an attack on Arabs?

I would submit that the President's error in sending so many troops should not be compounded by a further error in using them in a premature, unprovoked ground offensive.

In light of the development of this ground-oriented and ultimately paralyzing strategy, there is another matter for this committee to examine. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act gave new powers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many warned during its consideration that there was an inherent danger in cutting the President off from the full Joint Chiefs in favor of the advice of one person.

I hope that this committee will examine the impact of that legislation in this crisis and determine the range of advice the President received before implementing the present strategy. I would specifically be curious as to whether the President ever met with the fully convened Joint Chiefs to hear a full discussion of the military options available in early August.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Webb, on that point, because I think it is very important and a good suggestion, if I could just interrupt you here. Do you know of any instance where one of the Chiefs has asked to meet with the President because they have that right?

Mr. WEBB. I am not personally aware.

Chairman NUNN. But we will inquire into that. I think it is a very important question.

Mr. WEBB. With respect to the political strategy, the President has assembled a broadly-based coalition of nations who agree on the narrow issue of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and who diverge on just about everything else.

While these efforts are commendable, many Americans have become rather amazed at the lengths the administration has gone over the past few months to keep the coalition together. I will not belabor this point which is well-known to the members of this committee, but I would add my voice in concern about three elements of this political strategy.

First, this coalition is not an alliance. Other countries have differing reasons for coming together with us in a short-term condemnation of Iraq. The political and economic promises our administration appears to have made in exchange for much of this support have yet to be revealed. And the price we may be asked to pay in terms of unspoken commitments could come back to haunt us.

Second, many of those nations who would benefit the most in economic terms from our actions, including specifically Japan and Germany, who arguably are the true winners of the Cold War, seem content to allow us to take the human and military risk.

Third, it is, in my view, wrong for the administration to be pressing the issue of using force among other nations when it has no mandate regarding the clearly expressed feelings of the American people. We have no treaties in this region. None of the countries involved are democracies. Our troops have not been attacked. Using a United Nations vote as a lever to force the Congress to support offensive action is perplexing and even cynical.

This committee should ask for a complete accounting of all commitments made by the administration on behalf of the country to those nations who supported or will support the United Nations amendment that will be voted on today.

With respect to goals, the administration needs to clarify our national goals in the event force is to be used. Is our goal simply the ousting of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait? If so, does this mean we accept their definition of the battlefield and fight only those forces in Kuwait? Or, if we are going to fight other forces, does this mean we are prepared to enter a general war with Iraq?

If we are going to enter a general war with Iraq, would we do so while at the same time taking into account the hesitations of others, including some Saudi officials, that a large scale destruction of the Iraqi military would be harmful in the long-term because it would allow both Iran and Syria to grow stronger in a region where both countries have created great turmoil and worked against the interest of the United States?

Are we also prepared for the inevitability of yet another Arab-Israeli war and the immediate shifting of alliances that would accompany it with our troops at risk and even engaged in combat activities in the world's most unpredictable region?

Or, as the President has intimated, is our ultimate goal the destruction of Iraq's incipient nuclear capability? If so, would a costly attack on Kuwait merely be an umbrella action in order to justify this other goal?

Or is the goal the ousting of Saddam Hussein? If so, should this be done through a fire-power kill, which certainly would invite the same sort of retaliation, perhaps through terrorism aimed at our own leaders?

Or does the administration believe that the chaos of war will lead to Saddam Hussein's overthrow? On this point is it not better to continue isolating Saddam Hussein from the international community, which in the long run will humiliate him before his own people and bring about his demise while denying the other potential Iraqi rulers the rallying point of his martyrdom?

The two clearest options that I would see at this time are, number one, if the President is serious about going on the offensive, he should call for an immediate resumption of the draft and then for a declaration of war.

Given our responsibilities throughout the world, the U.S. military is already overcommitted in the Persian Gulf. If a ground war erupts and if it lasts longer than a few days, sustainability of force structure, ammunition, and especially of people would become a key factor.

Simply stated, if the President wishes to attack a 1,000,000-man army, he cannot count on a 2-day bombing campaign and home by February. And if a bombing campaign does not work, there is no way to predict the direction or the duration of a war in this region.

This committee should ask for immediate detailed briefings on the status of ammunition accounts measured against their probable rate of use, projected casualty rates, the viability of in-theater medical assets to care for the wounded, the availability of pre-trained manpower to replace those killed, wounded and sick, the projected availability of strategic airlift for med-evac and troop replacements during the initial stages of conflict, and an assessment of our security commitments in other regions of the world, should we be required to further cannibalize military units already in place overseas.

Based on the manpower projections in such briefings, I believe the committee will determine that proper planning for a ground offensive should include an immediate call for the draft, and I would be prepared to discuss that further. I will not go into that now.

The second option, and a viable one in my view, is to reduce the size of the presence and to call on our allies to commit representative numbers of ground troops. In my view, the proper course of action for our country should be to immediately and dramatically reduce the number of troops committed to the region, consolidating them into a defensive posture, and for the President to use his well-known connections around the world in order to persuade other affected countries that they also should commit soldiers toward the goal of containing and eventually reversing Iraqi aggression.

In sum, initiating a violent clash because another nation has not agreed to the President's timetable for an unconditional surrender is not the appropriate approach at this time toward achieving peace in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Webb follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JAMES H. WEBB, JR.

At the outset, I would like to remind the Committee that despite our focus on Iraq and Saddam Hussein, this crisis is not occurring in a vacuum. This is a region known for its ephemeral alliances and enduring hatreds. It's no small irony that yesterday, the two former Joint Chiefs Chairmen who testified before you were gentlemen whose greatest crises occurred in the Gulf, with Iran as the principal antagonist, and whose years spanned the Alpha and the Omega of a tilt by our government toward Iraq. If we go to war with Iraq, it is not inconceivable that the end result would be yet another cycle of ancillary confrontation, including an Arab-Israeli war, Iran re-establishing iself as the dominant regional power, and the Soviets emerging as the intermediary of choice in the region. This alone counsels our caution as we reach toward a solution to the crisis of the moment.

I will limit my opening remarks to three areas: the drawbacks of a military strategy based on the commitment of large numbers of ground troops; the odd -- at least to me -- political strategy of gaining international support for the use of force prior to putting the issue before the American people; and the need for the Administration to clarify its goals in resolving the crisis. I will then briefly outline my view of the two clearest options that are available to our government at this time.

MILITARY STRATEGY. Recent history indicates that, had the President dispatched a modestly-structured air-ground presence to Saudi Arabia, and then begun negotiating a mutual withdrawal of American and Iraqi forces from their respective positions, the crisis may have been over by now. Britain employed this strategy in 1961, and the Soviets were able to defuse an Iraqi occupation of portions of Kuwait in 1973 through quiet diplomacy.

In contrast, by sending such a huge commitment of American ground forces, and at the same time escalating the rhetoric of confrontation, the President has placed himself -- and our troops -- in a doubly unfortunate situation. First, the so-called "logic of war" and the danger of our country's losing its credibility makes it difficult to reduce or adjust these ground forces, since we might be perceived as "backing down" without having forced the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. Second, since a majority of the United States Army is now overseas, and since two-thirds of the operational forces of our Marine Corps will soon be sitting in the desert, we cannot maintain the size of our commitment for much longer without running into problems of human endurance. Nor could we develop a rotational base for deployed units without decreasing the size of the commitment.

In other words, the size and structure of our military commitment, rather than external events, risk becoming the dominant factors in whether force should be used. This, coupled with the fact that weather conditions favorable for attack will hold only through March, provides the temptation to use military force. Testimony regarding religious observances that begin in March, and other such conditions, are in my view minor considerations, or perhaps red herrings. Does anyone really believe that we can launch an attack in January, then secure, occupy and stabilize Kuwait, and withdraw from Saudi Arabia by March? And does anyone truly believe that the forces still in Saudi Arabia during these religious observances would be at less risk in the immmediate afterwash of a war where infidels launched an attack on Arabs? I would submit that the President's mistake in sending so many troops should not be compounded by a further error in using them in a premature, unprovoked ground offensive.

In light of the development of this ground-oriented and ultimately paralyzing strategy, there is another matter for this Committee to examine. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act gave new powers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many warned during its consideration that there was an inherent danger in cutting the President off from the full Joint Chiefs, in favor of the advice of one senior military man. I hope that this committee will examine the impact of that legislation in this crisis, and determine the range of advice the President received before implementing the present strategy. I would specifically be curious as to whether the President ever met with the fully convened Joint Chiefs, to hear a full discussion of the military options available in early August.

POLITICAL STRATEGY. The President has assembled a broadly-based coalition of nations who agree on the narrow issue of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, and who diverge on just about everything else. While these efforts are commendable, many Americans have become rather amazed at the lengths the Administration has gone over the past few months to keep the coalition together. I will not belabor this point, which is well-known to the members of this Committee. However, I would add my voice in concern about three elements of this political strategy.

First, this coalition has not produced an alliance. Other countries have differing reasons for coming together with us in a short-term condemnation of Iraq. The political and economic promises our Administration appears to have made in exchange for much of this support have yet to be revealed. And the price we may be asked to pay in terms of unspoken commitments could come back to haunt us.

Second, many of those nations who would benefit the most economically from our actions, including Japan and Germany, who arguably are the true winners of the Cold War, seem content to allow us to take the human and military risk.

Third, it is in my view wrong for the Administration to be pressing the issue of using force among other nations, when it has no mandate regarding the clearly expressed feelings of the American people. We have no treaties in this region. None of the countries involved are democracies. Our troops have not been attacked. Using a United Nations vote as a lever to force the Congress to support offensive action is perplexing and even cynical.

This Committee should ask for a complete accounting of all commitments made by the Administration, on behalf of our government, to those nations who supported the UN Amendment authorizing force.

GOALS. The Administration needs to clarify our national goals in the event force is to be used.

-- Is our goal simply the ousting of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait? If so, does this mean we accept their definition of the battlefield, and fight only those forces in Kuwait? Or if we are going to fight other forces, does this mean we are prepared to enter a general war with Iraq? If we are going to enter a general war with Iraq, would we do so while at the same time taking into account the hesitations of others, including some Saudi officials, that a large-scale destruction of the Iraqi military would be harmful in the long-term, because it would allow both Iran and Syria to grow stronger, in a region where both countries have created great turmoil and worked against the interests of the United States? Are we also prepared for the inevitability of yet another Arab-Israeli war, and the immediate shifting of alliances that would accompany it, with our troops at risk, and even engaged in combat activities, in the world's most unpredictable region?

-- Or, as the President has intimated, is our ultimate goal the destruction of Iraq's incipient nuclear capability? If so, would a costly attack on Kuwait merely be an umbrella action in order to justify this other goal?

-- Or is our goal the ousting of Saddam Hussein? If so, should this be done through a "firepower kill," which certainly would invite the same sort of retaliation, perhaps through terrorism aimed at our own leaders? Or does the Administration believe that the chaos of war, while causing heavy casualties among Iraqi soldiers and civilians, will lead to his overthrow? On this point, is it not better to continue isolating Saddam Hussein from the international community, which in the long run will humiliate him before his own people and bring about his demise while denying other potential Iraqi rulers the rallying point of his martydom at the hands of the infidels?

OPTIONS:

1. If the President is serious about going on the offensive, he should call for an immediate resumption of the Draft, and then for a Declaration of War.

Given our responsibilities throughout the world, the U.S. military is already overcommitted in the Persian Gulf. If a ground war erupts, and if it lasts longer than a few days, sustainability -- of force structure, ammunition, and especially of people -- would become a key factor. Simply stated, if the President wishes to attack a million-man army, he cannot count on a two-day bombing campaign, and home by February. And if a bombing campaign does not work, there is no way to predict the direction or the duration of a war in this region.

This Committee should ask for immediate, detailed briefings on the status of ammunition accounts measured against their probable rate of use, projected casualty rates, the viability of in-theater medical assets to care for the wounded, the availability of pretrained manpower to replace those killed, wounded and sick, the projected availiability of strategic airlift for medevac and troop replacements during the initial stages of conflict, and an assessment of our security commitments in other regions of the world should we be required to further cannibalize military units already in place overseas.

Based on the manpower projections in such briefings, I believe the Committee will determine that proper planning for a ground offensive should include an immediate call for the draft.

It would be difficult from the outset to maintain properly trained manpower without further cannibalization of existing units and emptying out the Reserves, including the Individual Ready Reserve. In the first months of the Korean War, more than 100,000 IRR members were called up, even though the draft had been in place for more than two years. Since the end of conscription, the Army's IRR and Standby Reserve has fallen from more than 1.5 million members to some 280,000, and about 45 percent of those present members are unreliable assets.

Additionally, the Army graduates only about 700 recruits a week from its basic training, and recruitment has dropped off dramatically since the crisis began. Still further, by law no draftee can be sent overseas until 120 days after induction. Also, the lack of adequate medical evacuation facilities in-theater -- and there could be serious problems in this area-- will cause many unnecessary deaths. Additionally, many mildly wounded soldiers will be evacuated out of theater, delaying their return to their units and emphasizing the need for replacments.

A declaration of war would be a clear, irrefutable signal to Saddam Hussein that the nation as a whole is committed to the effort. The lack of such a declaration can only guarantee that those, such as myself, who believe the policy is in error will continue to speak out.

2. Reduce the size of the presence and call on our allies to commit representative numbers of ground troops.

In my view, the proper course of action for our country would be to immediately and dramatically reduce the number of troops committed to the region, consolidating them into a defensive posture, and for the President to use his well-known connections around the world in order to persuade other affected countries that they also should commit soldiers toward the goal of containing and eventually reversing Iraqi aggression.

In sum, initiating a violent clash because another nation has not agreed to the President's timetable for an unconditional surrender is not the appropriate approach at this time toward achieving peace.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Dr. Luttwak.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, ARLEIGH BURKE CHAIRHOLDER IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. LUTTWAK. I will not read my prepared statement because so much of it would duplicate what this committee has just heard.

Chairman NUNN. We are not pushed for time, now, so it is up to you.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes, sir. I would rather enlarge on some other aspects of the question not covered in the previous statement. I would also like to make one statement about Goldwater-Nichols later on.

Chairman NUNN. You are agreeing with what Secretary Webb said?

Dr. LUTTWAK. I agree with everything he said except for his comment about the functioning of Goldwater-Nichols. We have just heard that the region of the Persian Gulf is characterized by instability and conflict because it contains very valuable assets while none of the governments in the area is either stabilized or restrained by legality or democratic participation.

There is no difference, from that point of view, between any of the governments in the area. They are all equally lawless. Therefore, if thousands of Americans were now to die to deal with the immediate crisis of Iraq, this would merely turn the wheel of conflict in the Persian Gulf one more time, and we would then face a new threat. Iraq would be gone. The threat would be Iran, or Syria, or both, and then we would be back to where we are now with oil supplies endangered.

In the past, when Americans were asked to die to change the situation, we did change the situation. In regard to Germany, in regard to Japan, the United States showed no deference whatsoever for the local political cultures or religious practices (in Japan's case). As we fought we did so with the fixed aim of transforming those societies to make them peaceful. In the Persian Gulf we have no such intention. As a matter of fact we are showing the greatest possible deference towards all the pretensions of the countries in question. Hence only the tragic loss to the families in question would be permanent. Any results achieved would be ephemeral.

Now, to me, the far graver issue in the long term is the world context in which all of this is taking place. We have been focusing on the Persian Gulf. We have had a Persian Gulf presidency since August. We have not had an economic presidency or an education presidency. Indeed, our national attention has been focused on the Persian Gulf.

But in the meantime, what has been happening in the world at large? What we have seen is the spectacular decline of geopolitics as a whole. Military power is being devalued everywhere in the world except in its strategic slums, such as the Persian Gulf—backward areas, where more backward rules still pertain.

What does that mean for us? It means that while we have been mobilizing reserves, and must now even consider the draft for very good, substantive reasons, while we are separating reservists from their families, sending them off with banners flying, while we have been concerned with the upkeep of expeditionary forces, while we have been focused on diplomacy (with the likes of Syria and Yemen), in the main arena of international life, the main participants, that is the Europeans, the Japanese, and ourselves have been silently engaged in the real struggle, which will determine who will make the aircraft and the electronics and the advanced materials and the other high, added-value products of the next generation.

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as before the invasion of Kuwait, the main struggle in the main arena of international life has been geoeconomic and not geopolitical. In the Persian Gulf what we have is a mere sideshow. It is very spectacular, but it is still a sideshow.

This may seem nonsensical because it is taken for granted that the security of Persian Gulf oil supplies is a "vital" U.S. interest. Everybody says this. Everybody repeats it uncritically.

Of course throughout the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union the availability of cheap energy was absolutely indispensable. From the 1940s in the immediate post-war period, cheap energy was the key to the economic recovery that prevented the war-damaged industrial countries from falling under communism. Subsequently, cheap energy was critical in building up their economies and strengthening them politically. Hence an entire generation of Americans has grown up with the assumption that cheap energy is a "vital" U.S. interest.

Cheap energy was indeed a key U.S. interest while the geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union still lasted. Under current geoeconomic conditions, it may still be a U.S. interest, but that proposition would have to be studied and demonstrated.

After all, if Japan's MITI were in charge, or the Ministry of Finance in Tokyo, they would calculate costs and benefits. The United States is only 50 percent dependent on oil imports, even at present prices. Japan is 100 percent dependent.

Our other chief economic adversaries in the struggle to define who will be the makers of the future are also almost 100 percent dependent on oil imports so perhaps it would suit us to have Persian Gulf oil supplies entirely disrupted yielding very high oil prices. If, let us say, we posit $100-a-barrel oil, Japan would still be 100 percent import dependent, whereas we would, of course, have large-scale energy substitution from imported oil to domestic alternatives.

Now I do not pretend to have answers to these complex questions. But what we have seen since August 1990 is the United States rushing into the Persian Gulf with boyish enthusiasm and no calculation at all of its actual interests in 1990 conditions. The security of Persian Gulf oil supplies and lower rather than higher oil prices were, indeed, a central American interest throughout the

Cold War but we are no longer in the Cold War. We are in a new geoeconomic world in which we have a different set of adversaries. It may be that we should still want cheap oil. But that is no longer an a priori certainty. It is something that has to be calculated and looked at very seriously.

Now if you accept what Secretary Webb said about the region and my own simplification that all that we would do by war is to give the wheel of regional conflict another turn, if you further accept the possibility that the Persian Gulf is a side show in present geo-economic conditions, then you must ask yourselves if Americans should die to achieve ephemeral results in a side show.

By the way, in case you think it absurd to consider the Persian Gulf crisis as a mere side show, please notice that when we asked today's serious and successful players on the world scene, the Japanese and the Germans, to contribute to the operation they were not impressed.

If we are dependent on Persian Gulf oil, they are far more dependent. Yet, the Japanese Ministry of Finance has found much less money for the Persian Gulf operation than a single Japanese electronics company found to purchase a U.S. film corporation. This shows what the successful players of today think of the Persian Gulf crisis, in real economic terms. If it is economics that motivated our policy, it needs to be calculated. It has not been.

Now let me address the issue of force. For all of the reasons we have just heard, unless Saddam Hussein capitulates we might find ourselves sliding into war. Force can become the unavoidable option. It need not have been the case. We had, in my view, a perfectly viable strategy of protracted, multiyear, economic sanctions.

By the way, the only thing that now prevents the development of the Iraqi military arsenal is that Iraq has no money. The moment we settle "the Kuwait crisis," Iraq will be back selling oil. It will have money again, and under one regime or another it will be back buying weapons.

So I regard a 2-, 3-, 4- or even a 5-year sanctions policy as perfectly acceptable. The only problem, of course, is that one could not do it comfortably with 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. I would have wished for an air power defense, with only ground blocking forces of a few thousand men and lots more from allies.

With 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, the perfectly successful protracted sanctions policy was inconvenient. With 400,000 plus troops it becomes impossible to sustain. The augmentation is a classic bridge-burning exercise on the part of the President, motivated by his calculation, which I am sure he is more competent to perform than I, that the Saudis and the others would not stay in the coalition; or motivated by the domestic political calculation that a protracted multiyear economic sanction which would have meant a multiyear hostage situation, would not be a paying proposition; or perhaps motivated by the President's concern for the Kuwaitis.

I, myself, must suffer from an excess of memory because I remember the U.N. representatives of the ruling family of Kuwait voting against the United States more often than the Soviet Union for years and years, not only on Middle East questions but on all issues. They were not our allies until they needed us.

So President Bush has a great concern for the Kuwaitis. I do not share it. Hence I was quite content with a multiyear sanctions policy with no use of force, no war.

You all know, gentlemen, that military power, unlike money, is not fungible. If force becomes inevitable we have radically different alternatives. Let us consider the ground warfare alternative.

Of course, our commanders have plans for elegant offensive operations. Let us assume that we avoid a frontal offensive to dislodge the Iraqis from Kuwait; hence, there would be no frontal attacks against the minefields, dug-in tanks, emplaced troops, and prearranged artillery fires of the Iraqi fortified zone of Kuwait. Instead, we would have a very elegant operation starting way to the west of Kuwait, swinging around in the best traditions of armored warfare in the desert to cut off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Let us assume that the softening-up air operations are extremely effective and achieve the highest results ever achieved by any such softening up in history. So we have an elegant operation and a highly successful softening up.

Let us assume further that any Iraqi attempt at mounting a counterstroke—we are penetrating deep into Iraq to cut off Kuwait, and the classic counterstroke would be to cut off our penetration in an encirclement—would be broken up by our air power, and not only broken up but broken up before it can really come to grips with our thrust. So our forces would not have to fight flank defense battles with the consequent losses.

Let us ignore the possibility that when our elegant envelopment reaches and abuts on the Iranian front, the Iranian revolutionary guards who have asked to be allowed to cross over and volunteer for Iraq, might do so, hence our forces will not face revolutionary guards carrying out petty, tactically insignificant attacks perhaps but each of which might inflict some casualties.

Let us also ignore the possibility that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops which will be left on either side of the U.S. offensive thrust might converge against it, if only by dribs and drabs and if only to retreat but nevertheless causing repeated contacts between battalions on their side, thousands of Iraqis on their side, and platoons on our side. Even if the Iraqis are only trying to surrender, misunderstandings and so on would cause casualties.

Let us further assume that all of our equipment works perfectly, all of our operational plans are very cunning, and all of our tactics are sound. In its totality, this would of course, be a very optimistic scenario. If we have a combat echelon, let us say, of 80,000—of course, we could have 400,000 there, but the combat echelon would be maybe 80,000 or so—and if we allow only the casualties incidental to a perfect operation, that is people stepping on mines, stepping on our own unexploded munitions (5 percent or so of the units in our cluster shells may not explode in soft sand); if we assume only casualties caused by very brief fire fights with stragglers and holdouts, material accidents, mechanical accidents etc.; if we imagine that only 5 percent of the Iraqi artillery survives and 95 is destroyed by air power, et cetera, then one must still estimate several thousand killed in action or permanently maimed, with the inevitable quotient of MIA's, the soldiers whose bodies will be lost in the sands of the desert, and we would not know what has happened to them, whether they were captured or died, or captured first and then killed.

Now in addition to my estimate, this committee on the basis of its own vast experience, may decide that the extreme optimism of my scenario is indeed excessive, that some equipment will fail and that some units will not carry out actions, will not be tactically splendid because, of course, most of our troops have not been in combat before.

The committee may even decide that greater errors should be allowed for because U.S. military forces have no experience in the conduct of large-scale armored operations, last carried out by U.S. forces in 1944. Hence we would be attempting a spectacular armored thrust, with forces that have never carried out an armored operation on a multidivisional scale, or even exercised such an operation. So you may decide that a few thousand casualties is too low an estimate.

For my part, I cannot be reconciled even to the most optimistic estimate because I must regard such a war as a side show in the new geoeconomic era, with ephemeral results at best.

Now what is the alternative? If force becomes inevitable because of our errors of policy, or by Iraqi choice, and if you decide with me that the use of ground forces is unacceptable given the human cost, that leaves only air power.

Let us consider the much-maligned air power option—it appears everybody in this town is a great expert on air power, and the moment one talks about air power they come out to say, that we should not even try interdiction. Several hundred thousands Iraqis in Kuwait need several hundred trucks a day to survive just for food from day to day, yet the moment one says that they could be cut off by air interdiction against those trucks, people say, oh, we tried that on the Ho Chi Minh trial. It did not work.

Let me tell you, air power is supremely contextual. Air power works in some contexts and not in others. The history of air power may be described as a prolonged misunderstanding in that an instrument of war almost designed for the Middle East was often misapplied elsewhere. Air power depends on target visibility, and that is what you have in the Middle East because of the lack of cover, of vegetable cover, and because of climatic conditions mostly, if not always favorable.

Air power works in the Middle East simply because the targets are starkly outlined.

I would say that the air power option has not been considered seriously in the public debate because of the prevalence of prejudice against it, prejudice admittedly caused by some 70-years of overpromising by air power advocates.

There is, I think, a particular method that should be applied. Whenever somebody comes before you and proposes air power, claiming that if this or that is attached a given political result will come about, you should assume that it will not work. Air power is a mechanical instrument and it can only achieve mechanical results.

It cannot break the morale of populations. The morale of populations is not a physical target and cannot be bombed. It cannot destroy regimes. They are not a physical target either.

Air power, for quite different reasons, cannot actually get rid of national leaders. We bombed Berlin very heavily. The British did too, many times. Yet as far as I know not even a fourth-level Nazi leader died. That is because to kill a leader you must not only bomb the right city, not only the right building, but a room—and a room at exactly the right time. If the fellow is going down the corridor for a moment, you miss him.

By contrast, air power can destroy systematically ground forces, even dispersed ground forces, even camouflaged ground forces, but only at a proportionate cost.

Let's assume one wants to destroy 50 percent of the Iraqi army in the field, that is tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery weapons, their crews, and things of that sort. To do that tens of thousands of sorties must be flown, with dozens of aircraft lost through mechanical failures alone.

Now, what air power can do, very much more effectively, is to starve the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, or rather give them a choice, between starving in place or deserting south, or retreating north. And finally, air power can certainly destroy the buildings associated with Iraq's military ambitions. The Iraqis have an assembly line for T-72 tanks. They have many workshops, laboratories where they do various things. They manufacture mortars. They attempt to grow bacilli, micro organisms for biological warfare. They have a few nuclear items here and there and so on. All these buildings can be destroyed—though not in a surgical strike.

All of you know what a ridiculous, meretricious misuse of language that is. I am not speaking of an air strike at all, but of an air offensive lasting at least several days to bomb, photograph, bomb again, photograph, and if necessary, bomb again. If we wish to destroy the Iraqi military infrastructure, not the Iraqi ground forces, we are talking about several thousand sorties, very much a doable proposition.

Before one does anything of course we would have to have defense suppression, to destroy the radars, the early-warning radars, the fighter aircraft and indeed the Iraqi air force as a whole. And you would have to destroy the surface to air missiles, at least the major fixed ones. That is defense suppression, give it a few more thousand sorties, but only 24 hours or less.

And of course you have to try to destroy as many of the upgraded Scuds and other ground-to-ground missiles as well. This is the air option.

Is it perfect? No. Does it assure immediate victory? No. But as against the imperfect air option, which by the way was available to us many moons ago, the ground option is still much worse.

The reason I think we have ground forces in place is a mixture of acting out our preordained plans, bureaucratic pressures, and a fundamental policy error at the very beginning of the crisis.

Let me end on that point. If somebody had woken me up in the middle of the night and said that Iraq had invaded Kuwait, and if I would have been too sleepy to come up with any original thought, I would have just proposed the standard U.S. operating procedure throughout the 40 years of the Cold War. I would have said, right, issue a statement telling the Iraqis that if they move one step forward into Saudi Arabia we bomb them. In other words, use deterrence albeit non-nuclear of course.

Deterrence has been the American method to protect countries around the world. We have put garrisons in Germany and garrisons in Korea, but we have not put garrisons in every threatened country. We have relied on deterrence.

That fundamental choice was overlooked from the beginning partly because of the way the President has been making decisions. This is not an ad hominem comment. This is a decision-making issue.

When President Eisenhower faced the Indo-China crisis in 1954, he was by then a man, you would agree, of some military experience and some political experience. And yet he did not attempt to make his decision on the back of a golf cart. He convened a large conclave, asked them searching questions, brought in everybody, all the Secretaries and so on. And then very deliberately he made his decision.

I am sure that if there had been such a formal conclave in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the decision would have been to protect Saudi Arabia by deterrence, not by defense, deterrence by remote air power. If the need were felt for economical, more reliable air power in place, we would have put in air power, with let's say, 8,000 to 9,000 troops to guard their air bases.

Somehow we have instead gone into a mode of deployment which has now become self-generating. Of course there has been a Presidential decision to double our forces as a bridge-burning exercise. But in addition there is self-generating growth. You put in a battalion, the battalion has to have a chaplain. The chaplain has to have a driver and a vehicle. The vehicles then must have a mechanic. And then one needs another air defense battalion.

By these procedures we might find ourselves in need of a draft even without war. While the Japanese and the Germans and the Belgians and the Dutch and all the others that I consider grownups continue about their business of taking over the chief economic activities of the planet, we find ourselves mobilized to nourish a self-driven machine of military accumulation. As you all know, gentlemen, right now they are in the process of transferring many of thousands of trucks because they want to have green-painted trucks there, instead of using Saudi trucks. So we are now sending trucks to one of the most truck-filled countries in the world.

It is true that the non-green-painted trucks do interfere with radio reception.

Let me say a word about Goldwater-Nichols before ending.

Goldwater-Nichols was designed to provide coherent military policy. It cannot prohibit the President from consulting anybody. President Eisenhower sat down in 1954 with the Joint Chiefs—and Eisenhower was a man of great experience in military matters. President Bush, to my knowledge, has not sat down with the Chiefs or his Cabinet. President Bush does not sit down with people in conclave.

President Bush, I agree, has shown quite exceptional skill. We must all recognize that. But nevertheless, it is a serious matter that serious military consultations are not taking place. And Goldwater-Nichols is absolutely no bar to Presidential meetings with the Joint Chiefs. The President has chosen not to meet with the Joint Chiefs.

I believe that the smoothest way to get out of our predicament is to go back to the allies, the larger beneficiaries of this altruistic operation of ours, and say to them that we need to have their bodies in place. There's no real need for bodies perhaps but we put all those bodies in place and cannot now start withdrawing troops without having achieved the desired result. And so the time has come to save our face. Kindly put troops in. This may be the type of diplomacy that sounds good, but is simply undoable, and if it is undoable, then we face more cruel decisions.

I would say that we can and should avoid the use of force. If force cannot be avoided for whatever reason, including our own mistakes, let us keep the ground forces out of it.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Luttwak follows:]

Prepared Statement of Edward N. Luttwak

I am of course honored by this opportunity to express my views before the Committee.

I propose to address primarily the military questions that arise from the present crisis. But no military choice can be defined as right or wrong except in context. Hence I shall say a few words about both the regional and the world contexts, as well as the alternatives to war.

The Regional Context

The region of the Persian Gulf is characterized by a chronic instability because none of the governments in place is either stabilized, or restrained, by constitutional legalities and democratic participation. From that specific point of view, there is no substantive difference between the equally lawless dictatorships, theocracies, absolute monarchies, and patrimonial despotisms that divide the region between them.

Regardless of the outcome of the present crisis, the region of the Persian Gulf will continue to be characterized by instability simply because nothing is being done to promote legality or democratic participation--certainly not by current US policies that are marked by an outright deference towards the lawless, undemocratic regimes ranged against Iraqi.

No military action now being contemplated against Iraq can therefore do more than to turn the wheel of Persian Gulf instability one more time. Before it was Iran that presented the immediate threat, and Iraq was therefore favored. Today it is Iraq that presents the immediate threat, and the United States is variously arming or courting its equally lawless neighbours. If Iraqi military power is destroyed, one or more of the powers in the present anti-Iraqi coalition will almost automatically constitute the new threat to be countered.

Comparisons with the 193Os and the Second World War are therefore entirely misleading. When Americans died in that conflict, their sacrifice was immediately followed by fundamental political, cultural and even religious reforms that transformed Germany and Japan into peaceful, democratic societies. Now by contrast, there is no intention whatever to impose any political or cultural reforms in the Persian Gulf region. Hence if Americans were to die in fighting Iraq, only the tragic loss inflicted on their families would be permanent, while any results achieved would be ephemeral.

The World Context

With the end of the Cold War, the main arena of international life is no longer occupied by geopolitical struggle. In the dealings of North Americans, all Europeans, Japanese and other advanced and advancing nations, military power is increasingly devalued, as is traditional security-focused diplomacy. In this emerging "Geo-economic" era, disposable capital is increasingly displacing firepower, civilian product development is displacing military innovation, and market penetration is displacing the possession of foreign garrisons and bases.

To be sure, that is not so in the Persian Gulf as in other unfortunate regions where governments rule by force, and military power still dominates. But if geopolitics thus continues to be important in those parts, it does so as a backward, provincial phenomenon. This suggests that the greatest cost entailed by the Administration's particular way of handling the Kuwait crisis -- and notably its refusal of any quick if imperfect solution-- is that it has kept the United States fixated on yesterday's geopolitical priorities.

COUNTRIES

The leaders and peoples already fully engaged in the new geo-economic competition have watched us with amazement and some pity as we have sent off great expeditionary forces, mobilized civilian reservists, engaged in frantic diplomacy with the likes of Syria and Yemen, and devoted billions of dollars without hesitation to assure primarily their oil supplies. From their point of view, the great questions to be resolved in the main arena of international life have not been changed at all by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait: who will develop and market the next generation of computers, civilian aircraft, advanced materials and other high added-value products ? For that it is not expeditionary armies that are needed but abundant, patient capital; not impressive warships but educational investment in a highly skilled labor force.

How little the new geo-economic champions think of our Persian Gulf efforts, of which they are the chief beneficiaries, is revealed most clearly by their response to our repeated begging for financial contributions. Unless I am much mistaken, the Japanese Ministry of Finance has yet to hand over the merest fraction of the 7.5 billion dollars than one Japanese electronics company is about to pay in order to purchase a major US corporation. From MOFA's point view, there is little point in paying for services so enthusiastically offered for free in any case.

Certainly, the defense of Persian Gulf oil supplies was once an indispensable adjunct to our overall geopolitical effort--without access to that oil our allies would have been politically very vulnerable to the Soviet Union. In present geo-economic context, however, it is not at all clear that it is to our advantage to assure cheap oil supplies for our chief economic competitors as well as ourselves. Perhaps it is, and perhaps it is not--Persian Gulf oil fields shut down and $100 per barrel oil would certainly hamper the 100% import-dependent much more than the United States which is only 50% import-dependent even at present prices, and which also has ample alternative energy sources at much less than that price. These are complex questions which I would not pretend to settle, but the facts on the public record show that the Administration eagerly rushed into action with much boyish enthusiasm and no economic calculation at all, acting out a geopolitical reflex that may well be outdated.

As for the subsequent discovery of the potential for a "New World Order", that is a prospect impressive indeed but only if one does not scrutinize its contents too closely, for it would entirely depend on the permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely a decomposing Soviet Union, the world's greatest non-democracy of China, two fading European middle powers--and of course the United States, which would presumably continue to pay the greatest share of the cost of any interventions in both treasure and blood. Interestingly enough, the Administration has said nothing about the prospects of a multi-lateral arms denial policy for the entire violent zone from North Africa to SE Asia, surely the most obvious constituent of a "New World Order".

The regional context tells us that the results of war would be ephemeral. The world context tells us that the Persian Gulf crisis that has so wholly preoccupied US policy since August is only a side-show.

The Lost Alternative to Force

The final contextual issue is the availability of alternatives to the use of force. And of course until the latest US force build-up, we did have a perfectly functional alternative: a long-term policy of economic denial. **While even the highly effective economic sanctions that have totally cut off Iraqi oil exports cannot reliably induce policy changes, they have inevitable and cumulative physical effects in the long term**. With each passing day, the Iraqi economy reverts another step to its organic agricultural level, which can supply dates and barley, but not ballistic missiles or indeed any other armaments beyond small arms. Perhaps the Administration feared that the the Arab regimes in our camp would lack the patience to wait out the necessary two or three years, and would instead make a separate peace with Iraq. Perhaps patience was deemed too costly in domestic political terms, or was abridged by a generous concern for the interests of the Kuwaiti ruling family (whose UN envoys, parenthetically, were well-known until a little while ago for the fervor of their anti-American polemics, and for a voting record more adverse to US interests than that of the Soviet Union).

In any event, the option of protracted sanctions is now closed. To wait with 200,000 troops or so would have been feasible perhaps. To wait with 400,000 and more is quite impossible.

THE USE OF FORCE: The Alternatives

War may thus be unavoidable unless Saddam Hussein capitulates, but we still have a large choice in how we use force. The different forms of military power are not fungible; the discrete operational alternatives diverge radically.

One thing is certain--almost mathematically certain: if there is any extensive use of US ground forces, commensurate casualties must be expected.

> Visualize an elegant envelopment operation that cuts off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, with no costly frontal dislodgement attacks against the minefields, sandwalls, dug-in forces and pre-ranged artillery fires of the Iraqi fortified zone in Kuwait.

>Visualize further highly effective softening up operations by airpower and even naval gunfire perhaps.

>Assume that any major Iraqi counter-stroke is broken by air attacks before it can reach US forces, let alone cut them off from their bases.

>Ignore the possibility that Iranian "Revolutionary Guard" volunteers would join the fighting when the US offensive reaches its necessary end-point at the borders of Iran.

>Ignore the possibility that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops on each side of the US offensive thrust will attempt to converge against it, if only by dribs and drabs, if only to make good a retreat.

>Finally assume that all our equipment works perfectly, that all our operational plans are cunning, that all our tactics are sound.

Having thus constructed the most optimistic of scenarios, allow only the casualties caused by the incidentals of war: troops stepping on unmarked mines, short fire-fights with stragglers and hold-outs, mechanical accidents, and the ragged fire of some surviving fraction of the huge number of Iraqi artillery tubes. If tens of thousands of US troops are present in the combat units sent into action, even such incidental casualties must amount to several thousand KIAs, WIAs maimed for life, and the inevitable quotient of MIAs.

But then of course such an extreme optimism may be excessive, if only because much US equipment is very new, and has never been tried in combat before; if only because because most US troops have seen no combat before, and no serving US military officer has any actual experience in the conduct large-scale armored warfare (last fought by US forces in 1944), while a spectacularly deep and fast armored offensive would be called for.

For my part, I cannot be reconciled even to the most optimistic of casualty estimates for a ground offensive. That Americans should be killed and maimed by the thousand to achieve ephemeral results in a mere side-show seems to me wholly beyond justification.

If the use of force is nevertheless deemed inevitable, that leaves only the much-maligned Air Option. Much has been heard of the past failures of airpower from assorted pundits and retired military officers. True enough, airpower has always disappointed whenever more than a purely mechanical effect was expected.

>Airpower cannot break the morale of a rigidly controlled population, or perhaps of any population.

>It cannot destroy regimes: they are not physical targets at all. >It cannot kill rulers except by mere chance: to do that not merely the right building must be hit, but the right room, at exactly the right time.

By contrast, airpower alone can annihilate even dispersed and dug-in ground forces, though not cheaply. To destroy, say, 50% of the Iraqi army some tens of thousands of sorties would be needed, in protracted air operations lasting some weeks, and which would entail the loss of dozens of aircraft in operational accidents alone.

On the other hand, bombardment can reliably destroy buildings, including those that contain stored weapons and weapon assembly lines, laboratories, and military repair workshops, including the buildings associated with Iraq's missile, chemical, biological and nuclear ventures. Bombardment can also destroy ammunition depots and PoL storage sites, insofar as they are not greatly dispersed and well camouflaged.

I am not speaking of the fantasy of a "surgical strike", nor of an one-act air strike of any kind, but rather of sustained air operations, with thousands of sorties over several days, to bomb, photograph and bomb again. But even adding the necessary preliminary of defense-suppression sorties against Iraq's air defenses and its modest air force, an air offensive could literally demolish Saddam Hussein's military ambitions within a week or so, and with the loss of not more than a few dozen aircrew at most--each a tragedy but all more tolerable than the thousand of lives that ground warfare must cost. And that loss would also be more tolerable than the far greater number of aircrew that would be lost to execute Close Support and Battlefield Interdiction sorties on behalf of a ground offensive--a use of air power that even the most skeptical pundits approve of, and which any ground offensive would certainly require by the thousand.

Moreover, airpower can also force Iraqi troops to evacuate Kuwait. They are fed by a daily traffic of hundreds of trucks from Iraqi depots. If that traffic is attacked by air interdiction patrols, the Iraqi troops in Kuwait must either starve in place, retreat to the north, or desert to the south. Comparisons with the US failure to close the Ho Chi Min trail are beneath comment. Trucks on desert roads are entirely more vulnerable than any traffic flowing trough jungle trails or even highways. Airpower is indeed terrain-dependent to an exceptional degree, and the terrain of Iraq and Kuwait is exceptionally favorable.

Not that airpower is a panacea. But air operations gone wrong can be called off immediately, while a ground offensive once started cannot be suspended half-way except in disaster. Airpower may only be effective to achieve mechanical effects, and not hypothetical political results, but it would be the appropriately arms's length instrument in a conflict that is very far from central to our national survival. Given the ephemeral results that can be expected in the current Persian Gulf side-show, even the original deployment of ground forces was grossly excessive, and most dubiously motivated by bureaucratic urges, and the President's elective affinities for some of the absolute rulers in the region. The currently expanded ground deployment is even more excessive for either deterrence or defense, but it is its commitment to combat that would be wholly beyond justification in my view.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Luttwak. Secretary Perle, we again appreciate very much you being here, and we have no time limit, so don't feel pressed. We are on time.

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. PERLE. You see what happened the last time you said that, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. Well, we really mean it in your case.

Mr. PERLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your invitation to appear before the committee this morning. These hearings have already made an important contribution to an essential national debate about our policy in the Gulf, and I am grateful to have been included in these deliberations.

I spent the better part of yesterday watching these hearings on television.

It is now nearly 4 months since Saddam Hussein's tanks led an onslaught against tiny Kuwait. The results are grim. The murder of innocent civilians, the taking of hostages on a scale unprecedented in this century, threats of mass destruction with chemical weapons, wholesale pillaging, the uprooting of millions, the destruction of a defenseless member of the United Nations.

With an embargo now in place, Saddam Hussein's reign of terror is Iraq's last remaining export. Before this crisis is over, there is a good chance that we will be at war with Iraq. If that war is to earn the support of the American people, its causes and consequences must be understood, its purpose defined, its meaning made plain.

"I have had it with Saddam Hussein" is not an argument, and it is not enough. Nor is the astounding notion advanced recently by Secretary of State Baker that we are in the Gulf to protect American jobs; as if the issue could be likened to a new round of import quotas or a plant closing.

The war that is probably coming is not simply about oil, although access to the lifeblood of the industrial world is obviously vital to our economic well-being. It is not simply about who controls Kuwait, although the protection of a sovereign state against aggression is fundamental to the future world order.

It is not simply about the reach of a malevolent Iraqi tyrant, although containing Saddam Hussein is a shared purpose that now unites Soviets and Americans, rich nations and poor ones, even Arabs and Israelis.

The coming war against Iraq involves all the issues of oil, order and containment, but it also involves the transcendent issue of America's role in the post-Cold War world. An American defeat in the Gulf—and we must not assume that defeat is impossible—would gravely diminish the strength and authority with which the United States has emerged from a half-century of opposition to the idea that military power, whether it be Hitler's or Stalin's or Saddam Hussein's, can be allowed to determine the fate of nations.

It takes vision to see this and leadership to make the choices—all of them costly—that Saddam Hussein has forced upon us. What makes the Gulf crisis a defining issue for America is the nakedness of Iraqi aggression. If we fail when the issues are so clear, the aggression so unambiguous, the values at stake so fundamental, the international community so united, how will we fare, Mr. Chairman, in the far more common condition of confusion, divided opinion, ambiguity, and moral uncertainty?

Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush, with the support of the United Nations, defined our objective in the Gulf as the removal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait. In early August, this was no easy prospect. Saddam Hussein had the offensive forces in place to attack elsewhere in the Gulf after crushing Kuwait. Our immediate task was to put in place sufficient force to block the Iraqi tank columns from continuing down the road to Saudi Arabia's oil fields, which are closer to Kuwait than to Baghdad.

The President's first urgent task has been accomplished. Moreover, Iraq's August superiority has now, with the buildup of American and allied forces in the region, given way to a far more even match. This is why we now have not one—I heard a number of references in yesterday's hearings alluding to the military option—

but a multiplicity of military options that did not exist 4 months ago.

It is also why we must now make the transition from buying time to using it for the broader purpose of mobilizing for the destruction—by diplomatic means if possible, military ones if necessary—of Saddam Hussein's military machine.

It is a dangerous trivialization of the Western interest in oil to suggest that we have sent American boys to the Gulf to protect cheap Western gasoline. The industrial world cannot survive, much less prosper, without access to oil. The concentration of control over much of the world's oil in the hands of a ruthless demagogue eager to use it as a weapon is in my judgment a direct threat to our vital interests.

Of course it is true that Saddam Hussein cannot drink the oil he seeks to control. But he can potentially manipulate markets in a monopolistic fashion that OPEC's diverse membership has never managed to achieve. And more important, he hopes to use control over oil to achieve political purposes, the most ominous of which is his ascendancy to the leadership of the Arab masses.

It is all very well to argue, as my friend Edward Luttwak has argued, and as I think Jim Webb has suggested, that we are talking about a region of instability in which the wheel of conflict will continuously turn. But the immediate prospect of Saddam Hussein as the leader of the Arab masses has to be one of the least appealing ways in which that wheel can rotate.

If Saddam Hussein and his war machine survive the current crisis, he will control directly the combined oil resources of Iraq and Kuwait. Indirectly he could, with threats and intimidation, compel militarily weak Gulf oil states to do his bidding.

No one can confidently predict how Saddam would use his military power and his influence over the Gulf. That he seeks the destruction of the other Gulf States' leadership is beyond doubt, but where would it stop? No oil for western fleets in the Eastern Mediterranean? No oil for countries unwilling to sell him the technology to complete his drive to acquire nuclear weapons? No oil produced in collaboration with American producers? No oil for countries that extradite terrorists?

What of the vast revenues he could earn by diminishing the oil production of, say, Saudi Arabia, while expanding his own to maximize Iraqi earnings, which will not be spent on day care centers and the Baghdad Symphony? Support for international terrorism and an anti-western Holy War would be far more likely, along with the installations of little Saddams around the world.

The issue is not the price at the pump, it is the independence of the policies of Iraq's neighbors now and the rest of us later. It is up to both branches of government to explain why the oil issue has profound implications for our foreign policy, as well as our economy.

The administration's talk of the nature of the new world order to come out of this crisis strikes many, myself included, as theoretical, abstract, sometimes even quaint, but ultimately, it is more. The defeat of Saddam Hussein will not guarantee a world order unburdened by the weight of military power, but his success will assure that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of weak states is in the hands of men who drive tanks and fire missiles, the men who make poison gas and invest their national wealth in the instruments of war.

To reward aggression anywhere is to encourage it everywhere. That is why there can be no political solution to this crisis, no face-saving formula of the sort Mr. Primakov has been peddling, no negotiated compromise in which Saddam Hussein, even if he is forced from Kuwait, is allowed to keep the military power he has used to destroy a sovereign state and to threaten the destruction of others.

One need not be romantic about the new world order to fear the scramble to build armies that will afflict the Gulf if Saddam escapes the noose. What is needed, Mr. Chairman, is a convincing demonstration that the price of aggression is greater than merely returning the spoils.

Some of those spoils cannot be returned. That is why we are right to insist on reparations, on meting out justice for the crimes of war. If that makes compromise more difficult, it is because compromise is not good enough, and what of the American role in the aftermath of the settlement in which Saddam and his military survive to fight another day?

Are we to remain in Saudi Arabia with military forces adequate to assure that he will not strike again? Would a trip wire presence be enough? For how long could we sustain the policeman's role in the Gulf, where the cops, exposed and vulnerable, are outnumbered by the robbers 10 or 20 to 1?

I agree entirely with Henry Kissinger, who yesterday expressed his judgment that we could not sustain a significant, long-term presence in Saudi Arabia. In this respect, Mr. Chairman, the argument that because we kept forces in Europe for half a century we should be able to keep them now in the Saudi desert is wide of the mark.

You can lose 300,000 American troops among 250 million Europeans, but try to accommodate and provide a reasonable life for a significant number of Americans in sparsely populated and culturally distinct Saudi Arabia. It cannot be done, and a strategy for stability in the Gulf that assumes it can will eventually come tumbling down.

Even before seizing Kuwait, Saddam's megalomaniacal ambitions were obvious to many, but unhappily, not to those who made our pre-invasion policy: poison gas, nuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles, militarization at the expense of economic development, threats of mass destruction, 8 years of war against Iran, 1 million casualties, children and old men pressed into military service. Now, he pats them on the head for the cameras. Later, he will send them to die in Iran or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, or on some civilian airplane brought down by a terrorist bomb. If Saddam had waited to get the nuclear weapon he is trying to build, who would have opposed the invasion of Kuwait?

Allow him the time, because he has the money, to acquire nuclear weapons, and the lives at risk will dwarf the losses we and others will suffer by defeating him now. It is simply not good enough to pose the question—as I have heard it posed repeatedly in these hearings and elsewhere—are we prepared to send Americans to die, as though a failure to take action assures that there will be no losses, no casualties, no fatalities down the road. Inaction has its cost as well.

No one knows how close Iraq is to achieving a nuclear capability. What we do know is that Saddam Hussein is doing everything in his power to get it as fast as possible. On this issue—Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons—there is a facile assumption that he would be deterred from using it. We deterred the Soviets all the years of the Cold War, the argument goes. So we can deter Iraq as well.

Yet we did nothing when Iraq used poison gas. We issued thousands of licenses for sensitive technology to Iraq, helping to build Iraq into a super power. We now hear the argument that stopping Iraq is not worth the loss of American lives. How can we be glib about the implied threat to use nuclear weapons against Saddam Hussein if he chooses to scoff at our notions of deterrence and uses a nuclear weapon anyway?

It is illusory to believe, as some argue, that Iraq's military power can be contained at the bargaining table, or that his nuclear ambitions can be controlled by allowing the International Atomic Energy Authority to inspect his reactors. Notions of disarmament agreements worked out with Saddam Hussein in some grand compromise when, if the sanctions take hold, are wishful thinking.

The idea that Saddam Hussein could not survive a negotiated withdrawal from Kuwait—my friend Jim Webb referred to the humiliation that he would experience—intended to pave the way for a settlement that achieves nothing more than a withdrawal from Kuwait is in my judgment dangerous nonsense.

Saddam Hussein survived 8 years of pointless, ineffective and costly war that produced meager gains, then he capitulated to Iran and gave back what little he had won. He survived. He has executed his own citizens on mere suspicion of disloyalty. He has murdered his way to power, and he will murder to remain there.

With each passing day, the risk increases that the coalition to which the President has, to a degree that I would not have recommended, made himself a hostage, will lose its sense of purpose and confidence. Saddam Hussein has kept it together by a foolish intractability that could at any moment give way to blandishments that could stay our hand. We could find ourselves overnight hapless riders on a diplomatic roller coaster.

With each passing day, the risk increases that the Americans and others who are in hiding in Kuwait and Iraq will be caught. Those in hiding outnumber those in captivity by 10 to 1. Delay will mean more, not safer hostages. Two more Americans were routed out just yesterday.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that time is on our side. I do not share the optimism of those who believe that if we only wait long enough, the sanctions will defeat Saddam Hussein.

Some who hold this view believe that the sanctions will become unbearable as time goes on, but the sanctions cannot possibly equal the pain and suffering of the 8 years of war with Iran—300,000 dead, 700,000 maimed, the economy wrecked. The privations of the embargo pale by comparison. Iraq's capacity to absorb pain is very great.

Others who envision waiting many months, or even years, count on crippling shortages overtaking Iraq's military forces. I think that is what General Jones was arguing yesterday. Yet the technical attrition arising from shortages of spare parts, while diminishing some advanced military capabilities, is unlikely to affect Iraq's ground forces significantly. If anything, the passage of time is enabling those ground forces to deepen their defenses.

Those who expect the sanctions to work must be able to describe the mechanism by which their success would secure our interest. Do they anticipate Saddam Hussein surrendering to American MP's in Saudi Arabia, or would effective sanctions lead only as far as the negotiating table, and if that is as far as they get us, what then?

How well does the U.N. coalition bear up during a protracted negotiation? With what iron resolve does it demand Iraq's total and unconditional surrender, or does it end up settling for something less?

But the main reason, Mr. Chairman, why time is no friend, is this: the sanctions, even if they succeed, aim too low. Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait is a beginning. It must not become the end of American policy in the Gulf.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your invitation to appear before the Committee this morning. These hearings have already made an important contribution to an essential national debate about our policy in the Gulf and I am grateful to have been included in these deliberations.

It is now nearly four months since Saddam Hussein's tanks led an onslaught against tiny Kuwait. The results are grim: the murder of innocent civilians, the taking of hostages on a scale unprecedented in this century, threats of mass destruction with chemical weapons, wholesale pillaging, the uprooting of millions, the destruction of a defenseless member state of the United Nations. With an embargo now in place, Saddam Hussein's reign of terror is Iraq's last remaining export.

Before this crisis is over there is a good chance that we will be at war with Iraq. If that war is to earn the support of the American people, its causes and consequences must be understood, its purpose defined, its meaning made plain. "I've had it with Saddam Hussein" is not an argument, and it is not enough. Nor is the astounding notion, advanced recently by Secretary of State Baker, that we are in the Gulf to protect American jobs--as if the issue could be likened to a new round of import quotas or a plant closing.

The war that is coming is not simply about oil, although access to the lifeblood of the industrial world is obviously vital to our economic well being. It is not simply about who controls Kuwait, although the protection of a sovereign state against aggression is fundamental to the future world order. It is not simply about the reach of a malevolent Iraqi tyrant, although containing Saddam Hussein is a shared purpose that unites Soviets and Americans, rich nations and poor ones, even Arabs and Israelis. The coming war against Iraq involves *all* the issues of oil, order, and containment. But it also involves the transcendent issue of America's role in the post cold war world. An American defeat in the Gulf would gravely diminish the strength and authority with which the United States emerged from a half century of opposition to the idea that military power, whether it be Hitler's or Stalin's or Saddam Hussein's, can be allowed to determine the fate of nations. It takes vision to see this, and leadership to make the choices, *all of them risky,* that Saddam Hussein has forced upon us.

What makes the Gulf crisis a defining issue for America is the nakedness of Iraqi aggression. If we fail when the issue is so clear, the aggression so unambiguous, the values so fundamental, the international community so united, how will we fare in the far more common condition of confusion, divided opinion, ambiguity, and moral uncertainty?

Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush, with the support of the United Nations, defined our objective in the Gulf as the removal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait. In early August this was no easy prospect: Saddam Hussein had the offensive forces to attack elsewhere in the Gulf after crushing Kuwait. Our immediate task was to put in place sufficient force to block Iraqi tank columns from continuing down the road to Saudi Arabia's oil fields, which are closer to Kuwait than Baghdad.

The President's first urgent task has been accomplished. Moreover, Iraq's August superiority has now, with the build up of American and allied forces in the region, given way to a far more even match.

This is why we now have not one--I've heard a number of references in these hearings to "*the* military option" --but a multiplicity of military options that did not exist four months ago. It is also why we must now make the transition from buying time to using it for the broader purpose of mobilizing for the destruction of Saddam Hussein's military machine.

OIL. It is a dangerous trivialization of the western interest in oil to suggest that we have sent American boys to the Gulf to protect western access to cheap gasoline. The industrial world cannot survive, much less prosper, without access to oil. The concentration of control over much of the world's oil in the hands of a ruthless demagogue eager to use it as a weapon is a direct threat to our vital interests.

Of course it is true that "Saddam can't drink the oil" he seeks to control. But he *can* potentially manipulate markets in a monopolistic fashion that OPEC's diverse membership has never managed to achieve. And, more important, he hopes to use control over oil to achieve political purposes, the most ominous of which is his ascendancy to the leadership of the Arab masses. If he and his war machine survive the current crisis, he will control directly the combined oil resources of Iraq and Kuwait. Indirectly, he could, with threats and intimidation, compel militarily weak Gulf oil states to do his bidding.

No one can confidently predict how Saddam would use his military power and his influence over the Gulf. That he seeks the destruction of the other Gulf states' leadership is beyond doubt. But where would it stop? No oil for western fleets in the Eastern Mediterranean? No oil for countries unwilling to sell him the technology to complete his drive to acquire nuclear weapons? No oil produced in collaboration with American producers? No oil for countries that extradite terrorists?

And what of the vast revenues he could earn by diminishing the oil production of, say, Saudi Arabia, while expanding his own to maximize Iraqi earnings? They will not be spent on day care centers and the Baghdad Symphony. Support for international terrorism and an anti-western *jihad* would be more likely, along with the installation of little Saddams around the world. The issue is not the price at the pump. It's the independence of the policies of his neighbors now, and the rest of us later. It is up to both branches of government to explain why the oil issue has profound implications for our foreign policy as well as our economy.

ORDER. The administration's talk of the nature of the "new world order" to come out of this crisis strikes many as theoretical, abstract, even quaint. But it is more than that. The defeat of Saddam Hussein will not guarantee a world order unburdened by the weight of military power. But his success will assure that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of weak states is in the hands of men who drive tanks and fire missiles, the men who make poison gas and invest their national wealth in the instruments of war.

To reward aggression anywhere is to encourage it everywhere. That is why there can be no "political" solution to this crisis, no "face-saving" formula of the sort Mr. Primakov has been peddling, no negotiated compromise . which Saddam Hussein, even if he is forced from Kuwait, is allowed to keep the military power he has used to destroy a sovereign state and threaten the destruction of others. One need not be romantic about a "new world order" to fear the scramble to build armies that will afflict the Gulf if Saddam escapes the noose.

What is needed, Mr. Chairman, is a convincing demonstration that the price of aggression is greater than merely returning the spoils. That is why we are right to insist on reparations, on meting out justice for the crimes of war. If that makes compromise more difficult it is because compromise is not good enough.

And what of the American role in the aftermath of a settlement in which Saddam and his military survive to fight another day? Are we to remain in Saudi Arabia with military forces adequate to assure that he will not strike again? Would a "trip wire" presence be enough? For how long could we sustain the policeman's role in the Gulf where the cops, exposed and vulnerable, are outnumbered by the robbers by ten or twenty to one? I agree entirely with Henry Kissinger who yesterday expressed his judgment that we could not sustain a significant long term presence in Saudi Arabia.

In this respect, Mr. Chairman, the argument that because we kept forces in Europe for half a century we should be able to keep them now in the Saudi desert, is wide of the mark. You can lose 300,000 American troops among 250 million Europeans. But try to accommodate and provide a reasonable life for a significant number of Americans in sparsely populated and culturally distinct Saudi Arabia. It can't be done, and a strategy for stability in the Gulf that assumes it can will come tumbling down.

CONTAINMENT. Even before seizing Kuwait, Saddam's megalomaniacal ambitions were obvious. Poison gas. Nuclear weapons. Intercontinental missiles. Militarization at the expense of economic development. Threats of mass destruction. Eight years of war against Iran. A million casualties. Children and old men pressed into military service. Now he pats them on the head for the cameras. Later he will send them to die in Iran or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or on some civilian airplane brought down with a terrorist bomb.

If Saddam had waited to get the nuclear weapon he is trying to build, who would have opposed the invasion of Kuwait? Allow him the time -- he has the money -- to acquire nuclear weapons and the lives at risk will dwarf the losses we and others will suffer by defeating him now. No one knows how close Iraq is to achieving a nuclear capability.

What we *do* know is that Saddam Hussein is doing everything in his power to get it as fast as possible.

On this issue--Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons--there is a facile assumption that he would be deterred from using them. "We deterred the Soviets all the years of the cold war," the argument goes. "We can deter Iraq as well." Yet we did nothing when Iraq used poison gas. We issued thousands of licenses for sensitive technology to Iraq, helping to build Iraq into a superpower. We now hear the argument that Stopping Iraq is not worth the loss of American lives. How can we be glib about the implied threat to use nuclear weapons against Saddam Hussein if he scoffs at our notions of deterrence and uses a nuclear weapon anyway?

It is illusory to believe, as some argue, that Iraq's military power can be contained at the bargaining table or that his nuclear ambitions can be controlled by allowing the International Atomic Energy Authority to inspect his reactors. Notions of disarmament agreements worked out with Saddam Hussein in some grand compromise when --if-- the sanctions take hold are wishful thinking.

The idea that Saddam Hussein could not survive a negotiated withdrawal from Kuwait, intended to pave the way for a settlement that achieves nothing more, is dangerous nonsense. He survived eight years of pointless, ineffective war that produced meager gains. Then he capitulated to Iran and gave back what little he had won. Again he survived. He has executed his own citizens on mere suspicion of disloyalty. He murdered his way to power and he will murder to remain there.

With each passing day the risk increases that the coalition to which the President has made himself a hostage will lose its sense of purpose and confidence. Saddam Hussein has kept it together by a foolish intractability that could, at any moment, give way to blandishments that could stay our hand. We could find ourselves hapless riders on a diplomatic roller coaster. With each passing day the risk increases that the Americans and others who are in hiding in Kuwait and Iraq will be caught. Those in hiding out number those in captivity by ten to one. Delay will mean more, not safer hostages. Two more Americans were rooted out just yesterday.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that time is on our side. I do not share the optimism of those who believe that if we only wait long enough, the sanctions will defeat Saddam Hussein. Some who hold this view believe that the sanctions will become unbearable as time goes on. But the sanctions cannot possibly equal the pain and suffering of the eight years of war with Iran: 300,000 dead, 700,000 maimed, the economy wrecked. The privations of the embargo pale by comparison. Iraq's capacity to absorb pain is very great.

Others who envision waiting many months or even years count on crippling shortages overtaking Iraq's military forces. Yet the technical attrition arising from shortages of spare parts, while diminishing some advanced capabilities, is unlikely to affect Iraq's ground forces significantly. If anything, the passage of time is enabling them to deepen their defenses.

Those who expect the sanctions to "work" must be able to describe the mechanism by which their success would secure our interests. Do they anticipate Saddam Hussein surrendering to American M.P.'s in Saudi Arabia? Or would effective sanctions lead only as far as the negotiating table? And if that's as far as they get us, what then? How well does the U.N. coalition bear up during a protracted negotiation? With what iron resolve does it demand Iraq's total and unconditional surrender? Or does it end up settling for something less?

But the main reason, Mr. Chairman, why time is no friend is this: the sanctions, even if they succeed, aim too low. Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait is a beginning; it must not become the end of American policy in the Gulf.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Perle. You have all given us thoughtful statements and we are the beneficiaries of your appearance. I have one question for you, Secretary Perle, and then one question to Secretary Webb and Dr. Luttwak.

You obviously believe that, as you said, time is not on our side, and you obviously believe that our policy goals do not aim high enough, that we really need to dismantle or destroy the Iraqi capacity to wage war in that area of the world.

What kind of war do you envision? And are you prepared to advocate that we go to war now? I believe that is what you are doing, are you not?

Mr. PERLE. In my judgment, we will not succeed by non-military means. I hope we do, but I think it unlikely that we will.

Chairman NUNN. How long would you give it?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I would certainly give it as long as the United Nations has been prepared to give it. Thereafter, I think the decision to go to war should be determined by whether we, contrary to my expectations, believe that the sanctions will achieve success. Recognizing that, there is a risk that intervening events could prevent us from keeping the option of going to war.

If it does come to war, I, like Edward, believe that a great deal can be accomplished by the use of air power. But I do not think that the history of air power is relevant to the particular circumstances of the Gulf. In this situation, Edward argued that air power was contextual. I think that is right.

There is one aspect to this crisis in particular that makes air power very promising. And that is Iraq's inability to resupply its principal weapons system. So a war of attrition against Iraqi military power is feasible in a way that air power has not been usable in the past.

And let me say, Mr. Chairman, that it would seem to me an entirely plausible approach, if force becomes necessary, to execute air strikes against critical Iraqi installations, to achieve control of the air over Iraq and Kuwait. And then, over many weeks or even months, if necessary, to interdict the supply of Iraqi forces in Kuwait to the point where we could hope to force surrender without engaging the Iraqi army on the ground.

I would not recommend engaging the Iraqi army on the ground, and I have doubts about this most recent increment of force. But I think we must not confuse whatever concerns we may have, and I have heard them expressed by a number of members of the committee, over some of the tactical moves of the administration.

But on the more fundamental question of whether we are unwilling to maintain a live military option, we run the risk of sending a signal that we are simply not ready under any circumstances to use military force.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Secretary Perle. That leads me to my next question. We now have about 230,000 forces in the Middle East. We are, under the President's announcement, going to build to well over 400,000 forces in the Middle East.

Secretary Webb, you indicated at this level that we would need to go to a draft. I have deep fears about the question—what do we do if something else happens in the world? We are concerned about not giving the signal of withdrawal in the Middle East. I do not know of anyone who is counseling withdrawal.

I do not consider it withdrawal to have 230,000 forces there, and then to decide that instead of building up to over 400,000; that when those new forces arrive, you begin rotating so that you at least then do not let the force level and the lack of sustainability, logistically as well as politically, drive you to a policy decision that needs to be made on other grounds.

Do you, Mr. Webb, believe that we should go, and I will also ask Dr. Luttwak, to some kind of rotation policy?

Mr. WEBB. Before I directly answer that, may I dovetail a little bit on what Richard just said about the supposed futility of waiting Saddam Hussein out or waiting the Iraqis out?

Chairman NUNN. Yes, with the committee's indulgence, if I could have that not count against my time, without objection, that will be done. [Laughter.]

Mr. WEBB. I think it is important to remember the recent history in terms of Iraqi moves against Kuwait, because it affects the way that we could have handled this situation at the outset.

In 1961, when the British pulled out of Kuwait, Iraq massed militarily on the border. The British preempted an Iraqi military move by putting forces inside Kuwait. There was a third-party Arab solution. The Kuwaitis basically bought back their country; Iraq went away.

In 1973, Iraqi military forces occupied a portion of Kuwait for more than 3 weeks, almost a month. And through Soviet intermediaries, specifically Admiral Gorshkov, and a third-party Arab solution in which Kuwait paid essentially a ransom to get its country back, the Iraqis withdrew.

So, the point is, if we had begun this with a low level of military commitment and attempted at the outset a type of negotiation where there would have been a mutual withdrawal of American forces out of Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, this issue may have been gone away.

We could have then separated a Kuwait problem from the Saddam Hussein problem, which is of much longer duration. And I should say for the record that I think I am one of the few people in the Reagan administration who opposed, in writing, the tilt toward Iraq in 1987, so I have no great fondness for Saddam Hussein either.

With respect to your question regarding rotation policy, I think we need to understand where we were when this situation began, and what the manpower flow will look like if we have to go to war with the type of structure that is evolving.

Even before this crisis, 43 percent of the U.S. Army was overseas, stationed in Germany and Korea, and about 25 percent of the Marine Corps was outside of the continental United States. We now have a majority, not of the operating units, but a majority of the people in the U.S. Army that are overseas.

You notice that we are beginning to cannibalize units, bringing units down from NATO to put them in under this latest announced buildup. We have no other people, no other units in the pipeline. If we ran casualty estimates on this, and I would be very interested for, the committee, anyway, to get a closed hearing and have the Pentagon planners pull out WARMAPS and just show exactly how they think these scenarios are going to go and what the tally is going to look like with people.

You simply do not have any one else in the pipeline because of the volunteer environment, which works in peacetime, to come in as individual replacements. The individual Ready Reserve and the standby Reserve in the Army today total about 280,000 people, 45 percent of whom were put in there under what is called the

"Transfer in Lieu of Discharge Program," which means they were discharged for unsuitability, apathy, failure to finish basic training, and this sort of thing.

During the opening stages of the Korean war, even though we had the draft in place for 2 years, we used more than 100,000 individual Ready Reserves. When we had the draft in place, we had a million and a half people in this pre-trained manpower pool. We have no people.

By law, it takes 120 days before you can send a draftee overseas. We are looking—this is the end of November—we are looking at January. There are no people in the pipeline. This is a serious problem. It is not a philosophical problem regarding the draft.

With respect to rotation specifically, you cannot do it with two-thirds of the operational forces of the U.S. Marine Corps in the desert and the majority of the Army overseas. The only way you can set up a rotation policy is to reduce the American presence, either through bringing in our allies as we pull people back, or reducing the structure.

And my view would be that we can reduce the structure, have a viable defensive environment over there that could take on the Iraqis if they conducted any sorts of attacks, and better serve our needs around the world.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. My time has expired. Dr. Luttwak, I will come back for your answer on that later.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. I had a joint speaking appearance with Secretary Atwood this morning elsewhere.

First I would like to say, Secretary Perle, I thought you made a very good statement and you brought out some aspects that no other witnesses have particularly in terms of how Saddam Hussein, if he were able to consolidate what his gains have been to date, could have a high influence over the remaining Gulf States, and therefore, have a multiplier of his power.

I am going to step aside from the debates on the tactics and the troop numbers and things of this nature, and ask your advice on the following. Let us address the issue of the moment. Tomorrow the President will be meeting with the leadership of the Congress; some present here today will join in that meeting. And he will again, for the third time, formally solicit our advice. Perhaps you can make an input to those of us who will be present tomorrow.

President Bush has set a record in the history of our country for consultation with the Congress as it relates to a serious national security matter, and I think that is to his credit. I will, at some point, address later the manner in which he has dealt with the Joint Chiefs. In my private meetings, and the Chairman has been present with the Secretary and the Chairman of the JCS, I have been clearly led to the conclusion that there has been an equally, if not greater consultative process between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS throughout this crisis.

But let us return to the issue of the moment, and that is the role of the Congress of the United States. Following the last meeting with the President, I said publicly that I felt that after he returned from the Gulf and reported to the Nation, after the United Nations had completed its deliberation on this present resolution which will be adopted today or tomorrow, that was the time for the leadership of the Congress and the President to collaborate on the issue of whether Congress should be brought back in a formal session to contribute to its policy making role under the Constitution.

If we are going to continue to tout our responsibilities under the Constitution, exclusive to declare war, exclusive to make appropriations or not to make appropriations, then we have the commensurate responsibility to establish what our goals are. And it is my hope that the Congress and the President can establish as nearly as possible a consensus and common goals. And that process, I think, should get under way now before the Christmas session begins.

So let us look at the issue of the Congress, and how that may relate or not relate to the action that is likely to be taken to the United Nations in the form of a new resolution today or tomorrow.

Secretary Perle, why don't you lead off? What do you feel is the role of the Congress? How can we accept the facts as they are? It is the role of the historians of the future to go back and decide whether or not we have done everything right to date. Let us accept the facts as they are today. We are all in this together. It is not the President's problem, it is the Nation's problem. Now, how best can the Congress, the executive branch, and citizens of this country bring to bear all of our intellect and thought to resolve this tough problem?

Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator Warner, I believe that the President is well-advised to convene the Congress to encourage and participate actively in a full and open debate about our interests in the Gulf and the options available to us.

I have some confidence that the basic outline of his policy, if not every detail, will gain endorsement if he does. To credibly maintain the military option, which is critical to whatever hope there may be that the sanctions can work, whether one is optimistic or not, I do not think there is any argument that the sanctions will not be effective unless they are backed up by the potential ultimate resort to force.

So in order to maintain that credibility, I think the President must bring the Congress along. And I believe the Congress will go along. So I would move immediately to convene the Congress for this purpose.

Senator WARNER. And would you suggest that the framework of our discussion be contained in some fashion? We are known to go on at some length occasionally, I think the Christmas period provides a nice backstop and cutoff date which might not be present should we launch this debate in January. But do you think we should have a framework along the lines of the most recent or the anticipated resolution of the United Nations?

Mr. PERLE. It goes without saying that an effort by the President to elicit a specific statement from the Congress that could not earn the majority would gravely weaken our position in this crisis. And that, of course, is the dilemma that the President faces. And I would not want, without knowing more about the predisposition of the congressional leadership, to hazard a guess about the best mechanism.

Some expression of support is vital. And some expression of support, I believe, can be achieved. The danger with seeking specific wording on a resolution is that if you either fail to achieve it, or if availing themselves of the rules of the Senate, which can make it difficult to bring an issue to conclusion, it all winds up inconclusive, then significant damage could be done.

Senator WARNER. Should the American public and the troops and the other nations joining in this know beforehand of the unwillingness of the Congress to accept its responsibility?

Mr. PERLE. I think Congress will accept responsibility.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I believe my time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Perle, I wanted to hear that last part

Mr. PERLE. I am not sure that it is necessary to pass a specific resolution. The sentiment of the Congress would become well-known in the course of a significant national debate in which the President and the Nation take a reading of that sentiment.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Warner, I do not want to interrupt the answer. I try to restrict questions beyond the time limit, but we do not interrupt answers. And if you would like to get an answer to that question from the other two, if they could keep it as short as possible.

Senator WARNER. That is fine.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I agree with what was said. I would simply add that the additional benefit to such a session would be to explore relevant issues which have gone unexamined such as if this is oil for the industrial world, what do we mean by the industrial world in the post-Cold War era, and who is to pay for it?

The Congress is very good at eliciting contributions, I think, from allies that the executive branch is biologically incapable of really coping with.

Mr. WEBB. I would reiterate something that I said before you came in, Senator Warner, which is that we are operating without a mandate from the American people. In this region, there are no treaties. Our people have not been attacked. These are not democracies. The President, under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, has moved forces into the region. Unless they are attacked, if he wants to use these forces in an offensive way, in my view, he needs not a joint resolution, but a declaration of war.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask the indulgence to take 30 seconds to read a reply that I got from an inquiry I just put to the White House to confirm my own understanding.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

Senator WARNER [reading]. "The President has met with the Chiefs and the service Secretaries at the Pentagon including General Schwartzkopf, who was present at that meeting. He has met with General Powell on a weekly basis, and has met with General Schwartzkopf and others at other times. The President will be meeting with the Chiefs this weekend at Camp David." I think that refutes some of the allegations.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I understand he, therefore, has not met the Chiefs yet. He certainly has not met the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator WARNER. The President has met with the Chiefs and the service Secretaries, General Schwartzkopf being present at the

Pentagon. He has met weekly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has a meeting scheduled this weekend with the Chiefs at Camp David.

Mr. **Webb**. The question in my testimony was in what form the advice came to the President in August.

Chairman **Nunn**. We are going to be asking very important questions about whether the Chiefs feel they have access to the President. The Goldwater-Nichols Act explicitly made it clear that the Chiefs were able, under the law, to request meetings with the President, and of course, as has already been observed by our witnesses, there is certainly nothing to keep the President from meeting with the Chiefs. We will be getting into that. Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and I have listened to every word that you have said.

Secretary Perle, I underlined two parts of your prepared statement as I listened. On page 4, you say, "I do not believe that time is on our side." And on page 1, you used the phrase "the war that is coming is not simply about oil." I take it then that if we listened to what you have said and take your whole statement in context, you really do believe that after January 15 the President should have the authority to launch an aggressive attack against Saddam Hussein to attempt to achieve the liberation of Kuwait?

Mr. **Perle**. Yes. I believe he should have that authority.

Senator **Exon**. Given that, Secretary Webb, and Dr. Luttwak, I took it that you have almost directly opposite views on that particular proposition.

None of us want to do anything to help Saddam Hussein, but there are many of us who are not in accordance with the views expressed here this morning and have been expressed earlier, implied or outright, by the administration, that the only option now is to go to war when only 90 days ago, the direct opposite of what was advanced to the people of the United States by the Commander in Chief. Then it was Desert Shield. Now, suddenly, it has become Desert Sword. And we have not yet figured out on these series of hearings what caused that abrupt change. I would simply ask recommendations from you, Secretary Webb, and Dr. Luttwak, what actions do you think would you recommend to us as Members of Congress to take at this particular juncture?

Mr. **Webb**. I would say, Senator, that if we look at the history of American military engagement since the end of World War II, executive department wars are enormously difficult to conduct and also to sustain in a democracy.

Also, I do not believe that any one man should have the authority in a democracy to order thousands of people to their deaths. I think that is why the Constitution was constructed the way that it is constructed. If this is worth doing—I am not talking about the inherent right of self-defense if our forces are attacked—but if going on the offensive is worth doing, then it is worth doing in a way that will bind the Congress and the American people to the effort.

Probably no clearer signal could be sent to Saddam Hussein than a declaration of war, which means that we are in a state of war. That does not mean that we are going to attack tomorrow, but that the United States is irreversibly committed as a nation to doing what the President has been saying that we are doing.

I would hope that that would be the form of the debate if the President wishes to go on the offensive. I personally do not believe this is worth a war, but let us have the debate. And if the vote is taken, then everybody can shut up and go about the business of doing it.

Dr. LUTTWAK. First, Congress can clarify facts. If you point out the arithmetic whereby a large force cannot be employed in ground combat without instituting a draft in order to provide replacements, you are not threatening, you are not limiting, you are simply identifying facts which have their own objective existence.

Second, you can advise constructively. You can say, for example, Mr. President, your policy has been very successful. The only problem is that the big buildup is not sustainable, let us change the big buildup into a replacement. After all, we have light divisions, sent initially in August, which are not operationally or tactically terribly useful in most configurations—the 82nd, the 7th and so on—in desert conditions. And so we are now bringing in armored forces, we will take these forces back, and so on. In other words, do not clash, but cooperate. And I think this can be done, and it has been done.

And the final thing is a declaration of war. If we have a declaration of war, then there is nothing whatever to prevent this war being pursued by the traditional method which has been used historically to deal with troublemakers overseas that did not threaten survival—various banditries and so on—which is the method of blockade.

You declare war and you decide in the interim that you follow the method of blockade and that is—and which, by the way, is the only method that prevents that growth in the Iraqi military power that motivates the bulk of my friend Richard Perle's statement.

Richard Perle says you have followed this building of great strength. Answer: only the blockade prevents that. Physical destruction of what he already has is less important than a blockade. And why not simply maintain it?

A final remark. Nothing that you do, as I understand it, and I am not an expert in these matters, will in any way tie the President's hands or the hands of anybody else in taking such action as may be needed at any time to protect U.S. forces from something that Iraq has initiated. So I do not think you have to feel paralyzed.

Thank you.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just want to make a brief statement to you and to the ranking member of the committee. I take it that there is going to be some kind of a meeting tomorrow between congressional leaders and President Bush. Senator Warner indicated that earlier. I think that is a good idea.

I warn against any agreement that might be reached tomorrow between you and Senator Warner and the President without full consultation with the rest of the committee. I do not think that we want once again to get into a situation like we got on a much more minor manner, comparatively speaking, with the failure of the budget summit that was agreed to by the leaders, but was not agreed to by the followers.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Exon, I understand your position. [Laughter.]

A point of clarification on the Joint Chiefs, and this is an important question. I will make sure it is understood by everyone as to what the law is under Goldwater-Nichols, and in fact, if I have my colleagues' permission here, I will read you section 1.51, "Advice and opinion of members other than the Chairman, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff other than the Chairman may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with or advice on opinion in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be."

Section E, "Advice on Request. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually or collectively in their capacity as military advisors shall provide to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary request such advice." So that is the law now. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, may I add that there have been no dissenting views received by the President from any members of the JCS to date.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to welcome you gentlemen here. We have a large committee, and they all ask questions. So if you make your answers as brief as you can we would appreciate it.

Secretary Webb, I do not recall any crisis in recent history which has united the community of nations more than Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. What message would we send to any future aggressor if we now did not follow through and force Saddam out of Kuwait either by sanctions or combat?

Mr. **Webb**. The question, Senator, in my view, is not whether we should continue to stand up to Saddam Hussein's aggression. The question is whether we should go on the offensive based on an inverted force structure and an artificial sense of timing; in other words, whether we should pull the trigger for offensive action simply because of the force structure that has evolved. That is a fear that I have.

My recommendation in my testimony was that we dramatically reduce the size of our presence, put it into a workable defensive posture and seek the cooperation of our allies. If the world community is indeed united, they will do a lot more than simply nod their heads in agreement that it is okay for the United States to use force in this region and, as Mr. Luttwak said, begin showing up with some of their own soldiers to take the load off of an overstressed American military system.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Secretary, you have not answered the question.

Mr. WEBB. I believe I have, sir.

Senator THURMOND. You posed your own question and answered it. This is my question. I am asking you what message would we send to any future aggressor if we now did not follow through and force Saddam out of Kuwait either by sanctions or combat?

Mr. WEBB. Well, my answer to you is that that is not even in the realm of what I was testifying to. I do not think that we are going to do that.

Senator THURMOND. I know it is not, but you answer my question. That is the question I asked you. Now what is your answer?

Mr. WEBB. I have no idea.

Senator THURMOND. All right, that is the answer.

Dr. Luttwak, in your judgment what would have been the outcome of this crisis had President Bush not reacted in a forceful manner in response to the Iraqi aggression?

Dr. LUTTWAK. If President Bush had threatened Iraq with bombardment early on if he advanced into Saudi Arabia, we would be exactly where we are now except we would not have all these troops in Saudi Arabia.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Luttwak, in the event the embargo is successful and we reach a diplomatic solution to this crisis, can we allow Saddam Hussein to maintain a military capability in terms of chemical and possibly nuclear weapons?

Dr. LUTTWAK. No, sir, but the problem is not just Saddam Hussein. The problem extends from Morocco to Bangladesh. We are badly in need of an arms denial regime as we had under the tripartite alliance agreement in 1950; total arms denial, no weapons to anybody. That would be the true new world order.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, in an article entitled "Pull No Punches on Saddam", you state, and I quote, "when the time comes the Iraqi army will collapse far faster than many observers expect."

What is your basis for such an evaluation?

Mr. PERLE. I wrote that article, Senator, at a time when one heard daily about a million-man, battle-hardened army. The Iraqi army was then being painted larger than life. The fact is that in the long war with Iran, Iraq, often facing teenagers with carbines, was unable to achieve a significant victory until it used poison gas, and even then it was a victory of small proportions.

If you look at the population of Iraq, it is clear that much of that million-man army, which probably is not 1 million men anyway, are men who would in most societies be considered either too young or too old to do credit on the battlefield.

The tactics of the Iraqi army are highly static. They are vulnerable to air attack, and in my judgment, Senator, it is impossible to measure the loyalty of an army in a police state in which there is a reign of terror. So I expect that if the fighting begins, we will see massive defections from the Iraqi army when it experiences for the first time, the kind of fire power that can be brought to bear by American air power.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Webb, based upon your experience as the Secretary of the Navy, how long can we keep our forces deployed in the region, assuming we maintain the current operational tempo and level of supplies?

Mr. WEBB. I would say in terms of what I have been able to observe, not being inside the Pentagon anymore, they are probably fairly near the stress point in terms of naval forces unless you start downsizing and rotating your units again.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, numerous articles both pro and con have been written about the strength of the coalition that the President and Secretary of State had formed in response to the Iraqi invasion. The question is how solid is this coalition and can we expect it to hold together at the critical moment?

Mr. PERLE. Senator Thurmond, it is very solid, with a great deal of help from Saddam Hussein whose intractability has enabled the coalition to remain cohesive.

What I worry about is the vitality of that coalition if and when we see an Iraqi peace offensive and the issues become cloudy. Now they are clear. One of the reasons why I fear waiting as long as some have suggested—although I certainly did not mean to suggest to Senator Exon that we should go to war on January 16—is that the disagreements on objectives which are now masked by Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to discuss withdrawal from Kuwait will rise to the surface.

So I think it is a tenuous coalition under the circumstances of a more effective Iraqi diplomacy.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the panel for in a very significant and important way illustrating the horrors and the cost of conflict or war and from very special perspectives, again indicating that the price of war would not be cheap. Certainly one can gather, as I do, that we ought to exhaust all the peaceful alternatives before we consider the alternative of conflict.

A number of us have inquired from you about your own kinds of positions about how we can try as a nation to pull ourselves in a common direction. I think that is enormously important. This has been reiterated by those who have had different positions with regard to whether we ought to move in a more aggressive form now or whether we ought to give sanctions a chance. So I would like to get a reaction from our panel about this type of approach.

I have supported for some period of time a special session of the Congress, I believe the sooner the better. I hope the Congress will make clear that sanctions need time to work and that going to war now or in the next few months would be a mistake that could cost the lives of thousands of Americans for no justifiable reason.

At the same time, I regard the United Nations resolution as a constructive step and an impressive achievement by the United States in marshalling the strongest possible collective support of the international community against Iraq's aggression. There is no necessary inconsistency between the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of military force after January 15, 1991 and a policy giving sanctions more time to work before such force is actually used.

So President Bush now has all the authority it needs from the international community, including the appropriate use of force, to deal effectively with Iraq's aggression. In practical terms, President

Bush can now put the U.N. resolution in the bank and draw on it in timely ways.

The United Nations cannot decide when America goes to war. Under the Constitution, only Congress and the administration can make that decision for our country. So when Congress returns to session, a realistic compromise would be for Congress to approve a resolution very similar to the United Nations resolution but with one very important modification: that we should change the date from January 15, 1991 to August 2, 1991. That change would allow 1 full year after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait for the sanctions to work and to prove that they can work. Then as we approach the August 2 date next summer, Congress would, of course, have the opportunity to extend the date for an additional period if it is clear that more time is necessary before we resort to force.

What we need most now that the hearings have clearly demonstrated is bipartisan consensus on the Persian Gulf, not partisan division. At the present time no consensus is either possible or even desirable for early war. The country is deeply divided over that alarming prospect and so is the Congress. So I hope that a session of Congress would be convened in December in time to end the current divisions and achieve the bipartisan consensus that our policy needs in order to succeed.

Mr. Webb, a number of our colleagues, including the ranking minority Member, Mr. Warner, Mr. Exon and others, inquired of the panel about ways that we can be constructive and also be together in a way that serves the national interest. We are all searching for ways. We know that tomorrow morning is going to be important, and what happens in the Foreign Relations Committee next week is going to be important, as well as the hearings that we have next Monday. Hopefully, if we do have a session, which I strongly hope we will, that will be important.

Can you help us find some ways to find some common ground? Does this appear to be a useful suggestion?

Mr. **Webb**. Yes, it does, Senator. Conceptually, in terms of having a session of Congress dedicated to this issue, I would hope that perhaps three things could come out of this sort of dialogue. One would be a true clarification of what the goals of this country are in the region.

As I mentioned earlier, we have lumped the Kuwait problem with the Saddam Hussein problem, and as you can tell just from the testimony today, we have got so many different versions of exactly what it is that we would even dedicate the use of force toward.

Are we talking about the nuclear capability? Are we talking about eliminating Saddam Hussein? Are we talking about driving troops out of Kuwait? I think we need to hear from people in the administration on that and to have a clarification regarding the Nation's goals in the area.

Another thing that I would hope would be put on the table is a clear indicator of what the costs of this United Nations resolution are going to be to this country in terms of obligations that have been made to other countries in exchange for this kind of support.

It seems to me that we are putting an awful lot of our international eggs into one basket on the hope that it is going to create this so-called new world order. We are dealing with people, with nations, many of whose leaders have their own agenda.

We have narrow agreement on the issue of the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, but there is a whole panoply of other issues. The Syrians come immediately to mind. Hafez al-Assad has an equally odious history, as does Saddam Hussein.

Third, I would hope that the Congress would say that if the United States is going to initiate an offensive war in this region, that it should be done only after the Congress votes the Nation into a state of war.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you Senator Kennedy.

Dr. LUTTWAK. If I could say very briefly that in the first place Congress in session instead of Congress being on holiday on ski slopes, and so on, tells the troops who may be asked to die that at least the Nation is deliberating most earnestly about the issue.

Second, I will reiterate that nothing you can do by such a session in any way constrains the hands of the President in acting, if he needs to, to protect our forces against Iraqi attack.

Finally, I do hope that the effect of deliberations and discussions as usual would be to go away from the immediate problem of Saddam Hussein to the wider issue of stability for the region.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Perle?

Mr. PERLE. I do not want to impose on the committee's time, Senator Kennedy, but I would think that a resolution that set August 2, 1991, as the earliest date on which the President would be authorized to take military action except in defense would devastate the United Nations consensus that has been painstakingly and perhaps even too costly put together.

The U.N. has selected, or is in the process of selecting, January 15 as the date, and I would strongly urge that you consider the consequences of choosing a date other than that agreed upon by the Security Council of the United Nations. That does not mean the President would go to war on January 16. I do not believe he should. But different authorization than that of the United Nations would do great harm to the coalition, in my judgment.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. I was going to pick up on this point. I think the witnesses yesterday presented an entire inconsistency, with all due respect, on the one hand urging the United Nations to authorize the use of force by a specific date, and saying that that would send a very positive message to Saddam Hussein and to our troops and help morale, and then urge this committee, and ultimately the Congress, to vote to delay any use of force, at least for a year to 18 months.

I think that while on the one hand the U.N. resolution does convey a sense of immediacy—whether one agrees with it or not, it does convey a sense of immediacy—a proposition that one would delay for 6 months, 8 months, or 18 months, is clearly a delay in the use of force, and so I think that they are entirely inconsistent and we ought to try and reconcile them one way or the other, either by having a delayed date from the U.N., or having perhaps no date at all, but to have inconsistent dates I think is the wrong approach.

Mr. Chairman, reference has been made to Goldwater-Nichols. The Chairman of the committee played a very important role in that particular issue, and I think it is interesting to note that Goldwater-Nichols is now cited as a barrier to prevent the President from hearing the full range of opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I recall, this committee played a very instrumental role in passing Goldwater-Nichols, because we came to the conclusion that the entire apparatus for developing a consensus within the Joint Chiefs of Staff inevitably led to paralysis rather than any action, and the consensus produced turf wars within the Pentagon rather than on the battlefields, and that was the reason why we passed Goldwater-Nichols, and I think it has done nothing to impede the President from getting a full range of opinion.

I do think there is some consensus among our witnesses pertaining to the participation of our allies, which I think has been deplorable to date, principally by Germany and Japan. I noticed last week in The Washington Post a story about Germany's role, and Mr. Lafontaine has been playing to the applause of German audiences by saying, "First we send Iraq chemicals and missiles, and then we are to send our young men to fight against them? Never."

Well, I assume from that they prefer to continue to send chemicals and missiles to Iraq, but the notion that somehow they bear no responsibility to help defend against Iraqi aggression it seems to me is totally unacceptable, and their contribution to date has been minimal, at best.

I also note, with some irony, that on the very same day that a major Japanese corporation decided to pay $6.1 billion for the purchase of a Hollywood studio, the Japanese Government announced they were willing to send $3 million worth of medical supplies to help out in Saudi Arabia. That irony has not been lost on me, nor will the message and the lesson from that in future deliberations about what our role is going to be with respect to our allies.

Dr. Luttwak, I would like to ask you a question. You said that if you were the President, and you had been sleeping throughout this crisis that has been developing in the Persian Gulf, and suddenly someone woke you up and said, Dr. Luttwak—President Luttwak—we have got a problem. Saddam Hussein has just moved into Kuwait. And you, waking up from your sleep, your response is well, tell him this: one more step toward Saudi Arabia and we bomb. The question I have is, bomb where, what, and with what at that time?

Dr. LUTTWAK. In the first instance, you will be using long range means of air attack.

Senator COHEN. I am going back to August now.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes. Instantaneously, the only thing you have will be B-52s operating, even from Loring, but also you would have them in Guam, and so on. Loring Air Force Base of course, Senator, most importantly. [Laughter.]

Then of course you would have, and we had, a sequential deployment presence, whereby the F-111s out of Britain, moved in, and we have F-15s coming down from Germany, and so on.

Senator COHEN. What would we be bombing?

Dr. LUTTWAK. First of all, there would have to be large fixed targets, buildings.

Senator COHEN. Baghdad?

Dr. LUTTWAK. No, sir. When you have large buildings to hit, you would go for buildings which are separated out—that is, in compounds—and that would be appropriately things like the weapon assembly lines, the facilities connected with the missile fabrication and that sort of thing. I do not see why you would want to bomb innocent civilians at large in Baghdad or Basra or any other settlement, when you have perfectly good military targets, well demarcated from civilian settlement.

Senator COHEN. And we have the same capability right now, and even more so, in your judgment?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. In other words, you could bomb the same targets today as you could have back in August?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Except with one exception. Because we did not exercise the option early, we have given ample time, of course, for dispersal. Some facilities, such as chemical plants, cannot be dispersed. Other things, such as ammunition holdings, can, of course, be dispersed infinitely.

Senator COHEN. Can I ask you what you anticipate the Iraqi reaction is going to be should the decision be made to bomb these buildings, or structures? Is it your understanding that the Iraqis now in Kuwait would simply sit there and wait to be cut off from their supplies?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Air power is very costly when used to dig out ground forces dug in, camouflaged and dispersed, but air power is highly effective when the same ground forces get on the road and attempt to drive down the road. We have 10:1 ratios, and so if you had bombed and they decided to move, the same air power that you would have bombed them with could have interrupted their advance very effectively.

Senator COHEN. The question is, what do the Iraqis do who are sitting in Kuwait? Do they just sit there, or do they fire their missiles?

Dr. LUTTWAK. They would undoubtedly—they could undoubtedly, if you chose to bomb gratuitously other things and not bomb their multiple sites where they have the Scuds and shelters and so on, to degrade the number of Scuds, which would be a very strange thing to do. They would fire them off.

Now, we have observed these upgraded Scuds being fired. Three hundred plus were fired at Iran. We know roughly what they would do. They would, of course, be launching them in a new vector, in a new direction, so they would have to go through a process of—as they did in Tehran they would fire some missiles, observe the fall through friendly embassies and correct, and so on. So I do not think the 10, 12, 15 Scuds you would expect—upgraded Scuds—would escape destruction in the first air strike. I would be amazed if they inflicted significant damage.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Bingaman, or Senator Dixon.

Senator **Dixon**. Secretary Webb, I must say I am fully in agreement with a number of things that you say in the course of your statement, and I would like to ask you to go to page 2 of your remarks, under "Military Strategy."

You say, "Recent history indicates that had the President dispatched a modestly structured air ground presence to Saudi Arabia and then begun negotiating a mutual withdrawal of American and Iraqi forces from their respective positions, the crisis may have been over by now. Britain employed this strategy in 1961. The Soviets were able to defuse an Iraqi occupation of portions of Kuwait in 1973."

I agree with that. I have said since the day we went in that the President was right in what he initially did. Being there in substantial force, dominant in the air and on the sea, and with reasonable numbers on the ground, I think from that position with an embargo and sanctions in place, we could have negotiated the kind of withdrawal that would have been in American national interest. Do you agree with that?

Mr. **Webb**. Yes, I do, Senator, and in fact I was in full support of what the President initially did. I thought it was appropriate to draw the line in the sand, as he put it, to defend—to make it clear that we were going to defend any further encroachment.

If we had been able, somehow to anticipate the crisis better we probably could have done a preemptive move inside Kuwait itself, which is what the British did in 1961. But at least in terms of problem-solving technique, that would have been, in my view, a good place to start.

Senator **Dixon**. Well, let us deal, then, with the next step that bothers a lot of us. This recent augmentation of forces puts us in a position, I think, where we are left with several unfortunate alternatives, none of which are very good, and you point out at the bottom of the page again something that I fully agree with.

Since a majority of the U.S. Army is now overseas, and since two-thirds of the operational forces of our Marine Corps will be sitting in the desert, we cannot maintain the size of our commitment for much longer without running into problems of human endurance, nor could we develop a rotational base for deployed units without decreasing the size of the commitment.

So I ask you, is it not a fact that we are now placed, by the augmentation of these forces, in this unfortunate situation where our alternatives are, either we reduce forces and lose face, and I suspect somehow foul the nest completely, or we initiate a draft, which would, I think, substantially increase our standing forces so that we could get into a rotation policy that makes sense, keep our logistical commitments and other things, and maintain readiness and sustainability over there, or we follow the alternative, I guess, which some of the administration may be whispering to the President, of entering into some sort of hostilities. Is that not about where we are right now?

Mr. **Webb**. I would say that the unfortunate result of this strategy is that it was designed to force Saddam Hussein's hand, and the end result has been that it has forced the hand of our own government. That was probably the most important part of what I was attempting to say with a question about the development of the strategy as I related it to Goldwater-Nichols. I just think we need to maybe understand, when the dust settles on this, how this entire strategy evolved.

Senator DIXON. That is what I wanted to pursue just a little further with you. You are a highly decorated veteran of Vietnam. You have served with distinction as Secretary of the Navy, and you have the background and understanding of this.

Where, along the line here, did we get to the place where now the President, through advice I suppose he has received from some around him, has committed himself to this course of this fast augmentation of our ground forces, which to me is that thin line we have crossed that gives us this difficulty now? How did that happen?

Mr. WEBB. In all due respect, I would say that that question would be better addressed to the people who evolved the strategy.

I would say that—I wrote an editorial in The New York Times in September, before the second increment of ground forces was sent over, expressing my concern, even at that time, about the extent of the ground troop build-up in the region, and how it was having a negative strategic impact on what we were attempting to do.

Senator DIXON. I think the dichotomy of it is that here is a situation that I think—we talk about needing the support of the Congress and the country for doing effectively doing what we are doing. Here is a situation where we had at the beginning—I do not have any quarrel with that, and I think it was almost unanimous in the Congress. I went home to town hall meetings. It was almost unanimous in my State. We had a President who was fully supported in what he was doing, and somewhere along the line now, somewhere we have made a mis-step that I think is deeply damaging to that fragile situation that previously existed. Would you agree with that?

Mr. WEBB. Yes, I would.

Senator DIXON. Secretary Perle, I am of course a great admirer of yours. You had suggested to Senator Thurmond that you regarded this as a solid coalition, and I wondered how you define that, in view of the fact that here is Germany and Japan, many countries that will profit so greatly by what we are doing there.

I do not have any sense, my constituents have no sense, that this is a solid coalition where everybody is pulling their own oar and carrying their share of the load. Where is that solid coalition, Secretary Perle?

Mr. PERLE. I did not go so far as to suggest that——

Senator DIXON. Well, that is what I call a solid coalition.

Mr. PERLE. And in fact, I do not even regard the Germans as participants in the coalition. The German policy is a disgrace. German companies have supplied Iraq, over the years, with weapons of mass destruction. The German Government has done little or nothing to stop it, and now, when we find ourselves in harm's way partly as a result of their action, we get very little support from the German Government.

Senator DIXON. I hate to impose, but could I ask one quick question of Secretary Perle?

Chairman Nunn. I think we need to confine it to this question. That is what we have been doing. We will let him answer that question, whoever you want to answer the question.

Senator Dixon. Well, as part of that——[Laughter.]

I simply wanted to say, Secretary Perle, when you talk about a U.N. consensus and Security Council action and so forth, I wonder whether everybody is going to join us in numbers and in additional help, and people will die in equal numbers over there with Americans. Is that going to occur?

Mr. Perle. No. The sad truth, Senator, is that we will not get the kind of participation we should from countries whose interests in the region are as vital as ours. That has always been the situation we have faced in this century of American leadership. I fear it will continue to be the case.

But it seems quite wrong for us to fail to take action in our own interest because others do not join us to the degree that we think is justified. You often face the dilemma of whether you will be forced to inaction on the basis of someone else's indifference or malfeasance or misfeasance.

Chairman Nunn. I think Dr. Luttwak would like to address one of your several questions, Senator Dixon.

Dr. Luttwak. Senator, I think, I myself have been guilty of this, but I think it is unfair to speak of the sins of the Japanese, of the sins of the Germans and so on. The reality of the matter is that in August, the invasion took place. We did not sit down and say, "Well, this threatens the interests of the industrialized world, including the United States, although the United States is much less dependent. And now, let us see if all these people want to move in."

And we go to them and say to them, to the Japanese, the Germans, then the Koreans and the Belgians and such, "Are you interested in the security of your oil supplies? And if so, what are you prepared to do about it?"

What we did instead is we rushed in with boyish enthusiasm and to what, and also, with an impulse that, to other people around the world, looked like a flight from the difficulties of real life, as it were, fling ourselves in this reprise, a geopolitical reprise, another great adventure, a military adventure.

You know, this is the new United States, not the solvent United States of the past, majestic democracy and also wealthy, but rather the sort of no money, no skills, have gun, will travel, sort of United States. [Laughter.]

And once you freely—if you eagerly offer free services to people, this is something that in other walks of life is well known—if you freely offer your services, you cannot then ask for payment. And our requests, our various begging requests—which have personally humiliated me; I had been in Japan when our Secretary was visiting, begging for money—have been met with icy contempt.

Because we prattle about the industrialized world, but they do not consider this, they do not agree with us, in effect. And they may well be right.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today the former Secretary of the Navy, James Webb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle, and Edward Luttwak from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I look forward to their testimony.

I continue to believe that patience is currently the best course of action in the Gulf crisis. I continue to support the President's policy of placing the initial United States forces in Saudi Arabia and his policy of pursuing a resolution of the crisis through an embargo. It is the projected ground force build-up and the future actions in the region which I feel necessitate a debate and require the administration to make a convincing case.

I want to ensure that the President exercises every option to seek a peaceful resolution through diplomatic initiatives—either through the United Nations or the Arab League, or any other productive means.

However, I do agree with Admiral Crowe and General Jones, witnesses before this committee, that Saddam Hussein should be aware that discussing the President's actions does not mean that we disagree with the President at this time.

I look forward to hearing the views of the distinguished panel on these concerns which vitally affect all of us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon. Next, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Luttwak, for your continued support of Loring Air Force Base. Over the years, you and I have grown to know Senator Cohen's commitment there, and the disappearance of Loring would mean the end of national security as we know it.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I fully agree.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. A lot of the questions I had, have already been answered. I would like to make several points and ask for your response, and maybe one specific question.

First of all, I am pleased that you are generally in support of a special session of Congress. I have for some time believed that it is of critical importance. And the timing is critically important, not just because of Christmas, but because of the fact that the American people need to go on record through their duly elected representatives.

On the issue of the draft, I think, (1) it sends a wrong signal; (2) that if we have to resort to a draft, that means that all of our strategy and plans for a peacetime military to cope with, in this grand scheme of things, a relatively small contingency would no longer be valid. And we would have wasted enormous sums on high-tech equipment and the air power that we will get into in a minute, which should preclude us from having to have a massive callup of young Americans.

As far as the air power itself, I agree with you, Dr. Luttwak, except for the fact that I think that, we would have to neutralize some significant air defense capabilities and we would have to neutralize clearly their air assets and the airfields. The downtown Baghdad prospect, of course, is not, one, either necessary, nor, in my view, psychologically correct for us to inflict needless civilian casualties on Iraqis or anyone else.

I would suggest that a declaration of war means that we intend to go to war. I would suggest that a declaration of support for the use of force if necessary still sends a message to Saddam Hussein that a wide variety of options are still available.

Rotation policy, I think, is putting the cart before the horse. First, we ought to figure out what our goals and objectives and tactics are before we address the issue of who gets rotated when, because, so far, we do not have consensus on how we would carry out our military operations if called on to do so.

But does this not also, in the long term, I would ask the three witnesses, bring us back to this issue of proliferation? It is not just the Iraqis that have this significant chemical and possible nuclear capability. The Syrians are just as bad, in my view, just as guilty.

It was mentioned by one of the witnesses about the Germans and other nations, including the United States to some degree, being culpable in helping these nations acquire these weapons of mass destruction. If this scenario were 10 years from now, where we were faced with this same threat, and events proceed as they have in the last decade, we would be facing an adversary with nuclear capability and possibly the means to deliver it.

So do we not get into the larger issue, once we get through this crisis, which we will one way or another, of nuclear proliferation, of nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation problems? Maybe we would start with you, Mr. Perle. And do you have any comments on what I said? And also, the issue of proliferation and how we address it?

Mr. **Perle**. We need to face squarely the poor system of export controls that has enabled a country like Iraq to receive from the Western industrialized world not only the aircraft that it flies and the missiles that it owns and operates, but the production of chemical and biological weapons and the technical base for the eventual production of nuclear weapons.

It is a scandal that the administration chose to veto, in the midst of this crisis, a tough measure that would automatically have imposed sanctions on companies knowingly selling the means to manufacture chemical weapons, for example. It was an absurdly misplaced sense of the prerogatives by the executive branch, in my view, which objected to the automaticity of the sanctions. And yet, only if sanctions are automatic, given the predisposition of the Commerce Department, are they going to be in the least credible.

I hope that this committee—since others clearly are not inclined to do more—will consider some very tough measures to restrain the proliferation of technologies and weapons systems going outside the industrialized nations that possess those technologies. In particular, to places like the Middle East.

Senator **McCain**. And the key to that is exposure and sanctions, is that correct?

Mr. **Perle**. That is right. If it were the law of the United States that any company, whether American or foreign, which sold the means to produce weapons of mass destruction to other countries, were prevented from doing business in the territory of the United States, for example, in the event of a foreign company, it would stop overnight. Because there are major multinational German, Swiss, French, British, and other corporations involved in fueling Saddam Hussein's instruments of mass destruction. And the benefits they achieve from servicing that market are trivial alongside their interests in this country.

If we got serious about it, we could quickly change the availability of these technologies to men like Saddam Hussein. I do not understand why we have failed to do it.

Dr. **Luttwak**. Senator McCain, I well remember how you have been personally focusing on this issue for several years. I remember your speech in Germany, and very powerful, it was, too, a couple of years ago.

People like yourself who have been making a special effort in this area are particularly vulnerable to the failure to recognize that we have undergone a great transition here. During the Cold War, we had to be indulgent with all kinds of countries because we needed their cooperation against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, we ourselves aggressively pushed weapons to strengthen allies and potential allies and so on.

The Cold War is over. Therefore, whereas the valiant efforts that you and your colleagues made were, in those circumstances, what you might call substrategic, they were going against the mainstream strategy. You constantly found yourself quarreling with desk officers who said, "Senator, we have to keep these people in line against the Soviet Union."

Today, the situation is different. This has now become the mainline of strategy, no longer a side. And I think that this matter, what I am saying basically, Senator, is that, by all means, but, take it out stronger and recognize that, from a secondary issue it has become a primary issue.

Mr. **Webb**. There is nothing that I could add to the expertise of these other two gentlemen on the area of proliferation. I would like to briefly comment on the issue of the draft. This is not—I am not coming here with a political recommendation.

If I may, this is a piece of advice from having spent 3 years as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, responsible for studying WARMAPS, looking at manpower flow, and this sort of thing.

You cannot say, this is a minor peacetime commitment, when we have two-thirds of the operational forces of the Marine Corps outside of the continental United States and a majority of the Army. The way you figure out manpower structurally, analytically, is to look at casualty flow. What your hospital structure is going to look like, what are called operational bed policy. How many people can you move back—keep in theater to move back into the units if they are wounded. What happens to strategic airlift. How many people you get out. How many people you lose because of inadequate medical care.

The present situation is that the U.S. Army graduates about 700 combat soldiers a week from its basic training programs. The pretrained individual manpower pool is down from about 1.6 million to about 280,000, and those are soft assets. If we are seriously considering a ground offensive operation, then we have to consider manpower flow. If the structure of our forces over there were different, it would not be an issue.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think with all the emphasis on the U.N. today and how the vote up there comes out, we may be overemphasizing all of that. For what we may be about to do it is nice to have the U.N. as a moral back-up, but this is not going to be a U.N. war per se, if war breaks out.

If it is a U.N. conflict, then let the Security Council gather the people, go over there, do it, and get equal representation rather than having U.S. forces carry the bulk of the load, as we are obviously going to do. Regardless, it is still going to be an American decision.

It has been mentioned several times this morning about the support of the American people, and I think when the people understand and back a particular foreign policy decision, that is one thing, but we stand ready to make the same mistakes we made in Vietnam all over again, when in that conflict, the people were not behind the war, and we finally had to get out of there.

The President does not go to war. It's the Nation that goes to war. The people of this country have to be committed to a war if it is going to be successful. Unfortunately, I think the press succumbs to the passion and rhetoric, and has overlooked the essential policymaking questions of this crisis. We have a big press representation here today.

The press thrives on "sound bite" policy. They really like to report on the evening news the picture of the President saying, "I have had it," or about the mistreatment of hostages or embassy rights, "Hitler-like," nuclear weapons danger—that greatly overexaggerated impression of nuclear danger, all of these things.

I would challenge the press to say how many times the press has recently emphasized with equal vigor the underlying, yet highly significant rationale that 70 percent of the world's oil reserves are in the Gulf region. That is the driving reason as to why we are over there to begin with. We are not there simply because there was aggression into Kuwait. If every time a border is crossed some place and we send 400,000 troops out, we are in for a lot of troop transfers back and forth around the world, I can guarantee that.

We are there because of oil, whether we like it or not. We are there because of similar U.N. collective security actions in the future, our long-term relationships with the Arab world, the balance of power in the Middle East, the preponderance of chemical weapons and possibly nuclear, and the interests of Israel.

Yet that is not what we are talking about with the American people, and it is not what the President is talking about, and yet it is imperative that these elements be understood if the American people are going to back a war. God help us if the American people fail to recognize these considerations, and we get into another situation like Vietnam, where the American people saw the horrors of war up close every night on the television.

That ended the Vietnam war, and it is that simple, and if we get into another conflict with that same lack of understanding from the onset, I just think it is tragic, and I want to state that for the record.

Secretary Webb, I agree with you completely on the issues regarding manpower. We worked in the past on the Manpower Subcommittee with you, and you did an excellent job when you were in there, and I appreciate your comments here this morning.

In particular, you remember that we assigned 80 percent of combat medical to the whole Reserve force. We are 71 percent short of doctors in that reserve. We are 66 percent short of nurses in that reserve. That is 7,000 short, DOD-wide, and some 31,000 nurses short, DOD-wide.

Combat support, combat service support was only 54 percent ready to go to combat. You talked about it then, we have talked about it for years. It is still basically the same. Is it possible to make that up without a draft?

Mr. **Webb**. Senator, I thank you for your comments, and I have very good memories of the efforts you have consistently put forward on this issue. I do not know, in terms of whether we can really get a volunteer medical system that will affiliate with the Reserves. I had a number of initiatives which I was attempting to work through the individual Ready Reserve—assign a doctor part-time, the same way the VA does it in their medical system, and that sort of thing.

The concern that I have today is that we get enough medical structure inside the theater to handle casualties at an initial evacuation point. It is about an 8-hour plane ride, if strategic airlift is available, before we can get them to the facilities that are in place on continental Europe, and I know that is an issue that has concerned a number of your staffers as well.

Senator **Glenn**. Ordinarily, in the size of the force we have over there, you would require probably two units of similar size, just as a rough rule of thumb, to back them up.

You have some people going, coming, it is a 2-week ship ride, getting there, getting back, retrained, you have one unit getting ready to go over. It is about a 2-1 to 3-1, depending on the type service they are going to perform.

Do you not think we can do that with the current Regular and Reserve components we have? We are going to have about 430,000 troops out there. Do you feel that we cannot maintain those people there and give them the rotation they have to have over a period of time?

Let me just say one other thing that feeds into that. If the embargo is to work, we either have to have a force that can stay there long enough and be rotated through with this 2- or 3-1 rotation—a force of the size that can be maintained by the existing Active and Reserve establishment—or, if we cannot do that, then we are going to have to go to a draft, as I see it, if we are to maintain the larger force and continue the sanctions for a year or whatever is required to let such an embargo have a chance to work. Do you feel that we do not have the adequate numbers now that we could sustain 430,000 people there?

Mr. **Webb**. I do not believe you could do it short of a much larger mobilization than the law will allow under current call-up provisions. As I mentioned, we had 43 percent of the Army overseas before this even began. The rotational base was very tenuous already, and the same thing with the Marine Corps now.

The other thing that plays into this is something that I know you have expressed concern about, and that is the effect of our ability to address situations that may evolve in other areas than the Middle East, when we are tying so much of our military up in one region. That also impacts on what we would do with the Guard and Reserve units that are still back here.

I think the preferable solution, in my view, is as I said, to reduce the size of the ground presence over there and match it directly to a defensive posture.

Senator GLENN. If we do not do that, we are going to have to consider a draft.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn, thank you. Senator Gorton.

Senator GORTON. Mr. Perle, at one or two points during the course of your written statement you referred in passing to the costs of inaction.

Perhaps you would expand a little bit on whether or not the only dilemma we face is whether or not to face a certain number of casualties at the present time or avoid this confrontation and presumably pay a small premium for oil but suffer no other adverse consequences.

What are the down sides of inaction from your perspective?

Mr. PERLE. I believe, Senator, that among the costs of inaction must be counted the prospect that at the end of the day we will fail to realize our most important objectives in this crisis, which, in my judgment, go beyond securing the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Because even after an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, if he retains his overwhelming regional military superiority, he will dominate the Gulf.

And with that domination, he will continue to build his military capabilities, including in particular his weapons of mass destruction. And under those circumstances, we would sooner or later, as history has demonstrated, be forced to confront a far more formidable adversary.

I think we can delay. But if delay means that we end up accepting Saddam Hussein in a position both to dominate the Gulf immediately and to lead, as he hopes to do, the Arab masses, the consequences of that, in my judgment, while unpredictable, are bound to be costly.

Senator GORTON. More costly than dealing with the situation at the present time?

Mr. PERLE. More costly than striking a decisive blow against that military power largely from the air, without significant ground force engagements, which I believe can be done.

Senator GORTON. So you feel that the consequences of leaving him in the possession of his present power will be highly adverse, without any particular prediction as to how that would play out?

Mr. PERLE. I think that as a practical matter, if he survives this and retains his military capability, he will from that moment on exert something close to total authority over the Gulf.

For example, let us assume that the crisis has ended and Saddan Hussein is back within his own borders but he is still in power. And he is now receiving, after the international embargo has been lifted; revenues from the sale of oil. And he decides that he would like to sell more oil at a higher price, which runs counter to the conditions of the market.

So he picks up the telephone and he says to King Fahd, "We think you ought to cut your share of the OPEC allotment by a million barrels a day because we intend to increase ours by a million barrels a day. And while you consider this, King, you might recall that the last time I made a similar request and it was denied, I destroyed the country that failed to bend to my will."

Now, I do not know what you would do if you were in the position of the Saudi leadership. U.S. troops would have gone home by then. But I would think twice before I incurred the kind of response that Kuwait received under similar circumstances.

You would have an immediate and practical exertion of Saddam Hussein's authority over the Gulf. And he would use, in my view, that commanding position to further build his military forces and to galvanize that significant fraction of the Arab word, which, unhappily, is poor, into an anti-Western force of potentially enormous danger to the Western world.

Senator GORTON. The question for you on the other half of that coin is inherently difficult to answer with precision.

But is it your view that the passage of the form of resolution which is before the United Nations at the present time, coupled with a ratification of that policy here by the United States, would increase or decrease the chances of causing Saddam Hussein to back down prior to, if only by a few days or a few hours, the exercise of that authority?

Mr. PERLE. There is no doubt that if Saddam Hussein sees an unraveling of the Western coalition, if he sees an American policy that is inconsistent with the quite extraordinary action that I believe the United Nations is about to take in authorizing the use of force by a date certain, he will be encouraged to believe that he can outwait us.

And it will diminish, if not destroy, the prospects that the sanctions might achieve their too modest objectives.

Senator GORTON. On the up side of that question.

Mr. PERLE. If we remain cohesive, if we take decisive action, if it is clear that we are prepared, if it comes to using military force, we will enhance greatly our prospects for avoiding the use of military force.

But Saddam Hussein has made it perfectly clear that he does not believe we have the stomach to use military force. He has said, "I was prepared to take 10,000 casualties in a single battle, and you are not," when he spoke to American officials.

We are dealing with a man who doubts that we are prepared to use force. He is watching this debate, and to the degree to which he concludes that his initial instinct was right, he is not going to move diplomatically.

Senator GORTON. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gorton. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask questions of these witnesses, I would like to make a very brief statement which I think is called for as a result of some rather extensive briefings which I engaged in along with some other members of the committee.

I have no intention of dealing with any classified material, but I would like to say this. I believe, on the basis of lengthy briefings, that some of the statements made by spokesmen for the President about the near-term capability of Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons were clearly misleading, unsupported by the evidence, and gave a wrong impression.

This is not to say that we should not be extremely concerned about Iraq's nuclear program. We should be. It is to say that if we base judgments on the evidence that is available to this country, we should be very careful about calculating the time frame during which we believe we will face that threat.

Crying wolf is especially dangerous in the area of nuclear proliferation, because one of these days that particular wolf may well be at our door. And when that day comes, we must be prepared to respond quickly and without hesitation. I wish to make that statement because I thought the evidence that I saw made it clear that some statements, especially those by Secretary Eagleburger and the President's spokesman, Mr. Fitzwater, were clearly wrong.

Now, I would like to ask some questions. I appreciate the statements of all three witnesses. I heard much with which I agreed and much with which I disagreed. I wish I had the time to explore all three statements at length.

But, Secretary Perle, you say on the final page of your statement that you believe the sanctions do not have a very good chance of succeeding because, among other things, the economic pain imposed by them will pale in comparison to the economic pain endured by Iraq during its long war with Iran. I would like to question that conclusion.

When I heard your statement, I asked the staff of the committee and they called upon the Library of Congress for assistance in analyzing this question. And although the evidence on current economic damage is not strong, and we will be viewing this question this afternoon.

The overall conclusion of the experts available to the committee is that the economic damage to be expected from these sanctions will completely dwarf the economic damage endured by Iraq during the war with Iran. We heard yesterday that the racetrack opened every night during the war with Iran.

And to briefly summarize what happened to their economy during the war with Iran, the economy was damaged and set back, but not wrecked. There were no collapses of or any major harm in any major sectors of Iraq's economy: electric power, aluminum production, et cetera.

There were strains and damage in many sectors such as steel and consumer goods, and Iraq did have to cut back severely in its 5-year development program for the major industries. This cutback and the strains primarily were the result of resource decisions and allocations and/or allocations to the war effort, rather than into classical, classic economic arenas.

As an example, the naval battles in the Gulf led Iraq to create two new pipelines across Turkey and Saudi Arabia, yet those pipelines are themselves cut off and have been since early August as a result of these sanctions. The other pain endured by Iraq during the war with Iran was in terms of lives lost and casualties suffered.

That pain, which they have demonstrated they can endure, is the kind of pain which would be inflicted by a military option. The economic pain, which will be severe far in excess of what they had suffered during the war with Iran, and progressive in its impact, is something which has not been applied to Iraq previously.

I respect your judgment, but in, if you changed your conclusion on what they had really suffered economically during the war with Iran, would that affect your conclusions?

Mr. **Perle**. Senator, I think by far the most serious pain from the period of the Iran-Iraq war were the casualties—which numbered over 1 million. They are not now suffering casualties, and one could forgive Iraqis for thinking that while the economy is stagnating under current circumstances, while things are disappearing from the shelves, at least their children are not dying.

I think the capacity of the Iraqis to accept something approaching subsistence is probably considerable. We have learned in the past that trying to inflict privation, even by military means—strategic bombing in World War II, for example—does not work very well.

People will endure tremendous hardship, and that is doubly true in a situation where the decisions are made by a small number of people at the top, or as in this case, by a single individual at the top, and where giving voice to a complaint can mean execution on the spot. That is why I am pessimistic that we can in a matter of months, or even in a year, bring Saddam Hussein to his knees by damaging his economy.

I accept your point, that during the war they managed to keep the racetrack open and the economy did not collapse, and a wrecked economy was perhaps an overstatement on my part. It is an economy that was driven deeply into debt, of course, and it was only able to survive, ironically, by the contributions of Kuwaitis and Saudis and others.

But I think it is wishful thinking to believe that if we keep the sanctions in place for a year or so, Saddam will say, okay, I give up. I do not believe he will give up, and in any case—and this is a far more compelling point—even if he does give up and withdraw from Kuwait, that is not good enough to secure our long-term interests in the Gulf.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gore, I am going to have to call time on you.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Wallop.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Perle, I take particular note, and you have explored it more than once in questioning, of your statement on the last page. Those who expect the sanctions to work must be able to describe the mechanism by which their success would secure our interest.

The sophomoric thing that is going on is that the people are talking about sanctions working without describing what constitutes "work"—the measurement against which success or failure can be determined.

I find lots of that in your statement, Secretary Webb, which I found really genuinely disappointing for its content on that basis.

Yesterday, we heard Admiral Crowe define two separate goals for sanctions versus a military option. The sanctions goal was much lower, and the military option was much higher, and it seems to me it is almost impossible to create any level of national commitment, or national support, behind such things.

Then we look—and we have heard some say, well, the support of some of our allies, or participants in the alliance in the region, is flagging, and I would suggest that one of the reasons it is flagging is because there is a great deal of uncertainty about our commitment and how credible it is.

They have to live there after this is over, and it seems to me it is almost implausible that you would find strong commitment to them while it appears that the Congress of the United States, and indeed the United States generally, is wavering as to what its purpose is and what its commitments are.

So I just want to say that I genuinely agree with your rationale. Dr. Kissinger gave good rationales for the purpose of being there, and so, too, did former Secretary Schlesinger, who thereafter ignored them.

My question goes, really, to this: Saddam has stated that he doubts our will. I think there is reason to doubt that will, when you hear the kind of dialogue that is going on in this country, and so are we—a threefold question. Are we now a great nation? Are we in danger of abdicating that role because we believe that there may be easy ways out, some sentimental kind of view of the future, and if we do abdicate, of what consequence is that to not only the United States but to the world in general, as Soviet power ebbs? Secretary Perle?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I believe we are being put to a test, which is not to say that the criterion for whether we pass that test is whether the Nation as a whole agrees with every aspect of our policy. There is a lot of scope, in my judgment, for disagreement. I disagree with some of the ways that this administration has gone about putting its policy in place.

Senator WALLOP. And let me say, so do I, and have stated so as well.

Mr. PERLE. But if we take action that is understood to have been taken principally for the purpose of not facing up to the challenge that Saddam Hussein's invasion has forced upon us, then I think we will gravely damage our standing as a great power.

If we talk about giving the sanctions time to work when what we really want is to avoid a difficult decision because deep down we did not have great confidence that they would work, then we would be abdicating in the aftermath of having put together a coalition based upon the proposition that we were prepared to take action. I believe the disappointment would be all the greater because of the way we went into this crisis in August.

Senator WALLOP. Would it cause us a more stable or less stable world on the other side of it, if we default?

Mr. PERLE. If you believe, as I do, that the United States is a source, the principal source, of stability in the world because of our capacity, often by ourselves and in combination from time to time with allies, to resist aggression, then you must conclude that it will be good news for potential aggressors around the world that the United States can no longer be counted upon to resist.

Senator WALLOP. Not only in the region of the Middle East, but really, the potential for disruption worldwide.

Mr. PERLE. Not only in the Middle East. I believe that a decline in American power is bound to mean a more menacing world.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wallop. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning.

I wanted to give at least one Senator's perspective on the importance and relevance of the U.N. resolution. I have a great deal of respect for the United Nations, and believe the Administration's efforts to weave this international coalition together have been admirable, but I think it is imperative that we keep this resolution in context.

As was pointed out, by Secretary Webb and others, the U.N. resolution certainly cannot commit the United States to military action. We want to be very clear that the passage of this resolution is understood to be what it is—a resolution.

I think we should also be honest about what the resolution is. I think it is in many ways a "“hold our coat” resolution. We have gotten the United Nations to agree to hold our coat while the fight is carried out by the United States. It is very clear from the testimony we have heard here that at least 90 percent of the casualties that might be incurred would be young Americans.

We have achieved this, and much of the international support surrounding it, at potentially great long-term cost. We have begged the Japanese, with minimal success. We have been unsuccessful in gaining German help.

The Chinese foreign minister is here, or on his way. The U.S. policy of isolating China has apparently been jettisoned. The American public was appalled by what happened in Tiananmen Square and now, in return for their agreeing to be neutral, apparently we are saying it is okay, you can come back into the fold.

President Bush gave Assad a prestigious photo opportunity. This, for a Government world renowned for harboring terrorists, and certainly not on our list of allies.

We paid the Egyptians $7 billion in debt forgiveness.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think what we have to do is get a clear accounting from the Secretary of State, from the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of the Treasury, of what the cost of all of this is to the American public. What promises have been made?

We have given a lot of credit out there—the Assad photograph and bringing the Chinese in from the isolation that I think we had justifiably imposed on them after their incredible abuses in Tiananmen Square. These are costs by themselves, but are there economic costs as well?

All of this should be taken into account when we think about what the U.N. resolution means. We have paid, I think, very dearly for it. We have to understand that it should not inevitably propel the United States Congress, whether next week or the week after, into a position of giving a carte blanche to the President of the United States.

There are some very real costs in this, Mr. President. The United States has incurred enormous operational costs for its involvement in the Persian Gulf, but this has come at a great windfall to the Saudis. The administration is saying, “Isn't it wonderful? The Saudis are helping to pay a large part of the costs of U.S. troops.”

It is, Mr. Chairman, but let us remember that they are pumping 7 million barrels of oil a day plus; their return for that oil has nearly doubled since the start of this crisis. They probably are getting a windfall of $100 million a day, 365 days a year. I mean, that is a very significant amount of money flowing into the Saudi treasury.

We should also understand that they should be paying the greatest percentage, if not all of the cost of us being there. If we were not there, they would now be under Iraqi occupation. There are a lot of costs to this, Mr. Chairman, and we have to understand that.

Having made that statement, I wanted to say that I was very impressed with some of the comments by Dr. Luttwak. I wanted to quote them briefly and ask the other two panelists if they have any comments.

Dr. Luttwak said, "Military power is increasingly devalued as is traditional security-focused diplomacy. In this emerging geoeconomic era, disposable capital is increasingly displacing firepower. Civilian product development is displacing military innovation, and market penetration is displacing the possession of foreign garrisons and bases.

"This suggests that the greatest cost entailed by the administration's particular way of handling the Kuwait crisis, and notably its refusal of any quick, if imperfect, solution, is that it has kept the U.S. fixated on yesterday's geopolitical priorities."

You have developed that argument in other articles as well. I would like to ask Secretary Perle, and then Secretary Webb if you have any comment on that analysis provided by your colleague on the panel.

Mr. PERLE. Well, like much of what Edward says, it is incisive, entertaining, and wrong. [Laughter.]

And wholly irrelevant to the issues that are before this committee. In general, the fact is that the relevance of military power, the importance of markets and the development of civil technology, tell you none of the things that you need to know about what we should be doing in the Gulf in this crisis.

Senator WIRTH. Secretary Webb?

Mr. WEBB. I find myself in a great deal of agreement with Dr. Luttwak and those comments. I think if we ask ourselves are we still a great Nation and is this a test of whether we are a great Nation, and if we read the rhetoric that has been written, particularly at the outset of this, that we are the only remaining superpower, I think we have to temper that celebration with the reality that we are not even our own banker. When another nation directly finances 25 percent of your national debt, you certainly do not have the freedom of action in an international arena that you might think you do.

And I am greatly worried about the whole shape of what we are calling the new world order, if this is a test case for it. Because it seems to mean that the U.S. is going to become the weapon of choice in areas even where its national interest is not as strong as others who are fully capable of participating in a very large and meaningful way.

There was a comment by former Secretary Schlesinger about a month ago to the effect that this is the first time in modern history where a major power has stepped into an international crisis and seen the value of its currency decline.

One of the reasons for that, in my view, is that, in 1985, we turned over a good portion of the valuation of the dollar to the Group of Seven. They all have a second agenda in this case, and that is we buy oil on world markets with dollars. So as the price of oil goes up in a crisis like this, the value of the dollar declines because of oil prices.

Those are the kinds of things that I think we have to put into the formula.

Chairman NUNN. Time has expired, but let me give Dr. Luttwak an opportunity to respond.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Mr. Perle said that I was wrong. He is saying that military power is not being devalued or that it is not irrelevant. The fact is that the Persian Gulf clearly is the exception, along with other unfortunate parts of the world which are not participating in the new geoeconomic era, much as at one time in some parts of the world we were industrializing; in other parts of the world people were still practicing cannibalism.

The fact of the matter is that however important you may consider the Persian Gulf question to be, if the United States remains fixated on this type of activity, necessarily it will not confront the problems of developing the capital and labor needed to assure the ability of our own children to make the same kind of mistakes as we are now making, to put the least of it.

We have seen before us the case of Great Britain. Great Britain is a country which has been steadily, in spite of Maggie Thatcher's great achievements, moving away from the ranks of the advanced countries and towards the third world, while maintaining high competence geopolitically, doing splendidly against the Argentinians and so on. Every few years, they go and have a wonderful expedition. Is this what we want to do?

Further, Mr. Perle seems to believe that the invasion of Kuwait is not the problem, but rather is an opportunity to deal with the real problem, which is Iraq's military accumulation. As it happens, I agree. But the one thing that is stopping Iraq's military accumulation are the sanctions. So we have here an economic problem. Namely, Iraq has too much money, spends on weapons. We are now interrupting the flow of money, and we do it by economic means. To the extent that we ought to be the ones managing the economic means and the other countries should be the ones putting in the infantry, if you need to put in some modest amounts of infantry.

I must tell you that what I find sinister is this is not the allies refusing to give us these payments, but the wholesale eagerness to rush into this familiar geopolitical role, as if we are afraid to cope with the new challenges of the new era.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth. We have a number of members still here and we are now about to start a second round. We have to ask our witnesses whether they have the time to remain for a few more minutes. I hope they do.

I have a question, Secretary Perle, relating to war. You talked about, in your testimony, I think you made it very clear that, while you, like everyone else, would like to avoid war, you laid out an additional set of goals beyond that the President has articulated.

I believe that, based on all the other witnesses we have had, most people would conclude that by adding those goals, that we would inevitably have to go to war. I think you have indicated a willingness to do that. Also, you have indicated the kind of war that you would visualize, which I happen to identify with, if we get to that point.

But what we haven't heard is what you visualize after the war. Do we go in and occupy Iraq? You indicated you had problems with a large number of military forces in Saudi Arabia. So do I.

But is it your view that after a war, even if it is successful and fought on the terms that you and I would have preference for, do you indicate that we could then move out of Saudi Arabia? Or, on the other hand, do you believe we might have started a process of further destabilization of the whole area and have to remain there with a large force for a long time?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I agree with Edward and Jim Webb that this is an area of instability. It is an area in which stability, if it can be achieved, is likely to be ephemeral. If you can obtain stability for some years, that is better than not having it at all.

It is very hard, obviously, to envision how the clash of forces at play in that region would shape the postwar situation if it comes to a war. But I do believe that if you have Saddam Hussein as a regional superpower, the prospect is not for the emergence of stability, but rather for instability throughout the region.

I believe, for example, that he will finance insurgencies against the principal governments in the Gulf and I doubt they will survive for very long under those circumstances. It is precisely because I do not think we can maintain a large presence that I find it difficult to imagine stability emerging if Iraq remains such a predominant military power.

Chairman NUNN. I understand your vision of the gloom that will follow if we do not succeed and you believe military force may be necessary. But what I am trying to get is what kind of gloom are we going to have with a war, and do you believe we are going to avoid a continuing American military presence—a large presence in the area—after a war, even a successful war?

Mr. PERLE. If we are successful in significantly reducing Iraqi military power, not by destroying it entirely, because there are regional balances that one hopes can be maintained. Then we could, with a modest presence, contribute to such stability as we are able to find in the Gulf. It would be difficult to achieve, but terribly important internationally if we agreed upon restraining the supply of weapons to the region so that we can at least attempt to maintain some kind of balance.

It seems very much like the situation that was faced in Europe in the 19th century where when you had a balance of power, you had relative peace, and when that balance broke down and a country was permitted to achieve superpower status relative to the others, you had war. And making the adjustments necessary to try to maintain that balance will be the most urgent task of our postwar diplomacy.

But it must be combined with control over the flow of weapons and the technologies for the production of weapons.

Chairman **Nunn**. Would we still have to have a large presence?

Mr. **Perle**. No. I think a small presence would suffice after Iraq's military power is reduced.

Chairman **Nunn**. May I ask the other two witnesses to comment on what they see after a war. And for the purposes of this assumption, let us assume that it was a successful war from the American point of view. Maybe I should label this a successful "battle," but my own view is that "war" is a longer term situation.

Dr. **Luttwak**. Yes, sir. If we transition directly from the present blockade to an arms denial regime, the current stock of Iraqi military capabilities would be of diminishing importance. If we have a war, in order to destroy that stock of military capabilities, then it may well now be more difficult to transfer to an arms denial regime.

But certainly, if we have a war, if we destroy the stock, if we do not have an arms denial regime for the region, then the destruction would not matter very much because the Iraqis will have money again.

Might I suggest also that they have lots of money from other sources. The Saudis, for example, as part compensation for having cooperated in their destruction will undoubtedly be very generous to them. As of now, Iraqi soldiers cross the line into Saudi Arabia every evening in order to have dinner served to them—free food—by the Saudi First Division which is deployed north of our marines along the coastal area.

The normal mode for Saudi Arabia to behave after a conflict is to appease Iraq. The only way, or the best way, for the Saudis to appease the Iraqis is to give them lots of money. Money, which the Iraqis again will not use to pay for the Baghdad Symphony, but to move expeditiously towards the acquisition of the nuclear capability which is the one thing they are missing.

That is why I see no virtue in making that transition through war and having several thousand Americans die for the sake of a somewhat different set of probabilities.

Chairman **Nunn**. Secretary Webb, what do you see as being the after-war effects, in particular regarding the American military presence?

Mr. **Webb**. I think, assuming your scenario of a relatively short and successful war and assuming that Saddam Hussein does not bring the Israelis in and completely undo the region——

Chairman **Nunn**. I am assuming the best realistic case, not quite as far as Dr. Luttwak's assumption.

Mr. **Webb**. You are even seeing this again from Saudi officials that they are greatly worried that the better the job we do on the Iraqi military, the greater it enhances the position of both Syria and Iran in the region.

Syria and Iran have been playing both sides of this issue all along. There was a report in the paper yesterday that the Syrians, now having participated directly in the elimination of the Christian Phalange, are moving toward the Israeli buffer zone in Lebanon. I say that because those things will be going on. They are unknowns. I have no way of predicting whether Iran will move in and this sort of thing. I think they will be tempted to.

But assuming a short and successful engagement where we would have to move in and stabilize Kuwait at a minimum, I am reminded—maybe it is the novelist in me—of an O. Henry short story called the Ransom of Red Chief. You will recall when this rich kid was kidnapped and the kidnappers asked for a ransom and within a few weeks they were paying his parents to take him back. You are going to reach a situation, I believe, that it is going to be very difficult to extricate ourselves from.

Chairman NUNN. So you see a continuing long-term American presence there after a war.

Mr. WEBB. I do not see how we can avoid it if we cross that line on the ground.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I just wish to make a brief concluding statement thanking our witnesses for coming forward.

But I do want to take this opportunity to reply to Senator Gore's comment. I, too, sat through, I think, all of the briefings you have had on this issue of the Iraqi nuclear capabilities. The Chairman and I discussed that issue several days ago and made a specific determination to incorporate in this series of hearings a panel for the purpose of informing the public as best we can, given the highly classified nature of this subject. It should be classified.

Tomorrow I will have further to say about this issue. In the context of our panel discussion, I would hope that people would withhold any judgment at this time. I feel the administration spokesmen, certainly Secretary Cheney on Sunday, as well as National Security Advisor Scowcroft, did their best, in my judgment, to inform the American public and others about this issue, and I hope that our hearing tomorrow can provide additional clarification. It is a judgmental one. I think the basic facts, to the extent they can be made available, certainly to the Congress, they have to my knowledge yesterday and in previous meetings that I have sat in in the Intelligence Committee, give rise to a very, very serious concern about this problem.

We know that the Israelis in 1981 determined there was such a threat to their national security that they had an air strike against those facilities and that set back Iraq's capability for some time. We all know that Saddam Hussein has put a lot of his GNP into this effort for many, many years. Now what threat it poses not only to the immediate area, but to the rest of the world remains to be seen. So I hope that we will await further deliberation by the committee as a whole tomorrow during our panel discussions and possible further forthcoming comments by the administration before we reach any conclusions. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We will have hearings tomorrow morning. This afternoon we will have hearings with experts on the economic consequences on the sanctions. Tomorrow morning we will have hearings on this very subject that Senator Warner and Senator Gore have expressed their views on, and to the maximum extent possible, we will be dealing with it in open session. We have already had closed sessions on the subject.

The witnesses tomorrow will not be those speaking from classified information but from outside analysis of open information.

We open for a second round. I will yield to Senator Kennedy.

Senator **Kennedy**. Yes, I didn't intend to get into a further discussion of the point that Senator Gore had made. But I must say that I sat through the briefings as well and I welcome whatever clarification can come tomorrow. But I think he is absolutely correct right down the line.

Let me just get into one final area. I was interested in Mr. Perle pointing out, first of all as a brief comment, about those that are expressing some diverse opinion towards the march to war as somehow selling out the United States' interest.

The fact of the matter is this country is divided, and divided very deeply. And I think what we're seeing expressed here in the U.S. Senate, by the members here, is that division which exists out there. So this idea that we all have to march in order because the United Nations has taken a position and if we do not do so we are somehow failing to meet our responsibilities is really a position that I think belies history and our constitutional democracy.

A point that Mr. Perle had mentioned is—we understand from his positions and the statements—that he is prepared to go to war at the present time or whenever we reach the military build-up. And then he went on to say we want to be able to reduce, not destroy the Iraqi military capability. I can imagine that being something that we give to our soldiers at the front. Look out, fellows, you can destroy some of those soldiers or you can destroy some of those military facilities, but you cannot destroy them all. We are going to ask you to go over the border and we are going to ask you to bomb and we are going to ask you to interdict. But miss one out of three trucks. And do not bomb all those facilities, because we are going in there, risking your life but you have got to understand we have to maintain some regional balance after this conflict.

I mean maybe that is what we are coming down to. I do not believe so and I certainly would hope not. But I think if that is the follow-on position to those that are urging us to get into conflict at the present time, I, certainly, for one, do not want to be talking to the parents of people who are killed from my State—and saying that there was some kind of a position that was taken by the policymakers of this country that we were going to get into that war with one hand tied behind our back.

Let me just ask one question. I heard Mr. Webb, Mr. Luttwak and also Mr. Perle indicate that if we are going to get into conflict that we ought to rely on air interdiction to the extent possible. A number of the strategic targets have been listed in the Washington Times. They have 19—not that it is all-inclusive, but it mentions many of those. A great number of those are located near significant civilian populations. I will not take the time to go through all of them. But we have to recognize that they do have strong aerial defenses and many of the targets are in areas where there are significant populations.

Let me ask you, are there any historical examples where a Nation has been able to defeat, take, or recapture territory by air attacks alone, Dr. Luttwak?

Dr. **Luttwak**. There is, of course—the only example of a grand garrison that surrendered to air attack alone was Pantelleria, in 1943. Pantelleria came under air attack. And there was a strongly entrenched garrison. And it surrendered. But, Senator, on the question of civilian casualties, you may want to do this in classified session, obviously, but the principal, as I understand it, sir, in the current operational plans, the principal targets are well separated.

Of course, there will be cases of actual aircraft—aircraft going on course and not bombs going astray. But from the bomb-going-astray type of collateral damage, which is the most important type in modern conditions, there ought to be very little of that. This is a factual question which I invite you to explore separately.

On the issue of surrendering, if you cut-off food supplies to an army in Indochina, a force in Indochina, they can live off trees, live off whatever they find. If you cut-off food supplies to an army standing in a desert, they cannot stay there. That is what interdiction can achieve.

Senator **Kennedy**. What do you think their reaction will be?

Dr. **Luttwak**. Sir, they——

Senator **Kennedy**. Are they just going to take it or are they going to launch chemical weapons?

Dr. **Luttwak**. No, sir, if they advance into Saudi Arabia, then the same air power that causes them to suffer shortage from interdiction can blast them off the roads. The one thing we know about air power is that in the Middle East, air power has stopped movement ever since the First World War, for obvious reasons. You, Senator, are quite familiar with the area and you can visualize why air power works so much better than it works in temperate zones or certainly in tropical zones with jungle cover.

And so the Iraqi garrison cannot invade Saudi Arabia effectively.

Senator **Kennedy**. Just finally, let me ask Mr. Webb how realistic is it to expect that you will have an air war and not end up with a ground war? It is difficult for me to believe that you are going to be able to starve people out and not figure that the Iraqis are going to use whatever weapons that they have, chemical or others, against the aggressors. But what is your view?

Mr. **Webb**. I would certainly not—I would certainly not, as a prudent planner, count on being able to bomb Iraq into submission. I just—I do not see it. Pretty soon somebody is going to have to go in and move them out.

Now I think that in terms of the use of strategic air power, Dr. Luttwak has an interesting point and it probably is more directly analogous to the sea battles in World War II where you have these vast expanses and military garrisons that are isolated.

But if you do that, it becomes a question of national will. And I have seen no indication that the national will, itself, would collapse.

Chairman **Nunn**. I believe Secretary Perle wanted to answer this question and the time has expired.

Mr. **Perle**. I do find it curious that one can harbor the hope that the sanctions will succeed while discounting the possibility that we could bring Saddam Hussein to submission even with the massive application of air power. But what I really wanted to say, Senator Kennedy, is that I trust that your ironic and derisive characterization of my view that we would not aim to destroy the whole of Iraqi military power was a rhetorical flourish and that you don't really think that I believe that we should instruct our forces in the battlefield to spare Iraqi targets.

I think that we could bring about an end to the war before it became necessary to destroy all of Iraq's military capability.

Senator **KENNEDY**. My time——

Chairman **NUNN**. Senator Cohen? Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Well, the only thing is how you find the historical background to think that you can monitor military conflict, to the degree that you are suggesting, is something that I really find difficult to accept. But evidently you believe it and I respect your knowledge of history.

Mr. **PERLE**. Well, most wars have ended before the final destruction of all the military forces of the combatants. The war between Iraq and Iran ended, for example, with sizable numbers—hundreds of thousands of prisoners on both sides.

Senator **KENNEDY**. World War II, World War I—what about those?

Chairman **NUNN**. Senator Cohen?

Senator **COHEN**. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Kennedy is correct that there are great divisions and doubts in the country, and that those divisions and doubts are reflected on this committee, and I suspect in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Congress itself.

And we should not try in any way to gloss over those doubts or divisions. The whole purpose of the hearing is to try and find out, number one, what the strategy is, whether it should be pursued, and what way our goals can be arrived at. But simply passing resolutions which profess to claim that there is unity, when in fact there is not, I do not think serves us well.

I am still struck by the irony that, with respect to Japan, we are defending their access to oil while they are buying up Hollywood. But I must say, Dr. Luttwak, I am not sure what you are professing. In August, when the invasion took place, should President Bush have placed a conference call to Japan and to Germany and gotten them on the phone saying, "Are you willing to commit either resources or troops?"

Do you really believe that that would have made a difference before he was required to take action?

Dr. **LUTTWAK**. Sir, the theory of alliance, in theory, we are in an alliance relationship. And in theory, you are supposed to consult. In practice, as you senators certainly know very well, whenever we are consulted, we will obtain cooperation. When we try to go ahead without consulting, we did not. Now——

Senator **COHEN**. Well, excuse me——

Dr. **LUTTWAK**. We could not prevent invasion. The invasion had taken place. The Iraqis made a fait accompli. So there was no particular hurry. We decided on the 6th; we could have decided on the 8th, we could have decided on the 12th.

Senator **COHEN**. It is your judgment, I take it, that we do not need any ground forces beyond those necessary to support air operations out of Saudi Arabia and Diego Garcia?

Dr. **LUTTWAK**. Yes, sir. Categorically.

Senator COHEN. So we could, in fact, declare victory in terms of deterrence to date, and announce that henceforth we are going to rely upon air power in order to devastate the Iraqi military or war-making capability. And reduce dramatically the 230,000 down to possibly 20,000 or 30,000 necessary to support air operations, and remain an effective deterrent in that region?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Militarily you could. Whether you could–

Senator COHEN. What is your judgment——

Dr. LUTTWAK. The political and prestige aspect——

Senator COHEN. Well, that is——

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. To the world it would look like, may well look like a capitulation, and then you would have obviously unraveling effects.

Senator COHEN. So, in other words——

Dr. LUTTWAK. But militarily, definitely you could do it.

Senator COHEN. Well, but, beyond the military, then, do you think we have to take into account the kind of political perceptions that we are now discussing, as a matter of tactics or strategy——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes, Senator, but of course we must. The perceptions are the substance.

Senator COHEN. But what difference do the perceptions make if this is really a spectacular sideshow in any event, to use your words, what difference does it make whether we are concerned about the political perceptions on the part of others?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Purely because we have become engaged. This is, of course, a familiar trap, but it is a very realistic one. Because we have become engaged, we cannot just irresponsibly walk away.

But I would suggest the middle way. The middle way would be to say that the forces now being sent are not additive but are to replace the, operationally, far less suitable light forces, and then to draw down the marines to a level that we can sustain, instead of the current level that we cannot.

And then you would not have, and you could mask the whole thing, not mask it, but the whole thing would be, actually, compensated, if we did get some more allied contributions. So that would be a middle way.

Senator COHEN. Dr. Luttwak, you mentioned that, or maybe Mr. Webb indicated, that both Iran and Syria have been playing a double role or game in this particular case. I would direct a question to Mr. Perle. What about the Soviet role to date?

Have they engaged in a double role as such, trying to maintain a relationship with Iraq, maintaining technicians, advisors, and personnel there? We finally learned this week that they now are being held hostage, and that has finally gotten the attention of Mikhail Gorbachev, who has in essence said, "Let my people go, or else."

Is that one of the rationales now driving the Soviet Union, that Gorbachev found that Saddam Hussein has even betrayed him, as he has betrayed other people, that he is holding Soviet citizens hostage? Does that in part account for the change in attitude?

We know there are also some compensations, Saudi Arabia has kicked in $1 billion. We know that there will be other compensatory efforts undertaken. But could the Soviets have acted sooner, taken stronger action?

Are they in a position to really help resolve this peacefully even now, by sending a signal to Saddam Hussein that not only do they support the use of force, but might very well join in an air power capability in that region? Would that be a way of perhaps persuading Saddam Hussein he has no allies left, no friends, no way out?

Mr. PERLE. Clearly, Senator Cohen, if the Soviets were to indicate that they would join in military operations, that is something that Saddam Hussein would have to take into account.

As to their earlier role, there were hints from very early on that the sizable Soviet presence in Iraq was involuntary. I am not at all sure that is true. I think they wanted——

Senator COHEN. Let me correct you. Initially, it was indicated that there were technicians who were there under contract. In fact, General Moiseyev came to Washington to reaffirm that there was a contract~~ual ob~~ligation and duty for them to remain in Iraq until such time that the contracts expired.

I thought that, at the time, that was a fig leaf excuse, and I think that we have seen to date that that, in fact, is true.

Mr. PERLE. It was a touching fidelity to the concept of keeping one's contracts, and certainly disingenuous. But at the same time, there were suggestions—disinformation undoubtedly—that they could not withdraw those elements. And they were clearly assisting, and there are others assisting as well.

There has been a bit of a double game, but I think it has now come down to something closer to unity.

Senator COHEN. If I could just raise one final point, Mr. Chairman, that I know that there is a lot of division in terms of the analysis of whether Iraq could acquire a nuclear device within the next 6 months, 10 months, or 10 years. And I think that we are going to have to sort out the respective kinds of testimony we will receive on this.

But I notice in today's, one of today's papers, I think the Washington Times, indicated that Libya is now mobilizing its forces and saber-rattling, and perhaps even starting to threaten Chad. But the interesting thing in the item was that, meanwhile, intelligence officials said the chemical weapons plant at Rabta has entered full production of blistering and nerve agents.

Here is a facility that we have known for some time was developing a chemical weapons capability and we announced that it is our policy to try and persuade our allies from sending any further technology to help them complete it.

And if this article is, in fact, accurate, once again we see that our allies or someone is supplying the technology to an unstable country. As Dr. Luttwak has indicated, the others are very hard pressed to prevent the technology from eventually arriving. But whether it arrives in 6 months or 6 years, it will arrive.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to pick up on what Senator Cohen just said. All three of our witnesses, as I understand it, are strongly in favor of tough export controls and technology transfer controls as part of our national effort to protect against future dangers coming from unstable countries that acquire advanced, 21st century technologies. And I welcome the statements made.

What we refer to in the committee as the Bingamam-Gore-McCain measure was passed on the defense authorization bill but was, in virtually identical form, vetoed on another bill. The same provisions that were on the banking bill were vetoed.

I want to identify with and applaud Secretary's Perle's statements about that veto. I think it is extremely inconsistent on the part of the administration and I, like him, I find it difficult to understand.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the aftermath of this immediate crisis, or perhaps during it, if it persists, that we would find a way as a country to develop very tough bilateral policies toward each one of the dozen or so countries that is a potential supplier of critical technologies, such as nuclear technologies or ballistic missile technologies or poison gas technologies, and really bear down on those policies in an extremely determined way.

I wanted to compliment these witnesses for their contributions here this morning. Dr. Luttwak and Mr. Webb have acknowledged that what has happened thus far does shape the meaning of subsequent moves, even though like many of us, they would have handled it differently in the beginning. And I think that acknowledgement is important.

And Secretary Perle, you acknowledged that all of the choices facing us now are risky, the ones imposed by Saddam Hussein. I wanted to follow up in my questions this time on the dialogue we had earlier.

I agreed with your final point that the Iraqis have indeed demonstrated an impressive ability to endure economic pain. Leaving aside the analysis of what happened during the war with Iran, there were other occasions when they unilaterally deprived themselves of enormous amounts of money during conflicts with Aramco. And I want to acknowledge that I am very uncertain about what would likely happen, whichever course we take.

But in analyzing the relative merits of continuing to see if economic deprivation on a scale they have not yet ever endured, which becomes increasingly more severe, is a better course of action than going in with an offensive strike. I'd like to just explore that a little bit.

And I think Senator Kennedy's point bears some relevance to this for this reason: if you want to inflict military damage sufficient to cause a surrender, but not sufficient to take Iraq's military power off the board where Iran and Syria are concerned, then you really are proposing that we thread the eye of a needle.

Maybe it can be done. I do not know. But I do not understand the contrast. You have a sarcastic comment in your statement, and sarcasm has its place. You talk about the prospect of economic sanctions forcing Saddam Hussein to surrender to MPs, U.S. MPs in Saudi Arabia. But then you seem to easily accept the image of a limited amount of bombing producing essentially the same result.

I do not. What gives you the confidence? Maybe you are right, let me say again. But what gives you the confidence that a nation which has endured what Iraq endured during its long conflict with Iran, would, if subjected to just enough military destruction to cause severe damage but not enough to take it off the board, that

that would cause a surrender without leading to, you know, door to door, building to building, extremely bloody, brutal conflict?

And an aftermath that required the kind of extensive military presence that you rightly are concerned about if we simply stay with a sanctions policy?

Mr. **Perle**. That is a fair question, Senator, and I cannot tell you that I am confident about any of the events that would follow because this is such a vulnerable situation. I can outline the logic that with the right kind of use of air power, Iraqi military forces will experience something they have never experienced before. And that is the tremendous damage that can be done from the air where there is clear air superiority which I believe that we can achieve.

So the Iraqis would see in fairly short order—I don't know how many days or weeks—the destruction of their principal military airfields, much of their air fleets, much of their air defense capability, many of the fixed installations that support their war machine.

In conjunction with this they would experience the interdiction of supply lines from Iraq into Kuwait and the supplies necessary to sustain that force in anything but a dormant condition are considerable—water, for example.

We need not wrap this up in a day or a week or a month. Any time the Iraqi military forces moved, they would be vulnerable to attack. If they stayed hunkered down, they would suffer the attrition that would flow from cutting off supplies, and under those circumstances, it is not implausible that the Iraqi people, who are badly led at the moment, would decide that Saddam Hussein was no longer the man they wanted to lead them, having led them into terrible destruction without result.

And I would expect that somewhere within the Iraqi military establishment there is a potential successor who would move against him. Now you cannot guarantee this, but you would certainly have created the conditions in which a population that has been terrorized all these years by Saddam Hussein—and the stories about his executing his own generals on the spot I believe are in many cases true—there must be among them someone who would like to be rid of him.

And when the impression that he is a winner begins to dissolve as they come under attack, we could hope for a change of government with whom we could conclude an agreement.

Senator **Gore**. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, but I would be interested if there is time to hear the responses of the other two witnesses.

Dr. **Luttwak**. Just a brief comment, Senator. In regard to air power, as in regard to economic measures, we must vigorously distinguish between mechanical-physical effects and hoped for political effects. Senator Kennedy spoke about bombing Iraq into submission—bombing Saddam Hussein into submission. I would not advocate force—and force must be used to advocate bombing—but I would advocate no bombing or economic sanctions on the premises that if you do such and such, they will then evaluate it in this way as you would and react as you would wish them to react.

I would evaluate economic measures in terms of their physical effects. Are they preventing Iraq from buying more weapons? The answer is yes.

Is this bombing going to destroy the assembly line for rockets? Yes, do it.

I would take no actions, economic or military, on the basis that having then undertaken these actions or those political decisions will result--those political decisions invariably do not result. In this case, however, we could do a great deal by mechanical effects alone. Both in regard to economic measures that we are doing, and possible military measures.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Webb, would you like to answer that one?

Mr. WEBB. I would like to add a comment about the earlier part of your statement relating to proliferation of chemical weapons and this sort of thing that also, in a sense, addresses what Senator Cohen had said before.

There was an article in the paper today about Libya possibly mobilizing. One thing that we have not talked about today in terms of the multifaceted threat in this region, is that Saddam Hussein is not without allies. Libya is an ally, Yemen is an ally. He has had troops in Sudan for a good bit of time and some of those areas are near Mecca. Certainly, in a structural way, they draw a ring around Saudi Arabia. And those are the types of situations that we should examine in terms of their potential before we decide to move forward in one direction toward Kuwait.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore. Senator Gorton, do you have any other questions?

Senator GORTON. No, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Before I thank you all again, a final question. Assuming we get approximately 430,000 forces into Saudi Arabia in the middle of January—say January 15, which is the goal—and assuming either way you would like that we have a war, and even assuming the best assumption, that it will last 30 days, or 60 days and is satisfactory—or assuming that we decide to keep that level of force there for another 45 days, 60 days.

Starting with Secretary Webb, are we capable, the United States, with that size force being deployed, considering the Marines, the Air Force, the Navy, Army and so forth, are we capable of meeting another contingency somewhere else in the world that we may not now foresee?

Let us take a contingency, a small contingency, the size of Panama, as a case. Are we capable of meeting that kind of contingency with that size force deployment in Saudi Arabia?

Mr. WEBB. I have been concerned on this point since September. And it certainly is a much more egregious situation today. I would say we would have a very difficult time. I saw how the Navy was tied up just keeping about 30 ships in the Persian Gulf in 1987, and if you add a second contingency onto what we are seeing right now, I think we would have real trouble.

Dr. LUTTWAK. It would depend on the location of the contingency. In Panama, of course, we have an extensive base facility. Assuming that the contingency is no greater than that, but out of area, that would create a totally different set of problems. I fear, however, that the only serious contingency, which perhaps would not be of the order—the only thing that seems at all possible—one is always wrong on these things—would be a Korean-type contingency that we have to worry about, which is barely possible. That would be wholly beyond our abilities to cope with.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Perle?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I think we have trouble dealing with more than one crisis at time even when it is just deciding on the policies. And in this case, we would be in some difficulty if we had another contingency elsewhere in the world.

Chairman NUNN. At that level of forces?

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. One other question along that line. We put the 82nd Airborne over there at the very beginning because we needed to get forces in there very quickly. We put the Air Cavalry in there very quickly at the very beginning, and I understand both of those decisions and supported them and still do. But it was my understanding when we put them in there, these being the quick reaction forces that we would have to deal with and other contingencies in the world, and not being the kind of heavy forces that you would need for the kind of war that may develop over there, that we were going to pull them out at a reasonable time and thereby preserve the option for the United States to be prepared to deal with other unforeseen events elsewhere.

All three of you answer the question if we were to, let us say, whether we call it rotation policy or whatever we call it, decide that we are going to pull those forces out so that we can deal with other contingencies. Would you consider that a wise step or would you be fearful that that would be considered a "withdrawal of forces" thereby causing the United States to lose face.

Secretary Webb, could I start with you again?

Mr. WEBB. Just so that I understand your question, you are saying that if we pull them out and directly move them to another contingency?

Chairman NUNN. I would say if you pulled them out so we could bring them back here and have them ready just to go—in other words, rotate them out of their——

Mr. WEBB. I would support that.

Dr. LUTTWAK. The 82nd are the ones which operationally are the ones who are the best candidates for such exchange because they are both the most deployable units and also they are less useful in a sense in the context. The 101st is a somewhat different case because as it now constitutes, as you know, Senator, that should really be considered the core level support force to provide an air mobile—a large air mobile complement to your tanks.

Chairman NUNN. You are saying it would have a bigger role?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes, sir. The presence of the 101st is operationally highly valid under both configurations. If you accept the ground forces——

Chairman NUNN. Let us not deal with these specific divisions, then, but let us talk about our basic light, quick reaction forces in concept. Would you support pulling those out of there at some point so they could be prepared to deal with other contingencies?

Dr. **Luttwak**. Yes, sir. Including some of the Marines because the Marines are an infantry force predominantly and they too are not operationally suitable to a large extent.

Chairman **Nunn**. Secretary Perle?

Mr. **Perle**. I happen to agree on the point about the Marines. But it seems to me, Senator, the critical question which is how would this be perceived and would it give comfort to Saddam Hussein depends entirely on what else is going on. And if there is a redeployment from the theater or an alteration in the present plans that is combined with strong congressional support for the President's freedom of action consistent with the U.N. resolution, then I think it need not send a damaging political signal.

If on the other hand, it is coupled with congressional action that says we are going the sanction forever to operate and you get the sense that what really lies behind that is an unwillingness to do anything else, then the redeployment of forces in those circumstances would be devastating politically.

Chairman **Nunn**. Do you consider a year to 18 months the same as forever?

Mr. **Perle**. That is an awfully long time, Senator.

Chairman **Nunn**. But you used the word forever.

Mr. **Perle**. Well, it is 1 year to 18 months until you meet to decide, again, whether the time has now come. Frankly, I do not believe we could sustain a credible posture for that period of time. And it is not just the mechanics of the number of men in the field. It is the sense of resolve that would be at issue.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I want to join in with what Secretary Perle said. We have got to be very careful about what signals could be sent. We have to bear in mind, again, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. And it is very difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to determine what troop levels should be, what policies on rotation should be. Because, frankly, we are scattered among the 50 States a good deal of the time. We do not have immediate access to immediate intelligence of changes and developments and things like that.

It would be my hope, in this session—which I do believe will be a thing of reality very shortly—that we give the President not a blank check, but indicate to him a sense of support that we have confidence in him as Commander in Chief to make certain decisions like those that have been discussed throughout our testimony today. That is what I hope we can achieve.

And we can stand with him and reach a common consensus on what the objectives are. That this Nation—not just the President, but this Nation—hopes to achieve in the Gulf on behalf of our American citizens and on behalf of the world as we exercise our leadership.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner. I would just add that the question of how many forces you put into an area is not simply a tactical question, but as we have heard from every single witness that we have had here with differing views on other things, I think all of them have felt that we have overdeployed. So that is not a tactical question. And it is certainly not a tactical question when, as some witnesses have said—not all, but almost all—it tends to drive you to a policy, whether or not you are ready for that policy. So I do not consider that simply tactical, but rather really a strategic question.

But nevertheless, we all appreciate very much—Secretary Perle, Dr. Luttwak and Secretary Webb—you being here. We know you private citizens have your own schedules and you have gone to considerable trouble to make yourselves available and to prepare for this hearing. We are very grateful to you, and hope that we can call on you again.

Thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing adjourned.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room SR-253, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, and Gorton.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; and Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Richard E. Combs, Jr., Douglas George, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, and T. Kirk McConnell.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Debra A. Rice and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn and Nancy E. Soderberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to continue receiving testimony on U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf. We will focus in this hearing this afternoon on two key topics: first, the impact on Iraq of the United Nations economic sanctions and, second, the regional issues in the Persian Gulf area.

Our witnesses this afternoon are experts on economic and political matters in the Middle East and Iraq in particular. Dr. Christine Helms is an independent consultant on international, economic, political, and social issues, specializing on the Middle East nations.

She has published extensively on Middle East issues. She has traveled in Iraq extensively during the past 10 years and met many of the senior officials in Iraq.

Dr. James A. Placke is an international affairs consultant in private business in Washington, DC. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has served in Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya. He also served in several government positions involving Middle East policy issues, including as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Dr. Phebe Marr is a Middle East historian and specialist on Iraq. She has studied the area for years, written widely about these nations and traveled extensively in the Middle East. I believe she visited Iraq three times since 1987 and met a variety of senior Iraqi officials and citizens.

Dr. Ajami, the Director of Middle East Studies at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, also was invited and had agreed to testify today. Unfortunately, he is unable to be here because of a family emergency. And he has been invited to submit a statement for the record.

We have asked our witnesses to address, among others, at least the following questions: sanctions, first of all. What is Iraq's susceptibility to a comprehensive set of U.N. economic sanctions with U.S. military and other military enforcement? Is there credible evidence now that these sanctions are beginning to have some significant effect on the Iraqi economy and military? How long will it take to determine if these sanctions are going to be effective? Will these economic sanctions ultimately force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait?

Of course, we all know that the answers to these questions are not easy and we know that they will not, perhaps, be able to be precise. But the best estimate these experts have will be most helpful to our deliberation.

On regional issues, in the long term, how will the region be changed or altered, as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the actions by the United Nations and the United States so far? How durable are the Arab and Islamic components of the U.N. coalition? What will be the long-term impacts in the Arab and/or Islamic nations and among the peoples of those nations if a war over Kuwait takes place? What role does Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism play in this particular crisis and also in the future of the region?

These are very broad and sweeping questions, very difficult questions. My understanding is that each of our witnesses is prepared to give an overview of his or her assessments. I have asked them to try to keep their statements between 10 and 20 minutes, somewhere in that range. But we are not going to keep a time clock on any of our witnesses today.

We appreciate all of you being here. I suggest that we first hear from Dr. Helms and then Mr. Placke and then Dr. Marr.

Senator Cohen, do you have any statement?

Senator COHEN. No thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Helms, we are delighted to have you here. And after we hear from all of you we will come back with questions rotating to the panel.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE M. HELMS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CONSULTANT

Dr. Helms. Well, first of all, thank you very much for inviting me today.

I have, as you know, submitted a longer version of my statement to you. But essentially, my testimony will argue that a negotiated settlement is the optimum solution in the Gulf crisis.

Even if the blockade against Iraq succeeds, which is likely, given sufficient time, severe economic and political costs will accrue. This is because the effects of the blockade cannot be isolated to the primary recipient, that is, Iraq. This is not an argument, however, for the use of military force, but the contrary.

American-led forces could well win a military victory, but the Bush administration could suffer severe political defeat. The force required to obtain Bush's objectives risks the integrity of the Iraqi nation-state. Resulting economic, political, and military problems may then become intractable, costly and extend far beyond Kuwait and Iraq, to the Arab, Islamic, and Third Worlds, and indeed, even into Southern Europe as the Italian Government has hypothesized recently.

It is important to state at the outset that the quality of data regarding Iraq is often misleading, subjective and many times inaccurate. The country essentially remained isolated after the 1958 revolution, and much information originates from biased, secondary sources.

The ruling Ba'th party has followed a policy in commercial and foreign affairs of maximizing dependence and minimizing risk. It has not submitted economic data to the OECD, the World Bank or the IMF for more than a decade. The Ba'th also presents a unanimous front, despite rumors of heated, internal policy debates. So therefore it is very difficult to get a fix on personalities or cliques within the party. I am less concerned here, therefore, with so-called fact than with elucidating general trends which are much more readily observable in the case of Iraq.

WHAT WAS THE STATE OF THE IRAQI ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE INVASION?

Unlike Iran, Iraq made a conscious decision while waging war to continue its domestic development programs, essentially mortgaging existing and future resources. It began the war with $36 billion in revenue reserves, but Iraq's debt was estimated to be about $50 billion owed to non-Arab lenders by 1988. To give you an idea, for example, of how controversial these figures are about Iraq, this estimate has been as low as $20 billion and as high as $70 billion.

Iraq responded by cutting expenditures, selectively repaying debt and restructuring and eliminating nonessential contracts. It emphasized the duplication of technology and encouraged privatization. Manpower and raw materials were pooled across ministries under the aegis of the Minister of Industry and Military Production. A blind eye was turned to a growing black market and the private sector was allowed to import consumer goods.

Iraq's problem, however, was that it was cash strapped. In order to service debt, it was paying $10 billion to $18 billion a year. Foreign companies were offering financing, but at rates of 17 to 20 percent. Iraq's OPEC quota in mid-1989 was 2.783 million barrels per day. At a price of $16 per barrel, Iraqi earnings were just $14 billion for the year. This was insufficient, clearly, even to service its debt. Iraq either had to see an increase in oil prices or to seek a larger export quota. At a production rate of 3.85 million barrels per day, at the same price, Iraq, theoretically, would be able to break the cycle of accumulated debt. By 1990 its quota had risen only to 3.14.

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AGAINST IRAQ?

I think sanctions will and are most likely to be effective if there is total compliance of the world community over many months. I would agree with James Schlesinger that it could be as long as a year. No single factor, however, but an interaction of factors will be causative. Further, it would be misleading to weigh any single indicator unduly. For example, the absence or abundance of food in stores within the Iraqi context, I believe, is more an indicator or a reflection of a political decision, rather than a response to economic rationalism of supply and demand.

Why will the sanctions take so much time? I think you can look briefly at five factors. Oil is the first. It has been frequently noted that Iraq is more than 95-percent dependent upon oil revenues. It had the capacity to ship 1.65 million barrels of oil per day through Turkey and approximately the same quantity through the IPSA lines through Saudi Arabia. It had the capacity to ship another 1 million barrels through its offshore Gulf loading facilities, and, of course, to truck oil to Jordan—both refined product and crude—as well as to Turkey. This export capacity, which neared, importantly, some 5 million barrels of oil per day, has been shut down.

However, at the same time, Iraq has stopped all debt repayment. Ironically, therefore, it is much more useful in this instance not to think of Iraq as an oil producer but, instead, to think of it really as a subsistence economy when trying to analyze the impact of the blockade.

Food is the second factor. Sanctions on food are unlikely to succeed, not only because of negative reactions in the world community. Estimates place Iraqi food imports at anywhere from 60 to 80 percent, mostly grains. However, again, I would caution you about the use of statistics with regard to Iraq. We know that there is at least a 4-month stockpile of certain grains in the country. But much more importantly, an average Iraqi consumes nearly 3,000 calories per day. That is much more akin to an American diet and certainly much higher than the average caloric intake for any Arab, Middle East country.

Again, ironically, one might find that rationing in the Iraqi situation might create a healthier population in the long run. Note that Iraq has renewable water resources and arable land. It has, in fact, one of the few constantly renewable water supplies in the Middle East because of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and receives rainfall in the northern one-third of the country. It can essentially grow food all year round.

Manpower is a third issue. The effect of sanctions on manpower is perhaps the least understood in terms of demographics. No one, even today, has a ballpark figure for how many Iraqi casualties were suffered during the war nor the impact of their loss on the Iraqi economy. After the invasion, some 1.5 million foreign laborers fled Kuwait and Iraq. But what sectors in the Iraqi economy employed them? Will it even be necessary to replace them given the present crisis? Here, too, Iraq may be able to compensate in the short term. For example, Iraqi women—ironically, along with Kuwaiti women—were among the best educated in the Arab world. It is reputed that nearly 50 percent of the petroleum engineering classes in Iraq are women. A number of women have professional degrees in a variety of fields. During the war, they sometimes assumed two to three jobs.

Spare parts is another factor that is worth looking at. Lack of spare parts may well be the most critical aspect of sanctions. Nevertheless, consistent with Iraq's longstanding policy of diversifying risk, undoubtedly material has been stockpiled. This was a lesson that Hussein learned well and hard from the Soviets in 1975 when they cut off armaments. Indeed, one can term the Iraqis as "rainy day shoppers." If an item became available on the market and they had the money, they bought it, regardless of whether they needed it. They also have sufficient military hardware to parasitize and took spare parts and equipment after the Kuwaiti invasion.

Morale, the last factor, is a wild card. On the one hand, Iraqis may resent sacrifice so soon after one protracted war has ended. A general antipathy toward Iran existed even prior to the Iran-Iraq war and in any case, Iraqis knew they had the backing of most Arab States during the war. The invasion of Kuwait is different, for the obvious reason that Kuwaitis are Arabs. There have been only two instances since the formation of the Arab League in 1945 where force has been used by one Arab State against another. The first, of course, is the Syrian involvement in Lebanon and the second was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

On the other hand, popular Arab sentiment in the Middle East has changed since the invasion of Iraq because of the arrival of a large, American-led military force. The killings of the Palestinians on the Temple Mount in mid-October by Israeli soldiers and police deepened the virulence of the sentiment, with the Arab press querying "America's Double Standard," that is, lack of parity or so-called linkage in the implementation of U.N. resolutions.

Although many Iraqi military officers may not like the Ba'th, they state definitively that they are pro-Iraqi. If they believe a Bush objective is to inflict serious damage on their ground forces, they may well see that their objectives are similar, if not the same, as Hussein. If so, there is every incentive for the Iraqi forces to remain in Kuwait, if for no other reason than to deny access of port facilities to others.

WHAT, THEN, IS THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS VERSUS THE POLITICAL COSTS OF MILITARY FORCE?

It is important to note that the initial shock and disappointment of the Arab community after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has undergone revision. Even before Bush claimed that he had the overwhelming support of the Arab world, regional attitudes had shifted. It is more revealing, I think, to ask what pressures caused Tunisia not to attend the Arab League vote condemning Iraq; Jordan, Sudan, and Mauritania to vote against Iraq but with reservations; and Algeria and Yemen to abstain.

While some Arabs said that they did not approve of Hussein's invasion, they resented foreign presence more. Many, particularly Arab youth—who I want to stress to you number 70 percent under 20 years of age and have one of the highest birth rates in the world, 3.2 to 3.5 percent—have gone further. I would add here, too, by the way, that the Iranian growth rate in an urban area like Tehran is 4.0. Its population of 55 million will double by the year 2007. Arab youth state that Hussein is now the one leader capable of redressing the injustices inflicted on the region and their domestic, economic problems. Hussein's most effective tactic has been to play on the difference between the oil-rich "haves" versus the "have-not" states.

Note that the difference between these two categories is much deeper than mere words. The haves are also countries with hereditary leaderships whose combined populations number only about 10 million in contrast to the so-called "have-not" states, whose populations total something in the order of 250 to 300 million.

One should ask why both Syria and Egypt have publicly stated they will not participate in offensive actions against Iraq. The answer, I believe, reflects their own calculations about their domestic, political environments. Bush's strategy is inevitably tied to broader geostrategic realities, whether he likes it or not. Even if Hussein loses, he has already gained prestige, if only because to defeat him more than 500,000 foreign forces have had to be assembled in Saudi Arabia.

The chances, I believe, are very good that Arab youth will view even his defeat as a victory in much the same convoluted way that Egypt's loss against Israel in 1973 was construed.

WHAT ARE THE WIDER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COSTS OF THE BLOCKADE?

It is important to note here that it is not possible to blockade a country like Iraq and isolate its economic and political cost from others in the region. Turkey, for example, was initially reluctant to support the blockade. Some 60 percent of its crude oil comes from Iraq and it earned $5 million a day transshipping Iraqi crude. This is at a time when its role as the southern flank of NATO was being questioned, Bulgarian refugees were flooding over the border, and Turkish workers were returning from Germany. Terrorism levels have now reached pre-1983 levels. Many of these terrorist groups for the first time have definitely been associated with militant Islamic groups, some of them allegedly tied to Iran. Since 1988, there has been increasing Islamic fundamentalism among the Kurds, including, again, Islamic militancy.

Jordan, a resource-poor country is more seriously affected by the blockade even than Iraq. Some 50 percent of its GNP derives from trade with Iraq; 70 percent of its exports went to Iraq; 80 percent of its energy needs were met by the country and almost its entire transportation sector was geared toward Iraqi trade. Some 220,000 Jordanian workers have returned since the crisis. Unemployment currently stands at 20 percent and is expected to rise another 13 percent or more this year. On-and-on the figures go, including the cost of refugees pouring over Jordan's border. It was promised $50 million by international relief organizations. At last count, several weeks ago, only $4 million had been delivered.

Eastern European countries such as Poland and Romania were also dependent upon Iraq for energy supplies, to a tune of $2 billion each, per annum. They will have to buy crude on the open market at increasingly more expensive prices while they are still facing food shortages.

The list goes on—India, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, and so forth are affected variously by the loss of direct trade with Iraq, loss of remittances and increased energy costs.

AT THE HEART OF THIS CRISIS, I BELIEVE, IS A SINGLE DILEMMA FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. CAN FORCE BE TAILORED TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC POLITICAL OBJECTIVES?

If not, can Bush win a military victory but suffer political defeat? An offensive strategy designed to achieve all of Bush's stated goals involves a massive projection of force. You will recall, since the beginning, he has had a number of objectives: the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the ejection of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the protection of Saudi oil, the protection of democracy, the defense of American jobs. A strike at this point, to remove Hussein, appears slim, as do hopes for a coup.

If, however, Bush covets an unstated objective which he has alluded to during the past several weeks, that is, destruction of Iraqi military capabilities—ground forces and his weapons facilities—massive projection of force is inevitable. I think then you must ask how much force is too much? That is, will Iraq's collapse enhance Western security interests and access to oil or create even more costly political, military quagmires?

Iraq's population is approximately 18 million people. It is one of the most pluralistic countries in the Middle East, much more pluralistic even than Lebanon. Iraqi Christians alone comprise a community of nearly 500,000 people clustered in Mosul in the north and in Baghdad. This population figure, by the way, is notably equivalent to the population size of Kuwait. Since October articles have appeared in Turkish publications rekindling irredentist claims to northern Iraq, similar to those Iraq harbored for Kuwait. If Turkey were to fulfill those dreams, would Iran and Syria remain idle? Can Bush ensure the safety of Iraq's minorities? I think this is unlikely given the lessons learned painfully in Lebanon, whose size and pluralism pale in comparison to Iraq's.

A long-term presence in the Middle East is and will increasingly become destabilizing. A number of diverse scenarios can be readily envisioned from instability of so-called moderate, Arab regimes—Egypt, for example; increasing radicalism; increasing opposition to the West, in particular the United States for its prominent role in the blockade and deploying military force; and unrest in Arab

States as well as in non-Arab, Islamic States—in particular, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. This is even truer if force is used.

Further, if a regional security arrangement is implemented——

Chairman **Nunn**. Dr. Helms, point of clarification there. What did you say about Egypt? I am not sure I was able to separate those countries.

Dr. **Helms**. I was giving an example of potential instability in these countries, that one should not make a mistaken assumption that popular opinion in countries hold an opinion synonymous to that of their leader, such as we saw in the case of Sadat. We woke up one morning and he had been assassinated.

We have seen increasing terrorism in the past several weeks in Egypt, including about a month or 2 months ago the assassination of Maghoub. If force is used, we may very well find that the Egyptian people who formerly supported Mubarak may ask what Mubarak has won or achieved by joining the blockade.

FURTHER, IF A REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IS IMPLEMENTED, AGAINST WHOM AND FOR WHOSE SECURITY WILL IT BE IMPLEMENTED?

There are many imponderables here. How will a young Arab officer, for example, really view defense of Saudi oil fields if it is perceived merely as protecting the access of only a certain small interest group to the wealth, or only for the West?

IS FORCE THE BEST AND ONLY SOLUTION?

By calling attention to the ever-growing potential for destabilization due to an American-led military force in the region, I am not advocating the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait. To the contrary, the problems arising from such a solution are infinitely more intractable, if not catastrophic.

Even if Bush resorts to force and wins, the question must be asked, will he want what he has created? That is, the United States can probably destroy Iraqi military capability, but what other demons will be unleashed? Will the United States be able to put them back in their Pandora's Box, and, if so, at what cost?

In conclusion, although negotiation might not be palatable, the alternatives, I believe, carry an infinitely more hefty price tag.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Helms follows:]

STATEMENT BY DR. CHRISTINE HELMS

The first part of my testimony is directed to the impact of the blockade on Iraq. It is prefaced by notes qualifying available data and a statement about the Iraqi economy prior to the invasion. While economic sanctions already have had an impact as evident in Iraqi diplomatic contacts indicating a willingness to negotiate, it is nearly impossible to predict when the cost would become so great that an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, as specified by President Bush, is effected. This is because compliance will not be due to any single factor and we have a tendency to think in terms of Western political behavior and institutions.

The second part of my testimony argues that a negotiated settlement is the optimum solution. Even if the blockade succeeds, which is likely, severe economic and political costs will occur elsewhere since its effects cannot be isolated to the primary recipient. This is not an argument for the immediate use of military force, but the contrary. American-led forces could well win a military victory, but the Bush administration suffer political defeat. The force required to obtain Bush's objectives risks the integrity of the Iraqi state. Resulting economic, political, and military problems may then become intractable, costly and extend far beyond Kuwait and Iraq to other arenas in the Arab, Islamic, and third-worlds.

QUALITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT IRAQ

A brief word about the quality of data regarding Iraq is necessary. Less information exists about Iraq than almost any other Middle East country. What passes as fact, at least in the public domain and I suspect elsewhere, is often misleading and subjective, if not inaccurate, for numerous reasons. First, foreign relations and image-building were of secondary concern to Iraqi governments after the Revolution of 1958. The country remained virtually isolated. Leaders were variously absorbed with development and consolidating power. Even after the Iran-Iraq war prompted external contacts, Iraqi officials were largely ill prepared for a challenge made all the more sensitive during the critical war period. Many diplomats were distrusted and Western journalists remain suspect even now.

Another reason concerns the nature of the Iraqi Ba'th party which took power in 1968. Undue dependence on any foreign power was seen to jeopardize Iraqi national security. Ba'thists cited as proof the failures of the pro-Western Hashemites prior to 1958 and of a succession of pro-Soviet military governments during the 1960s. Therefore, Ba'thists pursued non-alignment in commercial and foreign affairs: "maximize dependence, minimize risk." Similarly, Iraq compartmentalizes information within its bureaucracy and with foreigners. It has not submitted economic data to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund for the past decade. Iraq has been equally circumscribed about its overseas financial deposits and transactions. Even businessmen complained it was difficult to find out which contracts were being bid since Iraqis solicited qualifying documents from specific companies on a project-by-project basis.

Third, there is an assumption that the Iraqi system is monolithic, run by a dictator who manipulates all decisions. While Husain appears and, in fact, is the power nexus, he achieved that position not merely by force, but because he has been the most successful, efficient political broker to date. He is organized and has an agenda. It was Husain who negotiated with the Kurds during the 1970s, caused the implementation of many economic development plans from the 1970s on, effected the agreement with the Shah in 1975, pursued non-alignment which included diversifying arms purchases with Europe, and reached out to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold during the 1980s. It was

Husain who understood and manipulated the structure and processes of the Ba'th Party, which reach deep into his society and from which he derives feedback, albeit less so as the Iran-Iraq war became protracted. Because the Iraqi Ba'th Party is civilian, one sign of this was his ability to relinquish command-and-control decisions to the Iraqi military during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, the Ba'th party presents a unanimous front despite rumors of heated internal policy debates. Accordingly, it is difficult for outsiders to get a "fix" on party cliques or personalities.

Fourth, because there has been little access to Iraq for more than three decades, data that passes as original or "hard" can usually be traced to secondary and tertiary sources. Because the Iraqi government characteristically never denies allegations, they are inevitably lent credence. Diplomats, normally a good source of information about the country in which they serve, were arguably the most isolated of all foreign communities. Journalists were infrequent visitors until the Iran-Iraq war when some acquired rare permission to visit selected sites at the warfront, but primarily sought interviews with Baghdadi officials and, failing that, foreign diplomats. Western businessmen established good rapport with their Iraqi counterparts, but for obvious reasons regarded their knowledge as proprietary. The academics who have visited, let alone studied there, are rare.

Fifth, some data has been given credibility even though it derives from subjective sources. There are, for example, political exiles who left during the 1958 revolution or trickled out during successive transitional governments. Some have formed opposition groups in Europe. Despite widely divergent ideologies and goals, they have coordinated their activities, including contacts with the media, in recent years.

In conclusion, there is an endless recycling and embroidery of data which, regardless of whether it can be substantiated, is able to be construed in a variety of ways. I am less concerned here with so-called fact than with elucidating general trends and patterns of behavior which are more readily discerned.

STATE OF THE IRAQI ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

Unlike Iran, the Iraqi government made a conscious decision while waging war to continue domestic development programs. It essentially mortgaged existing and future resources in order to stabilize the domestic political environment.[1] Starting the war with some $36 billion in reserves, Iraq's debt in 1988 was estimated to be something in the order of $50 billion owed to non-Arab lenders (note that this figure has been estimated to be as low as $20 billion and as high as $70 billion). While this figure appears formidable, Iraq's oil reserves (second only to those of Saudi Arabia), renewable water resources, and manpower endow it with unique development potential among Middle East states.

Iraq responded to this debt in 1989 and early 1990 by cutting expenditures, selectively repaying debt, restructuring and eliminating non-essential contracts. It emphasized the duplication of technology and encouraged privatization. Under the aegis of the Ministry of Industry and Military Production, manpower and raw materials were pooled across ministries. Priorities were established: energy, heavy industry, agriculture and irrigation, and basic infrastructure, particularly education, scientific research, and manpower training. A blind eye was turned to a growing black market. In addition, the private sector was allowed to import and sell some consumer goods, including luxury items. One found, for example, an abundance of "ghetto busters" of all brands even in Iraqi Kurdistan.

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[1]. The analysis of this section is based on interviews I conducted in Iraq during several months of 1989. Some figures have been printed in The Financial Times, MidEast Markets (August 21, 1989) in two articles: "Iraq's Development Priorities" and "Constraints on Iraqi Development." Although written without a byline, these articles were authored by me.

Iraq's problem was that it was cash strapped. In order to service its debt, it was paying $10 - $18 billion a year. Foreign companies were offering financing, but at rates of 17 - 20 percent a year. Note that Iraq's OPEC quota in mid-1989 was 2.783 million barrels per day (mbpd). At $16 per barrel, Iraqi earnings would be $14 billion, insufficient to service debt let alone aid in reconstruction after a debilitating 8-year war. Clearly, Iraq either had to see an increase in oil prices or seek a larger export quota. For example, at a production rate of 3.85 mbpd at the same price, Iraq would theoretically break the cycle of accumulated debt. By 1990, its quota had only risen to 3.14, which theoretically includes 400,000 bpd of domestic consumption. Herein was a central point of Iraq's grievance against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq's displeasure with Kuwait had been aired during a variety of Arab forums in the months prior to the invasion, culminating in the well-known letter of Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz publicly released in July. Overproducing their OPEC quotas, both states were contributing to a decline in oil prices. Kuwait, as an aside, made more money from investments than oil sales.

IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AGAINST IRAQ

Sanctions are likely to be effective if there is total compliance of the world community over many months. No single factor (oil, food, manpower, spare parts and morale), but an interaction of factors will be causative. Further, it would be misleading to weigh any single indicator unduly. For example, the absence (or abundance) of food in stores within the Iraqi context is more a reflection of a political decision rather than a response to the economic rationalism of supply-and-demand. Moreover, the blockade is likely to be protracted due to a hardening of the Iraqi will to persevere in the face of adversity imposed from foreign forces and doubts in the world community about the wisdom of such a high-stakes gamble.

Oil. More than 95 % of Iraqi revenues derive from oil exports. The blockade shut down a potential export capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day (mbpd) through Turkey, some 1.65 mbpd through the IPSA lines through Saudi Arabia, and about 1 mbpd through its off-shore Gulf facilities of Khaur al-Amaya and Mina al-Bakr. Iraq used to truck some 40,000 to 50,000 bpd to the Zarqa refinery in Jordan during 1989. Whether that continues, I do not know except these shipments were intended to offset Iraqi debt rather than enhance revenue. Oil shipments to Turkey by truck have reportedly ceased.

While Iraq weathered a severe cutback to 300,000 bpd or less in 1982 due to Kurdish guerrilla activity and Syrian stoppage of the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline, it should be recalled that Iraq had substantial reserves at that time. However, there is another critical factor which differentiates these two periods. Iraq stopped outgoing payments following a freeze on Iraqi assets. Ironically, therefore, it is perhaps more useful to think of Iraq as a subsistence economy when analyzing its ability to withstand the blockade.

Food. Sanctions on food are unlikely to succeed. Estimates place Iraqi food imports at anywhere from 60 - 80 percent, mostly grains. Iraq has reportedly stockpiled a 4-month supply of rice and wheat and 7 months of barley.[2] Again, I caution you about statistics about Iraq, not only about their origin, but also assuming a parity between Iraqi and Western systems. Not only may this sanction have a negative impact on world opinion, but Iraq may be able to compensate. An Iraqi consumes an average of 3000 calories per day. More akin to American caloric intake, this figure is higher than any other Arab country. In other words, they are getting more than their minimum nutritional needs and then some. They can cut back on their food intake nearly by half.- I am told, but have not been able to confirm yet that Britain's civilian population in World War II actually had lower morbidity and mortality rates, attributable in part to rationing and less fat in the diet. There have been other instances, such as the Spanish Civil War, when nutrition fell far below optimal levels, but people were stimulated to sacrifice. Iraqis are noted for their endurance, probably a function of being a frontier state, and, notably, were able to sustain the sacrifices required of eight years of war. At the same time, Iraq has renewable water resources and arable land. Iraqis can compensate in other ways, such as planting small-scale gardens, similar to the British "Victory Garden," i.e. plant spinach, not roses. In this, Iraq will be aided by its climate and the use of plastic-tent agriculture.

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[2]. Refer to a book scheduled for publication in December 1990 entitled Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott (published by the Institute for International Economics).

Manpower. The effect of sanctions on manpower are least understood. No one really has even a ball-park figure for Iraqi deaths and serious cases of injury during the war, nor the subsequent impact of those figures on the Iraqi economy. Certainly, many agricultural workers entered the military. Fields remained fallow and date plantations went unattended. Women and foreign laborers, however, gradually although did not totally replace them. Since 1988, Iraqi recruits had begun to return to their workplace, but it was not yet clear what adjustments took place.

Similarly, after the invasion, some 1.5 million foreign laborers fled Kuwait and Iraq. Were they skilled or unskilled? What sectors of the economy employed them? Can they be replaced with Iraqis? Here, too, Iraq may be able to compensate in the short-term despite or because of another military call-up because of its economic problems. In any event, Iraqi women, ironically alongwith Kuwaiti women, were among the best educated in the Arab world. A number have professional degrees, are encouraged to work in public, and may well take on additional responsibilities. Further, some foreign workers remain in Iraq.

Spare parts. Lack of spare parts may well be the most critical aspect of sanctions. A nation may sacrifice on food, but tanks do not roll without parts. Typically, Third-World countries almost always suffer from shortages of tires, electrical components, and so forth, but are therefore relatively innovative. Nevertheless, consonant with Iraq's long-standing policy of diversifying risk, undoubtedly material has been stockpiled. This was a lesson Saddam Husain learned well and hard from the Soviets in 1975 and I am sure he has not forgotten it. Indeed, one might term the Iraqis opportunistic or "rainy-day" shoppers. That is, if an item became available on the market, they might buy it irrespective of whether they had immediate need.

As you are no doubt aware, they have sufficient military hardware so that another readily available solution in the near-term is parasitism. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Iraq had begun to streamline its bureaucracy, pooling information about availability of raw materials, human skills, and priorities. This clearly gives them additional flexibility.

Finally, it is clear that Iraq has been adapting captured U.S. weapons and, presumably, spare parts and equipment for a range of purposes.

Morale. Morale, the most intangible of factors, is a wild card. On the one hand, Iraqis may resent being made to sacrifice so soon after one protracted war has just ended. A general antipathy toward Iran had existed prior to the Iran-Iraq war and, in any case, Iraqis knew they had the backing of most Arab states. The invasion of Kuwait is different. Kuwaitis are Arabs and a number of Arab governments have joined the international condemnation of Iraq.

On the other hand, popular sentiment among many Arabs who had been critical of Iraqi actions has changed significantly since the beginning of the invasion of Kuwait because of one fact -- the arrival of a large American-led military force. The killings of Palestinians on the Temple Mount in October by Israeli soldiers and police deepened the virulence of this sentiment with many Arabs now asking why there is no parity in the implementation of U.N. resolutions.

Finally, although many Iraqi military officers may not like the Ba'th Party, they would state they are "pro-Iraqi." If they perceive that one objective of the Bush administration is to inflict serious damage on their ground forces, perhaps risking the loss of structural integrity of the Iraqi state, they may well see their objectives coalescing with Saddam Husain. Statements by Bush and Baker this past week can be read in several ways, including the use of force to destroy Iraqi military capabilities -- ground forces and exotic weapons facilities -- irrespective of an Iraqi withdrawal. If so, there is every incentive for Iraq to remain in Kuwait, retain present entrenched positions and deny access of port facilities to others.

REGIONAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND POLITICAL COSTS OF MILITARY FORCE

The most important point when analyzing the political impact of the present crisis in the Gulf is that Arab and Islamic perceptions of it have changed dramatically since August 2. Initially, shock and profound disappointment existed in the Arab community. Implicit in membership in the Arab League was recognition of the sovereignty of neighboring Arab states.[3]

However, even before Bush claimed he had the overwhelming support of the Arab world, regional attitudes shifted. It is more revealing, for example, to ask what pressures caused Tunisia not to attend the Arab League vote condemning Iraq; Jordan, Sudan, and Mauritania to vote against Iraq, but with reservations; and Algeria and Yemen to abstain? While some Arabs said they did not approve of Husain's invasion, they resented foreign presence more. Many, particularly Arab youth who number some 70 percent under 20 years of age, have gone further. They believe that Husain is now the one leader capable of redressing many of the injustices they perceive have been inflicted on the region by the outside.

Indeed, one should ask why both Syria and Egypt have publicly stated they will not participate in offensive action against Iraq? The answer, I believe, reflects their own calculations about their domestic political environments. In other words, Bush's strategy is inevitably tied to broader geostrategic realities in the region. Here, I stress that you should not assume that the attitudes of the Arab masses are synonymous with those of their governments. Even if Husain loses, he has already gained prestige if only because in order to defeat him more than 500,000 foreign troops have had to be assembled. The chances are very good that Arab youth will view his defeat as a victory in the same way that Egypt's loss against Israel in 1973 was construed.

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[3]. Note that the Arab League was having increasing difficulty addressing the diverse economic problems of its 21 members recently for three reasons. First, the Arab world is highly pluralistic. The further one moves from the heartland of the Middle East, the so-called Fertile Crescent region, the more diverse are the social, linguistic, ethnic, and religious groups included under the Arab umbrella. Second, the League's rationale was initially political. Independence from foreign powers was the primary criterium for membership. Iraq, notably, was the first Arab country to gain independence from mandate control as early as 1932 -- something not achieved by some Arab states, such as the Gulf shaikhdoms, until the 1970s. Third, in recent years, economic problems for individual states have multiplied. In the next 20 years the population of the region will double in the face of already dwindling resources, particularly water.

Thus, the Arab League found formerly palatable political platitudes were no longer acceptable to more restive Arab masses who demanded reform and it became increasingly difficult to obtain unanimity among members whose national contexts were so different. The relatively recent formation of three regional groups -- the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union -- were symptomatic of the need for more pragmatic sub-regional solutions.

Saddam's most effective tactic has been the one the American media aptly labelled the difference between the oil-rich "have" versus the "have-not" Middle East states. Only Iraq in a strict sense is the odd-man-out of both categories. Differences between the two run deeper than mere wealth. The haves are also countries with hereditary leaderships. Their populations number somewhere around 10 million in contrast to some 250 million in the have-not states. Regardless, they both confront serious dilemmas in the years ahead. Doubling of their populations in the face of already dwindling resources, particularly water. Simply in terms of relative human cost, it is of note that some 500,000 Sudanese have died since 1986 of famine. Relief organizations say conditions are such that 8 out of 25 million Sudanese are now at risk.

Moreover, it is important to note that foreign presence has also acted as a lightning rod for non-Arab Muslims. While the majority of Arabs are Muslim, Allah revealed his message in Arabic to Arabs, who were sent to deliver that message to non-Arab populations. Therefore, even if you are an Indonesian Muslim, you must be concerned about the present crisis because of the contaminating influence of foreign presence in the heartland of the Islamic world where God's message was first revealed. Non-Arab Muslim governments have generally adopted low-key supportive positions of the U.S. (which they publicly portray as defense of small nations and national sovereignty), yet have reservations about how the presence of foreign troops or the use of force will affect their populations in the aftermath. There have been violent demonstrations in Pakistan in the past, for example, during America's involvement in Lebanon. Note further that although Pakistan has sent forces to Saudi Arabia, they reportedly have been stationed in defensive positions outside Mecca and Madina. If true, for who and from whom have these positions been determined?[4]

Wider Economic and Political Costs of the Blockade

It is not possible to blockade a country like Iraq and isolate its effects from others. Both the economic and political costs are staggering. A few examples suffice.

Turkey was initially reluctant to support the blockade. Some 60 % of Turkey's energy needs were met by Iraq and it earned $5 million daily transshipping Iraqi crude. This is at a time when Turkey's former importance as the southern flank of NATO was being seriously scrutinized. It was under serious pressure with the arrival of Bulgarian refugees and the return of Turkish workers from Germany. Since January 1990, terrorism has reached pre-1984 levels. The government and the military are increasingly Islamized. Terrorism, some allegedly tied to Iran, is on the increase. Two prominent secularists were assassinated early this year. Kurdish insurgency has also increased since 1988 with some Kurds joining Islamic militant groups. Ozal's handling of the Gulf crisis has reportedly led to the resignation of his defense and foreign ministers.

Jordan, a resource-poor country, is more seriously affected by the blockade even than Iraq. Some 50 % of its GNP derives from trade with Iraq, 70 % of its exports are to Iraq, 80 % of its energy needs were met by Iraq, and almost its entire transportation sector was geared toward trade with Iraq. Fuel purchases on the open market could cost Jordan some $900 million this year. Further, some 220,000 Jordanian workers have returned from Iraq and Kuwait and they will lose $500 million in tourism this year. Unemployment stands at 20 % and is expected to rise another 13 % this year. King Husain has done the best he can to balance increasing domestic unrest and a deteriorating economic situation with demands for United States sanctions against Iraq although it may permanently lead to the demise of his rule and that of his state. At the same time, he has born the brunt of refugees pouring out of Kuwait with only $4 out of $50 million promised by international relief organizations.

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[4]. For further explanation of the relationship between Islam and Arabism and its effect on modern political dialogue, refer to my monograph "Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States," published by The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Papers #10.

Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Romania, were also dependent on Iraq for energy supplies to the tune of some $2 billion each per annum. They will have to seek new sources of increasingly expensive energy at a critical time when they seek to establish fragile democratic institutions and face food shortages.

The list goes on: India, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines and so forth are affected variously by loss of direct trade with Iraq, loss of remittances, and increased energy costs.

The issue of refugees and loss of remittances is a topic unto itself. There are now some 1.5 million displaced workers, but not just from Iraq and Kuwait. It is estimated, for example, that of some 4 million expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia, 2 million are Yemenis. They comprise one-sixth of Yemen's 12 million population and contributed some $2 billion to the Yemeni economy. Since the crisis, 750,000 have reportedly been forced or encouraged, depending on one's interpretation, to return home.

Can force be tailored to achieve specific political objectives? If not, can Bush win a military victory, but suffer political defeat?

Bush's goals present a formidable task to military planners. He has stated that he wants Husain toppled; the Sabah family returned to power; Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait; hostages returned; and democracy, Saudi Arabia, access to oil, and American jobs safeguarded. An offensive strategy designed to achieve these goals involves a massive projection of force. A strike to remove Husain and other Ba'thists appear slim, as do hopes for a military coup. If Bush covets an unstated objective--destruction of Iraqi military capabilities--massive projection of force is inevitable.

How much force is too much?

That is, will Iraq's collapse enhance Western security interests and access to oil or create even more costly political-military quagmires? Iraq's population of 18 million is a living museum of religious, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic groups. Iraqi Christians alone comprise a community of some 500,000--a population roughly equivalent in size to that of Kuwait. Since October, articles have appeared in Turkish publications rekindling irredentist hopes for northern Iraq similar to those Iraq harbored for Kuwait. If Turkey were to fulfill those dreams, would Iran and Syria remain idle? Can Bush ensure the safety of Iraq's minorities? Unlikely, given lessons learned painfully in Lebanon, whose size and pluralism pale in comparison to Iraq's.

Impact of Foreign Presence in the Middle East

A long-term American presence in the Middle East will and already is destabilizing. A number of diverse scenarios can be readily envisioned even if Husain himself is overthrown or killed. Among them are domestic unrest against so-called moderate regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt...greater radicalism among Arab nationalist groups as well as Islamic fundamentalist groups in Islamic countries as a whole... cooperation between those groups...increasing opposition to the West--in particular, the United States for its prominent role during the crisis...and increasing anti-American sentiment in non-Arab Islamic states, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

If a regional security arrangement is implemented, against whom and for whose security will it be implemented? How will Arab youth or interest groups, such as the military, perceive its implementation? Further, will such an arrangement be seen to have become the only viable solution specifically because of America's initial response to this crisis? What complexion are Arab militaries? What are the issues that divide or unite them? How will a young Arab officer really view the defense of Saudi oil fields if it is perceived merely as protecting the access of only certain small interest groups to the wealth and for the West?

Is Force the Best and Only Solution?

By calling attention to the ever increasing potential for destabilization due to an American-led military force in the region, I am not advocating the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait. To the contrary, the problems arising from such a solution are infinitely more intractable, if not catastrophic.

Even if Bush resorts to force and wins, the question must be asked: "will he want what he created?" That is, the US can probably destroy Iraqi military capability, but what other demons will be unleashed? Will the United States be able to put them back in their Pandora's box? If so, at what cost? In conclusion, although negotiation might not be palatable, the alternatives carry an infinitely more hefty price tag.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Helms. Mr. Placke.

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. PLACKE, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CONSULTANT

Mr. PLACKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee for the invitation to appear today.

I have submitted a statement for the record concerning the U.N. sanctions. In my opening comments I would like to focus particularly on the economic boycott of Iraq and its effectiveness, and from that standpoint evaluate some of the structural elements in the Iraqi economy that I think make it particularly vulnerable to the effect of sanctions. Rather than attempt to argue for any given proposition, I will endeavor to be as analytical in possible.

In saying that Iraq is uniquely vulnerable to sanctions, I think what it really comes down to is this: the record of international sanctions so far is not a particularly good one. There has never really been a case that I can recall where they have been absolutely effective, and this is true, also, in the case of Iraq.

In the case of Iraq, what is really important is its ability to pay, because without cash to finance transactions, blockade-busting and embargo avoidance really become a pastime of not great interest.

Iraq's ability to pay is tied up with its ability to export oil. As Dr. Helms has already mentioned, about 95 percent, perhaps a little more, of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings are derived from oil exports, and in this case we have been very effective indeed in closing off those exports. There have been none from Iraq's three principal oil export terminals since the early weeks of this crisis.

There continue to be small amounts shipped to Jordan to enable Jordan's only refinery to stay in operation, and there are reports, I believe credible reports, of small amounts of Iraqi excess petroleum products being bartered to Iran in exchange for particularly valued spare parts and industrial materials. So even this element is not absolute, but it is pretty tight, and tighter than any other example that I think we have before us.

The structure of the economy also lends itself, I think, to a vulnerability to sanctions. Iraq had embarked, certainly from the mid-1970s onward, on a program of fairly rapid industrialization, but it has really been caught more or less in mid-stride. It does not have an integrated manufacturing sector. It is very spotty and uneven, largely dependent upon semi-processed and semi-assembled materials and sub-assemblies coming in from the outside, and those items for the most part, have been cut off.

Beyond that, particularly in the last several years—the change coming in the latter years of the Iran-Iraq War—around the mid-1980s, the investment in development of additional industry was especially focused on defense production and is not particularly helpful to Iraq in the present crisis.

As Dr. Helms mentioned, and I would second this, food, which has been highly publicized, especially in Iraqi propaganda, as being unfairly withheld from Iraq, and against ordinarily moral standards, is not really the issue. Nor, in my view, is medicine. These, I think, are largely products of Iraqi propaganda.

I would agree with Dr. Helms that the Iraqi economy is capable, with some adjustments that have already been made, to provide at least an adequate diet for the Iraqi population as far ahead as one can see, as far ahead, I would think, as this crisis is likely to be with us—certainly through the end of 1991, beyond the next harvest. Therefore, food and medicine—and medicine, I note, is explicitly permitted to be sold to Iraq under the existing U.N. Security Council sanctions—are really not the issue.

What it comes down to, I think, is finance. We do not know nearly as much as we would like, and indeed relatively little about the details of Iraq's financial operations. As Dr. Helms has said, a great deal of data is simply not available. The Iraqis have been very secretive in these matters, but best estimates are that at the time of the invasion Iraq had from $1 to $3 billion in foreign exchange available and accessible to it after the sanctions went into effect.

From Kuwait, the best estimates are, Iraq probably obtained about another $1 billion in convertible assets, making a total at the most of about $4 billion. Imports—that is, apart from capital goods—for the civilian and military sectors were running in the range of $12 to $14 billion annually up to the time of the invasion of Kuwait.

One would expect, given the adjustment measures that the Iraqi Government has taken, that Iraq would be able to stretch that $4 billion of foreign exchange to at least twice the normal period. In other words, stretch it out from an import coverage of 4 months to as much as 8 months. If that is the case, today we are just about in the middle of that period. About 4 months have gone by since the invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the implementation of sanctions.

I think, then, two factors become significant in answering some questions about why Iraq is apparently fairly well able to withstand these external pressures. For one thing, the government during the 8-year war with Iran developed and became very skilled at implementing a comprehensive allocation system, and this is now fully back in effect.

Prices and distribution of critical items, especially foodstuffs, are government-controlled, and the system is really relatively efficient, and it is—the government's experience permits it to operate quite effectively and efficiently.

Beyond that, there is a peculiar and really distinctive Iraqi resistance on a popular level to bowing to any kind of foreign pressure, and therefore, whatever the level of popularity of Saddam Hussein in Iraq—and that is impossible to assess—there is on the other side of the ledger a resistance to knuckling under to foreign pressures, however these might be mandated, even through the United Nations. This, I think, allows the government to maintain a compliance of the population that is beyond what would otherwise be expected.

The pressures that we are beginning to see appearing, and the strains appearing in the Iraqi economy, are evidence that the sanctions are having effect. It is largely anecdotal information that is available, but there are reports of factories working reduced hours, and some are closing down. There are episodic shortages of a wide variety of things, particularly consumer hard goods, which one would expect to have the lowest priority, but on high priority matters there is very little evidence, yet, of severe dislocation.

Examples of what I mean are military supplies in general. Certainly Iraq is able to maintain the state of readiness for its forces that it needs to. Electricity supplies, water supplies, and the transportation system, so far do not seem to have been severely impacted. These, I think, are the areas that we ought to keep our eyes on.

That we have not seen any breakdowns in these areas yet, is not surprising, given the resources that Iraq was able to draw upon in terms of internal stocks and the indications that it was building up particularly critical supplies and materials in advance of the invasion. With the limited amount of foreign exchange available to it, one would anticipate that it is these particular industries and sectors that would have the highest priority in any allocation system. Therefore, we will not see serious disruption in these critical areas until the economy is really on the verge of breakdown.

Now, the question is, when is that magical day going to arrive? Well, I wish I could point to the calendar and give you a precise date, but I am not able to do that any more than anyone else. But let me say this: if this general financial background is in the ballpark, and I think it is, we should see the Iraqi economy progressively coming to a halt as we go into the second quarter of 1991, by which time this amount of foreign exchange should have been expended. If that is the case, we should see an accelerating and rolling shutdown, really, of the industrial sector of the Iraqi economy.

Some would say, well if the Iraqis are able to maintain their military posture, and if they are able to at least minimally feed the population, does this matter? I think it does. It think it does more than one might normally expect, and for this particular reason: despite its repressive character, the Ba'athi regime, and particularly under President Saddam Hussein, has been very successful in satisfying Iraqi aspirations for economic progress. This is conceded even by the regime's most severe critics and is really its principal claim to legitimacy. This, I think, is what is at risk through the economic sanctions.

Undermining that claim to legitimacy will, I think, produce the sort of political backlash that the regime will find increasingly difficult to deal with, especially when the point is reached where truly important services and sectors begin to close down.

At that point, the Iraqi regime, it seems to me, will need to make a choice between two broad courses of action. It can either tighten the screws on the population further and by sheer force enforce further deprivation on the population. That is an option. That has some very serious political implications to it. The pressures will build up, and the potential for serious internal political disruption then, I think, becomes a real possibility.

The other alternative, and one might anticipate that this will be more likely, is for a change of policy, at least with respect to the occupation of Kuwait, and there are a number of things, of course, that could be done: further efforts to divide the multinational consensus supporting the international sanctions and the deployment of forces to Kuwait; an effort to preempt the situation by a partial withdrawal from Kuwait—they are certainly options that the Iraqi regime could exercise.

I think the most that we can expect from sanctions is bringing the issue to a point where the regime has to choose between potential political disruption internally and accepting that it cannot continue to pursue its present line of policy.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Placke follows:]

James A. Placke
International Affairs Consultant

VULNERABILITIES OF THE IRAQI ECONOMY:
The Impact of Economic Sanctions

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to comment on the state of the Iraqi economy, as Iraq defies the will of the international community through its continued occupation of Kuwait, and to assess the effectiveness of the United Nations-mandated embargo on trade with Iraq as a means for pressuring it to end the occupation.

The Iraqi economy has been distorted and its performance constrained by a series of contradictory and ill-conceived government policies over at least thirty years. The result is an economy exceedingly dependent upon a single natural resource, petroleum, with an inefficient and resource-deprived -- but potentially significant -- agricultural sector and an industrial sector skewed toward defense-related production. As a consequence, Iraq is uniquely vulnerable, in my view, to the effects of a trade embargo because of its dependence upon foreign sources for higher quality consumer goods -- including foodstuff -- but especially for a wide array of industrial materials, semi-finished goods, technical services and supplies. This vulnerability is most stark, however, in its virtually complete (at least 95%) reliance upon oil exports as a source of foreign exchange. It is the ability to block Iraq's access to foreign exchange that makes the ban on exports to Iraq potentially effective to the extent of inflicting serious damage on the economy over time.

The blockade of Iraqi, and Iraqi-controlled Kuwait, oil exports is a near total success. Iraq's oil production has fallen from about 3.4 million barrels per day in July, 1990 to about 400,000 barrels per day currently. Its three oil export terminals have been completely closed since the early weeks of the crisis, and only a small amount of crude oil exports -- around 60,000 barrels per day -- continue as the sole supply for Jordan's only refinery. There also are reports of small volumes of oil products being bartered by Iraq for imports of high value spare parts and materials from Iran. Iraq's massive oil infrastructure has been essentially reduced to supplying the domestic economy.

With oil exports -- and therefore foreign exchange earnings -- cut-off, Iraq has been forced to husband carefully the financial resources available to it since its occupation of Kuwait. Because of long-standing secretiveness, little specific, reliable data is available on Iraq's financial operations. Generally, the foreign exchange available to Iraq, subsequent to the blocking of its foreign accounts under the U.N. sanctions, is estimated at $1-3 billion. Added to this is the estimated $1 billion in convertible assets Iraq seized from Kuwait, for an estimated total of not more than $4 billion in available foreign exchange reserves. This is about one-third of the amount of annual foreign exchange expenditure on combined civil and military imports prior to the embargo. By severely restricting imports to critical supplies, especially industrial and military materials and parts (which continue to leak across Iraq's borders and by air at low volumes), Iraq may be able to stretch its financial resources from four months import coverage to eight months. We are now at about the mid-point of that eight-month period, and strains are beginning to show in the economy.

Most of the available evidence of such strains is anecdotal. There are reports of factories closing or working reduced schedules. Hard consumer goods are increasingly in short supply, and probably would have disappeared altogether but for the stocks seized from Kuwait. Basic commodities are price and distribution-controlled, and there are severe penalties for price gouging. Nonetheless, there is significant price inflation for non-controlled goods. There has been large-scale labor dislocation, especially in the petroleum industry, but the unemployed appear to be absorbed into the lower skill jobs formerly held by departed foreign workers and by successive waves of induction into military service.

Meanwhile, critical sectors -- such as military, electricity, petroleum product, water and transportation -- are reported to be operating without apparent difficulty. This should be expected to be the case, since these ought to have the highest priority for resource allocation. It is these sectors, therefore, which should be the best indicators of serious impact by economic sanctions, but such impact will become visible only when the economy is virtually exhausted and on the brink of collapse.

Two factors, in my view, account for the apparent resilience of what otherwise has been an inefficient and rigid economic system: the considerable skill (acquired during the eight-year war with Iran) of the Iraqi Government in operating a comprehensive allocation system and the willingness of the Iraqi public to accommodate hardship. The latter is the case in part because there is no choice in the face of government control and in part because of a distinctive Iraqi resistance to yielding to foreign pressure, whatever may be the degree of dissatisfaction with Iraq's leadership.

There also is apparent, and increasingly openly expressed, public dissatisfaction with the consequences of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That such dissatisfaction is visible at all -- in a society under a ruthless dictatorship -- is remarkable and an indicator of growing internal pressures. Such public attitudes have a special significance in Iraq. The ruling Baathi regime is widely acknowledged, even by its severe critics, to have brought internal stability and economic progress to Iraq -- even if at the price of free political expression and participation.

The regime's claim to legitimacy rests, more than anything else, on its performance in bettering the Iraqi standard of living, and great strides have been made in education, health care and other public services. It is this claim to legitimacy which the deteriorating economy threatens to undermine. At some point, the Iraqi leadership, if not Saddam Hussein himself, will have to concern itself with a potential loss of not only public support, but of public acceptance. It is when (or just before) this point is reached that we can expect to see a change of Iraqi policy toward the present crisis or the prospect of a change of leadership.

This analysis leads to the key question: When can the critical point in Iraq's economic implosion be expected to be reached? Inevitably, the answer is imprecise, but an answer cannot be avoided. With due regard for the lack of data and for the consequent wider margin for error in any such projection, I believe that the progressive shut-down of Iraqi industry and deterioration in the ability to provide vital services should become evident, even to distant observers, sometime in the second quarter of 1991, by which time foreign exchange should be exhausted and the flow of goods into Iraq brought to a virtual halt.

The critical factor will then be the Government's response. Adoption of draconian measures to force public endurance of an increasingly intolerable situation could prolong this siege, but at the growing risk of an uncontrollable internal political backlash. The other general possibility would be intensified Iraqi efforts to find a way out of the impasse by seeking compromise, by attempting to split the multinational alliance or by a grand gesture such as a partial withdrawal from Kuwait.

As a footnote, and only because Iraqi propaganda has succeeded in giving the issue widespread attention, I will mention food and medical supplies, which I have not brought into this analysis since I do not believe that they will be in such short supply as to become critical factors in the foreseeable period over which the present impasse might extend. Iraq is a significant agricultural producer, and the Iraqi Government has adopted measures both to stretch out available food stocks (mostly by lowering the quality of the diet) and to maximize domestic food production. These measures should ensure a less satisfactory, but adequate, diet beyond the 1991 fall harvest.

There is no objective evidence, of which I am aware, of serious shortages of essential medical supplies at this time. This could become a factor in the future, depending upon resource allocation decisions by the Iraqi Government, but U.N. Security Council Resolution 665 specifically exempts medical supplies from the general prohibition on transactions with Iraq.

I thank the Committee for providing me the opportunity to submit this statement.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Placke. Dr. Marr.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, MIDDLE EAST HISTORIAN AND SPECIALIST ON IRAQ

Dr. MARR. Mr. Chairman, I, too, welcome an opportunity to testify before the committee, and I, too, have submitted a longer statement than the one that I am now going to read and talk from.

Chairman NUNN. All of these statements will be added to the record immediately after your oral testimony, and they will be entered in their entirety without objection.

Dr. MARR. As you know, I have been asked to comment on the present and future impact of the events in the Gulf on the Middle East. I have not specifically addressed all of the questions you emphasized, but I think I will cover most of them and would be happy, of course, to answer questions to the extent that I can in the discussion.

The Iraqi attack on and occupation of Kuwait is a pivotal event that will have a profound impact on the region regardless of the outcome of the crisis. Many of the area's previous problems remain, but they have been sharpened and intensified, and the basic assumptions and ground rules for dealing with them have changed.

In my view, the Gulf crisis has had an impact in four main areas. The first is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The second is the growing socioeconomic cleavages in the Arab world already mentioned. The third is the legitimacy and stability of regimes in the area, particularly the Gulf. The fourth is the growing Islamic resurgence and Arab nationalism. Let me elaborate a little on these four.

First, the Arab-Israeli issue. The long-festering Palestinian problem and the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace process have now come into sharper focus and been put into a different perspective by the Arabs. Whatever the reality, there is a widespread perception in the Arab world that the United States has been hypocritical in its denunciation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait while acquiescing in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

There is widespread Arab condemnation of what they see as America's double standard for actions taken against Saddam Hussein for violating U.N. resolutions while refusing to apply the same standards to U.N. resolutions condemning Israel's occupation of its occupied territory.

The potential consequences of the reaction are serious. The strength of the pro-Saddam/anti-American sentiment among Jordan's population, for instance, together with Jordan's economic links to Iraq have already shifted King Husain's previous staunch support for the United States in a more neutral direction. In Jordan's more open democratic system, the King is likely to continue to distance himself from the United States unless this problem can be addressed.

The linkage between the Arab-Israeli problem and the Gulf crisis is widespread in the minds of most Arabs despite U.S. attempts to separate the two. It is also a factor in the issue under discussion; how long the United States can wait for sanctions to take effect. The longer the crisis goes on, the more pressure will be exercised by Palestinians and other Arabs to bring the Arab-Israeli issue to the fore and to make the start of a negotiating process or an international conference a quid pro quo for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

As the increase of violence inside Israel and along its borders indicates, some incident involving Palestinians and Israelis such as that on the Temple Mount could dramatically reduce support for the coalition among Arab populations and regimes.

Second, the crisis has intensified the socioeconomic disparity between wealthy Arabs of the Gulf and the poorer Arabs of the Mediterranean rim and revealed the real bitterness between these two groups. Dr. Helms has already given some figures. Let me just say that this feeling helps to explain why there is not more sympathy for the plight of the Kuwaitis in the Arab world.

This new class division has been fueled by a variety of trends in recent decades: the exploding population growth; the rising debt in poorer countries and declining terms of trade; a degradation in living standards as larger families in urban areas are crowded into inadequate housing; a decline in literacy due to scarce funds for schools and teachers; and slow progress in integrating women into the work force.

The Iraqi occupation did not create this problem, but it has brought the north-south division into the open and resulted in new alignments. It helps to explain support for Iraq from Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. The fact that the United States is backing the wealthier Gulf States in this confrontation and seeking to restore the ruling family to Kuwait has been misunderstood and has not worked to the U.S. advantage.

Regrettably, the boycott has worsened the situation. It is the poorer States—Egypt, Turkey, Jordan—that have had to absorb returning workers from the Gulf, compensate for the loss of remittances, and assume the burden of feeding the new unemployed workers. Meanwhile, the Gulf oil countries have had windfall profits from rising oil profits and increased oil production.

The longer the Gulf crisis lasts, the more divided the Arab world would become and the greater the possibility of erosion of support for Gulf regimes and their backers, the United States and the international coalition.

Third, the crisis has revealed with great clarity the absence of popular participation and accountability in Arab governments and the damage that can be wrought as a result. Authoritarian regimes that rule through relatively small circles, whether the police state variety represented by Iraq and Syria or the monarchical oligarchies of the Arabian peninsula, is not new in the Arab world. The Gulf crisis has revealed their bankruptcy and accelerated a movement already underway prior to the crisis for more democratic governments.

How far and how fast this tendency will go cannot be determined, but the movement supported by a Western educated middle class in these countries is gathering momentum and will be a feature of the post-crisis environment.

The presence of international troops in the area is accelerating the process in an interesting way. Already there is a growing linkage at the popular Arab level between the U.S. military presence and expectations of U.S. support for democratic reforms. If a military presence remains for any length of time, as it must under an extended boycott, this demand from an assertive middle class may become the quid pro quo for its continued acceptance. These factors will put pressures on the very regimes that support our presence and provide the backbone of the alliance.

Last, the U.S. military presence has strengthened Islamic movements in the Arab world. Although many of these were initially opposed to Saddam Hussein, who can in no sense pose as a legitimate Islamic leader, many have now fused with Arab nationalists and taken an anti-imperialist line. Distaste for reliance on the West, however, has been balanced by dislike of Saddam Hussein, his brutal rule, and his occupation and virtual obliteration of an Arab country. At the same time, the United States is seen as imperialist by many. The presence of foreign, mainly U.S., troops on Arab soil is largely responsible for this development.

The Islamic movements under discussion are a natural focus for most Middle Eastern dissidents concerned about the problems cited above. Islamic movements oppose continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank in Gaza; they strongly favor a better distribution of wealth and benefits in the Arab world; they are opposed to the corruption and oppression of the ruling regimes; and, above all, they are against what they see as the imposition of foreign domination and control, particularly of Arab oil resources.

For them as for the nationalists, the presence of foreign troops has become a greater evil than the occupation that brought it about. A prolonged U.S. military presence would allow time for Islamic opposition to grow and spread, gradually threatening the stability of some U.S. allies.

These four factors will be flash points to watch in any strategy—a long wait for sanctions, a war, or a peaceful withdrawal. I do not want to overestimate, however, the forces arrayed against us. Arab dislike of foreign troops on their soil and the intrusion of foreigners to settle an Arab dispute must be put in perspective.

Thus far, disruptive outbreaks have been minimal. There have been no major demonstrations against the United States, and in key countries there has been support. Religious decrees in favor of asking for foreign troops when needed have been issued by Saudi and Egyptian religious leaders. Moreover, Islamic movements are not monolithic or homogeneous, although they do share some broad ideals and goals. There is little evidence of effective organizational coordination across frontiers.

Moreover, the Gulf crisis comes at a time when the Middle East had been moving in the direction of pragmatism and moderation. One feature of this process has been a strengthening of State structures in the area and a gradual abandonment of Arab nationalism defined as the integral union of Arab States. Instead, governments and populace alike appeared to be accommodating to existing State structures and accepting the status quo as legitimate.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait has challenged this State system as well as the existing borders in the Middle East. If he succeeds, the repercussions will be widespread in a region where almost all borders have been drawn by foreign powers and do not represent geographic realities. But the reaction to his invasion has also demonstrated the bankruptcy of old pan-Arab ideas and showed in the last analysis just how strong State interests have become.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have overcome enormous sensibilities over what other Arab States might think by its willingness to host a huge foreign presence on its soil. Egypt has done the same by spearheading the resolution condoning this force. The split in the Arab League and the resignation of its Secretary General reinforce this conclusion.

The stakes in the outcome of this crisis are high. In my view, none of the alternatives facing the international community are good. On either end of the spectrum, we have two extremes. On the one hand, a failure to dislodge Saddam Hussein from Kuwait will not only make him the hegemon of the Gulf and the enforcer of OPEC production, but it will arrest the trend toward pragmatism, undermine the legitimacy of the existing Gulf States, to say nothing of their regimes, and, of course, greatly erode U.S. influence in the area.

Equally damaging at the other extreme would be a long, protracted and devastating war that destroyed Iraq's military and its infrastructure. In the larger regional context such an action would destabilize Iraq, destroy the balance of power in the Gulf, turn the Iraqi people and possibly much of the Arab world against the United States for at least a decade, and strengthen the Islamic and Arab nationalist elements that are opposed to our interests.

Somewhere in the center of the spectrum are two other options. The international coalition hopefully now with the United Nations Security Council support must dislodge Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. International pressure and diplomacy would be best, unquestionably; but if that fails, a short war, if possible, that uses mainly air assets and minimizes casualties on both sides may be necessary.

Far more attention must be put on the end game and what lies beyond the end game. What is the outcome we wish to achieve in the region, and what means do we have to achieve it? Above all, more attention needs to be devoted to the regional environment and the underlying problems that have emerged in such acute form in the course of this crisis. The intensification or mitigation of these regional problems will determine the staying power of the coalition in peace or in war and the extent of U.S. influence in the region in its aftermath.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]

Dr. Phebe Marr
Senior Fellow

Institute for National Strategic Studies
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Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify before the Committee and to explore with you the present and future impact of events in the Gulf on the Middle East. As you may know, my expertise lies in the modern history and politics of the Arab world, with particular emphasis on Iraq and the Gulf. In addition to my research, I travel to the region frequently and keep in touch with government officials, academics, journalists and other opinion makers. The views expressed here are my own and not that of NDU or the administration.

The Iraqi attack on and occupation of Kuwait is a pivotal event that will have a profound impact on the region, regardless of the outcome of the crisis. Many of the area's previous problems remain, but they have been sharpened and intensified; the basic assumptions and ground rules for dealing with them have changed. In my view, the Gulf crisis has had an impact in four main areas:

1. The long-festering Palestinian problem and the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace process have come into sharper focus and put into a different perspective by Arabs. Whatever the reality, there is a widespread perception in the Arab world that the US has been hypocritical in its denunciation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait while acquiescencing in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. There has been widespread Arab condemnation of what they see as America's "double standard" for actions taken against Saddam Husain for violating UN resolutions while refusing to apply the same standards to UN resolutions condemning Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The reaction of the

Palestinians and Jordanians has been clear. Despite their dislike of Saddam's rule at home, they have supported him in this crisis as the only Arab willing to stand up to Israel and its ally, the US. While there have been some second thoughts about that support among Palestinian refugees from Kuwait, now out of work, and among the PLO leadership, worried about being on the losing side of the crisis, the reaction of most Palestinians has been to support Saddam. This reaction is more understandable in the light of the Palestinians situation prior to the crisis. The collapse of the administration's efforts to initiate a dialogue between Arabs and Israelis prior to the crisis; the lapse in the dialogue between the US and the PLO--understandable but regrettable; the ineffectiveness of the intifada in bringing change to the West Bank, have all generated wide spread frustration, even despair, in the Arab world. Saddam Husain has succeeded in tapping into this discontent and turning it to his advantage and against the US and its operation in the Gulf.

The potential consequences of this reaction are serious. The strength of the pro-Saddam, anti-American sentiment among Jordan's population, together with Jordan's economic links to Iraq, have already shifted King Husain's previously staunch support for the US in a more neutral direction. In Jordan's more open, democratic system, the King is likely to continue to distance himself from the US unless this problem can be addressed. The linkage between the Arab-Israeli problem and the Gulf crisis is widespread in the minds of most Arabs, despite the US attempt to separate the two. It is also a factor in the issue under discussion--how long the US can wait for sanctions to take effect. The longer the crisis goes on, the more pressure will be exercised by Palestinians and other Arabs to bring the Arab-Israeli issue to the fore and to make the start of a negotiating process or an international conference a quid pro quo for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. And, as the increase of violence inside Israel and along its borders indicates, some incident involving Palestinians and Israelis, such as that on the Temple Mount, could dramatically reduce support for the coalition among Arab populations and regimes. Ironically, the crisis has already impacted negatively on the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement in the near term. Palestinian support for Saddam Husain has reduced the willingness of Israelis to deal with the PLO as credible partners in a dialogue; increased Israeli distrust of Palestinians has reintroduced the Green Line on the West Bank, reducing contact between the two adversaries; and the reemergence of Palestinian nationalism in Jordan has weakened the fabric of the Jordanian state, making cooperation by King Husain in this effort more difficult. A war with Iraq that might involve Israel is a Jordanian nightmare. Given the high level of popular support for Saddam in Jordan, it would be difficult for King Husain to hold a neutral line and his army to contain his own population. Instability in Jordan, the possible removal of the Hashemite monarchy, or the creation of a Palestinian state in Jordan, under a variety of scenarios that cannot be considered here, would create monumental problems for the US and its ally Israel.

2. Second, the crisis has intensified the socioeconomic disparity between the wealthy Arabs of the Gulf and the poorer Arabs of the Mediterranean rim and revealed the bitterness between the two groups. This feeling helps explain why there is not more sympathy for the plight of the Kuwaitis in the Arab world. This "class" division has been fueled by a variety of trends in recent decades: an exploding population growth that will double the population in these countries by the year 2010, rising debt in poorer countries and declining terms of trade that have made for slow--or no--growth, a degradation in living standards as larger

families in urban areas are crowded into inadequate housing space, a decline in literacy due to scarce funds for schools and teachers, and slow progress in integrating women into the work force. Meanwhile Gulf states, with small indigenous populations have readily available (often unearned) income from oil, a situation that has spawned the "politics of envy." Many educated Palestinians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Egyptians working in the Gulf are often the technocrats and managers that run Gulf economies, yet they have been accorded neither citizenship nor social equality within these countries. Their second class status and the profligacy of some of the Gulf elites has generated animus toward these elites and thrown the legitimacy of the ruling families into question.

The Iraqi occupation did not create this problem but it has brought the north-south division into the open and resulted in new alignments. It helps to explain support for Iraq from Yemen, Jordan, Algeria and Tunsisia. The fact that the US is backing the wealthier Gulf states in this confrontation and seeking to restore the ruling family to Kuwait, has been misunderstood and not worked to the US advantage. Regrettably, the boycott has worsened the situation. It is the poorer states--Egypt, Turkey, Jordan--that have had to absorb returning workers from the Gulf, compensate for a loss of remittances, and assume the burden of feeding new unemployed workers. Meanwhile, the Gulf oil countries have had windfall profits from rising oil prices and increased oil production. The policy of Saudi Arabia in penalizing the workers of neighboring countries for their perceived support for Iraq--especially the Yemeni workers who have had to leave Saudi Arabia and Jordanian merchants cut off from trading in Saudi Arabia.

The longer the Gulf crisis lasts the more divided the Arab world will become, and the greater the possibility of erosion of support for the Gulf regimes and their backers, the US and the international coalition.

3. The crisis has revealed with great clarity the absence of popular participation and accountability in Arab governments and the damage that can be wrought as a result. The collosal miscalculation of an isolated, monolithic ruler in Iraq brought the conflict about. The failure of the Kuwaiti regime to take its population into its confidence during the growing crisis with Iraq aided in its fall. Authoritarian regimes that rule through relatively small circles, whether the police state variety represented by Iraq and Syria or the monarchical oligarchies of the Arabian peninsula, is not new in the Arab world. But the Gulf crisis has revealed their bankrupcty and accelerated a movement, already underway, for more democratic governments.

Even before the crisis, the region was experiencing a cautious move toward more democratic systems and greater regime accountability. In Jordan, the first genuine election in decades was held last year. In Algeria, elections for local municipalities resulted in a resounding defeat for candidates of the ruling FLN. Since the occupation, the Kuwaitis in exile have taken steps toward establishing a constitutional monarchy if they regain their country, while some Gulf regimes have grudging moved toward more consultation (Saudi Arabia, Oman). How far and how fast this tendency will go cannot be determined but the movement, supported by a Western educated middle class in these countries, is gathering momentum and will be a feature of the post crisis environment. It would be accelerated by changes of regime in Iraq and Kuwait, if these took place. In any event, few regimes in the Gulf are likely to escape the trend. In addition to previous criticisms with respect to its administration of the pilgrimage, the Saudi regime's legitimacy is now being called into question because of its resort to foreign troops for defense. (Its population was not told of the Iraqi invasion for several days after its occurrence.) Gulf regimes are unlikely to survive the decade in their present form and some may not survive at all. The presence of international troops in the area is accelerating the process. Already there is a growing linkage at the popular Arab level between the US military presence and expectations of US support for democratic reforms. If a military presence remains for any length of time, this demand from an assertive middle class may become the quid pro quo for its continued acceptance. These factors will put pressures on the very regimes that support our presence and provide the backbone of the alliance.

4. The US military presence has strengthened Islamic movements in the Arab world. Although many of these were initially opposed to Saddam Husain, who can in no sense pose as a legitimate Islamic leader, many have now fused with Arab nationalists and taken an anti-imperialist line. However, distaste for reliance on the West has been balanced by dislike of Saddam Husain, his brutal rule, and his occupation and virtual obliteration of an Arab country. At the same time, the US is seen as imperialist by many. The presence of foreign, mainly US, troops on Arab soil is largely responsible for this development. These movements do not support Saddam Husain's authoritarian rule, his secularism, his disregard for Islamic norms of behavior and his brutal occupation of another Arab/Muslim country. But other imperatives have superceded these concerns. Islamic opposition is now focused on a huge foreign army, overwhelmingly US and Christian in composition, on the territory of the country in which Islam's holiest sites are located. And the fact that the bulk of the forces belong to Israel's staunchest supporter is the bond that unites them with the generally secular nationalists. The Islamic

movements are a natural focus for most Middle Eastern dissidents concerned about the problems cited above. Islamic movements oppose continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza; they strongly favor a better distribution of wealth and benefits in the Arab world; they are opposed to the corruption and oppression of the ruling regimes, and above all they are against what they see as the imposition of foreign domination and control, particularly of "Arab" oil resources. For them, as for the nationalists, the presence of foreign troops has become a greater evil than the occupation that brought it about. A prolonged US military presence would allow time for Islamic opposition to grow and spread, gradually threatening the stability of some US allies.

These four factors have already been affected by events in the Gulf and they will be flashpoints to watch in any strategy--a long wait for sanctions, a war, or a peaceful withdrawal. However, I do not want to overestimate the forces arrayed against us. Arab dislike of foreign troops on their soil and the intrusion of foreigners to settle an Arab dispute must be kept in perspective. Thus far disruptive outbreaks have been minimal. There have been no major demonstrations against the US, and in key countries there has been support. Fatwas (religious decrees) in favor of asking for foreign troops when needed have been issued by Saudi and Egyptian religious leaders. Moreover, Islamic movements are not monolithic or homogeneous, though they share some broad ideals and goals. For the most part they are an expression of populist discontent over existing problems--political, economic, and social--in their respective countries. Hence their objectives vary from country to country. On the West Bank and Gaza, the focus is Palestinian liberation; in Egypt, remedying conditions of poverty; in the Gulf, regime corruption. There is little evidence of effective organizational coordination across frontiers.

Moreover, the Gulf crisis comes at a time when the Middle East has been moving in the direction of pragmatism and moderation. One feature of this process has been a strengthening states structures the area, and a gradual abandonment of Arab nationalism defined as the integral union of Arab states. Instead, governments and populace alike appeared to be accommodating to existing state structures and accepting the status quo as legitimate. The PLO publically stated its goal of establishing an independent state. Iran failed in its attempt to impose its messianic universalist version of Islam on its neighbors. Even Iraq adopted a state centered version of Arab nationalism with itself as the leader. Recent attempts at unification have been state centered and pragmatic; the successful GCC, the Maghreb Union and the now-defunct ACC.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait has challenged this state system, as well as the existing borders in the Middle East. If he succeeds, the repercusions will be widespread in a region where almost all borders have been drawn by foreign powers and do not represent geographic realities. But the reaction to his invasion has also demonstrated the bankruptcy of old pan-Arab ideas and showed, in the last analysis, just how strong state interests have become. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have overcome enormous sensibilities over what other Arab states might think by its willingness to host a huge foreign military presence on its soil. Egypt has done the same by spearheading the resolution condoning this force. The split in the Arab League and the resignation of its secretary general reinforce this conclusion. One should also mention here the new international climate and its impact on the Middle East. The withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan, its preoccupation with domestic affairs, and growing cooperation between the two super powers have had a profound impact on the region. In one sense, detente has produced anxiety as local powers realized that they could not long play one side off against the other, that they would henceforth have to rely on their own resources. As a result, there has been some movement toward economic and political cooperation among regional blocs--the Maghreb union and the Arab Cooperation Council are examples. But detente also had an unfortunate effect; it loosened the control of one superpower over its clients allowing one regional power--Iraq--to move aggressively to fill a perceived vacuum. Cooperation with the USSR will be essential to containing Iraq and creating a better political environment in the region in the post-crisis period.

The stakes in the outcome of this crisis are high. A failure to dislodge Saddam Husain from Kuwait will not only make him the hegemon of the Gulf and the "enforcer" of OPEC production, begun with his oil price demands; it will arrest the trend toward pragmatism, undermine the legitimacy of the existing Gulf states, to say nothing of their regimes, and of course, greatly erode US influence in the area--and the world. Equally damaging would be a long, protracted and devastating war that destroyed Iraq's military and its infrastructure. In the larger regional context, such an action would destablize Iraq, destroy the balance of power in the Gulf, turn the Iraqi people, and possibly much of the Arab world, against the US for at least a decade, and strengthen the Islamic and Arab nationalist elements that are opposed to our interests.

The international coalition, hopefully now with UNSC support, must dislodge Saddam Husain from Kuwait. International pressure and diplomacy would be best, but if that fails, by a short war that uses mainly air assets and minimizes casualties on both sides, may be necessary. Unfortunately, none of the alternatives facing the international community is good. Lastly, far more attention must be put on the end game, and what lies behind the end game--what outcome we wish to achieve and the means to achieve it. Above all, more attention needs to be devoted to the regional environment and the underlying problems that have emerged in such acute form in the course of this crisis. The intensification or mitigation of these problems will determine the staying power of the coalition, in peace or in war, and the extent of US influence in the region in its aftermath.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you very much, Dr. Marr. We appreciate your testimony. You have given us a lot to think about. Senator Dixon has to leave in just a few moments. So I am going to yield my time to him and then take his turn in the rotation. So I yield to Senator Dixon.

Senator **DIXON**. Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate your kindness and your accommodation. And I would simply like to ask this question of each of the three witnesses. Will the embargo succeed? How long will it take? Now Mr. Placke has already suggested, in his view, probably toward the end of the second quarter of next year. And can the embargo succeed without negotiations preceding the ultimate withdrawal of Mr. Hussein from Kuwait?

I would ask that of each of the witnesses.

Mr. **PLACKE**. If I may, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could start.

Yes, I think it is fairly clear that my view is that the embargo can succeed in accomplishing this. That is, effecting or bringing Iraq to the point of confronting the necessity to change its policy. It does not necessarily mean that it will force Saddam to withdraw. He has a variety of tactics that he might choose to employ to try to avoid withdrawing. He could also continue to tough it out, even beyond the point where this makes economic sense, because economics, of course, is not the only matter at issue.

But I think the pressures on the present Iraqi policy will become severe by the middle of next year.

Senator **DIXON**. And do you think it is possible that he would withdraw without negotiations preceding the withdrawal?

Mr. **PLACKE**. I think as a tactic the possibility of a partial withdrawal is certainly an option that has some advantages from an Iraqi viewpoint.

Senator **DIXON**. Dr. Helms?

Dr. **HELMS**. Well, I think the sanctions do have a chance for success. You can already tell, in fact, that there are pressures on the Iraqi Government, if only because of the continued interest by the Iraqis about the diplomatic context—not only with Arab States, but among the European Community. Clearly, this has to reflect some domestic strain or their recognition that ultimately they are going to face increasing economic and political problems.

Senator **DIXON**. How long will it take?

Dr. **Helms**. I would say—perhaps even longer than Jim's estimate—as long as a year. I would also say, in response to your second question about whether they might arbitrarily pull out, several months ago I might have believed that. I thought, in fact, that might have presented the United States with our worst-case scenario. What I am increasingly concerned about are Bush's statements in the press about using military force and raising the danger of nuclear weapons and exotic weapons. This may well give the message to Hussein's administration that even if they withdraw, they may well be hit with the military force in order to destroy that capability. During the 4 months they have been entrenched in Kuwait, they have dug in further and further. What would be the incentive to withdraw if they think they are going to be hit when pulling back militarily, particularly when retreats are some of the most difficult military maneuvers.

Senator **Dixon**. So you think negotiations will be necessary, coupled with the embargo?

Dr. **Helms**. Yes.

Senator **Dixon**. Dr. Marr?

Dr. **Marr**. I am a little less sanguine that the embargo will work, in and of itself, in a time frame that will allow our coalition to hold together.

I accept Jim's estimate, because he certainly does know more than I do on the subject. But for Saddam Hussein to give in, I, too, think it would take perhaps a little more time. And I think that coupling embargo with at least a threat of military force is very useful.

I see Saddam Hussein, as I think my colleagues also would, as a political survivor. I do not see him at all as having a Masada complex. I think he wants to survive. He wants his regime to survive. And he still feels, I believe, that he has a number of options to undertake.

I think that more thought must be given to the emphasis on the four aims that the President outlined in his policy. Deterrence in Saudi Arabia, I think has been taken care of. We don't need to worry about it.

The second one was withdrawal from Kuwait. The third was security in the area, which I take to mean an improved balance of power in the region. That does not necessarily have to be accomplished by war or taking out Saddam Hussein's assets.

Senator **Dixon**. But can it be accomplished without negotiations, in your view?

Dr. **Marr**. It depends on who is going to be doing the negotiations. I think that one of the things that needs to be done, is to sort out whether we merely want his removal from Kuwait or whether we are also determined not only to take out his nuclear and other assets but to so constrain him, even after he withdraws, by a variety of measures we have heard discussed—continued sanctions, economic squeeze and so on—that his political survival might be threatened after he gets out. These seem to be contradictory. And in his own mind, he may be asking himself the question, "what is in it for me if I withdraw and then face slow political death?"

I think clearing up that issue, in public statements for example, might help a lot. I am not so certain about the negotiations by us, but I would certainly see negotiations by Arabs and others as helping facilitate the withdrawal process.

Senator DIXON. I appreciate the Chair's accommodation.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. I would pass to my colleague, Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Dr. Marr, you have indicated you thought you were going to have to have sanctions plus a threat of force. How credible does that threat have to be in order to be effective and what do you mean by threat of force in the context that we are currently structured in the Persian Gulf?

Dr. MARR. Well, I think—if you are going to have a threat, it has to be credible. I think Saddam Hussein has to believe that at some point it probably is going to be used. I do not want to put too fine a time line on the point. He is a very tough customer. He has faced down a lot of other issues. I would like to cite two examples, where he has, in fact, withdrawn from very sticky situations: his 1975 agreement with the Shah, in which he was actually facing a potential war between the two parties which he did not think he could win. In 1982, he also had to withdraw during his hostilities with Iran and managed to save his face in doing it.

Senator COHEN. Well, does he have to face a threat of offensive war on the part of the United States and those nations who are currently in the Gulf? In other words, today, I assume—I have not heard the latest news—but the United Nations is going to be debating a resolution that after January 15 he may face a threat of force. I assume a resolution of some sort will be debated before the full Congress that would either grant or deny the President of the United States the ability to go on offensive war or make war against Saddam Hussein.

Is that something that you see as beneficial or detrimental to getting him out of Kuwait?

Dr. MARR. I see it as one element of a strategy. It should not be the only element. I think racheting up the pressure, getting his attention, convincing him that he is in a serious situation might be helpful. But I think it also has to be accompanied by what I would like to call at least enough wiggle room to allow him to back out of the situation. That is only one element of the strategy.

Senator COHEN. You would call that a face-saving opportunity for him?

Dr. MARR. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. Do you think that we should be engaged in any kind of direct negotiations or indirect negotiations with him to allow him to save face—your understanding of how this would be perceived by the Iraqis or, indeed, the Gulf State communities?

Dr. MARR. There is an up side and a down side to all of these. These are extremely difficult issues to face. I think we probably both understand a direct negotiation, of course, would be a huge face-saving benefit for Saddam. It would give him a great deal of prestige, which he, indeed, does want—dignity and face are very important issues with Saddam. He wants to be recognized on an international level. I think we have to ask ourselves whether, in fact, we want to give him that at this point as the price for withdrawal.

The down side is once you start on a negotiating process, it could be a very slippery slope. It could drag the process out and it could end by not actually enforcing the U.N. resolution in its entirety.

Senator COHEN. I think the Reagan administration found that when it tried to negotiate a release of the hostages during the past several years known as the Iran-Contra Affair.

What about the long-term presence of American forces? I think all of you have indicated, Dr. Helms, Mr. Placke, Dr. Marr, that it may take a year or more in terms of sanctions to really be effective in that regard. Can the United States maintain any kind of a significant military force on Saudi territory and really avoid the problems you mentioned—rising nationalism, radicalism, instability in the region—can they last through the spring into the summer, possibly into next fall and next winter with a significant, credible, military presence and yet not jeopardize Saudi Arabia itself, Egypt—all of the other states who are supporting us?

Dr. MARR. Let me just say a few words and then let the others speak. There is no either/or, of course, in this process. The size and visibility of the American presence, the fact that it is so overwhelmingly American are important factors. It would be nice to have more Arabs, more Europeans there.

There is no time line that we can set for coalition cohesion, just as we cannot set it with the boycott. But I have tried to outline in my paper some, perhaps not even all, of the repercussions of stability. Our military presence is Saddam's best focal point. He is using it in terms of propaganda and otherwise to align people against us.

Senator COHEN. Let me shorten this if I can.

Would you agree with the proposition that if we were to rely principally upon air power, as such, maintaining an air power presence in the region and use that as the military threat, coupled with an economic blockade, that that is the best possible option under all of the unfavorable options that we have?

Dr. MARR. Well, I am not a military specialist and I do not want to get into that. But in political terms, in political terms it probably would be. But I cannot speak to the military ramifications.

Senator COHEN. I am just asking in terms of the——

Dr. MARR. The less visible, the better.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And we appreciate very much your all being here today. I listened with great interest to your testimony. Much has been said about the embargo and its effect on Iraq and its economy. And you helped us a great deal on that.

I am concerned also about the other nations—Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and others—that have been hurt by the embargo. There has been quite a contribution on their part to the embargo. They were to be compensated to some extent by the European Community, Japan, West Germany and others to try and make up, partially, for the losses that they have sustained.

Do you have any information as to whether or not that money that was supposed to be flowing in to help out those Arab nations that have been supporting us, has that money, indeed, been forthcoming from Japan and the European Community and others, helped them out? Or has been lagging to the extent that those countries not involved militarily offered to help out with cash contributions? Has that money been forthcoming?

Dr. HELMS. I cannot answer across-the-board for all of them. I did, in fact, talk to somebody who is a member of the Egyptian parliament several weeks ago who said that, as of that time, only a small percentage of the money had arrived.

Certainly in Jordan, I know for a fact, that money promised for aid for refugees had not arrived—I mean, it had been pledged, up to $50 million; $4 million had arrived. I cannot answer what the situation is for Turkey. So there is some lag, definitely.

Mr. PLACKE. If I could attempt to add a bit to that, Senator.

I think it is important to distinguish between the non-Arab contributors and Arab contributors. Arab contributors, of course, to some extent have a different set of priorities. I think contributions from Saudi Arabia, from the UAE, and from other states in the peninsula have flowed to Egypt, to Syria, in particular, and to a lesser extent to North Africa. Not to Jordan, because of the political tensions that exist between Jordan, especially, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

On the international scene, I have very little specific information to add to what Dr. Marr has said. Inevitably, there is a lag between the impact, which is almost immediate in terms of a cut-off of funds—for example in Turkey, with the closure of the pipeline it lost revenue from that day onward—and the inevitably slower arrival of these funds when they do arrive.

Senator EXON. We heard testimony this morning, particularly with regard to the fact that the administration, in its rush to collect this support from many of the Arab countries, arranged compensation for them. It was not mentioned this morning, but I suspect a part of that was the controversy over the forgiveness of the $7 billion that was owed to the United States by Egypt.

Evidently there has been diplomatic efforts for exchange of money and promises of help that had a great deal to do, directly or indirectly, with these nations coming on board with our U.N. initiatives.

I have had the feeling in some of the briefings that maybe one of the concerns of the administration right now is—and possibly one of the reasons that we have dramatically shifted from what, in August, 3 or 4 months ago, was described as Desert Shield to Desert Sword—whether or not this rather fragile Arab coalition that is supporting us is going to hold together for more than 60, 90, 120 days.

Have you picked up that indeed that Arab coalition supporting us is so fragile that it is a major concern of the administration and why they are seemingly moving more swiftly than earlier anticipated to the use of military force?

Dr. HELMS. I think the answer to that is definitely yes. If you look, for example, at Turkey, Ozal now is incurring increasing domestic—and in fact, perhaps even inciting, one might say—increasing domestic unrest in his country over his handling of the Gulf crisis. His Defense and Foreign Ministers resigned, reputedly specifically over this policy. And I think there is no doubt that if you look at the figures, one can definitely see a linkage between money given by the Saudis to Syria and to Egypt. Notably, the original amount promised by Saudi Arabia to Egypt was $600 million. Before we canceled Egyptian military debt, that was precisely the amount that Egypt would have paid in interest this year to the United States on that debt. And the list gets longer.

But I think these countries, as I mentioned in my talk and which I cannot stress enough, are very much worried and concerned by their domestic environment. They most often make decisions based on domestic pressures, rather than on their foreign alliances.

Senator GORE. Would you yield out of my time for a brief follow-up on that? The two ministers in Turkey did not resign recently, after growing pressure, did they? I thought that was right at the beginning of the policy by Ozal and does not reflect.

Dr. HELMS. You could be right. I do not know the exact date. I just saw a press release on that.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Senator EXON. Any other comment, Dr. Marr?

Dr. MARR. Yes, I would agree with that. And I think that the gist of my paper is just that. I would be a little cautious, however, on how fragile the coalition is. These governments have a very good way of keeping their ear to the ground and shifting position to accord with their populations. They are the best judges of how far they can go.

But there are lots of signs of pressure on the coalition. For example, let me just mention the Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt. I think its shift is interesting. When the occupation first occurred, it came out with a statement opposed to Saddam Hussein. Then, after some thinking and presumably some pressure from the government, it backed off. But recently the head of the Muslim Brotherhood came out with a statement opposing foreign forces in Saudi Arabia.

So we see that the longer the troops remain, the longer the crisis drags on, the more there will be gradual pressures against foreign forces. There will be an erosion of support which these regimes must take into account.

Mr. PLACKE. If I could attempt to add just one point, Senator. Clearly, the popularity of foreign intervention is not going to grow. It is going to become less and less popular and, therefore, more and more of a liability over time. The question really is over what period of time.

Also, it is important to remember that the regimes associated with the United States, or us associated with them in the multinational enterprise, have made a commitment from which they are going to find it very difficult to back away.

Saudi Arabia took a significant risk in opening its doors to this level of foreign involvement. Egypt, similarly, has taken a risk. They are not likely to back away from it in any sudden way, more likely, I think, in subtle ways such as searching for openings to negotiate an arrangement with the Iraqis.

Senator EXON. Getting back to the time pressures that everyone is under, we have had considerable testimony that indeed, with the pilgrimage that is going to take place in the next few months, with Ramadan coming upon us very rapidly, that all during those times we could conceivably see more of a deterioration in the support of other Arab countries in the area.

Do you believe that religious angle, which is very important to the people of that faith, could cause us some additional problems in the region?

Dr. **Marr**. There will be some increased tension. It is an opportunity from which Saddam and his propaganda machine can profit. But I think it can be handled—providing that we are not fighting during that time. I think this is one constraint that needs to be taken into consideration. I think it is handleable.

Senator **Exon**. If we are not fighting.

Dr. **Marr**. If we are not fighting.

Senator **Exon**. If we are fighting, then what?

Dr. **Marr**. I think that is one of the constraints that the administration is looking at. These are very religious months. To be fighting during Ramadan, for example, is really, almost unthinkable. It is even more unthinkable during the Haj. Fighting during the months of these holidays would be a real constraint. In fact, I think that is one of the time constraints that is operating. I do not know how true it is. But we have heard, for example, that from January to March would be, hypothetically, a time frame——

Senator **Exon**. Best time.

Dr. **Marr** [continuing]. When one could fight. Ramadan is not only a religious month, but a month when the troops will be fasting. Fasting depletes your energy. You do not want to fight in that month. Then you are into some warmer weather and sand storms, followed by the Haj and the hot summer months. So it seems to me that one has to think of this time frame.

The presence of troops in Saudi Arabia during these months would cause a little trouble, it is manageable.

Chairman **Nunn**. I would like the panel to go ahead and any of them that want to address that question. But we need to move on.

Dr. **Helms**. I would like to add a couple of points that have not been mentioned. The Saudis, themselves, were increasingly sensitive to this early on. I do not know the exact date. They took journalists around Mecca and Medina, to show them, in fact, that there were no foreign forces there. And specifically to deny some of the reports, particularly in the Islamic press, that there might be foreign forces.

Notably, and I think I did mention that in my written statement, the Pakistani forces are reportedly stationed outside Mecca and Medina, far away from the front. And there is a third point that one can only hypothesize about. We have only heard bits and snatches of it in the press: the Saudi emissary to Iran. They have had over the last several years increasing negotiations over how many pilgrims—Iranian pilgrims—would be allowed into Mecca and Medina. As we know, they have had many, many problems over the last several years, several major incidents with scores, in one case, several hundred people being killed. The initial part of the trip to Iran seemed to go very well, but the Iranians themselves released a statement at the end that they had another debate over how many pilgrims would be allowed to go this coming year. That was the end of what we heard about the trip. I think this is certainly an issue that the Saudi family, in particular, must be concerned about.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. I would defer to Senator Gorton.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gorton.

Senator **Gorton**. I would appreciate the comments of each of you as to the depth, effectiveness, and usefulness to us in achieving our goals of dissident Iraqis, either in exile or Iraqis who we might find in some fashion or another within the country. Is there any such movement at all? Does it have any popular support? Should we be at least considering that as an aspect of our own campaigns?

Dr. **Helms**. I think that is a dead end. And the reason I think that is that Hussein basically has developed a political machine. As the years have gone by during the war, he has adapted that machine more to his own needs. He has been increasingly worried about his own security, further isolated in the country, particularly since the year 1985. There may, indeed, be people within the Ba'th party who are credible, but they have no political base yet. Certainly none that we would have heard about.

There are other members of the Revolutionary Command Council who, in fact, are credible leaders and might well do something, given the opportunity. Each one of them, in their own right, has a political past that dates back to the 1950s in the party. Each one has credited to him some particular expertise, such as Saadoun Hammadi, who is noted for economics; Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, who has conducted a number of negotiations with the Kurds and with the Soviets; Taha Yasin Ramadhan, in particular, who has dealt with the Eastern European bloc and the Soviet Union. Technocrats per se do not have a political base.

Opposition groups in Europe are very scattered. They are very divided among themselves. Although they have temporarily found common cause, their ideologies and their goals are very different. Some of them are extreme, militant, Islamic fundamentalist groups who have used force and terrorism in the past. Others are simply one or two isolated military colonels who reside in London—again, without a power base.

Potentially, you have people in the military. That is the last and perhaps the most important group in Iraq. They are carefully isolated and protected by the Iraqi Ba'th party. It is difficult even to be able to have the opportunity to talk with them. Certainly it is clear that some of them, during the course of the war, have developed enormous prestige and status and are well respected by their men. But once again, many of them are far from Baghdad. It would be difficult for them in the political environment of Iraq to make a move without endangering themselves or the people that they have been dealing with. And this, by the way I should add, is something that the Iraqi Government is very much alert to.

It is important to make the distinction that the Iraqi Ba'th party is civilian. The Syrian Ba'th party is controlled by the military. You cannot, in Iraq, run for Parliament, for example, if you are a military officer unless you resign your rank and your pension. You may not appear in the chambers in a uniform. And the Iraqi Ba'th party has done everything they could, over the last two decades, to control the potential for the military to interfere in domestic politics.

Dr. **Marr**. I would simply like to second what Christine said. Looking at exiles, they have been out of power for 22 years. You cannot develop a political base inside a country when you are outside that long. They are extremely disparate. You have got fundamentalist Shia, you have Kurds, you have some wealthy liberals. Their heart is in the right place but I do not see them as any kind of an alternative to a government, if that is what you are thinking of, in Iraq.

There are institutions in Iraq, as Christine has said: the party itself, the military. Inevitably, should the regime be replaced, someone will emerge from inside Iraq. And one of the things that concerns me is this kind of talk about replacement because it is simply not the kind of thing that we, on the outside, are capable of doing. We can get ourselves in very serious trouble if we try it.

Mr. PLACKE. I would add only one comment after associating myself with all that has been said in response to your question, Senator, and that is any foreign involvement by any potential dissident group, should it ever come to light, would be the absolute kiss of death. Foreign support is absolute anathema—and throughout the Iraqi society, not just with the Ba'th leadership.

Senator GORTON. How many people in Iraq are there who are disaffected from the government? We know what happened to the Kurds. That was a part of common knowledge before this took place. How deep is that in Kurdistan? How many people are there there? Are there other minority groups in Iran who are disaffected from the government simply by reason of their treatment as a group as against individuals?

Dr. HELMS. Well, I think you also have to be careful to qualify this question and the answer. It is very easy, if you are in the United States, to get an opinion that Saddam Hussein is a brutal, ruthless leader who has acquired his position by force and maintained it by force.

In fact, during the course of the time that he has been in the government, he played a major role in negotiating with the Kurds during the 1970s, arranging the Algiers 1975 treaty with Iran, diversified arms purchases with Europe during the mid-1970s, and was a driving force behind economic development. Therefore, if you travel in Iraqi-Kurdestan—as I have done on numerous occasions—you will, in fact, see that many Kurds are living well and have homes and orchards and families and indeed are supporters of the central Iraqi Government. This is not really what you pick up in the press here, and that is why I cautioned at the beginning of my talk that one must weigh carefully a lot of data that exists in the public forum about Iraq. Certainly there are disaffected Kurds. There is no question about that. Certainly the Iraqis took a harsh and dim view of Kurdish guerilla movements, in particular, during the course of the war, I might add, in the north, because they essentially opened up a war front and were isolating troop carriers and killing soldiers on the roads. There are many places in Iraq, where, in fact, you could not travel during the course of the war because Kurdish guerrillas controlled those areas. But, now you can travel there. And again, you will see—as I have done staying in Kurdish hotels, for example—they may even carry weapons—they have a social life and operate just as you would in any social setting here. So I am just cautioning against making overall generalizations about Iraqi society.

Dr. **Marr**. One just simply does not know the answer to your question because obviously there have been no polls. And this is not the kind of question one can ask in Iraq and get an answer.

But generally speaking, I am uncomfortable looking at minorities as sources of opposition in Iraq. It is the kind of destabilization policy that I think is very counterproductive. And as a matter of fact, I think Iraq has done a very good job in integrating its population—perhaps not so much with the Kurds, but certainly with its Shia population.

Iraq came out of the Iran-Iraq war more of a nation-state, having more of a national identity than when they went into it. And this is certainly true of Christians. There are many Christians who support the regime because it is secular. The foreign minister is a Christian.

So if the thrust of the question is to look for opposition among minorities, that may not only be counter-productive, but I do not think you are going to find it.

Now how much of the Iraqi population actually supports Saddam? Some do. I have heard tell of spontaneous gatherings to greet him when there was really no need for it. Some do not. The Ba'th is probably full of careerists who have joined for their own benefit.

But let me introduce a concept here that I think is important. I think we need to make a distinction between the message and the messenger. Many people do not like Saddam Hussein's obviously repressive rule, but they do like the aims for which he is governing. And these have been mentioned: upward social mobility, economic development. And as in every society, people make tradeoffs. They may not like this, but they accept that. And I think there is at least evidence that the population, by and large, acquiesces in Ba'th rule.

Senator **Gorton**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Gorton. Senator Kennedy.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize that I missed the other presentation. But I look forward to going through the material.

There has been a ratcheting up in recent weeks on the need to go further than the goals outlined by the U.N. resolution, the unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the unconditional release of all hostages and the restoration of Kuwaiti's Government. Many have argued that unless we deal with Iraq's chemical and nuclear capabilities, America will be seen as having failed—retreated and cowered before Saddam Hussein. That was mentioned this morning and yesterday as well.

Iraq's chemical weapons threat has existed since the mid-1980s and his campaign to acquire nuclear capability spans the last decade. These threats existed well before the August 2 invasion and yet were consistently ignored by the Bush and Reagan administrations.

And over the past 5 years, the United States has approved the sale to Iraq of $1.5 billion worth of computers, electronic equipment, and machine tools. Some have suggested these could be used by Saddam Hussein to develop nuclear weapons, missiles and poison gas. Other computers were sold to help Iraq analyze satellite photos.

Government documents show that the total U.S. sales of high-technology goods surged in 1985, 1986, reaching $780 million. They were $720 million over the last 4 years. These sales were all approved by Commerce, Defense, Energy, State Department, as well as the Intelligence Agency.

And former officials have said it was U.S. policy to continue normal trade with Iraq. But the administration has consistently imposed sanctions against Iraq, even just 2 weeks before the invasion, and on November 12, it announced a pocket veto of the sanctions against any country that uses chemical and biological weapons, the most egregious offender of which is Iraq.

The administration misjudgment of Hussein's intention may well have given a green light to his invasion of Kuwait. Some have said that if we had just been paying attention, we might have been able to prevent this crisis. Are we talking about sacrificing lives of tens of thousands of Americans to atone for a mistake in policy of tilting toward Iraq during the previous administration and the current administration's policy, Dr. Helms?

Dr. HELMS. That was a long question.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I think it gets to it at the end.

Dr. HELMS. I think really for me the question comes down to what are Bush's objectives? If Bush's real objective is to destroy Iraq's military capability, including, as you are talking about, chemical weapons facilities, the handling of the crisis since the early days is very different now than what was presented to us.

We have not had put on the table specific intelligence data, which you may have access to, about Iraq's nuclear capability. There is a debate taking place about this now. We definitely know, in fact, that Iraq does produce sarin and mustard gas. But, if it really does come down to an issue of whether the United States is going to use military force against Iraq to destroy those capabilities, I think the United States risks broader diplomatic issues in the future for a number of countries.

In other words, as Mitterand says, will we then end up in a position of policing countries throughout the world—Pakistan and India—who may also attempt to acquire exotic weapons? And as an individual, as an American citizen, personally, I find it rather appalling that we would send in this number of troops, risk the economic and political costs destabilizing a number of countries, such as Jordan, in order, basically, to destroy a capability which we and our European allies sold over the past 10 years. And, although they are willing to share the moral high ground with us, they basically are not putting their people in the front lines. Although I have looked hard and long in the newspapers for the exact numbers of foreign troops, the closest I can get is 7,500 British troops on the front lines and 5,000 French who, the last I heard, did not want to participate under our command-and-control umbrella. Many are counted as naval forces. A request by Thatcher when she was still Prime Minister for the Netherlands to contribute 150 chemical warfare experts was denied. I do not even think you can really use air strikes against Iraq unless you can predict what the Iraqi reaction is going to be. From my own experience with Iraqis, I do not think you are going to be able to do that.

We go back to the central dilemma for Bush which is, if force is an instrument of political policy, can you tailor force to achieve specific, political objectives? So far, it is not clear to me what his objectives are, what he wants to achieve. If he does want to destroy Iraqi chemical weapons facilities, and that is his main aim, the level of force required to do that will have to be major, combined naval, ground and air forces. The Iraqis may well not sit still for that. You also do not know what the reaction of other Arab forces in the region might be. And, as I said, you open up a Pandora's box of many, many problems in the future.

Dr. **Marr**. I do not want to go into the past policy, but just two points on your question.

I made the point earlier that there may be something of a contradiction in two aims that the President would like to accomplish. He would like to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, and he would like to reduce the military imbalance in the area, which means dealing, somehow, with Hussein's arsenal.

It appears to me that it may be difficult to achieve both. If Saddam Hussein feels that, after he withdraws from Kuwait, his military might is going to be reduced, that he is going to be squeezed or that he is going to be attacked, he is not going to have the motivation to withdraw. There is not any motivation there. That is one thing.

Second, if Saddam Hussein withdraws by negotiated settlement, or by any other way, we can devise a containment policy through our allies in the region and outside of it that would deal with these effects.

And the third point, that I want to make, is that if we are going to undertake the kind of military destruction in Iraq that this requires, we had really better think carefully about the balance of power in the region. We want a balance of power between Iran and Iraq. We would like a reduced military in Iraq. We would like Saddam to shift out of military industries into some other areas. And, in fact, I think economic means—credits, economic inducements and disincentives—could be used to accomplish that purpose. This would be preferable to ending up with a badly destroyed Iraq which would damage our interest in the area due to an imbalance, politically and militarily.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Helms, Mr. Placke and Dr. Marr, we appreciate your appearance before the committee. Your expertise on the Middle East will be most beneficial to us in gaining an appreciation of how the people in the region feel about this crisis.

I have a question here I would like to propound to all three of you. We will start with Dr. Helms. What role do you see for the United States in the Middle East if we force Saddam Hussein from power? Can we remain in the region without nullifying our relations with Israel?

Dr. **Helms**. No. I do not think you are going to be able to unless you somehow address the Israeli problem. I think for sure you will have continued and increasing destabilization and perhaps destabilization of the Saudi family and Egypt in the long run.

Senator THURMOND. The first part is what role do you see for the United States in the Middle East if we force Saddam Hussein from power.

Mr. PLACKE. Well, I think, Senator, in answering your question I would like to pick up the last comment made by Dr. Marr; that is, in talking about eliminating Saddam Hussein or eliminating his regime we need to think carefully about what follows. There is no guarantee that what follows Saddam Hussein is necessarily going to be an improvement. In fact, I would think that that is relatively unlikely.

Beyond that, Iraq occupies a role in the region, and it is going to be there whatever happens. It is an important element in the balance of power, and if we remove it we have changed that balance of power. We had better understand how we are changing it, and how we are going to manage the change, before we embark on that course of action.

Dr. MARR. I would like to make two points in agreement with my colleagues. This is a country about which we know very little, particularly its domestic political dynamics, precisely because we have been cut off from one another. Our ability, our knowledge to undertake social or political engineering—such as "replacing Saddam"—is really extremely difficult. I cannot over emphasize this. The fact that we would have a finger in a pie such as this is disturbing to me.

If for some reason Saddam goes, I would assume this would take place through the medium of his own population. I believe this is up to the Iraqi people to determine. Someone else will emerge. Whoever emerges, if that occurs, is then going to form a government, lead the country, and that is the person or group, whoever it may be, that we should recognize. We should not be involved directly or indirectly in replacing Saddam or in attempting to restructure Iraqi society.

Now on the Israeli issue, this is one of the key elements in the changes taking place in the Middle East. A lot has been said about addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict, about getting some kind of a peace process started as the quid pro quo for Saddam's withdrawal. The administration does not want to tie the two things together for negotiating purposes, but I feel very strongly that that is an issue that simply must be addressed in the region if we want to have any role at all, regardless of the outcome of this conflict.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Marr, in another hearing I asked the question whether or not Saddam Hussein would bow to internal political and military pressure as the sanctions begin to hurt. The answer I was given was no.

Do you agree with that assessment? If so, what is the value of the sanctions?

Dr. MARR. Excuse me. The internal pressures, Senator? I did not hear you.

Senator THURMOND. Yes. Internal political or military pressure.

Dr. MARR. I think no one can say categorically what might happen there. I think we can just put it in the range of possibility or plausibility.

This is where I feel a threat, a military threat, could play a role along with sanctions, without having to go to war. The military threat and the sanctions are credible together.

It seems to me that there is a possibility that some people around Saddam Hussein might think about replacing him, first if their economy were damaged and, second, if they really felt they were facing an attack which would destroy their country. Certainly somebody in the military might be a likely candidate; somebody within the regime itself might in fact take matters into his own hands.

I have to say that I consider that to be a possibility. I would not give it a high level of probability because this is a regime, as everyone has said, that is very tightly controlled. The punishments for that sort of thing are very clearly known.

I think if the domestic situation really got serious, you just do not know, it might happen.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Placke, I am told that Saddam Hussein has usually faced adversity with tactical retreats only without abandoning his goals. If this is true and the sanctions have the desired effect, can we allow Saddam to make a tactical retreat from Kuwait only to have him try it again in a few years?

Mr. PLACKE. Senator, I think that characterization is one that I would share, and it is certainly a possibility. I referred to this in my initial comments, that as a tactic he might well choose to employ a partial withdrawal from Kuwait when sanctions really do begin to hurt and the threat of military force is upon him.

The solution, I think—to what would then be the worst case presented to the United States—is to adopt a kind of containment strategy that I think is slowly beginning to take shape, a series of economic and trade measures and financial measures to limit strictly the access of the Iraqis to the kinds of materials and technologies that we do not want them to have because of the way they are utilized. In other words, to control and limit the possibility of Saddam doing in the future what you suggest.

Senator THURMOND. I believe my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Helms, in your statement you appear to urge us to pursue a negotiated resolution of this situation and get on with that because that is clearly, as I understood your statement, a better option than the others.

Dr. Kissinger said in his testimony yesterday, at least I understood him to say, that he felt the ramifications for the other Arab leaders, other Arab Governments, would be devastating if we were to pursue a negotiated resolution of this and give Saddam Hussein half a loaf or some significant portion of what he set out to achieve in this invasion.

What is your reaction? What would be the effect on these other Arab States?

Dr. HELMS. Well, the greatest danger for these Arab States other than the use of force, I mean until force is actually used, the longer the blockade goes on their economies are suffering. In the case of some economies, Jordan in particular, there is a question of how well those economies can survive. They, in fact, are more severely hurt than Iraq. If you look at the figures for Jordan alone, they probably will have a 30-35 percent unemployment rate this year. They are going to be buying energy on the open market. Their debts from Iraq were being paid in oil which, presumably if they are receiving, they are not receiving very much. The Saudis who, supplied something like 20 percent of the rest have stopped the remainder of their oil shipments.

I do not think that is an argument to use force. As I pointed out in my talk and as the other two panelists here have reiterated in arguments of their own, the one major element in the Middle East that has always drawn enormous public cohesion, sentiment, adhesion to political ideology was the issue of foreign interference in the region. This runs long and deep in the historical memory of both Arabs and Moslems.

I believe if the United States comes to the point of using force, Arabs in the region will completely overlook the actual invasion by Saddam Hussein of Kuwait and, indeed, see the aggressor as the United States. Then we will have to deal with a multiplicity of political problems in almost every single Arab country in the region.

Senator BINGAMAN. So your basic point is that regardless of what problems a negotiated resolution would cause for those governments, it would be better than allowing the situation to continue on the course it appears to be on? Is that right?

Dr. HELMS. Yes, and I will mention one other thing which is a possibility. The worst case scenario arising from the use of force would be the disintegration of the Iraqi nation State—in other words, the disintegration of nation State integrity. I believe Kissinger did mention this. What happens if you have Turkey moving into northern Iraq to take control of the oil fields there? What would Iran's reaction be? They have indicated interest in the past in al-Najaf and Karbala. Syria is unlikely to look well on that possibility. It is clear from debates taking place inside Syria that a lot of people, perhaps even Assad's own military and the Alawites are opposed to his present cooperation with the United States.

Senator BINGAMAN. One of the points that Dr. Luttwak made this morning as I understood it was that the traditional way that we have tried to contain aggressor nations or potentially aggressor nations is with deterrence and that that is what we should have relied upon in this case. Rather than actually putting troops in Saudi Arabia, we should have threatened massive retaliation if other borders were crossed, as I understood it.

Is there any reason of which any of you are aware why deterrence would not work as well when retaliation would not be as credible or as useful a deterrence against Saddam Hussein's aggression as it would be in the case of the Soviet Union in the last several decades and in our strategy in Europe?

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman, if I could interject I believe what he meant was deterrence with air power and getting it on the scene as quickly as possible and a limited ground deployment. I do not think in fairness to what he said that he was talking about basically deterrence from over the horizon. I think he was talking about on ground deterrence, but with much reduced force levels.

Senator Bingaman. I think that is accurate.

Dr. Marr. Well, just a couple of points on that.

The President has enunciated several aims. One of them was deterrence of Iraq going into Saudi Arabia. And as I understand it early on the intelligence was similar to that facing us when he went into Kuwait. And you have to call the shots.

Did he intend to go into Saudi Arabia? Was he only going to stop in Kuwait? And since we did not exactly call it right in Kuwait, I would suspect that people were not willing to take the chance in Saudi Arabia.

I do not myself know why that number of troops was put in. But I might suggest, too, that there might have been some suggestion on the part of the Saudis, who were going to cut off the pipeline, that they needed an assurance that the United States was going to be there to protect them from what the Iraqis might possibly do.

The issue of deterrence now, I think, is moot. We have deterred Iraq from going into Saudi Arabia. I do not know anyone that is really worried about that now. The issue now is getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Mr. Placke. If I may, Senator, let me take a different slice of that question. I took it in a more prospective sense that this might be a policy for the future. Given the situation that we have got now, where we are is where we are.

One of the issues here is oil, access to it and the terms for that access. Saddam does not need to occupy Saudi Arabia to influence very precisely the price of oil. He simply needs to be able to intimidate the Saudis and the other States of the Arabian peninsula into doing his bidding, as indeed he was already able to do in July without invading Kuwait.

The resulting situation is very difficult, if one assumes that he could modulate his approach to whatever the circumstances were. Do we launch forces if the price of oil goes up $3, or is it $5 or is it $7? It becomes, I think, an impossible situation to control. And even if we were in a closer state of readiness and able to project significant force more rapidly than we did in this case, it does not take long for Iraq to get as far as the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. And the Iraqis do have a formidable military capability.

It does not seem to me that this set of circumstances is really comparable to the way deterrence worked in the East-West context.

Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you, Mr. Chairman, in thanking these individuals for coming forward to help us become better informed on this part of the world.

My question is as follows. To the extent any measure of success may evolve out of this very complicated situation it is my judgment that the coalition of nations presently in place and most particularly the Arab members of that coalition have got to stay in place, particularly if the option to use force is decided upon.

The testimony before this committee is if the option of force is resorted to, it is most likely that in one way or another, Hussein will implicate Israel in the battle. Do you agree with that?

Second, if Israel is implicated in the battle to what extent is that coalition likely to fracture?

Why don't we just start in the order you spoke.

Dr. **Helms**. I have heard this scenario mentioned a great deal. It is totally plausible that Iraq would see benefit in bringing Israel into it. But again, as you have heard a number of times during the course of the question and answer, the role of foreign interference in the region is sufficient, I believe, to muster public sentiment among Arab leaders. If there is an actual point where American forces, or predominantly American forces, cross the border into Iraq, that alone may well be equivalent to crossing an invisible political boundary in the minds of every Arab in the Middle East and, in fact, in the minds of many Muslims throughout the world.

This is simply because of the issue that God delivered the Koran in Arabic to Arabs who were meant to deliver that message to non-Arab populations. The heartland of the Islamic world is in the Arab Middle East. We now have forces in the heartland of the Middle East. There is in Islam very elaborate concepts of political space and sacred time. And we are now impinging upon that political space and sacred time. The Saudis are well aware of this. We could well cross that Iraqi border and, at the same time, cross a political-mental border in the minds of Arabs and Muslims. Therefore, Hussein may well not have to do anything with regard to Israel, but be assured that public sentiment will turn in his favor.

Senator **Warner**. Let me just add a technical observation to your response.

Crossing the border could be by land, but also by air. Undoubtedly air power would be involved should the necessity of an option employing force be used. Is there any distinction between air and ground?

Dr. **Helms**. No. My comments would still hold.

Mr. **Placke**. Senator, I certainly think it is a possibility, as Dr. Helms just said, that Saddam could choose that course of action especially if he were under military pressure. And there really is not anything that the United States or, indeed, Israel could do about it. Quite clearly he could act in a way that would provoke a retaliatory strike from Israel. And we could conceivably find ourselves in an operation involving both U.S. and Israeli forces.

Under that scenario it is difficult to imagine what the political consequences in the Arab world would be; but they would be adverse and serious, quite clearly.

The question then really is, what is the degree of likelihood that Saddam Hussein might take that action? I do not think anyone can forecast that with any high degree of certainty. But let me offer this observation, which is that, as was said earlier, he is not a martyr. He wants to be remembered as a great Arab leader and not a great Arab destroyer. In the context of provoking a strike from Israel with war already going on in the southern flank, it seems to me that his destruction and the destruction of his country is virtually assured.

Dr. **Marr**. Yes, I would like to second that. We cannot rule out the possibility that with his back to the wall and in desperation he would involve Israel in some way.

But I do believe the man believes in deterrence. He has verbally attacked Israel but we have not seen anything further than that. And I think he does know the consequences of such an attack for his own country and for a second front. And so I think that this would constitute a strong deterrence.

There is no doubt that Israel's involvement in some kind of a war would be very serious and adverse. But we have been so depressing in our testimony here that I would like to throw a little bit different light on the subject. I am not advocating war, but I do feel that the kind of war—its extent and length—would make something of a difference. That is why some States in the region are now advocating military action and getting it over with quickly. The big question is, of course, whether you can do that.

I agree with Mr. Placke who has said that some of these countries have such a commitment that would be very difficult for them to pull out. The Egyptians would be a more difficult case.

But I believe that up to a point the Saudis are deeply committed; that their national survival, and the survival of the regime is at stake. I am not sure that everything would collapse in a war provided it was not a long drawn-out conflict and that we were not terribly destructive.

Senator WARNER. I think all of us share a fundamental hope that somehow this matter can be resolved without, let me use the phrase, blood shed. I think when we say that we focus primarily on the military order of battle is now laid out throughout the Gulf, both on the Iraqi side and on the Saudi side.

But blood shed could come in a different way. That is if the sanctions begin to make the squeeze, as we hope they do, and that squeeze reaches a point of near intolerance. We have reports to the effect that Saddam Hussein has gathered together some large number of terrorists. Might he then in a clandestine way begin to counteract the sanctions over a period of time with terrorism throughout the world?

Dr. MARR. I will start with that. Again, all of these things are a possibility. He has practiced a sort of terrorism with his own dissidents. I could see him in desperation attempting to strike against regimes in the area, trying to get at the Saudis, at the Egyptians. He has held off doing this so far. In fact, I do not know of any instance where he has actually attacked, by terrorism, a foreigner.

Again, this would undoubtedly bring our wrath down upon him. And the presumption of your question is that we would not be engaged in hostilities. I think that again that is a very strong deterrence.

Senator WARNER. On his part?

Dr. MARR. Yes. On his part.

Senator WARNER. A counteractiveness to the effectiveness of the sanctions?

Dr. MARR. That is right. That is to say he would hesitate very strongly to use it against us. I feel less strongly about the local regimes because of the retaliation he feels he would certainly get.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Mr. Placke do you have a view on that?

Mr. PLACKE. I would share those comments, Senator. I would only add one observation that might be useful based upon some previous experience of mine. And that is that in the 1970s and early 1980s when Iraq was still associated with international terrorist groups it finally broke that association, not to please the United States—although it had that side effect—but because it learned that it could not control them. Even if Iraq was a significant contributor, that risk, I am afraid, of terrorism is with us as long as these groups are around and have these capabilities even if it is not done at Iraqi behest.

Senator WARNER. Is there confirmation of the reports that he has assembled a very large group of individuals for purposes of terrorism?

Mr. PLACKE. I am not familiar with that particular report but I think it is correct. I certainly am persuaded that Iraq has reestablished its formal links with most of the terrorist groups in the Middle East.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Helms.

Dr. HELMS. Again, I would just reiterate that many groups and individuals in the Middle East may well share similar goals even though they are not being controlled by the same puppeteer. It is clear when the incidents occurred on the Temple Mount in mid-October that we saw sympathy expressed on the part of many different groups which were both Arab nationalists in complexion and also Islamic fundamentalists.

I would, however, disagree with my two fellow panelists on an assessment of Saddam Hussein. On the whole over the past 20 years when placed in a tight situation, given the option, he has in fact tried to negotiate his way out of it. On the other hand, he is very tough. He has a sense of destiny and, if really pushed against the wall Arab leaders like Saddam Hussein do not retire quietly to a condo over the Euphrates River and they do not retire to condos in London. He knows that there are going to be limited options for him if he is not given a leeway out of this.

I could well imagine a scenario where he would elect to go down in flames with one major goal: to pass on this banner of Arab unity and leadership to somebody else in the Middle East. I think a very primary goal for him at that stage would be, even knowing that he would suffer military defeat, to inflict major damage specifically on American forces someplace along the front. In other words, knowing full well that he will suffer political defeat, he would attempt to leave a legacy to Arabs that he, in fact, was one Arab leader who was able to stand up to a foreign force, particularly the Americans.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I want to take Senator Dixon's turn, I guess.

I know each of you has a background in the Middle East and Iraq in political, economic and religious matters. A question to each of you: Do you prefer to continue to rely on the embargo now with the military force being there in the region that we have, or would you be prepared to commence military action? If you are prepared to commence military action, when or at least what would be the trigger for that?

May I start with you, Dr. Helms? If you were advising the President of the United States.

Dr. Helms. If I were advising the President of the United States, I would say you only use force against Iraq if in fact they use it first, if they take a first strike initiative on you. That would be my advice, to avoid military conflict no matter what intensity it is at all levels. Try to find some way to open the door to negotiations, reduce the impact of the economic blockade on these other countries, and reduce the presence of foreign forces in Saudi Arabia which will act as a destabilizing factor on the Saudis and eventually on the Egyptians.

Chairman Nunn. I assume you would not advise him to add additional forces, then?

Dr. Helms. No.

Chairman Nunn. Mr. Placke.

Mr. Placke. Senator, it seems to me that the question of whether or not to use force will have to be addressed in one way or another between now and, say, February 1 for reasons that have already been discussed, environmental, weather, religious and others. Once the calendar moves beyond early March it simply is no longer feasible to go to war until about this time next year.

So you have this interim period where you will have foregone effectively that option unless it is forced on you by some other outside action.

In that period of time, my answer to your question would be no. I think I would continue to rely on sanctions and maintain, of course, the military and the diplomatic pressure, and the international isolation in which the Soviet Union has played a very important role as well as others, with one caveat. That is, if the assessment is that the coalition of Arab and non-Arab factors supporting the multinational force and supporting the United States leadership in the Security Council is likely to fray in that period of time, say between now and a year from now, that changes the picture, and maybe it forces you to go ahead.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Dr. Marr.

Dr. Marr. That is obviously a very difficult decision to deal with. I, too, would look closely at the coalition on the ground in the Middle East and in Europe. I would be concerned, of course, about domestic public opinion.

One of my concerns is that if we let the crisis drag on until the fall even if we draw our forces down, people are going to forget about it; it is going to fade from view. If you feel you need to revive the threat of war again at the end of this period, it may be well nigh impossible.

So I think you do really need to take a look at the role a threat of force can play, without its actual use, along with sanctions. I think both have probably achieved a good deal together. I think at this point I would explore the ways in which you could open the door to Saddam Hussein for a reasonable exit in this time period.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask each of you another question along the same lines but perhaps not exactly along the same line. If you were advising the President what would be the one, two or three things you would tell him, that you would advise him to do now? What would be a couple of things you would tell him not to do now given the present state of facts?

Let me start with Mr. Placke in the middle.

Mr. **Placke**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us start with the negative, unfortunately. I think the antagonism has been too much personalized, and I think much of that has indeed come from the U.S. side. This is not helpful. It is not what is expected in the Arab world, putting aside the rest of the world, of a leader of the single remaining great power. It just not presidential, and it builds up Saddam Hussein at the same time that it tears down the President of the United States. I do not think it is a good public affairs approach. It does have substantive implications. That is one thing I would advise against.

In advising for, I think, as they say, timing is everything. There is a moment, it seems to me, when it would be the right moment to deliver an ultimatum to Saddam, a military ultimatum. I cannot forecast at this point when that is, whether it would be in the first quarter of next year possibly or possibly a year from now, but at a point when he has been sufficiently weakened, when the underpinnings of the economy are beginning to deteriorate, and when it is clear that the international community is not about to walk away and lose heart and give up. There will be a moment when that kind of an ultimatum could turn the issue.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. 1Dr. Helms.

Dr. **Helms**. I do not know that I have a number of profound things to say about this. I do agree with Jim. The reduction of demonology with regard to Saddam Hussein would certainly help, and it might also cool tempers in general among a lot of the populations in the Middle East.

I think there is one thing, however, on the negotiation that you could do or you at least could open the door with Saddam on. He made an issue over the Ramaila oil field, and he has claimed that Kuwaitis have established installations on Iraqi territory. At a basic minimum we have now demanded that Iraq must unconditionally withdraw, this is a return to the "status quo ante." At present, Bush will not even entertain or look at some of Iraq's complaints.

One positive step forward might be to say, all right, you have the evidence that Kuwait has established installations on Iraqi territory. Let us examine those or find a forum for looking at, for example, the issue of extractiing oil from the Ramaila reservoir. That at least might be a beginning of a dialogue.

Chairman **Nunn**. Dr. Marr.

Dr. **Marr**. It is very difficult to come up with things. I would second the lack of demonology.

I would suggest letting the Arabs open channels. I think that is very proper. I think it would be very difficult for the President to start negotiations himself or send a representative, as has been suggested, but the Arab regimes, particularly perhaps Algeria and Jordan, can play a role in seeing whether there is some kind of a position that Saddam might be induced to take after withdrawal.

The President originally said that negotiations would be possible on these issues that were troubling Saddam Hussein after he withdrew. Surely some kind of quiet negotiations could take place on the Arab——

Chairman **Nunn**. Do you mean take place now as to what might happen afterwards?

Dr. **Marr**. That is right, and I think perhaps some statements by the President that negotiations after withdrawal—he said it once, he could say it again—would begin to satisfy this demand from the Iraqis on negotiation without the President himself having to engage it.

I would like to see some statement by the President on the issue which Saddam Hussein has raised, that when this is over the United States is going to deal with the Arab-Israeli problem. That will seem to be a very good quid pro quo for the people in the area and for Saddam himself.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Around Washington, what passes for conventional wisdom goes up and down by the hour. It does not even require a full 24 hours sometimes, it seems to me.

Ramadan is one of those elements which has become the conventional wisdom as a defining barrier as to where we can do this and when we can do that. If we are going to take action we have to do it between January 15 and March 15 or somehow we are wiped out if the war has not been completed by then, I gather.

Maybe you can straighten me out a little bit on Ramadan. Saddam Hussein used Ramadan during the Iran war as a time to attack, and he called one of his major offensives Ramadan, and away they went.

Are Hussein's Muslims less devout than the Saudi Muslims? Are the Iraqi Muslim more tuned in to making this a religious experience as they attack, and our Saudis could not attack their Muslims but their Muslims can attack our Saudis?

Straighten me out on Ramadan. I am confused.

Dr. **Helms**. Well, the issue here really is slightly different. The issue is the question of bringing in pilgrims from around the world from these different Islamic countries.

Senator **Glenn**. That is usually the Haj, is it not?

Dr. **Helms**. Yes, that is the Haj.

Senator **Glenn**. That is in the summer. That is in June.

Dr. **Helms**. People have in fact fought during Ramadan. The embarrassment is the presence of foreign forces in Saudi Arabia during the time of the pilgrimage and how will other Muslims and Arab Muslims in particular respond to that.

Senator **Glenn**. Why has mid-March become the defining barrier here with Ramadan?

Dr. **Marr**. I would like to address that.

There is no inherent barrier, but I would like to say two things. It is a holy month, and people tend to be pious during it. Although there is no scriptural prohibition that I know of against fighting during that month, nobody is going to fight very well in that month.

Second, it is a month of fasting. Certainly on the Saudi side you would find a lot of people fasting, so it is not a good time to think about engaging in war.

Third, I would see something of a distinction between Saddam's troops and those that are fighting on our side, particularly the Saudis. After all, Iraq is a secular regime. That does not mean that he does not have a number of devout Muslims in his forces, but they are much more secularized. The Saudis, of course, are the custodians of the holy places. They claim to be practicing according to an Islamic constitution. Most people would consider them officially more religious.

So it is just not a good time to fight.

Mr. PLACKE. I believe the reference you had to attacks during Ramadan were attacks staged by Iran rather than by Iraq.

Senator GLENN. I would like to clarify a point. I thought that Saddam Hussein actually used Ramadan during the Iran-Iraq war. He called one of his offensives Ramadan whatever it was.

Mr. PLACKE. That was an Iranian offensive, sir.

Senator GLENN. He was responding to that?

Mr. PLACKE. He was responding to that, so there is not a good track record that Iraq has played that role, but I would agree with Phebe Marr's observation. There is no specific Koranic injunction that I am aware of, and I certainly do not represent myself as a Koranic scholar, that would preclude the possibility of attacks during Ramadan, and Iranian conduct tends to reinforce that.

Nonetheless, it is a holy month, and there are injunctions toward piety and peace and conducting military operations certainly is not consistent with that, and I think fasting is a serious factor. I know that you have visited Saudi Arabia frequently enough to be aware of the very major role that Islam plays in Saudi life, and the Saudi forces, and indeed most of the other participating Arab forces, I expect, would be observing the fast, and it just is not a good time to go to war. So Ramadan is not an absolute barrier, but it is a serious consideration.

Dr. HELMS. Could I add one final thing here? It is not at all clear to me, and I guess I would have to go and check it, but there are exemptions during Ramadan for fasting. If you are pregnant, or if you are moving—if you are transporting yourself from Point A to Point B you do not have to observe the fast. I do not know whether there is a specific injunction that during war also that you would be allowed to, in fact, break the fast, and that could well be.

Senator GLENN. What we need is year-round Ramadan. Maybe that would solve a few of our problems. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Dr. Helms, you indicated that the resulting economic political and military problems may then become intractable, costly and extended, far beyond Kuwait and Iraq, to other arenas in the Arab Islamic Third World.

Some of the bad things that would come out of this, you talk about influences not only in the Arab world but extending to Poland, Romania—a long list of countries affected you list as India, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, that we are destabilizing by our presence there, just for all the reasons that we have talked about here.

Do you think this really has a significant impact around the world? Now, we know the disruption of oil and so on, that is a very important consideration. But expand on that a little bit, will you?

Dr. HELMS. Well, primarily my statistics—and it is more clear in the longer version——

Senator GLENN. I read through that, and you have remittances and things like that.

Dr. HELMS. Primarily, the affect on the Philippines and South Korea is the issue of remittances and rising energy costs. It is primarily an economic issue for Poland and Romania as well. The areas I am talking about being destabilized are either areas in the Arab world, or non-Arab Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. Those would be the three in particular that I would mention.

I also mentioned Italy at the beginning of my talk here. The Italian Government, or a representative of the Italian Government, recently made a statement about the potential for terrorism. In other words, some of the countries which participated in the blockade, or might take part in force against Iraq, would be potential targets or victims in the future. Because Italy constitutes a "soft" underbelly of southern Europe they are specifically more vulnerable than, say, the United States.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Marr and Mr. Placke, do you agree with that analysis?

Dr. MARR. Well, I think the boycott is hurting certain elements economically. I do not think we can deny that—the Eastern Europeans for example. I did not look into the boycott, and so I do not know how far——

Senator GLENN. Well, I was thinking about—do you think it would have that wide an implication around the world, as Dr. Helms is talking about?

Dr. MARR. No. I think I would disagree slightly with Christine on that. Anywhere there is a Muslim population—that includes Malaysia, Indonesia, India—there will be some impact and some effect, but I frankly do not think that would be serious enough to really impact on our interest. The impact——

Dr. HELMS. Could I just add something here? Look at the situation when the United States was involved in Lebanon and also the massacres that took place in Lebanon. We saw definitively anti-U.S. rallies, including violent ones in Pakistan, and I think there is no question that you are going to see them—I predict absolutely you will see them in Pakistan.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Placke, my time is up. Could you answer briefly?

Mr. PLACKE. I would just say, Senator, that I find myself in a position of agreeing with both. There certainly will be an adverse reaction.

Senator GLENN. You are a diplomat. You need to get over there and negotiate this thing.

Mr. PLACKE. There will be an adverse reaction to some degree, but I think that derives from the fact of the large-scale U.S. military presence, not really from the effects of the boycott. Those have been felt—those, as usual, are felt by the countries that can least afford them. India, Eastern Europe and others—Brazil. But that is a fact of economic life, and I do not think it has turned the politics of any of those nations in ways that we would find threatening to our interest.

Senator GLENN. Thank you all very much.

Chairman NUNN. I believe, Senator Gore, you are next.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Placke, are you the one on this panel probably most familiar with the Iraqi economy? I heard Dr. Marr intimate that. Do you feel that way?

Let me ask you, then, about your very strong statement that, based upon your knowledge of the Iraqi economy you would predict that in the second quarter of 1991, if you are talking about April, May and June, there would be significant impact coming from the sanctions.

Where would that be felt? How would it be manifest, and how severe do you think it might be?

Mr. PLACKE. Well, Senator, I was trying to live down the reputation of economists always hedging their bets, and so here I am dangling on the end of this limb.

What I have in mind is this: that there are, obviously, strains already appearing in the Iraqi economy, but these are entirely within what is manageable. I also dismiss food and medical supplies as serious factors in the Iraqi calculation. What I would look to are services that are indispensable to the functioning of a modern economy, and by that I would include electricity service, water service, transportation services, and the sort of support for the very large—and burdensome for the Iraqi economy—Iraqi military deployment and level of operational readiness that they are trying to maintain.

My forecast is that in that quarter, the second quarter of 1991, we will begin to see effects on those critical services that suggest that the economy is unable to withstand for some prolonged period of time a continuation of the boycott. That seems to me to be the point at which Iraq, for a change, has to seriously assess its policy.

Senator GORE. Now, you make the further point that the support granted by the Iraqi people to the Ba'athi regime of Saddam Hussein has been based in substantial measure on a public perception within Iraq that their economic conditions have been improved during Saddam Hussein's regime, and that while they were tested during the war with Iran for their ability to withstand the pain of deaths and casualties in the military, that they really have not been tested for the kind of economic pain and pressure that you feel might undermine the principal source of popular legitimacy for Saddam Hussein that exists in Iraq. Is that a fair summary of what you are saying?

Mr. PLACKE. Yes sir, it is.

Senator GORE. Now you also say that—and I am quoting—"There is apparent and increasingly openly expressed dissatisfaction with the consequences of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait inside Iraq. That such dissatisfaction is visible at all in a society under a ruthless dictatorship is remarkable, and an indicator of growing internal pressures." What signs have been evident to you of this remarkable expression of public dissatisfaction inside Iraq, with the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait?

Mr. PLACKE. Well, let me underscore again, Senator, the fact that there is any at all in the Iraqi context is what is remarkable. American visitors and others as well, who have been to Iraq, who have had relatively open, relatively public conversations with Iraqis, including Iraqi officials, have told me of the kinds of expressions of discontent that they received.

Some of these have been reported by journalists, usually with the source understandably remaining anonymous. That this is going on is such a break with the pattern of the past in Iraq that I find it remarkable, and an indication of strain.

Senator GORE. Dr. Marr, you emphasized in the first point you make in your statement the significance of the long-festering Palestinian problem and the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace process as a factor that leads you to worry a great deal about the ability of the coalition to remain intact for an extended period of time.

Everyone who has looked at this situation shares your concern. But I wonder how you react to these following points.

The effort by Iraq to exploit this specific resentment early in the crisis was immediately and forcefully rebuffed by virtually all of the Arab nations and by Iran. Statements were almost in parallel to the point that these are completely separate, the invasion of Kuwait and the Palestinian-Israeli problem. I am sure you heard those statements.

Second, the initial appearance of popular demonstrations among poorer Arab populations in favor of Saddam Hussein subsided dramatically after the first few weeks of the crisis. At least that is the impression that I have looking at the evidence as reported through the news media primarily.

Third, the specific example of Jordan, which you cite as evidence of this particular problem, is mitigated in part by the fact that Jordan is obviously terrified of Iraq. And many analysts have said that its open and outright support for Saddam Hussein came in significant measure because of King Hussein's long-standing fear of Iraqi aggression.

How do you reconcile, how do you respond to that as an argument that maybe although this is extremely significant, no question, that maybe it is not as central as you make it here in your statement?

Dr. MARR. I think it is more central among the northern Arabs who are, of course, directly involved in the problem—the Palestinians, the Jordanians. And as we know, upwards of 60 percent, perhaps more, of the Jordanian population is Palestinian in origin.

Let me take the last point first. I really do not believe that the Jordanians are terrified of Iraq. I do not think that that is really what is behind the nexus, the economic, political nexus between Iraq and Jordan. Now it is quite true that the regime and the military must worry about a country as powerful as Iraq on its border and what it might do. But this nexus has grown up during the war.

There have been very clear economic benefits to Jordan from its contact with Iraq, the use of the Port of Agaba; the percentage of trade and so forth. So there is a real economic nexus there.

I just reject the terror argument entirely because I have talked to too many Palestinians. I have read too much, to the contrary

Even Jordanians themselves, genuine Jordanians feel acutely this sense of humiliation, and frustration, over the years and the decades, of not being able to deal with Israel.

And this new comparison between the Arab-Israeli issue and Kuwait is simply there. They do not like Saddam Hussein. They do not want to live under his rule. But he symbolizes someone who has stood up to Israel who can deal with one problem. And, hence, I think it is a real, genuinely-felt issue inside Jordan. Just look at the extent to which Jordanians are volunteering food and medicine and so on.

And so I think that King Hussein very wisely weaves and tacks to accord with what he feels is the genuine sentiment of his population. In doing so, he has had to distance himself somewhat from the United States.

I am sorry. I am trying to remember the first two points.

Senator GORE. My time has expired. But I will just summarize them.

First was that the initial effort by Saddam Hussein to exploit this resentment was powerfully rebuffed and by almost every country including Iran.

And second, the demonstrations which appeared early in the crisis have largely disappeared or subsided after a few weeks.

Chairman NUNN. If we could abbreviate it. I think we need to move along.

Dr. MARR. They may have rebuffed early on. But in talking to Arabs all over they make the comparison between these two issues very clear, I believe that they consider it a quid pro quo, particularly those that are supporting us, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that when this crisis is over we are going to make a good faith effort to deal with that issue.

And maybe open demonstrations have subsided. I have indicated in my paper, for example, that some Palestinians may be having some second thoughts. But just because popular demonstrations may have subsided does not mean that the issue is not deeply felt by the Arab population.

I think it is axiomatic.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would just say in 10 seconds that I think the distinction between invading by an aggressor to take something over, there is all the difference in the world than responding to an attack by establishing a defensive perimeter no matter what you feel about the occupation itself. The distinction is so clear that I think it is clear to the Arab nations as well.

Dr. MARR. Senator, that distinction may exist here, but it really is not felt and understood there. The question at issue is the American response over many decades of occupation by Israel and the immediate response to what was obviously a brutal Iraqi invasion that we all, including many of the Arabs, do not like in Kuwait.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up on the points made by Senator Gore.

I think it is absolutely wrong to allow the establishment of any kind of a moral symmetry between Saddam Hussein's claim to Kuwait, and Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank or Gaza. And I think, frankly, the perception of a double standard may exist in the Arab world, but they would have to pass over the fact that Iraq, to my knowledge, and maybe I am wrong on this, but I do not know that Iraq has ever been invaded by Kuwait, have they?

Dr. MARR. No.

Senator COHEN. Well, I think we have to constantly go back to that. His justification for going into Kuwait has absolutely no relationship to Israel's present occupation of the Golan Heights. Israel has been invaded on a number of occasions by Egypt, by Jordan, by Syria.

And so I do not think we should accommodate that view, whether or not it exists in the minds of Arabs. I think we have to be very clear that there is no moral equivalency of that. There is no doubt, however, that we have to deal with the so-called Israel-Palestinian conflict.

But I would hope, as you suggested, Dr. Marr, that the President might make it clear to Saddam Hussein that as soon as this is over and as soon as it is resolved that one of the top items on his agenda would be to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

But regarding any promise to attempt to settle the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, before he makes any such pledge, I would hope at the very least the President would meet with Mr. Shamir when he arrives in Washington since the administration felt compelled to pass over the Prime Minister while they were in the Middle East, opting instead to meet with the Syrian president.

I would think, before he makes any kind of a pledge or implied promise, that he talk to the Israelis to see exactly what they are going to be prepared to do.

One of the worst things that could happen is that the President makes a pledge to deal with this and he cannot deliver in the future. I think it is going to take both parties to this and not simply the President making representations to Arab leaders that we are going to resolve this issue once this crisis is settled. I think that would be an absolutely wrong thing for him to do.

Dr. Marr, you also indicated that there is a possibility that once the economic sanctions start to take hold that perhaps someone would be courageous enough to go to Saddam Hussein and suggest maybe that he ought to remove himself back to Baghdad.

I think you are probably familiar with the minister of health who, during the Iranian-Iraqi war, suggested that maybe if only Hussein would step down temporarily it might help to resolve that dispute. That minister of health now has, I assume, a grave marker over his body.

So I am not sure that anyone is going to be quite courageous enough to make that kind of recommendation.

One of the nightmares that has been expressed by a lot of members, or witnesses at least, is the situation where Saddam Hussein withdraws under pressure. He goes back to Iraq; 2 years later, 3 years later we have our worst nightmare and "Chuckie" is back. Only he is bigger and stronger and nastier than ever.

You have indicated that you think we could put together some kind of a regime that would limit his ability to function as a military powerhouse. I think it is going to be very hard to impose sanctions that would limit the size of his military.

Number one, I think it would be difficult to formulate sanctions that would prevent him from continuing to produce chemical and/or biological weapons. I think he has the indigenous capability to do that right now. He is producing them by the tons, by the thousands of tons right now. And I see no way in which any kind of imposition of sanctions could possibly prevent him from continuing to do that on an extended period of time.

I have just a moment left to go.

Assuming that he moves out, assuming that Saddam Hussein moves out of Kuwait in a year or 18 months, I guess the question is, what is left after all the bones have been licked clean? What is left of Kuwait? And should we care?

Obviously you have indicated many of the other Arab people do not care about the Kuwaitis except in terms of rich versus poor and that kind of class struggle.

But should the West care that 18 months from now there is very little left that is recognizable in Kuwait for all practical purposes, all evidences of sovereignty having been destroyed? Records have been burned. Kuwaitis have been moved out. Iraqis have been moved in. Should we in the West care that 18 months from now that there would be very little left of Kuwait, if anything?

Dr. MARR. Well, I made a note, and I hope I do not forget it on all of your points.

Just a quick response to the first two statements: no, I do not think there is anything moral about Saddam's occupation of Kuwait. I am absolutely outraged, and I am not indicating that we should make some kind of moral equivalency with Israel. I am indicating a problem that lies out there, and I fully applaud the President for making these suggestions to other Arab leaders that we will at least make an effort.

I do not think we can "settle it," I quite agree, but indicating that we plan to deal with the problem as soon as this crisis is over now would help us on the Arab front. You are quite right about the Minister of Health. I do not think I was suggesting that somebody inside Iraq suggests that Saddam leave. I suggest that they really plan something more serious. My suggestion was that other Arabs—that is to say, Arab leaders—make that suggestion, and a number of them have already done it and survived.

Now, to the constraints that could be put on Iraq. A constraint regime, to deal with his military should he withdraw, is not going to be a perfect solution, I guarantee you. However, as I have indicated, I believe that he is going to be in such bad economic shape that he is going to have to make some "guns" and "butter" choices.

Let us take his huge, million-man plus army. He has got to demobilize it. One of the reasons he cannot demobilize it is the absence of jobs. In fact, by using financial means, we can encourage him to get shift of the areas that we do not want him in—I say "we." I do not mean the United States, but Arabs and others—and to develop labor intensive industry, intermediate industry, import substitution industry, and a private sector. All of these industries would help develop the country, and it would move him in a direction which would provide more jobs.

I believe that after this episode, it is going to be easier, perhaps far easier, to get Europeans and others who have been supplying this technology to Iraq, to agree to a rather tight constraint regime. I would rely on all of you here to take a look at the Europeans who are not adhering to constraints and come up with some legislation that would take care of it.

Now, on Kuwait, I must say that ethically and morally, as a democratic nation, I think we really ought to be concerned about a nation and a people being wiped out. I think that has definitely got to be a concern.

But in addition to that, I think there is a real strategic concern. We sent troops in there because we did not want Saddam Hussein or any powerful person or country to control that much oil, and one of our main aims is to restore, not necessarily in my view the Emir, or any particular form of government, but a sovereign Kuwaiti State.

People will tell you that even though the Kuwaitis are in exile, they all know who the Kuwaitis are, who are their friends. I believe that a Kuwait which in fact might be more democratic and something of a model for other Arab countries could be reconstituted.

Senator **COHEN**. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Let me just thank all of the witnesses. You have been very helpful today.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Cohen. I have one more question to the panel and we have all alluded to it. You have during the course of your testimony, but it seems to me that one common thread among a number is that you believe that U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia should be lower than it is now, or lower than it is going to be, at least, when we get 430,000 troops there. Is that a fair assessment, or would you like to comment on that? Dr. Helms?

Dr. **HELMS**. I agree.

Mr. **PLACKE**. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not quite sure that I would describe it quite that way. I think if the intent is to actually conduct military operations in the near future, say in the first quarter of the coming year, then perhaps it is a military question as to what the right size of the force is, and perhaps this is the right size.

I would only say that if it is not used in the first quarter, then certainly it should be drawn down, and indeed, in some respects it will have to be. At the moment, the Haj terminal in Jidda is occupied by U.S. Air Force aircraft. You could not have a Haj today because there are American facilities in the way. So there has got to be some adjustment made, and it would seem to me as well that the rotation policy that has been put on hold would certainly have to be resurfaced.

Chairman **NUNN**. Would you go into a little more detail on that? You are saying U.S. aircraft are in that area, on the airfields that are to be used, or what?

Mr. **PLACKE**. Yes sir. The volume of civilian traffic which comes into Jidda Airport, which is the primary—not the only, but the primary—point of entry for most Muslims making the Haj coming from abroad, simply would be incompatible with the present use of that terminal facility in support of the United States and multinational deployment. You cannot do both things at the same time, not at this level.

Senator **GORE**. Starting when?

Mr. **PLACKE**. The Haj, sir? The Haj, as I remember, begins in mid-June.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Marr?

Dr. MARR. Well, I agree with Jim Placke it is a policy issue. What are you going to do with those forces? If in fact you are not going to use them, then I would agree that they should be drawn down.

I remain, concerned about losing the potential military option, if a long period of time elapses and the coalition erodes. I am also concerned because of the signal it would send to draw down the forces and settle into a deterrent policy.

Chairman NUNN. Do you believe that if we went to a rotation policy right now—we have 230,000, approximately and the President has announced building up to somewhere in the neighborhood of 430,000 to 450,000.

Do you believe, each of you, that if the President were to say, look, the economic boycott is working, it is working better than we thought, we are going to give it more time, therefore we are going to have a rotation policy and leave the combat support units in place so we can build up rapidly if we need to again, if we have to go to an offensive option, but we are going to go to a rotation policy and level off the force level at about what it is now, would that be seen in the Arab world, or among our allies, or even among Iraq, as a loss of American face? Would it be seen as the beginning of an American termination of presence in the region?

Dr. MARR. Well, let me start with that, and I suspect my colleagues may have a little different opinion on that. I think it would be interpreted by Saddam Hussein as the first victory.

We have taken a lot of time to ratchet up the threat, whether we are going to use it or not, to get his attention we are trying to get this crisis over with as soon as possible. He is trying to break up the coalition. He perceives us as not having the will to use them. A draw down would be interpreted that way by him.

Our allies in the area do worry about our lack of staying power. That has been expressed a number of times, and I believe in some circles that this would be the first indication of a lack of staying power. While they certainly are anxious over the whole issue of war—as you well know, a number of them would like to see this problem over with as soon as possible. These things have to be weighed in the balance.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Helms?

Dr. HELMS. I think you have to be careful of two things in the Middle East. One is, what is the perception by Arabs of what are United States' intentions. Once again, we return to this issue of is Bush intent on using force, or looking for a pretext to use force? Many of the people in the Middle East today I think have that fear. I would like to address something Senator Gore mentioned earlier in questioning of Dr. Marr when he asked why did Arab countries and Iran give the United States overwhelming support. I would caution once again that you should not assume that the opinion held by an Arab Government is synonymous with that of their Arab masses, or vice versa. There is tremendous sensitivity among the Arab population about this.

I would also agree with the qualifying statement that Jim Placke made. If Bush's objective is in fact to destroy these facilities by force, that he has some objective he has not elucidated yet to the

American public, obviously you do not want to draw down forces. But, if your objective in the long haul is to try to create some stability in the Middle East and to be a player with an effective diplomatic role in the Middle East then—one way is to maneuver or entice Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, perhaps through negotiating over the Ramaila oil field. This also allows you to diminish U.S. forces and presence which even now has a destabilizing impact on the rest of the Middle East. This is what I would advocate.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Placke, do you want to comment?

Mr. PLACKE. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I think I would agree with the two previous comments, and that is that certainly a drawdown or a reversal of the decision that has been announced insofar as strengthening deployment is concerned could be interpreted by the Iraqis, and by our Arab allies, as the United States beginning to back away from its resolve.

There are things that can be done to mitigate that. Certainly careful advance consultation would be in order—and real consultation, not necessary going in with a preconception. I cannot think of what it might be this afternoon, sir, but others ought to give some thought to what other measures could be announced or implemented at the same time to bring further pressure on Iraq as a way of offsetting that possibility.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. Al.

Senator GORE. Can I ask one other question?

Chairman NUNN. Yes. I have to leave for a meeting so I will leave you to close it out. I thank all of you very much for being here. You have been a very great help to us and we appreciate it, and we will continue to call on you.

Senator GORE [presiding]. There was a report in one of the national newspapers about the distribution of cassette tapes throughout Saudi Arabia by a fundamentalist cleric said to be of great prominence who was openly attacking the decision by the Saudi regime to allow the deployment of American and other foreign troops, principally American troops, on Saudi soil.

I had heard some analysts downplay the significance of those statements by that cleric, but I am interested in your analysis both of these cassette tapes, the potential for short-term instability within Saudi Arabia because of Islamic fundamentalism, and coupled with the resentment of the American troop deployment.

Dr. MARR. I have heard about them, too. This is the second report I have read about them, but they are simply indicative of what we have said here. The longer the troops stay, the longer this problem remains. Gradually there is going to be increased resistance to them, and the Islamic fundamentalist quarter is among those opposing the troops.

The Saudi regime knows that very well, and, as I have tried to indicate, each regime in the Middle East tends to adjust its policy to popular opinion. One of the ways in which it did that, in my view, was to crack down on these 25 women who tried to get a driving license. I would interpret that not as opposition by the regime—in fact, the regime happens to be more modern and progressive—but as a means to keeping their religious segment happy. That is one of the concessions that they have to make.

I would not get unduly upset about the tapes at the moment, but they are an indication that a lengthy presence, particularly of this size, but even a drawn-down presence is troubling. So we really have a very unpleasant choice; either hurrying up and trying to get the crisis over with so we do not feel increased pressure, or an equally unpleasant choice of going into military operations.

Senator GORE. Dr. Helms.

Dr. HELMS. Could I just add a footnote to what Phebe said? When you are looking at the statistics for the Middle East that I gave you earlier—a population growth rate of 3.0 to 3.5 percent, and a general population some 70 percent under the age of 20 years of age—I will add another statistic. Illiteracy in rural areas of the Middle East can be as high as 60 percent or more, depending upon which country you are talking and maybe 40 percent in urban areas in some cases. The point of using these underground tapes became well known to the American public during the time of Khomeni because, obviously, political parties are not allowed with few exceptions in the Middle East except under national front parties controlled by governments. You do not have labor unions. You have really basically only had two free elections this past year—in Algeria and Jordan. We have the beginning of elections in Yemen. The value of these tapes and of Islam is that of a political paradigm or political tool. People can meet in mosques unhindered by the government because no Islamic leader can forbid access to the mosque. So you had, for example, and I presume they still exist, during the 1980s in Cairo the development of something like 200 or 300 small Islamic fundamentalist groups with memberships of no more than 5 to 20 people. They began to identify other devout individuals with whom they could share common goals by attending the mosques and thus forming memberships.

Each country has taken its own path, but, for example, in Turkey a lot of the Islamic fundamentalists you will find there are highly educated. They are doctors, lawyers, and engineers. Because of the nature of their jobs, they have a higher salary rate. They have actually given money to support political platforms and specific politicians. Some issues like environmental degradation have become key issues of Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey.

So the value or the significance of the tapes is simply that at this stage people are willing to take the risk to distribute them and to give greater access to these opinions among the broader segment of the population. If you travel today in the Middle East, outside of every mosque you can buy tapes. If you befriend the individual selling the tapes, he will almost inevitably produce for you a few of the ones that should not be sold publicly. So it is a phenomenon, I would predict, indicating greater dissent from official government views.

Senator GORE. Mr. Placke.

Mr. PLACKE. Senator, I would make just a brief comment addressed to the second part of your question; that is, concerning the stability of the Saudi regime.

I have attempted to assess the public reaction in Saudi Arabia to the decision to admit such a large number of foreign forces, and my conclusion is that across the Saudi spectrum there is a resigned acceptance of that decision—that it was simply necessary; the alternative was much worse.

I do not see in the short term a serious question of stability of the Saudi regime as a result.

Senator Gore. All right. Very interesting.

I will just close by saying that I, too, wanted to compliment all three of you on the statements which you first made, Mr. Placke, and in which Dr. Helms and Dr. Marr joined. That is with regard to personalizing the antagonism and the effect that that has on the range of options available to reach a successful conclusion whether military force is used or not.

Senator Nunn has already expressed the thanks of the committee. May I add further thanks on my own behalf from all of us for an extremely interesting afternoon. Thank you all for coming.

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:01 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn, (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, and Gorton.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director and Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Douglas George, John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., and David S. Lyles.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Corts, Debra A. Rice, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; and Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

Our committee meets today to continue our hearings on U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region. This morning we will hear from Lt. Gen. William Odom, U.S. Army (Retired). General Odom is the Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute.

In his last governmental job, prior to retiring from the military, General Odom was the Director of the National Security Agency, or NSA. General Odom also served as head of Army Intelligence.

General Odom is an individual I have personally known for many years in a lot of different capacities. He has always been a very helpful witness before this committee, and a very important part of our overall national security leadership for many years.

General Odom, we appreciate your being here very much today. I will defer to Senator Warner, and then we will turn to your testimony before we get to questions.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming this distinguished public servant. We are delighted that you are continuing in that service.

Chairman **Nunn**. General, we will turn to you for any kind of observations you may have on the overall situation, and then we will have questions for you.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE, AND FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

General **Odom**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to testify before this committee today. I would like to treat briefly three subjects all related to the present U.S. strategy in dealing with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

First, I would like to comment on the strategic structure of the situation, and the options it seems to offer; second, I will speak about military operational realities, and finally, I will add a word, too, about the implications for our post-Cold War U.S. military force structure.

Now, I have been and remain supportive of President Bush's strategy insofar as I understand it. The recently announced build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia, however, seems to have introduced some confusion about both purpose and strategy. My comments, therefore, are meant as an attempt to clarify the tough choices the President faces in the future, and to help us think clearly about the implications of those choices.

At the same time, let no one conclude that my criticisms and cautions indicate less than full support for the President as he strives to rectify a grave violation of international law by Iraq, one that I think affects vital U.S. interests.

Both our adversaries and our allies should understand that public debate about our strategy shows not a lack of solidarity, but rather, serves to strengthen it through a sounder understanding of our purposes and our means.

Strategy is meaningless without goals. The President's goals, as I have understood them, are: to defend U.S. citizens; to defend Saudi Arabia by military force, if necessary; and to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

He has not, to my knowledge, said that he will absolutely use military force, if necessary to free Kuwait, although he has hinted strongly at that commitment and has begun a build-up of forces that will give him the option. He has employed U.N.-approved sanctions of Iraq for that purpose, making Iraq slowly pay a heavy price for its invasion.

Now, as these goals are stated, any objective judgment of the success of the President's strategy would have to be positive. Saudi

Arabia, and the smaller, littoral States on the Persian Gulf are militarily secure. The blockade is having an effect, to all appearances. No Iraqi oil is being sold and no imports of goods, to any significant extent, are reaching Iraq, adequate for Saddam Hussein to continue his economic construction program.

Admittedly, the strategy has not freed all U.S. hostages from Kuwait, and judging from our past experience with hostages in this region, no short-term strategy can do that.

The open question, of course, is how effective the sanctions will be. Now, it is easy to argue that they will be feckless if they are expected to work quickly, in a few months. We know from the leaky blockade of Iran that it took several years to have the desired effect, and we know that it hurt Iran badly, becoming a major factor in that country's decision to end the war with Iraq.

All blockades are bound to be leaky, but the present one, by comparison, seems to be fairly tight. If it is continued for a year or two, I think the damage will be large. Whether it will cause Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait may be doubted, but we cannot know that until it has been maintained for a year or so.

Those who criticize this strategy and recommend early military action against Iraq make at least two points. First, the sanctions are not working. Second, U.S. forces cannot remain in Saudi Arabia for a year or so.

The first objection is without merit, because it sets an unrealistic time frame for the blockade to take its toll. The second objection is self-contradictory. A successful invasion would deepen our involvement in the region and require a long stay to restore the balance of power in the Euphrates River valley.

If we cannot remain in Saudi Arabia for a year or more, how can we remain in Kuwait and Iraq for a much longer time? To leave soon after a successful invasion would be to invite war among bordering states for control of Iraq.

It is sometimes argued that a ground invasion is not necessary, that an air campaign is adequate. I know of no historical precedent for this claim, not even in Japan in World War II, because most of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Forces had been destroyed when Japan surrendered. An air war only will bring all of the disadvantages of a war without the fruits of a military success.

The situation in the region seems to me to have a fairly clear strategic structure, and two options stand out. First, the United States can continue the present strategy as I have outlined it. Second, it can seek a speedy expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by military action.

Now, the first option has much to recommend it. To date, it has been a winning strategy. I am puzzled by the administration's failure to take credit for its success on this slow route to its objectives. Every day, Iraq pays a bigger price for the invasion. Saudi Arabia is secure. Oil production from the moderate Gulf States should increase. The international support for the blockade is holding.

Some of the administration's rhetoric makes it sound as though we were losing. This clearly is not true. A number of side benefits accrue from this strategy. For example, the oil rich States no longer have to pay the large blackmail money to the radical Arabs for their security. That eventually could improve the Arab-Israeli military balance, as it reduces the radicals' resources.

Those large cash transfers now can go to the poorer, moderate Arab States helping with their economic development. In other words, our strategy could, in time, create a fundamentally changed allocation of resources among the factions within the Arab world, a change favorable both to the Arabs themselves and to the rest of the world.

Now, a second example is the possible impact on Pan Arabism. Several spokesmen from the small Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia have declared that Iraq's actions have destroyed the myth of Pan Arabism. While that is undoubtedly an exaggeration, it may be proved true that many Arabs will abandon the illusion of a larger Arab brotherhood as their primary focus for loyalty in favor of nationalism within the territories of their own States. This trend, if it progresses, could make it easier to deal with the Arab-Israeli confrontation and to maintain a balance of power throughout the region.

Yet a third side-effect may be both positive and negative. The presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is bound to have social and political effects, creating tensions for the ruling circles. The trend toward secularization, already in progress as a result of the great wealth on the Arabian peninsula, will probably accelerate. It could bring such strong pressures for expanding political participation that the present regimes might collapse, or those regimes might surprise us with their adaptability.

The destabilizing potential naturally is a disturbing prospect, yet it is going to occur eventually in any event. The U.S. military presence might well serve to prevent a sharp and radical discontinuity in the domestic politics of those States, the kind that occurred when the Shah fell in Iran.

This first strategy, simply holding our present posture, assumes a fairly long stay for some level of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Critics assert that the Saudis will not permit that. If they do not, we will have to depart, but I am inclined to believe they will not expel us as long as they perceive a serious military threat from Iraq, even if that means waiting a couple of years for the blockade to have a strong impact. A U.S. military presence may be onerous, but an Iraqi military presence would be much less attractive.

The second option—early military action to push Iraqi forces from Kuwait, is certainly within our means. If it involves only expelling those forces from Kuwait without further action to destroy the bulk of those forces in Iraq, it will not remove the military threat to Saudi Arabia, and we will face an indefinite period of the occupation of Kuwait. If it includes the destruction of the regime in Iraq, that, too, will carry a long period of U.S. military presence while a new balance of power is restored in that area.

The complexity of that process, the large range of uncertainties and hazards it brings, is vastly superior to the range of such uncertainties a continuation of our present posture carries. After a successful destruction of the Iraqi Army, we might find ourselves defending Iraqi territory against Syrian and Iranian territorial ambitions, and, of course, the impact on the rest of the Arab world might be highly volatile.

Now, the benefits of the invasion strategy are said to include a demonstration to the world that aggression will not go unpunished. To let it go unpunished is to set a terrible example.

The trouble with this reasoning, it seems to me, is twofold. First, our present strategy is punishing Iraq. Not as severely as our emotional reactions demand, but punishment, nevertheless. Second, it rests on a dubious analogy. It is, like parents and children, if the children are allowed to grow up and to misbehave without corrective action, they will grow up undisciplined, addicted to antisocial behavior.

States and leaders are not children, and the wealth of historical examples of the folly of aggressive wars is sufficient to impress any leader that such action eventually brings ruin. Yet some leaders still resort to war. We may teach Saddam Hussein a lesson, but we should be modest in expecting many other leaders to learn the lesson from his example.

The more sensible objective in this case is restoring and maintaining a peaceful balance in the region. While our moral sensitivities cannot be discounted as a guide to action, the limits of our power must also be considered. Do we really want to take on the responsibility for the education and political development of all the States in this region? Is that enormous undertaking within our power, given the many other regions of the world where we are seeking to maintain stability? It would seem wiser, even from a moral viewpoint, to seek a balance of power, although it may be emotionally less appealing.

Another advantage to the military invasion strategy is said to be the elimination of the Iraqi nuclear and chemical facilities. Proliferation of those weapons is a problem much larger than Iraq, and to let the issue become the primary raison d'etre for our strategy not only could confuse our priority of objectives, it could set a precedent for dealing with the proliferation problem that we cannot match elsewhere.

Iraq does not yet possess nuclear weapons. If it acquires them and brandishes them, we will have to deal with that problem at that time. It would seem to be a mistake to make a potential problem the focus for our strategy, instead of the real problems that now exist.

Now, this short analysis touches on the main factors in assessing the two strategic options. But the weight in favor of the first, holding our present defensive position in Saudi Arabia, seems to be quite large. Moreover, it does not rule out shifting to the invasion strategy at some future time. Shifting back to the first strategy is not an option if the military strategy proves not to our liking.

Now to the military operational realities. I think the major outlines of these are slowly becoming clear to the American public. The most important one is that sufficient forces to defend Saudi Arabia are now deployed there, while adequate forces for an invasion are not yet there.

We have no military precedent against which to judge what is actually required to defeat the Iraqi Army. The Arab-Israeli wars may look small by comparison. Not only are Iraqi forces larger, possessing more modern equipment, but they have been battle-tested in 8 years of war with Iran. While they showed a limited capacity to conduct deep operations in that war, they proved effective in the defense.

To appreciate the scale that an offensive would involve it is useful to recall the battle of Kursk in Russia in World War II. It was one of the largest tank battles of the war. The German Army had about 2,500 tanks. The Red Army had somewhere between 1,500 and 3,000—3,000 according to Soviet sources.

In Kuwait and Iraq, the number of tanks is closer to 5,000, including nearly 1,000 modern T-72s. If the U.S. Army brings as many as 3,000 tanks to the campaign, most of them M1A1's with 120 millimeter tank guns, that should tilt the tank balance slightly to our favor. That is about nine division equivalents.

The ground space for a campaign in Kuwait and Iraq is equivalent to that of the battle of Kursk. The weaponry, however, is much more lethal. Air forces and air defense means are much more powerful. U.S. forces in World War II never faced a single campaign perhaps except the Normandy landing, of such a scope. Such comparisons, to be sure, are greatly flawed in their details, but I offer this one merely to make the point that we could be surprised by the scale and intensity.

I have no doubt that we could win it. The Iraqi Army might break early. Victory might prove easy. General Schwarzkopf, however, cannot make his plans on that prospect alone. He must assume that the Iraqi Army will fight to its full capacity.

Now, a number of other operational realities that confront our forces in preparing for an offensive campaign strike me as sometimes poorly understood. First, the air and sealift required to put an invasion force in Saudi Arabia are enormous, yet our lift capacity is embarrassingly small.

Throughout August and September, the shortfall meant that our forces were vulnerable to an Iraqi offensive. We can only thank them for giving us the time to build up. Our forces could have faced a Dunkirk as late as the end of September. While we were able to bring large naval and air forces to the region fairly quickly, they did little to affect the actual balance of military power. They were more symbolic than real.

Second, our stocks of smart munitions which promise great effectiveness against Iraqi ground forces and installations are small. Their high cost has prevented us from stockpiling them in large numbers. Munitions, therefore, worry me as a possible shortfall in our capacity to mount an offensive.

Third, our heavy forces—armor and mechanized divisions—were designed to fight on the logistics base in Europe. Deep operations of 150 to 300 miles of offensive action were not anticipated to restore the boundaries in Europe. Yet an offensive into Kuwait would require these distances in a much less developed topography, one without highways, communications networks, buildings for shelter against the weather, local water supplies, and perhaps even food.

The division and corps support commands may find moving supplies forward rapidly a task that exceeds their capacity. Our new tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles will require vast tonnages of daily supplies. It seems doubtful to me that a sufficient build-up of the logistics base can be accomplished in a couple of months. Not only will the standard tonnages have to be increased, but the availability of supplies in the United States and Europe may be short.

—Combat expenditure rates with modern weaponry can only be vaguely estimated, because those developed in previous wars have long been obsolete. If combat actions are heavy, the replacement rates for tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles could jump to surprising levels. Do we have stockpiles of such weapons available? When can we get them to Saudi Arabia?

In the same light, do we have adequate stocks of bombs for a long and intensive air support campaign? Some observers have advocated a long bombing campaign. Before initiating ground action, I would like to know if our bomb and air launched munitions stocks are sufficient for such a campaign. If they are not, such an air offensive could leave the Army ground forces without adequate close air support when we take the offensive. Our assumed advantage in air power could prove illusory.

Replacement personnel for battle casualties are likely to be a problem. We have reduced our Active forces so that the number of trained personnel in many specialties are quite low. Reserves for this campaign will be in short supply. The complexity of training means that creating replacements will take a long time. The cuts the Congress plans this year for the Army's end strength can only serve to exacerbate this problem.

Our Reserve component personnel in specialties that have civil specialty counterparts, such as medics, mechanics, transport pilots, administrative personnel and the like, are a great asset. In the combat arms, however, where physical fitness and skills with no civil counterpart are critical, Reserve components are of little value. In 6 months to a year of training, of course, they could be brought to an adequate competency level. Only a few such units at a time can be trained, because the National Training Center has a limited capacity. Thus, we will probably lack the training base for a rapid mobilization of Reserve combat units. The competence of our Army leadership will be tested to the extreme in an offensive campaign. At the lower levels—platoon, company, and battalion—I have the greatest confidence in them. The National Training Center has produced a generation of young officers who have had to command and control forces in highly demanding circumstances not unlike those that they would see in Saudi Arabia.

At division and corps levels, however, the same training has not been possible. Moving a division or a corps a couple of hundred miles, fighting much of the way, requires experienced staffs and commanders. In this case, most of them will be learning as they go. We simply have not had the large exercises essential to prepare for that kind of operation, not even the Reforger Exercises in Germany each year.

The problem for Reserve component brigades and divisions would be infinitely greater. Most commanders and staffs would probably have to be replaced by Active component officers. The companies of our tactical air commanders will be equally tested. It is one thing to bomb target ranges. It is another thing to fly against hostile air defense and to try to fix and hold armored formations in place so they cannot be committed as reserves. Yet these are the kinds of operational missions they will have to accomplish.

Now, I have intentionally given a gloomy picture of these problems, and I have done so because I believe only by anticipating the very worst and alarming ourselves about the potential problems are we likely to take the kinds of actions necessary to fix them.

Finally, let me address an operational question that sometimes arises about building up an offensive capability. If we do that, must we use it? Many observers seem to believe that is the case. We must either use it or lose it after a few months.

I am not so sure. We could proceed on the present build-up course, eventually achieving stockage levels and force levels that are adequate. After a time, we could build installations in Saudi Arabia to hold these stocks and weapons in storage, much as we have done with Pomcus stocks in Europe. The troop strengths could be greatly reduced, leaving only a small manning structure in place.

With intelligence warning, or if we decided to pursue the offensive strategy at a much later date, we could fly the troops back into Saudi Arabia in a few days or weeks. In other words, we could create a capacity to regenerate our combat power rather quickly.

That would allow us to extract ourselves from the problem of morale that comes from an indefinite stay for troops in the desert. We would have an offensive posture that could be maintained for a long time.

Thus, I do not believe that the planned build-up means that we must go to war in 3 or 4 months just because we have deployed the forces and Iraq does not accede to our terms. We should not, of course, clarify what we will do to Saddam Hussein.

We should plan to keep the offensive option over a long period of time so that he cannot be assured that he has survived it after a few months. This is why I am not inclined to criticize the President for the planned build-up. I think we should back him on that account.

Just because there are many problems and uncertainties in achieving an adequate offensive capability is not a good reason for not achieving it. There are many good reasons, in my view, for creating it. The issue for debate is how and when to use that capability, if at all.

Now, let me make a few brief points about larger implications for U.S. defense policy. I think a side consequence of this crisis should be that we reframe our views on the kind of military forces we need for the post-Cold War era. Last spring, the congressional debate over the force structure, as I remember it, focused on the B-2, SDI, Midgetman, MX, naval forces and base closings.

Now, virtually none of the military problems we face today were given attention. For example, I recall no serious debate over airlift and sealift. The only debate I remember about Army heavy forces and close air support was how much to reduce them. They were to be the "bill payers" for the big procurement and R&D items.

Chairman NUNN. General, if I could interrupt on that, there has been a lot of debate on sealift, and in fact Congress has put a lot of money in sealift for the last 2 years. The administration and the Pentagon have said they did not want to spend it.

So there probably has not been a lot of debate on the floor that you read in the news or see on television, but that has been a subject of debate. The whole sealift situation has been a subject that has been very much on the minds of Congress.

Senator EXON. For many years.

Chairman NUNN. But not only has it not been requested from the Pentagon, it has been turned down.

General ODOM. Then I will turn my criticism to the Pentagon. [Laughter.]

General ODOM. Now, as we face this first post-Cold War crisis, what we need most is fast sealift, airlift, Army heavy forces, close air support, and munitions stocks. We are concerned much less with penetrating Soviet air space and with a threatening Soviet nuclear arsenal.

At the same time, the prospects for having to deal with regional stability in the Third World have remained high, and we must adjust to the new kinds of political military balances in the major theaters of Europe and East Asia.

It should be noticed that much of the talk in the past about needing light Army forces for the Third World has been off the mark. The weaponry in the Third World is often of the most modern and heavy kind, and it will grow heavier and more modern in the decade ahead.

It strikes me that the debate ought to be fundamentally reframed, and I would add that I would encourage the Defense Department to help reframe it, and it should put airlift, sealift, heavy ground forces and close air support at the top of the agenda.

In the post-Cold War period, I think we should have to be able to do two things: first, we need to retain the capability to regenerate forces for the Cold War conditions at least for a few years. Second, and more urgent, we should build the capability to move a heavy Army corps with accompanying close air support anywhere in the world in 20 days, and we should be able to reinforce it with a second heavy corps in another 30 days.

This second task requires no great R&D breakthroughs, nor should its costs begin to approach the present strategic forces and naval programs weapons. It is merely a matter of deciding to shift resources within the present defense budget levels.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]

STATEMENT

By Lt. Gen. (ret) Wm. E. Odom

Good morning Mr. Chairman. I am honored to testify before your committee today. As an opening statement, I would like to treat briefly three subjects, all related to the present issue of US strategy in dealing with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. First, I shall comment on the strategic structure of the situation and the options it seems to offer. Second, I want to speak about military operational realities. Finally, I will mention the implications for a post-Cold War US military force structure.

I have been and remain supportive of President Bush's strategy insofar as I understand it. The recently announced buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia seems, however, to have introduced some confusion about both purpose and strategy. My comments, therefore, are meant as an attempt to clarify the tough choices the President faces in the future and to help us think clearly about the implications of those choices. At the same time, let no one conclude that my caution and criticisms indicate less than full public support for the President as he strives to rectify a grave violation of international law by Iraq, one that affects vital US interests. Both our adversaries and our allies should understand that public debate about our strategy shows not a lack of solidarity but rather serves to strengthen it through a sounder understanding of our purposes and our means.

Strategy and Options

Strategy is meaningless without goals. The President's goals, as I have understood them, are to defend US citizens, to defend Saudi Arabia by military force if necessary, and to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. He has not, to my knowledge, said that he will use military force, if necessary, to free Kuwait, although he has hinted strongly at that commitment and has begun a buildup of forces that will give him the option. He has employed a UN approved blockade of Iraq for that purpose, making Iraq slowly pay a heavy price for its invasion of Kuwait.

As these goals are stated, any objective judgment of the President's strategy would have to be positive. Saudi Arabia and the smaller littoral states on the Persian Gulf are militarily secure. The blockade is having an effect to all appearances. No Iraqi oil is being sold, and imports of most goods, especially industrial materials, are not reaching Iraq in sufficient quantities for Saddam Hussein to continue his economic construction program. Admittedly, the strategy has not freed all American hostages from Kuwait, and judging from our past experience with hostages in this region, no short-term strategy can do so short of total capitulation to Iraq.

The open question, of course, is how effective the blockade will be. It is easy to argue that it is feckless if it is expected to work quickly, in a few months. We know from the very leaky blockade of Iran that it took several years to have the desired effect, and we know that it hurt Iran badly, becoming a major factor in Iran's decision to end the war with Iraq. All blockades are bound to be leaky, but the present one, by comparison, is fairly tight. To be effective in the sense of making Iraq pay a very heavy price, it need not even include food. The industrial and military embargo combined with denying the sale of Iraqi oil is bound to cause severe damage to the military and economic infrastructure of the country. If it is continued for a year or two, the damage will be large. Whether it will cause Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait may be doubted, but we cannot know until it has been maintained for at least a year or so.

Those who criticize this strategy and recommend early military action against Iraq make at least two points. First, the blockade is not working. Second, US forces cannot remain in Saudi Arabia for a year or so. Thus a military invasion this winter is the only way to achieve our objectives and depart quickly.

The first objection is without merit because it sets an unrealistic time for the blockade to take it toll. The second objection is self-contradictory. A successful invasion would deepen our involvement in the region and require a very long stay to restore the balance of power in the Euphrates River valley region. If we cannot remain in Saudi Arabia for a year or more, how can we remain in Kuwait and Iraq for a much longer time, maybe decades? To leave soon after a successful invasion would be to invite war among bordering states for hegemony over Iraq.

It is sometimes argued that a ground invasion is not necessary in a military campaign against Iraq, that an air campaign is adequate. I know no historical precedent for this claim, not even Japan in World War II, because most of the Japanese army, navy, and air force had been destroyed before nuclear weapons were dropped in the air campaign. I also note that the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the forces they want for a potential military campaign, must be similar to mine, that is, an air war only will bring all the disadvantages of a war without the fruits of a military success.

The situation in the region seems to have a fairly clear strategic structure. Two key sets of options stand out.

First, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia asked for US military forces, we had the option to respond or to decline. To have declined would have been to reverse a ten year US strategy toward the region, one set by the Carter Doctrine and reconfirmed by President Reagan. While the Carter Doctrine was specifically aimed at an external invasion, it carried the implicit commitment to work to maintain internal regional stability. President Reagan made this explicit in choosing to re-flag Kuwaiti ships and to prevent Iran from stopping oil shipments from the Persian Gulf.

President Bush's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia, therefore, was an essential step in restoring a balance that was upset by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. While some critics may disagree with the President in this decision, not to have restored the balance could have prompted major realignments in the region very unfavorable to US and Western vital interests.

The second set of options face us in the future. First, the United States can continue the present strategy as I have outlined it. Second, it can seek a speedy expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by military action.

The first option has much to recommend it. To date it has been a winning strategy. I am puzzled by the Administration's failure to take credit for its success on this slow route to its objectives. Everyday Iraq pays a bigger price for the invasion. Saudi Arabia is secure. Oil production from the moderate Gulf states should increase. The international support for the blockade is holding, including most critically the Soviet Union which might otherwise be providing military supplies to the Iraqi army. Some of the Administration's rhetoric makes it sound as though we are losing. That is clearly not true.

A number of side benefits accrue from this strategy. For example, the oil-rich states no longer have to pay large blackmail money to the radical Arabs for their security. That will eventually improve the Arab-Israeli military balance as it reduces their resources. Those large cash transfers can now go to the moderate Arab states who lack rich oil reserves, helping them with economic growth. In other words, our strategy could, in time, create a fundamentally changed allocation of resources among factions within the Arab world, a change favorable both to the Arabs themselves and to the rest of the world. The new Soviet foreign policy toward the region also plays a positive role in this regard.

A second example is the possible impact on pan-Arabism. Several spokesmen from the small Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have declared that Iraq's actions have destroyed the myth of pan-Arabism. While that is undoubtedly an exaggeration, it may prove true that many Arabs will abandon the illusion of a larger Arab brotherhood as their primary focus for loyalty in favor of nationalism within the territories of their own states. This trend, if it progresses, could make it easier to deal with the Arab-Israeli confrontation and to maintain a balance of power throughout the region.

Yet a third side effect may be both positive and negative. The presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia is bound to have social and political effects, creating tensions for the ruling circles. The trend toward secularization, already in progress as a result of great wealth on the Arabian Peninsula, will probably accelerate. It could bring such strong pressures for expanding political participation that the present regimes might collapse. Or, those regimes might surprise us in their adaptability. The destabilizing potential, naturally, is a disturbing prospect. Yet it is going to occur eventually in any event. The US military presence might well serve to prevent a sharp and radical discontinuity in the domestic politics of these states, the kind that occurred in Iran.

This first option, simply holding our present posture, assumes a fairly long stay for some level of US forces in Saudi Arabia. Critics may assert that the Saudis will not permit that. If they do not, we will have to depart, but I am inclined to believe that they will not expel us as long as they perceive a serious military threat from Iraq, even if that means waiting a couple of years for the blockade to have a strong impact. A US military presence may be onerous, but an Iraqi military presence would be much less attractive.

The second option, early military action to push Iraqi forces from Kuwait, is certainly within our means. If it involves only expelling those forces from Kuwait without further action to destroy the bulk of those forces in Iraq, it will not remove the military threat to Saudi Arabia, and we will face an indefinite period of occupation of Kuwait. If it includes the destruction of the regime in Iraq, that too will carry a long period of US military presence while a new balance of power is restored in the Euphrates River valley. The complexity of that process, the large range of uncertainties and hazards it brings, is vastly greater than the range of such uncertainties a continuation of our present posture carries. After a successful destruction of the Iraqi army, we might find ourselves defending Iraqi territory against Syrian and Iranian territorial and political ambitions. And of course, the impact on the rest of the Arab world could be highly volatile.

Another hazard in this option concerns the reaction of our European and East Asian allies as well as the Soviet Union. We have seen them offer support, albeit equivocal at times, for our present strategy. How sure can we be of their support for this second strategy?

The benefits of the invasion strategy are said to include a demonstration to the world that aggression will not go unpunished. To let it go unpunished is set a terrible example. The trouble with this reasoning is twofold. First, our present strategy is punishing Iraq, perhaps not as severely as our emotional reactions demand, but punishment nevertheless. Second, it rests on a dubious analogy. It is like parents and children. If the children are allowed to misbehave without corrective action, they will grow up undisciplined, addicted to anti-social behavior. States and their leaders are not children, and the wealth of historical examples of the folly of aggressive wars is sufficient to impress any leader that such action eventually brings ruin. Yet some leaders still resort to war. We may teach Saddam Hussein a lesson, but we should be modest in expecting many other leaders to learn the lesson from his example. Expansionist leaders seem to focus more on the opportunities at hand than on the historical record when they decide to go to war.

The more sensible objective in this case is restoring and maintaining a peaceful balance of power. While our moral sensitivities cannot be discounted as a guide to action, the limits of our power should also be considered. Do we really want to take on the responsibility for the moral education, and with it the political development, of all states in this region? Is that enormous undertaking within our power, given the many other regions of the world where we are seeking to maintain stability? It would seem wiser, even from a moral viewpoint, to seek a balance of power, although it is emotionally less appealing.

Another advantage to the military invasion strategy is said to be the elimination of the Iraqi nuclear and chemical facilities. The nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation problem is much larger than Iraq. To let that issue become the primary raison d'etre for our strategy not only could confuse our priority of objectives. It could set a precedent for dealing with the proliferation problem that we cannot match elsewhere. Iraq does not yet possess nuclear weapons. If it acquires them and brandishes them, we will have to deal with the problem at that time. It would seem to be a mistake to make a potential problem the focus of our strategy instead of the real problems that now exist.

This short analysis only touches the main factors in assessing the two strategic options, but the weight in favor of the first, holding our present defensive position in Saudi Arabia, seems to be quite large. Moreover, it does not rule out shifting to the invasion strategy at some future time. Shifting back to the first strategy is not an option if the invasion strategy proves not to our liking.

Military Operational Realities

The major outlines of the military realities are slowly becoming clear to the American public. The most important one is that sufficient forces to defend Saudi Arabia are now deployed there while adequate forces for an invasion are not. A wide range of opinion, professional and amateur, exists as to what is required for a successful offensive military action.

We have no military precedents against which to judge what is actually required to defeat the Iraqi forces. The Arab-Israeli wars will look small by comparison. Not only are Iraqi forces larger, possessing more modern equipment, but they have been battle tested in eight years of war with Iran. While they showed a limited capacity to conduct deep offensive operations in that war, they proved effective in the defense.

To appreciate the scale that an offensive would involve, it is useful to recall the Battle of Kursk in Russia in World War II. It was one of the largest tank battles of the war. The German Army had about 2,500 tanks. The Red Army had between 1,500 and 3,000, over 3,000 according to Soviet sources. In Kuwait and Iraq, the number of tanks is close to 5,000, including nearly 1,000 modern T-72s. If the US Army brings as many as 3,000 tanks to the campaign, most of them M1A1s, with 120mm guns, that should tilt the tank balance slightly to our favor. That is about nine division equivalents.

The ground space for a campaign in Kuwait and Iraq is equivalent to that of the Battle of Kursk. The weaponry, however, is vastly more lethal. Air forces and air defense means are much more powerful. US forces in World War II never faced a single campaign, except perhaps the Normandy landing, of such a scope. Such comparisons, to be sure, are flawed greatly in their details, but I offer this one merely to make the point that we could be surprised by the scale and intensity. I have no doubt that we could win it. The Iraqi army might break early. Victory might prove an easy. General Schwarzkopf, however, cannot make his plans on that prospect alone. He must assume that the Iraqi army will fight to its full capacity. The American public would never forgive him for doing otherwise. Thus we should prepare ourselves for a large, costly, and bloody campaign and consider an easy victory a bonus, if it comes.

A number of other operational realities confront our forces in preparing for an offensive campaign that strike me as poorly understood by many observers.

First, the air and sea lift required to put an invasion force in Saudi Arabia is enormous. Yet our lift capacity is embarrassingly small. Throughout August and September, the shortfall meant that our forces were vulnerable to an Iraqi offensive. We can only thank the Iraqis for giving us the time to build up. Our forces could have faced a Dunkirk as late as the end of September. While we were able to bring large naval and air power to the region fairly quickly, these forces did very little to affect the actual balance of military power. They were more symbolic than real, and the naval forces will continue to be limited to that role. The distances for carrier-based air to reach tactical targets are such that such air support is of marginal value for an offensive. Land-based air is not only cheaper by a large measure. It is more effective.

Second, our stocks of smart munitions, which promise the greatest effectiveness against Iraqi ground forces and installations, are small. Their high cost has prevented us from stocking them in large numbers. Munitions, therefore, worry me as a possible shortfall in our capacity to mount an offensive.

Third, our heavy forces, armor and mechanized divisions, were designed to fight on the logistics base in Europe. Deep operations of 150-300 miles of offensive action were not anticipated. Yet an offensive into Kuwait would require these distances in a much less developed topography, one without highways, communications networks, buildings for shelter against the weather, local water supplies, and perhaps even food. The division and corps support commands may find moving supplies forward rapidly a task that exceeds their capacity. Our new tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles will require vast tonnages of daily supplies. It seems doubtful to me that a sufficient buildup of the logistics base can be accomplished in a couple of months. Not only will the standard tonnages have to be increased, but the availability of supplies in the US and Europe may be short.

Combat expenditure rates with modern weaponry can only be vaguely estimated because those developed in previous wars have long been obsolete. If combat actions are heavy, the replacement rates for tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles could jump to surprising levels. Do we have stock piles of such weapons available? When can we get them to Saudi Arabia? In the same light, do we have adequate stocks of bombs for a long and intensive air support campaign? Some observers have advocated a long bombing campaign before initiating ground action. I would like to know if our bomb and air-launched munitions stocks are sufficient for such a campaign. If they are not, such an air offensive could leave the Army ground forces without adequate close air support when they take the offensive. Our assumed advantage in air power could prove illusory.

Little of the new weaponry has been combat tested. We should expect, therefore, some operational difficulties, especially from the desert environment. Such difficulties are to be expected in the best event, but prudence suggests that we hedge for fairly large ones in this case.

Replacement personnel for battle casualties are likely to be a problem. We have reduced our active forces so that the numbers of trained personnel in many specialties are quite low. Reserves for this campaign will be in short supply. The complexity of training means that creating replacements will take a long time. The cuts the Congress plans this year for the Army's end strength can only serve to exacerbate this problem.

Our reserve component personnel in specialties that have civil specialty counterparts, such as medics, mechanics, transport pilots, administrative personnel, and the like, are a great asset. In the combat arms, however, where physical fitness and skills with no civil counterpart are critical, reserve component units are of little value. In six months to a year of training, of course, they could be brought up to an adequate competency level. Only a few such units at a time can be trained because the National Training Center has a limited capacity. Thus we probably lack the training base for a rapid mobilization of reserve component combat units.

The competence of our Army leadership will be tested to the extreme in an offensive campaign. At the lower levels, platoon, company, and battalion, I have great confidence in them. The National Training Center has produced a generation of younger officers who have had to command and control forces in highly demanding circumstances. At division and corps levels, however, the same training has not been possible. Moving a division or corps a couple of hundred miles, fighting much of the way, requires experienced staffs and commanders. In this case, most of them will be learning as they go. We simply have not had the large exercises essential to prepare for that kind of operation, not even the Reforger Exercises in Germany each year. The problem for reserve component brigades and divisions would be infinitely greater. Most commanders and staffs would probably have to be replaced by active component officers.

The competence of our tactical air commanders will be equally tested. It is one thing to bomb target ranges. It is another thing to fly against hostile air defense and to try to fix and hold enemy armored formations in place so that they cannot be committed as reserves. Yet these are the kinds of operational missions they will have to accomplish. It has been my experience that inadequate attention has been devoted to this kind of air support for ground operations, and I know of no Air Force doctrine specifically designed for it.

I have intentionally given a gloomy picture of these problems. Only by anticipating the worst, by alarming ourselves about the potential problems, are we likely to take the kinds of actions necessary to fix them. They can be fixed, but the actions and costs to do so are great. They involve our military industrial production base. Munitions production comes to mind. So does the tank production line, which I believe is either closed or scheduled to close soon. That it has not already been pushed to full production capacity is strange in light of the talk about deploying forces for an offensive into Kuwait.

Finally, let me address an operational question that sometimes arises about building up an offensive capability. If we do that, must we use it? Many observers seem to believe that is the case. We must either use it or lose it after a few months. I am not so sure.

We could proceed on the present buildup course, eventually achieving stockage levels and force levels that are adequate. After a time, we could build installations in Saudi Arabia to hold the stocks and weapons in storage, much as we have done with POMCUS stocks in Europe. The troop strengths could be greatly reduced, leaving only a small manning structure in place. With intelligence warning, or if we decided to pursue the offensive strategy at a much later date, we could fly troops back to Saudi Arabia in a few days or weeks. In other words, we could create a capacity to regenerate our combat power rather quickly. That would allow us to extract ourselves from the problem of morale that comes from an indefinite stay for troops in the desert. We would have an offensive posture that could be maintained for a long time.

Thus I do not believe that the planned buildup means we must go to war in the three or four months just because we have deployed the forces and Iraq does accede to our terms. We should not, of course, clarify what we will do to Saddam Hussein. We should plan to keep open the offensive option over a long period of time so that he cannot be assured that he has survived it after a few months.

That is why I am not inclined to criticize the President for the planned buildup. We should back him on that account. This does not mean, however, that we should abstain from public analysis and debate about alternative strategies and options. That kind of discussion, it seems to me, not only helps the public understand the realities more clearly, but it also allows the President to gage more accurately the nature and degree of support he can expect for various courses of action.

The many problems and uncertainties I see for achieving an adequate offensive capability in Saudi Arabia are not necessarily a good reason for not achieving it. There are many good reasons for creating it. The issue for debate is how and when to use that capability, if at all.

Some Larger Implications for US Defense Policy

A major side consequence of this crisis in the Persian Gulf should be the reframing of our views on the kind of military forces we need for the post-Cold War era. Last spring the Congressional debate over force structure focused on the B-2, SDI, MX, Midgetman, naval forces, and base closings. Virtually none of the military problems we face today were given attention.

For example, I recall no serious debate over air lift and sea lift. The only debate about Army heavy forces and close air support was about how much to reduce them. They were to be the "bill payers" for the big procurement and R&D items, the issues at the center of debate.

Now, as we face the first post-Cold War military crisis, we find what we need most is fast sea lift, air lift, heavy Army forces, close air support, and stocks of munitions. We are much less concerned with penetrating Soviet air space and dealing with a threatening Soviet nuclear arsenal. While the Soviet naval capabilities have not declined, the prospects of having to destroy the Soviet Navy in the Barents Sea and the Northwest Pacific are much less.

At the same time, the prospects of having to deal with regional military stability in the Third World have remained high. And we must adjust to new kinds of political and military balances in the major theaters of Europe and East Asia. It should be noticed that much of the talk in the past about only needing light Army forces for the Third World has been off the mark. The weaponry in the Third World is often of the most modern and heavy kind, and it will grow heavier and more modern in the decade ahead.

It strikes me that the defense debate ought to be fundamentally reframed. It should put air lift, sea lift, heavy ground forces, and close air support at the top of the agenda. If there are to be "bill payers," some of the strategic and other big programs should take that role. Equally critical is a review of the kind of reserve component forces we should have. Our present structure was designed for the big war contingency in Europe and East Asia in which considerable mobilization time was expected. Neither the reserve components nor our manpower policies are appropriate for the new era. They need study and adjustments.

Let me end by suggesting a new force structure concept. In the post-Cold War period, we must do two things. First, we must retain the capability to regenerate forces for the Cold War conditions, at least for a few years. Second, and much more urgently, we should build the capability to move a heavy Army corps with accompanying close air support anywhere in the world in twenty days. And we should be able to reinforce it with a second heavy corps with another thirty days.

This second task requires no great R&D breakthroughs. Nor should its costs begin to approach some of the present strategic forces and naval programs. It is merely a matter of deciding to shift resources within the present defense budget levels. It means reviewing critically some "sacred cow" force structure and programs, and it means restraining interservice rivalry to include the reserve components.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my views before your committee.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General, for your, as usual, very stimulating testimony, and I appreciate your suggestions on the post-Cold War challenges we face. We have started the debate on where we go in the future, but it is a long, long way from concluding. I think your remarks here today will help lay the foundation for a lot of the debate that will take place on the defense budget next year.

I have a couple of questions. If we were to announce a modified rotation policy, as I understand it, along the lines you have outlined—that is, of going ahead and building up the force structure and the supplies and the combat support on the ground in Saudi Arabia but have a much reduced troop level there until such time as we actually decide to take our offensive action, whereby we could fly them back in—would that cause us to be perceived as having "withdrawn" or having given in to Saddam Hussein?

General ODOM. I do not believe it would if we kept those forces there and had the capability to fly them back in in a hurry.

Chairman NUNN. It would buy us some time. What you advocate is having an offensive option quickly available if we want it but also having the continued option of letting the embargo work?

General ODOM. I think that would worry Saddam Hussein much more. If we look at it as a use-it-or-lose-it short-term affair if he lasts through next spring and we do not use it, then he has scored a victory. If we can regenerate it, then it strikes me that he has the pressure of an offensive option facing him for the indefinite future.

Chairman NUNN. General, Vice President Quayle made a speech yesterday, and he made a number of thoughtful comments. He offered, though, a number of statements that seemed to be based on facts that have not been produced here in our hearings, and they may be known to him but not to us.

One thing he strongly insinuated was that time works against us, and he also posed the question, quoting him, "Does patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow?"

How would you answer that question?

General ODOM. Well, if one assumes that the sanctions be broken by a large number of countries in the world and that military supplies in considerable quantities will reach Iraq, I think that argument might be compelling. But as time passes with little or no military resupply on the Iraqi side and the other sanctions undercutting economic construction in Iraq continues, it seems to me that Iraqi military power slowly degrades.

At the present time, therefore, with the present set of sanctions, it seems to me the balance, the military balance, is moving against Iraq.

Chairman NUNN. That complies with almost everything we have heard in these hearings, that the Iraqi military is bound to erode——

General ODOM. I would say, sir, that the Vice President's argument would have, it seems to me, cogency if we cannot maintain a fairly broad consensus among major industrial countries in the world about supplying Iraq.

Chairman NUNN. In other words, if that basic premise that Iraq is getting stronger and that we are going to increase American casalties is correct, it also assumes that the embargo is going to not be successful and, in fact, will begin to erode?

General ODOM. That is right.

I would also think about——

Chairman NUNN. Do you see any evidence that the embargo is eroding today?

General ODOM. I have not. In fact, I have been impressed by the degree to which it has been adhered to by most all countries in the world, and I mentioned that in my testimony. I think it is much tighter than the fairly effective embargo against Iran.

I would also say that the Vice President's arguments seem to me to support the wisdom of generating the offensive option. If, next summer, we find that the sanctions are not sustainable and that Iraq is able to replenish its military supplies, then we might want to design a different strategy.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask one other question.

The Vice President also posed this question, which is certainly a legitimate question which we will be addressing later on today and have already done so in closed session. Will continued patience with Iraq help make the world more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein?

How would you answer that?

General ODOM. Well, that is a troublesome question, and I am unsure anyone has an unambiguous and indisputable answer to it. I can only express my own views in thinking about it.

The nuclear proliferation problem is broader than Iraq. We are going to face it in many parts of the world. I am unsure that direct military action to destroy nuclear capabilities in all countries in the world which acquire them in the future is a feasible policy.

We have deterred very large nuclear forces in the case of the Soviet Union and in China for a time. I think that is a problem we are just going to have to deal with, and I do not think we would eliminate it even if we could skillfully and surgically take out the capability today. In other words, were we to do it in Iraq I do not think that is a panacea for the proliferation problem in the future.

Now as I said in my testimony, I think it confuses things and runs the risk of causing us to mix our priorities if we focus on the proliferation problem to the exclusion of, or pushing into a secondary position, our concern with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the defense of the Saudi and small littoral States on the Persian Gulf.

Chairman NUNN. Is not the best policy on concern about Iraqi proliferation the embargo we have under way now with the cooperation, if it continues, of the Soviet Union, France, China, and other nuclear powers?

General ODOM. It certainly is going to postpone the date at which Iraq could have any significant nuclear capability.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. General Odom, yesterday Senator Kennedy made the suggestion that perhaps Congress should pass a resolution delaying any commitment to offensive force at least until August 1 and possibly including an extension beyond then should there be negotiations under way or should the climate for military action prove to be inhospitable, I would assume.

I take it from your testimony that those who would support this position of waiting until that time should renounce the so-called peace dividend that many had been expecting and dedicate much of those resources that were going to be saved to actually doing the kinds of things that you indicate we have not done over the past decade or two. For example, we would have to dedicate those resources to more sealift, to more airlift, to more end strength, to more tank production lines, to munitions production lines, to large-scale exercises, to perhaps flying against hostile air defenses, to experience in moving a division or corps a couple hundred miles, fighting much of the way in order to give our commanders the kind of requisite experience.

Is that a correct conclusion that I draw from your statement that, given the current circumstances, we are not prepared to wage an effective or successful military operation because of deficiencies that you have outlined in your statement? And if we are to obtain a credible offensive capability sometime in the future, then it seems to follow logically from your statement that we have to dedicate the resources that otherwise would have been saved to building up those forces. Am I correct in that?

General ODOM. Senator, I said that I was giving a gloomy picture, and I was giving you sort of the worst case analysis. All those points that you listed, I agree, are problems, and we could, I think——

Senator COHEN. I did not list those. I am just quoting.

General ODOM. I did.

Senator COHEN. You did, right.

General ODOM. I listed them. They are things that I think we need to put enormous emphasis on.

The resources are in the budget now. The question is whether you want to move them from other programs to these programs.

Senator COHEN. No, my question is this: assuming that you are correct that we have these deficiencies, and assuming there is a sentiment expressed, if not in this committee, in the Congress, that we wait and defer a decision until sometime next summer, next fall, perhaps even in 1992, is it your statement that we should take the resources that are necessary to do all the things you have indicated that we are currently deficient in?

General ODOM. Yes.

Senator COHEN. So if there were to be a resolution deferring military action, you would then say that we have to include in that particular resolution a commitment to higher defense expenditures in order to have a credible military deterrent or capability sometime next August or next fall or next year?

General ODOM. Higher in these categories. I am not sure that you would necessarily have to increase the overall defense budget.

Senator COHEN. In other words, then, we have had a misallocation of our resources?

General ODOM. No. We have had a change of threats.

Senator COHEN. Is it a higher threat now than against the Soviet Union?

General ODOM. It is a different kind of threat. ICBM's do not do much for us in the case of Iraq.

Senator COHEN. What you are saying is that we can now achieve these goals that you have laid out with the current budget that we have?

General ODOM. I think you could, but you would have to cut a lot of other forces.

Senator COHEN. Well, I would assume the B-2 bomber and the ICBM force——

General ODOM. Carriers.

Senator COHEN [continuing]. The carriers, submarines.

General ODOM. Exactly. I would not cut submarines.

Senator KENNEDY. Frigates.

Senator COHEN. Frigates. They have been cut, Ted. We do not build those anymore.

General ODOM. Reserve components should be reduced considerably by this approach.

Senator COHEN. The question was raised by Senator Nunn as to whether or not there is any evidence of Iraq moving to a nuclear capability in the near future. Indeed, there is a lot of conflicting testimony on that.

But I would ask you in your capacity as a former Director of NSA, at the time that Saudi Arabia deployed an IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile, did we have advance knowledge that they were about to achieve that capability by acquiring that missile technology from China during your tenure in that office?

General ODOM. I vaguely remember having to look into that issue, and I think the evidence was ambiguous. I think we had some evidence and an interpretation of it could——

Senator COHEN. Did we anticipate the Iraqis being able to enhance the SCUD missile that was transferred by the Soviet Union in terms of having advance knowledge about their ability to extend its range? Did that not come as something of a surprise to the intelligence community at the time it was discovered how, indeed, ingenious they were in being able to extend the range of that SCUD beyond what we understood to be their current capacity?

General ODOM. The intelligence community answers the questions that it is asked. I do not think anyone asked them that, and I do not think that would have been a difficult question to answer from intelligence had it been asked.

Senator COHEN. What about the Iraqi capability to launch a satellite?

We know, for example, that they failed to achieve a launching of a satellite in orbit, but they surprised many, including most, I would suggest, within the intelligence community that they were able to achieve what they did. They came close to putting a payload in orbit. Now that came as a surprise.

I only raise these because we have been surprised time after time. We were surprised to find Libya with its construction of the chemical weapons plant in the stage of almost 80 or 90 percent completion. We are told by recent stories at least it may have completed its chemical weapons production. So I think that we have to at least take that into consideration as we receive conflicting information.

I would like to ask the question, if I could, about the Soviet Union and what is taking place there; two questions, actually. You are an expert in the field, a Sovietologist I would submit. You are a real student of what takes place there. You indicated that if the United States were to use force we might lose the support of our allies and the Soviet Union which has been ambiguous at best.

Number one, would you say that that is true, particularly in view of what took place yesterday in the United Nations? Then after you answer that, one final question.

You indicated that perhaps there is a positive benefit coming out of all of this. We are seeing the moderate Arab States being given perhaps a redistribution of wealth in the region. In other words, Saudi Arabia is now assuming the position of a new paymaster. As a result of higher prices for oil, they are in a position to take that windfall benefit, as such, hurricane profit as I have called it, and distribute that to some of the countries who have been supporting them. So they have now become the paymaster for all of the modern Arab States.

Would you weigh that also against the alleged crisis in the Eastern European countries who are trying to develop and move toward democracy as to whether they are being crippled by the same higher oil prices and whether we can expect Saudi Arabia to pay them as well?

General ODOM. First, on the support of the Soviet Union, although I did not read it and it is in my testimony, I think their behavior has been a very pleasant surprise, a very positive——

Senator COHEN. You said that if we should go on the attack they might very well change that position.

General ODOM. I said that our coalition might change its mind. There are members of the coalition who might change their mind sometime down the course.

Senator COHEN. After the U.N. resolution, do you think that might be a likelihood?

General ODOM. I think the outlook of solidarity is better now than it was before, but States have a way of exercising their sovereignty in surprising fashions. I would expect them to maintain that solidarity for the present position more firmly than in the case of all the uncertainties and spinoffs that might occur if we invaded Kuwait and Iraq.

I just do not see how an invasion would not put a little more stress on the coalition than the present situation. That does not mean we may not want to do it. I do not rule that out. I just said that you have to take that into account. I am not adducing that as the determining factor in not pursuing an offensive strategy right now.

On the business of the redistribution of Saudi money—notice I said redistribution. The Saudis have long been distributing it. They distribute it to a lot of people, including the radical Arabs, in fairly large quantities. I think the prospects for new ways of burdensharing—perhaps even to include the one you suggested, looking toward some sort of program for economic support in Eastern Europe—should not be ruled out. I think we are in quite a different climate now, and this could be a paradigm for some of the post-Cold War strategy.

Senator COHEN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General, welcome. We are delighted you are here this morning. I have listened with a great deal of interest to your testimony. I think you have summed up what is in this Senator's mind. I quote from your statement. "I have been and remain supportive of President Bush's strategy so far as I understand it. The recently announced buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia seems, however, to have introduced some confusion about both the purpose and the strategy."

That, with the rest of your comments, very adequately reflects the concerns that this Senator has as we move forward in this crisis.

Let me first see if I can get your views on the action taken by the United Nations yesterday. The action taken by the United Nations seems to me to fall far short of the goals that the administration has been recently implying or stating. It is far short of authorizing the type of action that the Vice President outlined in his speech yesterday, and I may refer to some of the specifics of that a little bit later.

Resolution 660, which was adopted earlier by the United Nations and reaffirmed by the vote yesterday with the addition that it authorized the use of force after January 15, 1991, one, condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; two, it demands that Iraq withdraw its forces immediately; and three, it calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations immediately for a resolution of their differences.

It seems to me that Resolution 660 is somewhat of a much more limited statement by the United Nations than what has been stated by the administration as the reasons which might necessitate the use of offensive military force by the United States. Administration rhetoric goes far beyond what the United Nations seemingly authorized.

Do you agree with that?

General ODOM. I am not an expert in international law in this regard. My reading of the media reporting suggests that this resolution is on the level with the one of 1950, the U.N. resolution which allowed the United States to head a U.N. force in Korea. It certainly seems to provide latitude for military action which was not there before. So whether it puts a limit on those reactions after January 15 is an open question in my mind. I had not really thought about it that way.

It seems to me that, if anything, it has widened the latitude in the direction and use of military force. It looks to me, therefore, as though the U.N. has given the President fairly strong backing in that regard.

Senator **Exon**. Fairly strong backing in regard to what?

General **Odom**. In the sense that if he chooses to use the military option after January 15, I think he would be able to claim that the U.N. had authorized it.

Senator **Exon**. Do you think the U.N. action of yesterday authorizes only the use of force to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait, or would it authorize, in your opinion, the attacking of Iraq itself?

General **Odom**. I have to confess I really do not know the answer to that because I have not examined the text. It is difficult for me to imagine that the use of force in this case would rule out all military action inside the territory of Iraq. I do not think anyone can say in advance that military offensive could be successful without that.

I would assume it included Iraq, but you may have a point about the wording of which I am unaware.

Senator **Exon**. Back to the issue of troop reductions that was asked about by Chairman Nunn. We have had overwhelming testimony during this week that indicates that we are moving too rapidly, that we should pause and reflect upon what you have outlined very well in your testimony this morning—give the sanctions a chance to work. We have had overwhelming testimony that indicates that the sanctions are indeed working and, therefore, we should not be too rash in moving to combat action at this juncture.

That leads us to the proposition of the further increase in troop strength deployed in Saudi Arabia. We have heard testimony that many thought that the increase was not only unnecessary but unwise given the circumstances. You have referred to the proposition that some feel it is a use-it-or-lose-it proposition. I think that is a concern to all of us.

Whether it is right or wrong, the President has made that determination. The President has committed additional troops into the area. I guess I have some reservation about any direct statement that we say no, Mr. President, you cannot do that, you have to reduce these back to the 230,000 as they were before the November 8 decision to augment the forces.

Do you agree, I guess, with what I think that Chairman Nunn was trying to get at, that we could finesse that and not give Saddam Hussein any feeling that we were not sincere in our determination if we began a rotation plan with all of those troops, the original 230,000 and the 200,000 on top of that, a rotation plan that would send a clear signal, in my opinion, that we have the resolve and the staying power necessary to achieve the objectives outlined in United Nations Resolution 660?

General **Odom**. Let me address your question in two fashions. First, as you saw in my testimony, I am inclined to support the President's choice to create the offensive capability, it seems to me, to up the ante for Saddam Hussein and to make the prospects of an earlier rather than a later concession on his part better.

He has chosen to do that, and a number of critics have said that this puts us on the brink of war and has essentially made the decision to go to war. Maybe that is the way the President looks at it. I do not know. I am simply suggesting that it does not have to be that way, that he can go ahead with this buildup, and then there is a way to develop a rotation plan and to bring the force level down.

I could imagine bringing the forces down to 50,000 or 75,000 out there for the longer period. I do not see even maintaining the present force level we have if we decide we are going to stay in it for the long term. It strikes me that even if you did not generate the offensive capabilities, we will be in it for the long term, and we are going to have to develop a rotation strategy of some sort.

Eventually, I imagine we will draw the forces down. That will take a while. It will take a while to build facilities and to make the arrangements with the Saudis and to develop financing arrangements for this. It would seem to me that the States in the region who are receiving this military protection should and probably would be willing to do a great deal to defray the costs of building that kind of posture.

Senator EXON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

I believe Senator Wallop is next.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you have, I think, a good deal more faith in sanctions than do I. Let me state that you don't, as others have not, defined what constitutes "working." It gives the impression that there is an easy way out of all of this.

Some have told us that they cannot ultimately achieve goals of any consequence. And, as you say, there are no goals.

How should we measure success? Against what set of circumstances do we determine sanctions working or not working?

General ODOM. I don't think I presented a picture of an easy way out. I don't see it as an easy way out. I see a choice of a couple of alternatives.

If the Iraqi armed forces are becoming stronger a year from now, then I would cite that as evidence of the failure of the sanctions. In the case of Iran, where there was a leakier embargo, those forces became weaker.

Senator WALLOP. But what do we want Iraq to do when we say "sanctions are working?"

General ODOM. Well, we eventually want them to get out of Kuwait.

Senator WALLOP. And do you believe sanctions would do that?

General ODOM. They might.

Senator WALLOP. And if they don't?

General ODOM. A couple——

Senator WALLOP. It seems to me that there is an obligation for the Nation to have clear goals for its presence over there or we can't sustain it with or without sanctions. It seems to me that those who advocate waiting until we see if they work have the obligation to determine that set of circumstances by which we can measure success or failure.

General ODOM. Senator, I am merely responding to what I perceive to be the President's initial statement of his objectives. Militarily, he committed us to the defense of Saudi Arabia. He said that the invasion was unacceptable. His initial instrumentality for punishing Iraq for that invasion was the sanctions.

If he changes the goals and the means, or he changes the means for the goals, certainly that's an option. But if you're asking whether or not Iraq is suffering as a result of the sanctions, I think you'd have to say yes. And, as I said in my testimony, they may not be suffering as much as we would like. And if that proves a trivial impact on them, then I think an offensive option might well be considered.

I said in my testimony that if you go with the offensive strategy now, then you can't get back to the sanctions option.

Senator WALLOP. That I understand.

But I still maintain that those who advocate that we wait until we see sanctions working have the obligation to say what it is that constitutes working. The President has stated that they have to leave Kuwait. I don't believe they will.

General ODOM. Let me state what I——

Senator WALLOP. And to reestablish stability in this region.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, could we hear the witness' response.

Senator WALLOP. Well, perhaps I could finish my question, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, he was trying——

Senator WALLOP. Would you like to take over my line of questioning, Senator Kennedy?

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wallop, you are recognized. Why don't you proceed.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you.

It seems to me that by waiting till sanctions work, people must give us the measurement against which success is measured. To date, those witnesses have not done that.

General ODOM. Let me answer.

I think what you are forcing me to recognize is this and it is just a private view. The long-term and even the short-term objective for us in the region should be the maintenance of the balance of power there. That is more important than freeing Kuwait. Therefore, if pressed over a long period of time, I might decide that I didn't want to pay the price of an offensive to free Kuwait, particularly, as I said in my testimony, if I thought that that offensive action would disturb that balance even more.

It was my experience back when I was working on the National Security Council staff with regard to the Persian Gulf, as I became more familiar with the region, I began to understand that every subpart of that region has a quarrel as intractable and as old as the Arab-Israeli quarrel.

There are no panaceas to the region. There are only band-aids. There are only temporary solutions. Therefore, attempting to develop our policy in the context of lofty principles, such as punishing invaders, while I think we should make that applicable to the degree that we can, from a more pragmatic view, we will have to come to terms with maintaining the balance of the many disparate forces out there.

It strikes me that holding the balance we now have is worth continuing for a while, until we have a better understanding of what the other ramifications might be.

I might well change my view about this 3 to 6 months from now.

I also want to say that I don't think the President has made it unambiguously clear that he wants to invade January 15.

Senator **Wallop**. Oh, I think that's true. I think that needs to be restated.

You said in your response to a question, I think from perhaps Senator Cohen, about nuclear weapons, that if Iraq acquires them and brandishes them, we will have to deal with that problem at that time.

You have also said that there is no panacea to the problem of nuclear proliferation.

I would guess that that is a true statement. But could it not be viewed as a panacea for the problem of nuclear proliferation in Iraq, were we to use that as one of the purposes for our presence?

General **Odom**. I'm not sure I——

Senator **Wallop**. In other words, the region has to have some stability?

General **Odom**. Well, our presence there it seems to me is a deterrence if the Iraqis had nuclear weapons. If we are there, we clearly can match their nuclear forces.

I would not rule out considering a preemptive action against those at that time. It would seem to me that the leverage that Saddam Hussein could hope to achieve with brandishing those weapons while U.S. forces are in the region are very small. The leverage he might expect to achieve when we are not there could be considerably greater.

I think we'll have to think about that in that context at that time.

Senator **Wallop**. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Wallop. Senator Kennedy.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join in saying, General, how informative and helpful your testimony has been.

During the course of our deliberations, we have heard from those who have talked about the potential of an air war, that this is really a classic situation for enormous success, and that it might offer some very important opportunities of even being the ultimate success in driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait and also the Iraqis into submission.

I know you have referenced that briefly in your testimony. Could you give us your own military assessment as to what you would consider to be the possibilities of air war success?

General **Odom**. I don't think an air campaign can drive the Iraqi armed forces out of Kuwait. I think an air campaign can insure that we are at war without achieving the destruction of all of the Iraqi armed forces. And, as I said in my testimony, I think that gets all the disadvantages of war without the advantages of a military success.

It might be that this will be the historical exception, where air war causes a country to capitulate. But it might not be.

I think the record suggests more strongly that it would not be.

Therefore, I would not want to stake the strategic implications that are involved in the U.S. military actions in that region on an air war alone. It seems to me that the behavior of the Joint Chiefs, as I can infer it from the kinds of forces that they have sent out there, is such that they share my view on that. Otherwise, I don't think they would have those large ground forces moving out there.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think it is inevitable that if there were some air war initiatives, that it would be inevitable that there would be land combat involvement as a military officer?

General ODOM. Well, there wouldn't have to be. We could bomb and the Iraqis not capitulate. And we could decide that, well, we won't do any more. I think that would look bad for us militarily.

At the same time, we would be, in the eyes of the Arab world, killing Arabs, and we would essentially be at war. We are not doing that now.

Senator KENNEDY. But in terms of driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait from a military point of view, do you think it is possible to bomb them out of Kuwait?

General ODOM. I think the prospects are very low. No one can know for certain, but I certainly would not count on it.

Let me reemphasize that it seems to me that is the view the Joint Chiefs have in light of the forces we have sent out there. And when one considers what the ramifications are of military actions which don't get the results we want, I would not be inclined to gamble on an Arab campaign. If we're going to go to war, I would want to gamble on a campaign that I knew could destroy the Iraqi armed forces.

Senator KENNEDY. There are those who believe that unless we move toward conflict, that we will be undermining the moderate Arab leadership. You take a position on pages 7 and 8 that is a contrary position.

Would you elaborate on that, please?

General ODOM. Well, I think the shock that the Saudis and the Kuwaitis had when they offered Saddam Hussein to rescind his $80 billion of debt and to advance him several billions of new dollars, when he turned that down and invaded Kuwait, I think that sent a shock through the Arab world which has, to some extent, transformed permanently the politics of the Arab world.

As I mentioned in my statement, I think that is the basis on which a number of Saudis and others have said that Pan Arabism is dead. Therefore, I think that the notion that individual Arab states can't have alliances, even military alliances, with non-Arab states is a viewpoint that has lost a lot of ground in the Arab world.

It strikes me that, as time goes on and if things are reasonably stable with our forces in Saudi Arabia, that moderate Arabs will decide that this is not the end of the world for them and that it does not necessarily mean that there will be a great social upheaval throughout the Arab world. And, therefore, we probably can stay there.

It may have some positive effects. It may also have some negative effects, as I mentioned in my statement. But those are just the uncertainties that go with maintaining a balance of power in this terribly vital region.

Senator **Kennedy**. In "Commentary," in August, you talked in some considerable detail about the assets and the future assets that the United States might commit.

Could you give us your own assessment about the nature of the casualties? We saw in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war about 1,000 casualties a week. What can you tell us about the numbers, in terms of numbers? Also, what percentage of those would be American?

General **Odom**. My judgment on that is probably not a lot better than any amateur's on it. Everyone can speculate about it. If the Iraqi armed forces fight, if they use their artillery well, they can cost us considerable casualties in penetrating the initial defenses in the southern part of Kuwait.

Once we have broken through and have heavy armored forces in the rear, the Iraqi forces, their armored forces, will have to come out and fight or sit and be overrun. Then I think the advantage would shift enormously to our side and the casualties should be much less.

I can imagine a range of 3,000 or 4,000 casualties, up to 10,000 casualties. But those are figures I pluck out of the air.

I think the range of uncertainty is enormous. The Iraqi army might collapse.

As time goes on, I hear newspaper reports that there are a considerable number of defectors coming across. I don't know what the morale of those forces is. They may break. It may turn out to be a very easy thing to do.

On the other hand, if they decide to stubbornly hold defensive positions, that could cost us a considerable number of casualties.

Senator **Kennedy**. My time is up.

Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator McCain.

Senator **McCain**. You painted in your description a "gloomy picture" of our military capabilities. I would like to get into that in a minute.

As you were just mentioning, I think there are two sides to this equation whenever you are talking about the possibility of a conflict. I would ask you, isn't it true that Iraq never had to fight a major armored battle in 8 years of the Iran-Iraq War; that it never fought an enemy with effective offensive air power; that it never really had to fight air-to-air or surface-to-air combat; that it never fought an enemy that could make effective use of combined arms; that it never fought an enemy with meaningful reconnaissance capability; that Iraq never actually fought in true desert areas, as distinguished from desolate areas near its rivers; and, even in early 1988, that it was constantly surprised tactically, particularly at night, by the Iranians; that in 1987 and early 1988, Iranian infantry advancing on foot still penetrated through the gaps in Iraq's defensive barriers?

I guess my first question to you is isn't it true that this numbers-wise and equipment-wise enemy that we face is not "battle tested" in the same fashion that they would be in the event of conflict with the forces that we have in the area at this point?

General **Odom**. Many of the things you say are true. I would correct a couple of them, though. There were fairly large, mobile armored engagements in the first 6 months of the war, two or three divisions at a time; and there were also large armored forces on the Iranian side.

The exhaustion of the armored forces on the Iranian side caused some of those engagements to drop off.

The Iraqis did, indeed, prove not very competent in mobile armored operations.

Senator McCain. General, with respect, if I could interrupt. I never stated that. I said that they never fought an enemy that could make effective use of combined arms. I did not say that they did not fight. Clearly, I understand that there were some large land engagements early in that war.

General Odom. To the second point, the thing that impressed me in watching the Iraqis throughout the war was that they were skillful in their use of their reserves. Numerous times it looked as though they were going to break. And someone in that command and control system understood how to plug the holes with reserves fairly adequately.

One merely has to look at their deployments, the changes that they made in their deployments in, I think it was in September, when they deepened their defense by moving the armor back, much of it, into Iraq. That shows that same clear thinking on how to have reserves to make it tougher for you.

Indeed, a war might go very easily for us and their forces may break. Many of the things you've said are true. The question I would have is whether, given the implications strategically for such an action, not just in that region but in the rest of the world, would it be prudent for a U.S. commander to calculate or to bet on the Iraqi forces behaving in the way you suggested?

My reaction would be to say no, I'll take that as a bonus if I can get it. But I want to be sure that, if I go to war, I know what the consequences, what the outcome is going to be.

Senator McCain. I agree, General. But if you magnify the capabilities of potential adversaries in war to the degree you become restrained, to the fact that you can't or would be unwilling to engage, particularly if the profound lack of capability which you describe exists on our side—by the way, my "brains" tell me that the largest armored engagement was one Iranian brigade, called one division, and there was never a three division engagement in the Iran-Iraq War.

But I guess we can settle that at a different time.

More importantly, if we are this bad off now as your self-described "gloomy assessment" is, General, where will we be after the 9.7 percent cut in real defense spending in 1991 takes effect and by fiscal year 1995, when real defense spending is 16 percent lower? I strongly challenge your thesis that somehow a reallocation of existing resources can remedy the very serious shortcomings that you point out in your statement.

General Odom. Let me answer two questions that you have raised for me.

I said I gave a gloomy assessment, not because I wanted to undercut our resolve to have an offensive capability.

Senator McCain. I did not say that.

General Odom. I said in my testimony I think we can win. I would like to have that offensive capability and I would like to see us fix some of these problems so that it clearly looks to Saddam Hussein as if we will use it. And in certain circumstances in the future, I might be enthusiastic for using it.

So I certainly don't want to go on record here as saying we can't defeat the Iraqis. We certainly can. I said that at least two or three times in the testimony.

I just pointed out some of the difficulties one has in creating a force there that can easily roll over the Iraqi Army.

Now, precisely how much money it will take to do some of the things I am talking about I am really not sure. You may be right that the forecast in budget cuts will make it impossible to do it within the present levels. I have not looked at that in any kind of detail. Therefore, I cannot speak with authority on that.

But in regard to the kinds of force structure that I have suggested here, fast sealift is not nearly as expensive as most other kinds of sealift. And airlift is certainly something that we could afford. I think airlift aircraft are not as expensive as other kinds of combat aircraft.

I merely said that we need not cut the heavy forces.

Right now, it is my impression that, after this build-up, we will have only four active brigades in the continental United States.

Do you really want to find yourself left with four active component brigades as the sole force in the continental United States after you have put all of those weapons in Saudi Arabia?

Those are issues it seems to me you have to address. It may cost more. I'm not really certain.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. My time is up, but may I just follow up, Mr. Chairman?

The reason why I raise it, General, is because you, in the last page of your statement, say it's merely a matter of deciding to shift resources within the present defense budget levels.

So I thought you were speaking from some knowledge of what the costs would be, I think.

General ODOM. If you cut some other parts of the force structure, you could.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Odom, let me ask again about one of the statements that Vice President Quayle made yesterday.

As I read his comments, he talked about how exercising patience and restraint carries with it certain moral costs. He identified three of those moral costs. Two of those you have talked about or referred to both in your prepared statement and in response to Senator Nunn's questions.

You responded to the question of whether there would be a risk of greater American casualties in the future if we postponed military action. Also there was the question about nuclear blackmail and whether that was a risk that became much greater in the future.

The one other so-called moral cost that Vice President Quayle referred to is what he considered or what he referred to as the "fate of the people of Kuwait." "With every day that passes, their plight grows more desperate."

That's what he said in his statement.

He cited that as a reason not to continue with our position of restraint, as I understand his statement.

In your view, what are the circumstances with regard to the fate of the people of Kuwait? If we were to proceed with a military action now, is it conceivable that the injuries, the casualties to the civilian population would be less than if we were to go ahead with the action you are recommending?

General **Odom**. You know, I don't know a clear and unambiguous answer to that.

I understand the spirit of the Vice President's comments. I wrote my testimony before I heard them. But I think I anticipated it to some degree in here when I talked about the moral factor and the concern for the injustices that have been done by Iraq in this case. I counterposed to that the limits of our power.

I don't think that one can take moral responsibility for what one does not have the power to do anything about.

While we might have the power to do something about Kuwait right now, the question is Kuwait and other parts of the world and other actions that follow after that. The choices are difficult to make, and they are very complex and broad here.

I certainly would give moral weight to the Vice President's assertion. But, from my own personal viewpoint, in looking at it right now, I am inclined to say that I would like to use less power so that I have more available to deal with the wide range of uncertainties, not only in that region, but elsewhere.

Reasonable men can disagree over that and I think we will all end up having our differences over which is morally the best course of action. I don't see that is one that we are going to resolve unambiguously one way or another.

I think there is a great deal of right on both sides in this case.

Senator **Bingaman**. I guess what prompted my question is your statement and answer to Senator Kennedy that you felt that to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait would most likely require a land war in addition to an air war.

It seems to me that in pursuing a military action with that as a likely part of it, you would have to contemplate substantial civilian casualties in Kuwait. Is that not accurate?

How do you see that?

General **Odom**. I think most of the combat actions would not be in populated areas. It is my impression—I don't know that much about where the population is located in Kuwait but it is my impression—that it is largely in Kuwait City. It also strikes me that a large number of casualties have already been caused to the Kuwaiti population. They have probably learned to dodge Iraqi military capabilities.

I don't think that can afford to be a big factor in this decision. Certainly civilians are likely to be killed, particularly if the defense of Kuwait City becomes a long siege.

Senator **Bingaman**. You also, on page 8, I believe, of your testimony, refer to the situation you see after we could succeed.

You set out, as I understand your testimony, that our goal would have to be destruction of the Iraqi armed forces. Then you say that if we are successful in that goal, if we had any less as a goal, we would continue to have the threat to Saudi Arabia, which we are there to eliminate.

Then you say if we succeed in that goal, we might find ourselves defending Iraqi territory against Syrian and Iranian territorial and political ambitions.

It strikes me as an awkward choice that you lay out for us here. If, in fact, we prevail in our stated objective and drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait and, in doing so, destroy their military, we may, in your view, have the responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of Iraq against some of the people that our President has been meeting with to obtain their support to get this multinational force put together.

Maybe you could elaborate on this a little bit. It seems to me like an awkward circumstance.

General **ODOM**. That's why I favor the first option, to keep a balance of power there, rather than to put such a high priority on a rapid and extraordinary punishment of Saddam Hussein.

As I said, I think in answer to an earlier question, I think to Senator Wallop, it strikes me that a maintenance of the balance of power in this terribly complex region is a much higher priority goal than the destruction of the Iraqi armed forces.

Now, if at some point we decide that destruction of Iraqi armed forces are imperative to the maintenance of that balance, that they have become so much of a problem that we can't maintain it otherwise, then we will have to do it, and it will carry with it some of the uncertainties that you have listed here from my testimony.

Senator **BINGAMAN**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My time is up.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **THURMOND**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be placed in the record.

Chairman **NUNN**. Without objection, it will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Welcome, General Odom, and thank you for taking the time to share with us your views on the Persian Gulf crisis and our Nation's response.

During the past several days this committee has heard from a distinguished group of witnesses and had a great deal of discussion on this critical issue. I believe the hearings have been useful in understanding the issues involved. They have also identified possible consequences of the actions this Nation may have to take in the future to restore the independence of Kuwait.

General Odom, although I have some questions about your statements I want to compliment you for the following lines: "Both our adversaries and our allies should understand that public debate about our strategy shows no lack of solidarity, but rather serves to strengthen it through a sounder understanding of our purpose and our means."

Mr. Chairman, I hope that those who are foolish enough to believe that these debates show our disunity will take heed of General Odom's words.

Senator **THURMOND**. General Odom, I want to welcome you here. I am glad to see you again.

General Odom, I am always amazed that some retired military officers present the most pessimistic views of our military capabilities. I see it in their editorials in the press and in statements such as yours.

Can you explain why, when testifying in uniform, our officers are always optimistic about our capabilities; yet, when retired, some of them take the opposite view?

General ODOM. I think it has to do with the fact that you control the money, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator THURMOND. Is that your answer?

General ODOM. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator THURMOND. General Odom, assuming that United Nations sanctions are successful and Saddam Hussein withdraws his forces from Kuwait, can we allow him to retain his chemical weapons, nuclear facilities, and significant military forces?

General ODOM. If he threatens someone with them, I think we might want to consider taking action against him. I think it is a more complex issue to choose to decide to take nuclear and chemical weapons away from all countries of the world with which we do not have good relations.

Senator THURMOND. General Odom, Dr. Kissinger testified that, and I quote: "Our objective should not be to destroy Iraq, but, rather, to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to an unacceptable level by reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors."

Is this a realistic objective and can it be accomplished by the selective use of air power?

General ODOM. Well, air power could certainly reduce his military capabilities, as I have said in my testimony. Given the Soviet cooperation in not supplying weapons and spare parts to the Iraqi armed forces and given the willingness of other countries to support that embargo, we are causing a decline in Iraqi military capability through the sanctions.

It won't work as fast as bombing. But, as long as the sanctions hold, it strikes me that it does have a deleterious impact on their military capability.

It's a question of the choice of means and your sense of urgency. If you have a strong sense of urgency about doing it now, then clearly one would want to go to bombing and maybe even to an invasion. If one thinks that the sanctions will work and you are willing to commit more time to it, then I think there is yet that option.

Senator THURMOND. General Odom, what message would we send to another ruler like Saddam if we now did not follow through and force Iraq out of Kuwait, either through the use of sanctions or force?

General ODOM. As I said in my testimony, sir, I think the leaders make the decision to go to war less on the historical precedents of what happened to other people who went to war and more on the opportunities at hand. And, insofar as it concerns other countries in that region or other countries in other regions, they will make their decisions on whether we have the military power to counter them in those areas. That is the reason I mentioned in the end, I think in a post-Cold War force structure, the ability to move forces to a number of these regions and to create unattractive conditions for people who want to go to war. That becomes the real critical factor for maintaining peace, much more critical than setting an example.

I don't want to dismiss the example as having no impact whatsoever. But I would like to reinforce it with real U.S. capabilities to give future leaders who want to go to war what Stalin used to call the dilemma of one alternative.

Senator THURMOND. General Odom, on page 15 of your prepared statement, you imply that our senior commanders and staff are not technically competent of fighting the battle in the Middle East. You state, and I quote: "Most of them will be learning as they go."

Are these not the same officers who would have fought the battles in Europe or the rest of the world? Why, all of a sudden, are they not capable of leading our units in this crisis?

General ODOM. I think they are quite capable of leading our units in this crisis. I merely said that, compared to the training that the platoon leaders, the company commanders, and the battalion commanders have had, the higher level commanders have not had the same kind of training circumstances.

I think they will do very well. I was merely making a judgment about the training conditions that they have been allowed, as opposed to their junior officers.

The conditions for training in Europe are somewhat different from the conditions in Iraq. We have not focused the training program primarily on this kind of warfare down there. It just turns out that we have not had the opportunity for a corps commander to run an exercise with all of his forces in the field 200 miles in depth. That is not to disparage the capability and competence of our officers. It is just to say that they have not had that particular opportunity.

I know many of them. I know most of those people personally. I think in the circumstances, they are probably going to surprise us with their brilliant performance. But I think if one is making a cool and detached calculation, one needs to think about some of these uncertainties. I think they can be overcome. As I said earlier, it may well turn out that the campaign could be very successful in a very short amount of time with very few casualties. But when I think about the larger strategic implications, if a few things go wrong, I am inclined to want to hedge and to be sure that I have enough parts in my hand to win the rounds that I am going to face.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. General Odom, I first want to thank you for your very thoughtful and valuable contribution to deliberations in this committee. I want to spend most of my time on your discussion about the force levels on the ground over there because, frankly, I see a distinction between the positions taken by others in that respect that I kind of want to develop a little more. But before that, I want to ask two quick questions that I think are fairly implicit in everything you say. But I want to get them on the record.

As you know, in this last Department of Defense authorization bill, we reduced end strength from 2,100,000 to 1,600,000 over the next 5 years, at the rate of approximately 100,000 a year.

I would ask you, sir, whether it is your view, and I sense that it is, that we ought to slip at least this first year while we see what develops in the Persian Gulf.

General ODOM. You know, the details of manpower are very complex and I am not an expert in that area. But I do know that, given the present commitments over there, the strains on the manning system within all the services are very great. It would strike me that it would be very wise and very prudent on the part of Congress to give them some sort of end-strength relief.

I do not know how they will develop any kind of sensible rotation base without it. Unfortunately, the only people who pay the price for this are going to be the soldiers and their families who are deployed out there. I would give that a very high priority. I think that is one of the most urgent things you can do.

Chairman NUNN. May I comment on that for just a moment without taking it out of your time?

I don't think there is any doubt about the fact that when this end-strength level was proposed this year and passed, there was no contemplation that we were, first of all, going to have this kind of confrontation.

Second, by the time the conference came around, we actually ended up going up beyond the scope of either bill on the manpower because of this and gave additional flexibility with leeway.

Third, there is no one who anticipated, even when the conference was going on, that we were going to deploy anything resembling 430,000 troops in that part of the world.

General ODOM. That's true.

Chairman NUNN. And all indications were that we were not.

I don't think there is any doubt about the fact that when we come back here in January, we are going to have to revisit very quickly those levels of forces in the Army and the other services also.

Senator DIXON. I want to thank the Chair and I want to thank General Odom because that certainly is my view.

The second question is again a quick question. I hear everything you are saying about sealift and airlift. I am sure we all agree about the importance of that.

I ask you whether, in view of that, you think it is clear that we need to do something to augment our situation with respect, for instance, to the C–141, which is a very old aircraft—it can't handle outsized materiel—and that we need to move toward either the C–17 in decent numbers or some equivalent that can handle M–1 tanks and other equipment and can get us there in enough time. Would that be your view?

General ODOM. Well, without being specific about C–17s and C–141s, I think airlift and sealift do need a lot of attention.

Now there are very serious tradeoffs that one could make in this regard. Notice, I just set the goal in my statement for a starting point of the ability to move a heavy corps and the close air support that goes with it anywhere in the world in 20 days. The fast ships that the Defense Department bought back in 1980—I think there were 8 of them—33 knot ships, if they had been kept in really good shape could have delivered an Army division, heavy division, to Saudi Arabia in, I think, about 14 or 15 days.

One can make it cheaper or more expensive, depending on whether one wants to go by sea or by air. Therefore, the mix of air and sealift here is something that analysts will have to talk about.

Senator DIXON. Sure.

General ODOM. But I think really the important point that I was making about airlift and sealift is to have it ready to do this in a short amount of time.

Eventually we could bring the airlift and sealift on-line. We could go out and bring it commercially, like we have done. The worrisome thing, to me, is to have forces there vulnerable for a long time, whereas they did not have to be had we had a reasonable airlift and sealift capability.

Senator DIXON. General, the major question I wanted to get to and that I am concerned about is this.

On page 10 of your statement you say that the most important one—this is major outlines of military realities—"is that sufficient forces to defend Saudi Arabia are now deployed there while adequate forces for an invasion are not."

When you say "now," are you referring actually to now, today, November 30—240,000?

General ODOM. Right now, today. Yes. Today.

Senator DIXON. Of course, there was a good deal of discussion by all the witnesses throughout this week about the augmentation of an additional 200,000, bringing us to a very high level which impacts on rotation policy, as you well know and presents us with logistic problems.

General ODOM. Right.

Senator DIXON. Now, I thought it was implied in your statement that you support, in fact, the augmentation to the higher number?

General ODOM. I do.

Senator DIXON. Now, I want to pursue that.

There was a division among the witnesses that I sensed, at least. I hope my colleagues felt the same way. I thought Dr. Schlesinger, Admiral Crowe, General Jones, Secretary Webb and others implied, at least, that this augmentation was probably not too good because it was the engine that drove us, essentially, to an offensive posture.

On the other hand, I got the impression at least—and they might say they didn't mean to characterize it in this way—from Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Perle, at least from those two, that well, okay, that's where it is now and so we have to go forward offensively because to do otherwise and to bring down these forces causes us to lose face in the region and weakens our posture there.

So, what I see in your testimony that I think is very profoundly important is your suggestion that we can build this thing up, augment these forces, bring in the materiel, get ourselves in place for the offensive posture, and then, in time, bring down the numbers some, and with our capability to restore them in a quick fashion to maintain an offensive posture.

Now, did I hear you correctly in that?

General ODOM. Exactly. I would bring them way down, not just a little way down.

Senator DIXON. Okay.

Let's assume for the purposes of our discussion that by the middle of January—and my investigation indicates that that is the

President's hope—that they have 440,000 or 450,000 troops over there, okay?

General Odom. Right.

Senator Dixon. And that they then build it up with all the logistic capability and support systems and so forth so that we have the offensive capability that is needed.

As I understand what you are saying, that is all okay. That does not mean we have to go in. Let's be prudent. Let's follow the course we originally followed. Let's see if the embargo and the sanctions will work.

We are there in force. Maybe let's even try to get some talks going. We can always bring it down and defend that as a reasonable offensive posture.

Is that true? Is that what you are saying?

General Odom. That is the military force structure arrangement that I proposed here. Yes.

Senator Dixon. I am very intrigued by that. I like that contribution very much. I appreciate your giving that to us and sense that it is——

General Odom. May I——

Senator Dixon. Pardon me, if I could, I would just pursue your answer—that, based on your past experience, which is important from the standpoint of what you understand in the region, you really believe that we could do that without, as Dr. Kissinger said, losing face and then losing the support of our allies in the region?

General Odom. Yes. I believe we can do it. I was puzzled by their statements to that degree. That's why I added the point in here toward the end of my statement——

Senator Dixon. I think it's important.

General Odom [continuing]. That I don't think the "use it or lose it" is so inexorably the choice as they suggest.

To the point of losing face, I am not nearly as concerned about face as I am concerned about maintaining the balance of power out there and insuring that oil will be produced and sold on the world markets so that the prices will eventually come down, and that we do that at as low a military cost to ourselves in terms of lives as possible.

If we have the objective capability out there, "face" is really not the point. It is the objective, hard options that are the point. I want those options. And, as I said in here, I don't rule out an offensive later on.

Senator Dixon. May I interrupt you, General Odom, just for a second? I forgot to ask the very last question I wanted desperately to ask.

We build the number up to 450,000; we get everything in place—support systems, logistics and all this stuff. How much do you believe in 3 months or so, let's say, we could bring the force levels down to and defend in every public place and still be in good shape over there?

General Odom. I don't know, Senator.

Senator Dixon. Just a guess?

General Odom. I would think that bringing that force down would take 3, 4, or 5 months anyway because installations have to be constructed and I think they probably could be in a fairly hasty way. They are temporary building structures.

Senator DIXON. Well, then, in 5 months, what could you bring it down to? A couple hundred thousand?

General ODOM. Oh, I would think that is feasible. You know, I'm really talking off the top of my head.

Senator DIXON. And still be safe there.

General ODOM. I think it takes some military staff planners who have data at their hands to give you a sound judgment on that.

Senator DIXON. But you would be safe there then and you could have rotation policies that made sense and so forth?

General ODOM. I think we could start that. I would think by the middle of next year we certainly ought to be into a posture.

You know, I'm not surprised the President is not saying this out loud. He wants to create as much pressure as he can on Saddam Hussein.

Therefore no, one should not be appalled that he has not suggested this. I would not be surprised to see somebody begin thinking about it in the Defense Department. I'm not really sure.

Senator DIXON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome you again, General, and I apologize for being absent for a period this morning. We are going to have a meeting with the President this afternoon and it is important that some of us gather to work on some thoughts to convey to the President.

General, we are fortunate to have you here for many reasons. Of course, yours is a wealth of experience and your reputation for sound thinking and good judgment. But also you are a soldier, and you have been one for many years and have served your country.

The statements that you make have a certain degree of importance and credibility with our men and women in the Gulf that are very important today. I think it conveys to them a sense of confidence that they are performing a mission and are doing so in the best interests of their nation.

Do you agree with me that we want to do everything we can to convey not only to Saddam Hussein our commitment and resolution to achieve the goals as enunciated by the President and now by the United Nations, but also that those men and women must understand exactly why we are there to do it? That leads me to this question to you.

You have been around Washington for a long time and you understand the decision-making process. Our President made the decision to augment the forces. You have commented on that today. That decision is predicated on extensive consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consultations with the Joint Chiefs as a group. He will be meeting with them again this weekend at Camp David.

Do you have any reason to believe that the President is not receiving as good a military advice as is possible?

General ODOM. I think he is receiving very good military advice. I have the utmost confidence in General Powell, General Vuono and the other members of the committee of the Joint Chiefs.

Watching the force structure evolve out there suggests that they are aware of all these issues that I have raised and that they are hedging against them and that they are taking them very seriously.

I think we should be very proud and confident in the kind of leadership you are seeing deployed.

I would be surprised if most of the concerns that I have listed here today are not ones that bother them. They have much more detail. I may be off on the munitions. I may be off on some of these lift issues. They could dispute whether the division and corps staffs are better or worse off or whether the air staffs are better or worse off. But anybody getting ready for serious action is going to take those things into account.

I think they would agree with me, as I have said in here, that if we start this, we will win. The issue is not whether we'll win. The issue is if we can do it with fewer or more casualties, and whether we'll be able to deal with some imponderables that we did not anticipate effectively.

It is simply to elucidate some of these, to provide a more textured sense in this forum of what some of those are that I have made those comments.

I know those gentlemen well. I have the utmost confidence in them.

As I say, I would be surprised if in the privacy of their councils that most of these issues are not being put on the table.

Senator **Warner**. But to the soldier right there, the sailor, airman and woman and Marine right there in the Gulf, your message to them is that in your professional judgment, having been a part of this system here for many years and knowing personally the military leaders today, those service persons should have full faith and confidence in the decisions being made by their President and being made by their senior military leaders today?

General **Odom**. Absolutely.

I see all sorts of urgency on the part of a number of people in the Pentagon, a number of people in the Command, and General Schwarzkopf, in particular, insofar as I can judge from his public statements and some of the forces I have seen moved out there, has the greatest sense of urgency about these issues.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you very much.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I believe Senator Glenn is next.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to clarify one thing.

You referred several times, General, to an "air war alone," I think is the term, or to "gamble on an air campaign."

As you know, I spent a career flying and I have never viewed air, nor do I think most pilots do, as anything but a supporting arm. Somebody still has to go in there on the ground and control territory once you take it. And air is, granted, a very capable supporting arm. But it is, once again, like artillery and other combat elements, a supporting arm.

I think there are too many people maybe who think that if we amass enough air power over there, that such a force would take care of things and we would never have to have other combat except for air.

I have never viewed it that way and I don't think most pilots do either. But I think in this case, looked at as a supporting arm, it is the most ideal air warfare situation we ever have run into or that I ever have even heard of.

I think the first thing we would not do is to go after all these targets that everybody talks about. The very first thing you would do in an air campaign is take out all the surface-to-air missile sites, eliminate all the anti-aircraft sites, knock down everything that can shoot at you in the air, and establish air superiority. Shoot up all the airplanes, which we could do in short order, and then you can pick and choose.

Next, you can hit every tank emplacement, hit everything under the sun, so that, when we do finally have to go in there on the ground, it is far easier than it would have been to do a Greek phalanx type approach with the Army going off from Square One without any premilitary preparation ahead of time.

I would presume you would agree with something like that.

General **ODOM**. Absolutely.

Your view of air power and that role coincides with mine precisely.

Senator **GLENN**. We look at the charts and we see all of the lineup of American forces and the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and it's phalanxed and it's here and there and they're all dug in and so on as though we're going to attack and they are going to attack and it is going to be a World War I trench-type warfare in there.

General **ODOM**. It won't be that way.

Senator **GLENN**. That would be idiotic, with our technical capability these days, to pick them apart once you establish air superiority and take away their ability to shoot down your air power. Then you can really emaciate that place if we had to do it before anybody has to move in on the ground.

I just wanted to clarify that.

You had a couple of things in here that disturbed me a little bit.

Your opinion is that we might have a munitions shortfall. You say on page 12 that you are concerned about the industrial base, that it is now eroded down and munitions production might be a problem if we got into a sustained operation.

Would you elaborate on that because that would be extremely serious?

General **ODOM**. Well, I don't know in detail. I only know secondhand information in this regard. But my recollection from my active duty was that the costs of advanced conventional munitions, smart weapons, was very large, and that we have not stockpiled those in enormous quantities. They will be terribly important in cutting air casualties in an air support campaign. Perhaps they are adequate.

As I said in my statement, I would want to know about that, and I would not want to find myself in a position where we carried through the kind of air war you just described and then found that we did not have adequate support for the ground campaign part.

There is no reason for that to be the case if we have the munitions.

Senator **Glenn**. That is something we ought to look at, I think.

General **Odom**. I don't know the answer to that. I was just raising the issues here, which I think deserve scrutiny.

Senator **Glenn**. Looking at the size force we have over there, you are familiar with our Total Force concept and the Reserves and so on. You are rather critical on page 14 of the Reserve capability to fit in immediately over there and be a combat partner, as we have always looked at the Reserves as being under the Total Force policy.

Would you comment on that?

General **Odom**. I think that total force policy was developed for the European scenario, where there would be considerable warning time and there would be a mobilization process to support that.

This scenario is remarkably different. It requires moving forces over there in a very short amount of time and it seems to me to be the more likely kind of scenario we are going to face in the post-Cold War era.

Therefore, it does raise questions about the Reserve component policy, which was very adequate for an earlier condition.

I am only expressing one opinion on that. I flagged it because it just strikes me as one of the issues that does deserve scrutiny, at least to review, as we move on during this crisis and after it.

I also said that it strikes me that if you had a general decision rule about this, it would be that where there is comparability of civil and military skills, the Reserve components really pay off. Where there is less, the pay-off is less.

Senator **Glenn**. I agree with you. We have a total force policy study that is due to us by the end of the year. It was commissioned a little over a year ago. The first draft they gave us was wholly inadequate. We sent them back to the drawing board, in effect.

They are supposed to have a new one to us and it is supposed to go through an analysis just like you were going through yourself there.

Let's say we have 400,000 troops over there, but we are going to have the embargo in place. We are going to wait out the embargo to see whether it works.

Is it your impression that with the forces we have, both Regular and Reserve, that we can sustain our presence and sanctions over a time period sufficient so that we could rotate people through, if it had to be done over there, set up a rotation policy—without a draft?

General **Odom**. If we stock the weapons and we put them in a storage condition that will not require the forces to maintain them daily, there is no reason we couldn't come down quite far, maybe to 100,000 or less. I think we should be able to support that kind of ration base.

Now, it will be a more difficult rotation base to support if the military service end strengths are reduced, and it will be somewhat easier with a little increase in the service end strength. That is one of those things that one has to work out the details of to see the range of choices and some of the trade-offs one would have to make in that regard.

I don't see why it would require a draft.

Senator GLENN. Just one other question. My time is up, so I will be very brief on this one.

There is one other element of going to war that I think we overlooked in Vietnam, and that was that we did not have public opinion with us in Vietnam at the end of that war. You watched that end of it, I am sure, as well as just the military capability.

General ODOM. Sure.

Senator GLENN. Is it your opinion that the American people are willing to support going to war?

General ODOM. I think they will support it with clear objectives which they find compelling. If there is confusion on that point, then I think we are going to be a divided nation.

Senator GLENN. Do they have that education on the system at this point?

General ODOM. I think we have had it up until very recently. I don't think it has eroded entirely. I think we are just seeing some signs that eventually could lead to that.

Therefore, as I said here, I think the hearings are very important in the sense of clarifying what our role choices are and trying to get a sense of what really is in the U.S. vital interest.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Glenn. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Odom, it is a great personal pleasure to see you again. I want to remind my colleagues on the committee that General Odom is a Tennessean.

Senator GLENN. We won't hold that against him. [Laughter.]

Senator GORE. He has served in a very distinguished way.

May I say on a personal note that I know that my father, who served in this body, was very proud to watch your career after he appointed you to the Academy. My colleagues are probably tired of hearing me brag about the Tennesseeans who are working their way up, like the new CNO, Admiral Kelso, and others.

General Odom, you have been particularly distinguished in your service and we have always valued your advice very highly.

Chairman Nunn started by asking you about the Vice President's conclusion that the military casualties in the United States would probably be higher if an offensive military action took place after a period of delay during which the sanctions took place and during which other things took place.

You disagreed with that. Correct?

General ODOM. Well, I disagreed with it with a contingency—that is, that the sanctions hold.

Senator GORE. Right.

General ODOM. If there is great replenishment of the Iraqi armed forces, then I think the Vice President has a point.

Senator GORE. Right.

General ODOM. If the sanctions hold, it strikes me we could cause a decline in the Iraqi capability and that things might actually work out the other way.

Senator GORE. That is what the other military experts who have testified before the committee have also said. I bring it back up just for this reason.

It was cited in the press this morning as a new argument, articulated by the Vice President for the first time. But I went back and read President Bush's rationale, entitled, "Why we are in the Gulf," in "Newsweek" magazine, and, buried in his statement, among the reasons offered, is that same argument, when he says that the potential cost in human lives of what would be needed to break Saddam's grip on Kuwait mounts, as do the global economic costs of his aggression. The President has also made that same argument. From a military standpoint, it may simply be wrong.

I wanted also to comment on the Vice President's statement about the moral costs of waiting.

I stood on the floor of the Senate 2 years ago, after the Iraqis dropped poison gas on the Kurds and called upon the President to request a special session of the United Nations Security Council for the purpose of condemning the use of poison gas. But the administration at that time decided to wait.

I think there were some moral costs involved there.

In fact, up until the invasion on August 2, many of us in the U.S. Senate were arguing that we impose sanctions on Iraq because of Iraq's policies toward the Kurds and the massing of troops against Kuwait. And right up until the day before the invasion, President Bush and his spokesmen were arguing to wait. I think there were some moral costs there.

Of course, there are many other examples, such as after the massacre in Tiananmen Square, there were some moral costs in going to Beijing and raising our glasses to toast those who conducted that operation.

So, indeed, there are moral costs to many decisions that are made in foreign policy and in military policy. What is needed, as you said in your opening words, is clear thinking about the options available to us and the full range of costs associated with which option is chosen.

Now, among the points you made in your excellent statement, one really jumped out at me. It stated explicitly what others have sort of hinted at. But, because of your experience, I think it carries even more weight coming from you, and you say it more clearly than others.

You say that if we choose a military option, such as an offensive move into Kuwait or an air war which might well bring about a ground invasion as well, an offensive military option would itself almost certainly require a long-term deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and/or Kuwait and/or Iraq.

Now, one of the arguments against letting the sanctions work has been the view that if we choose that option, we will have to incur the costs of a long-term deployment, with all the attendant risks of a long-term deployment.

So your statement that the alternative course, a military option early-on, would require exactly what is described as the principal downside of a sanctions policy, is extremely important.

Now, how confident are you that this is the likely outcome of a military course of action now? What would you say to those who say that it doesn't have to happen; we could go in, get this over with; that before the Haj starts in mid-June, we could have it all over with and be out of there?

General **Odom**. My answer to that would be two-fold.

First, the record of us leaving quickly after military invasions of other countries is that we stay a long time.

Second, given Syria's hostility toward Iraq and particularly Saddam Hussein, and given the obviously deep, grieved feelings in Iran toward Iraq, I find it difficult to imagine that both of those countries will not struggle to assert some sort of hegemony over that region if its regime is destroyed.

I don't think that would be in the U.S. interest. It would probably make the region much more unstable.

Then the question becomes how do we restore a stable regime in Iraq that could stand off those two opponents. I don't think that will be done overnight.

Sponsoring the construction of a new regime it seems to me would fall to us. That is the logic of my reasoning. No one can know for certain, of course, what will happen. We obviously could go in and defeat them and just decide to go home and live with the consequences. And the consequences might not be that.

But, given the border wars and territorial disputes over there, I would not want to bet a lot of money on it.

May I make a point which relates to your earlier points about both moral and global economic costs?

It has occurred to me that the global economic costs are really important for us here and that the sooner we can get a surge of production by the moderate Arab States, the better. We really need to bring down the oil prices.

Let me just throw out another idea that I heard recently that strikes me as interesting.

Given our own deficit, financing of our own debt problems, why would it not make sense to ask the Saudis to buy a big Treasury bill issue at a very low interest rate? It strikes me that some innovative ways to share this burden and to deal with the economic instabilities or uncertainties is a very pressing issue.

I just throw that out for your consideration.

Senator **Gore**. My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Gore.

I would like to have another round of questions.

General Odom, I think this is fascinating. We could sit here with you most of the day. Unfortunately, we have a very busy schedule. We have an important panel that is coming up on the nuclear issues next.

I would defer to Senator Cohen for what I would hope would be a brief period.

Senator **Cohen**. I have just a couple of quick points.

Mr. Chairman, General Odom made a very important statement to Senator Thurmond. He said that when military officials who are in uniform come to Capitol Hill and give their testimony, they tend to present the most optimistic assessments of our capabilities and needs.

I guess the question I have—not really a question, but an observation—is that when Colin Powell comes before the committee either on Monday or some time next year, to talk about the next year's budget, apparently we should apply some kind of discount factor for inflation. I think that perhaps the General at some point in time may want to tell us what that discount factor ought to be because it is very distressing to hear that military officials are always inflating their testimony and then, once they are out of uniform, they come back and tell us what the true facts are.

Second, there is a problem that I have with the notion that we are going to put an additional 200,000 troops over in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of building up an infrastructure.

It seems to me that what we ought to do is perhaps increase the Army Corps of Engineers. I don't know why we have to put 200,000 troops in the desert in order to build a structure so they can go back in at some future time. But it seems to me that what the General would like to do is to send a psychological message of support for what the President has already done and to use the presence of that 200,000 to construct facilities which the Army Corps of Engineers probably would be better equipped to do.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to come back to the issue that we are going to have and get General Odom's response to this. I talked before about Iraq having tested a satellite rocket. That was just about a year or so ago, on December 9. The reports came out in 1989.

I want to read just from one report on this, Mr. Chairman.

"The size of the Iraqi rocket indicates that, in addition to being able to place a satellite in low earth orbit, Iraq is probably able to deliver warheads to targets thousands of miles away. In addition, the Iraqi announcement was the first indication the country had been working in secret on a space program. It came as something as a shock to U.S. missile proliferation experts, who apparently had little idea that an Arab nation had made such progress."

I won't take the time now, but I will also cite *Jane's*, which also talked about the total shock on the part of our intelligence experts, who had no idea they even possessed such a capability. I think that we have to keep that in mind as we move along on this.

Finally—I said "finally" before, but I really mean finally now, General Odom—on page 7 of your statement, you indicate that the U.S. military presence might well serve to prevent a sharp and radical discontinuity in the domestic politics of these states, the kind that occurred in Iran.

I was a bit confused as to what you implied there, the implication being that perhaps had the United States had a presence in Iran, the Shah might have lasted longer in the face of the domestic turmoil that was confronting him.

I don't know of any one who has suggested that a U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia might, in fact, deter a move toward a radical revolution over there. I am not sure that we could make that statement, that our presence might serve as a deterrent for forces that might seek to move in a different direction. But I would be happy to hear you clarify that.

General **Odom**. Let me comment first on your point regarding my answer to Senator Thurmond earlier.

I really mean that as somewhat less than serious.

Senator **Cohen**. But it is serious. It is serious.

General **Odom**. I'm not sure I agree that we come over here in uniform and always say things are rosy.

Senator **Cohen**. Senator Thurmond asked you if that was your answer, because we hold the power of the purse strings here. I'm not sure what the significance of that is.

Of course we hold the purse strings here. But if military officials are going to come before us and not lay it on the line exactly as it is, but inflate our capabilities, and then we find out when a crunch comes that we don't have those capabilities, I think we have a big problem.

General **Odom**. Well, I think Senator Nunn said you had talked about air and sealift before and some of the things that I said were short. The military I think admits the case.

I also think, sir, that you will recall that when I have testified before you, I have been fairly candid about some of the capabilities not being what we set them out to be.

Senator **Cohen**. Unfortunately all of those hearings were in classified session.

General **Odom**. I did not want to dispute the long set of examples of Senator Thurmond's point. I guess I am not really convinced that the divergence is all that great.

I knew both General Jones and Admiral Crowe when they were Chairman, and I think they would have said some of those things in uniform. I think I would say some of these things if I were in uniform today. I don't think I would have any hesitation about that.

Senator **Cohen**. Then the record should indicate that your response to Senator Thurmond was more in jest.

General **Odom**. I appreciate that and it should do that. In all seriousness, the latter statement, my latest statement, is what I mean. It was partly in jest.

Senator **Cohen**. Just for the record, General, there was a time during the past decade in which this committee called the Joint Chiefs to testify before the committee and felt compelled to put them under oath, because there was some doubt at that time as to whether they were free to give their testimony without political pressures being placed upon them.

I don't want to see us return to that kind of situation.

General **Odom**. Yes, sir.

Your other point, the last issue, you raised a question about my comments on preventing a sharp discontinuity in Saudi Arabia. I did not mean to say that perhaps if we had had troops in Iran that wouldn't have happened. I would not have advocated having troops there for that purpose. I am just saying that now we do have forces in Saudi Arabia. It occurred to me that we have worried in the past about the stability of those small regimes. They themselves, many of the people in those regimes, talk about the strains and tensions that have emerged with the effects of modernization.

I am sure you have heard some of the interviews on public radio and other media where issues of wider participation, changing mores, et cetera, are being raised.

Now, those regimes, as I said in my statement, may prove quite adaptable. But they might not.

Now, I would say in the case of Korea that we have managed to keep things reasonably stable there when, if we had not been there, there might have come a much more radical discontinuity in the regimes in Korea. I was merely looking for some side benefits that might accrue here.

I certainly would not advocate that we go over there to do that as a primary mission. I said that it might be one of the possible side effects that could be positive. It also could be negative, I said. Undoubtedly we have already accelerated that process of the strains and tensions.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. I will yield to both Senator Thurmond and Senator Gore. But I would like to make one comment first, though.

I have known General Odom for a long time, and we have engaged in a little bit of perhaps frivolous comments on the question of uniform or non-uniform testimony. I have known him for years and he is one of the people I always called on when I was getting official lines from the military, from the Pentagon, from the White House, or from anyone else that I had doubts about because I always knew, in uniform—and I still believe that—he says exactly what he thinks. He did it his entire career. He did it sometimes at considerable peril to his own position and his own services and even his own intelligence.

I have not always agreed with Bill Odom. But I have always known, whether he had a uniform on or had on a civilian suit, that he was going to tell us what he thought. That is what we have to have to operate around here. It's the only way we can have it.

I would also say, on a serious note, that the usual accusation against the uniformed military is that they over-exaggerate the threat and they always talk about what they don't have. So that is sort of a flip on that point.

But, on a serious note, I just want to make it clear that I have total confidence that Bill Odom is telling us what Bill Odom believes, before and now.

General **Odom**. I appreciate that very much, Senator Nunn.

Senator **Gore**. I will defer to Senator Thurmond before I speak.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions, but the time is brief, so I will waive them for now.

Senator **Gore**. I have a very brief comment, Mr. Chairman.

On the latter point, I both understood what you said, in your words, not Senator Thurmond's words, and I thought it was funny. I would not want to deter candor and humor in responses.

Second, on the question of the Iraqi orbital capacity, I think it is extremely significant and I think it is extremely unfortunate that, after they demonstrated the aggressiveness of their effort to acquire ballistic technologies, President Bush chose to veto a measure passed by the Congress designed to put tougher penalties on private corporations which seek to profit by selling key technologies to Iraq, which make it possible for them to develop the capacity to acquire ballistic delivery systems to put whatever they want to put on top of them and deliver them to targets thousands of miles away.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore.

If there are no other comments——

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would just make one other comment.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I will be very short.

While we have been in hearings this morning, the President momentarily just made some very dramatic announcements with respect to this Gulf situation. It points out the fast-moving sequence of decisions and actions taking place.

I have repeatedly, along with others, recommended that this Congress of the United States join this decision-making team. I will continue to recommend that to him this afternoon.

Otherwise, Congress, as an institution, is going to be eclipsed and will not have had the opportunity to, hopefully, express itself in support of the directions and the leadership being given by our President.

Senator COHEN. Would you like to say what the announcement was so that we are not in suspense?

Senator WARNER. No, you can make it if you wish. We will eventually hear it.

Chairman NUNN. I just heard it and I would not want to try to announce what the announcement was, having heard it in my ear as I was listening to other dialogue. But it was, as Senator Warner said, a very dramatic announcement by the President, and I am sure we will hear more about it today. It essentially opens discussions with Iraq.

General Odom, we want to thank you for being here. Again, we will continue to call on you. We benefit from your wisdom and advice.

I don't always agree with you, but I always know I am getting it straight. We appreciate that.

General ODOM. Thank you very much. It has been a pleasure to be here.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee recessed.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:21 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, and Wallop.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; and Lucia M. Chavez, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Douglas George, and William E. Hoehn, Jr.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Cindy Pearson, Debra A. Rice, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn and Christopher E. Paine, assistants to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

Chairman NUNN. We are going to have to stay in order here because we have another panel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. With our next panel we will hear from Mr. Gary Milhollin, a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin and Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control which monitors nuclear proliferation developments; Dr. William R. Graham, Senior Vice President at JAYCOR and formerly the Science Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush; during the Reagan administration, Dr. Graham also served as Deputy Administrator of NASA and Chairman of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control; and Mr. Leonard S. Spector, Director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-author of a recent book about the Iraqi nuclear program, called "Nuclear Ambitions."

The committee has explored this issue twice this week in closed sessions with intelligence officials. In light of the keen public interest in this subject, which has followed the repeated statements in recent weeks by top administration officials, the committee decided that it should also schedule an open hearing on this subject with nongovernmental experts. We appreciate our witnesses' willingness to come before the committee today to help our members, as well as the American public, understand the dimensions of this problem.

In our hearing this morning we will deal with only unclassified information. I know that all of our witnesses understand that. This is an open hearing, and I ask all members to keep that in mind. We cannot and we must not divulge classified information, even if we are reading leaks in the newspapers coming from others. It is our obligation not to do that. There has been an awful lot of information that we have been told is classified that has been appearing in publications in the last several days, some of it accurate, some of it totally inaccurate. I think that in trying to deal with this subject, we have to be sensitive to the fact that we do not have the authority to declassify information.

We also must try to develop as complete a public record as possible because this is an important subject. It is important in considering actions in the short-term, and it is certainly important in the long-term.

There are a number of questions that we will be going into: what is the range of possibilities with respect to Iraq's efforts to obtain a nuclear weapons capability? How likely is the worst case scenario that is the basis for recent administration statements? Is it a plausible scenario or an extremely remote scenario? What assumptions involving diversion of safeguarded fuel or clandestinely obtained and undetected alternate fuel sources underpin this scenario? Does Iraq have the capabilities implicit in these assumptions? Is it likely that we would detect an effort by Saddam Hussein to manufacture, on a crash basis, a crude nuclear device? If we did detect the effort, what options would we have for interdicting it? If Iraqi acquisition of such a device went undetected, what would be its military significance? Could we count on our overwhelming nuclear weapons preponderance to deter the use of any such device? How did the Iraqi program progress this far and to what extent were the United States and the Western Allies major contributors to its advance?

Finally, but probably more importantly in the long run, I think while this crisis is on our minds now and has very important implications, it is my view that this whole question of nonproliferation in the nuclear area and in other areas, including chemical and biological missile technology, may be the dominant theme of our national security interest in the years ahead. I believe this is the first of a focus in crisis on something that may be a long-term and, hopefully, will be a continuing priority of this country.

I will now turn to my Republican colleague for any opening remarks he may have. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important committee meeting. Serious questions have been raised on the capability of Iraq to manufacture simple nuclear weapons from the 45 kilograms of enriched uranium they have received from France and the Soviet Union. Although this material is under safeguards and has not now been diverted, we need to understand how long it would take for them to get a nuclear weapon.

The President has been accused of overplaying the potential of the Iraq nuclear threat in order to get the backing of the American people for offensive action. I am convinced that the President is correct to point out that Saddam could have a bomb far sooner than people thought. I hope the witnesses today can give us their views on this.

Mr. Chairman, we know what Saddam has done. He has announced his intention to get nuclear weapons. He has the sanction of Muslim clerics to do so. He has built a vast, secret plant at Tuwaitha and strongly defended it. He has kept international inspectors out of most of this plant.

He attempted to buy a plutonium production reactor from France. He rebuffed French efforts to substitute low enriched fuel. He bought 250 tons of uranium ore from Brazil, Portugal, and Niger. He bought an Italian plant to separate bomb material. He tried to buy 12 tons of uranium pins to produce plutonium. He tried to buy 34 kilograms of plutonium from Italian smugglers. He bought special German drill presses to build gas centrifuges. He hired German technicians for a centrifuge plant. He tried to buy magnets for centrifuges from China. He tried to buy U.S. vacuum pumps. He built a great plant to convert uranium ore for enrichment.

President Bush's fear is what Saddam could have done. He could have secretly developed a recovery process line to recover the uranium from reactor fuel and have tested it repeatedly with surrogate fuel made from natural uranium. He could easily have such a plant ready to receive the highly enriched uranium fuel whenever he gives the word to divert it. He could have secretly done the high explosive testing needed to design the bomb, easily. He could have a number of small bombs in a few months, easily. He could deliver the crudest of bombs in a civilian airliner, easily.

Mr. Chairman, Saddam is at war. President Bush is right to fear what Saddam could easily do to get nuclear weapons. I hope the witnesses today will address these issues. Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. I think what we will do today, because I know we have people very interested in this subject, is give each member an extra 4 minutes so that each member will have 10 minutes in the opening round of questions. But first, let's go to our witnesses. I don't have any particular order here this morning. Mr. Milhollin, I guess we'll start with you. We would be delighted to hear what you have to say on this subject. Then we will go to Dr. Graham and Mr. Spector and then we will come back with questions for the panel.

STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Mr. Milhollin. Thank you very much, Senator. I am pleased to be here. I will try to cover basically four points: first, what the near-term threat is of an Iraqi nuclear weapon; second, what I consider to be the greater risk, which is that there is a long-term threat of an Iraqi nuclear weapon; third, how we got to this position; I'd like to talk about exports; and fourth, I would like to make a suggestion to the committee concerning the Pentagon's role in the export control process.

First, how close is Saddam Hussein to a bomb? Could he make one in 6 months to a year? If he did, how would he do it?

It is generally agreed that Iraq cannot now make nuclear weapon material on its own. If Iraq were to make a bomb, it would have to be with imported material. There are two kinds of imported material. The first kind is under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The second kind is not.

We know that Saddam Hussein has about 12.4 kilograms of high enriched uranium fuel that he bought from France. Could he make a bomb out of that? Our nuclear weapon makers in the United States could make a bomb out of 12.4 kilograms of high enriched uranium. Perhaps they could make more than one. For Saddam Hussein to do it, he would have to use a fairly advanced design because this is not very much material. With only this small amount of material, one would require a fairly good design.

I have not seen anyone say that Saddam Hussein's designers have reached the point of sophistication that would be required for that kind of success. Of course, I have not been privy to the classified briefings that the committee has had.

The second question is what would Saddam do with such a bomb if he had it? I'm sorry, before I discuss that, I would like to cover a couple of other points.

The fuel that we are talking about has been lightly irradiated. That would pose an additional barrier to using it in a bomb, although it is unclear how great a barrier that would be. There would also be some processing time. It is necessary to take the material and reduce it so that one separates the uranium from the aluminum with which it is now alloyed. That would take time. At the end of this process, one would get a device which may or may not work. It could not be tested since there is only enough material for one bomb. So the question becomes what would one do with such a device.

I have said before that I believe it is unlikely that anyone would take one untested bomb and threaten three or four or five other nuclear weapon states, three of which happen to have troops deployed in the Gulf already, another one, Israel, which is near-by, and another one, the Soviet Union, which also has material in Iraq under safeguards. So, for Iraq to divert material from safeguards and try to make a quick bomb would defy openly many nuclear weapon states and, I think, be unlikely.

Also, I think we have to consider that the alternative facing us, the one that has been suggested, is that we should go to war to prevent this from happening. I am sure the committee will have questions about this.

I would suggest that we ought to consider it this way. There is a certain risk in this event happening, that is, Saddam Hussein making a quick bomb. I think probably the risk is small that he would do that, and I think the risk is small that it would work if he did. So I think the risk to life is lower in this scenario, if we can call it that, than the risk of lives lost if we go to war to prevent it, since it is certain that we will lose lives if we go to war. So, if you are balancing things in deciding what course of action to take, you have certain casualties on the one hand and uncertain casualties on the other.

The second possibility is that Saddam Hussein has imported secretly nuclear weapon material that we don't know about. I haven't heard the administration or anyone else say that that is true. If it is, and it is a reason for going to war, then it strikes me that we should know about it publicly before making a decision to go to war on that basis.

The second point I would like to talk about is the long-term threat briefly. Saddam Hussein does have the capability to mount over the long-term a centrifuge production effort, which could in 5 to 10 years result in critical masses of high enriched uranium. I think, frankly, that this is what he is counting on doing. He has imported a great deal of equipment and material and technology to that end, primarily from Germany. He has imported material from Germany. He has imported blueprints that originated in Germany. He has imported machines for making centrifuges from Germany. He has imported German engineers to help run the machines.

He has also had help from Brazil. Brazil got its capability from Germany somewhat earlier. So when Brazil started helping Iraq, which Germany was also helping, we had the spectacle of Germany's nuclear progeny helping each other down the road to high enriched uranium.

This export disaster did not happen by accident. We have had export controls over the past decade that have been too loose. We have given export control too low a priority. The United States knew about many of the German deals, not only in nuclear but in chemical and ballistic missile technology, and did not take effective action to stop Germany. Now we have reached the point where we have to face the results of this decade of loose export controls.

In the United States, the policies which we have followed have been dominated by a process which has not really included the Pentagon to a great enough extent. The Pentagon has been a minor player in the question of export controls.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying in general or are you saying in the nuclear area?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. I'm saying in the nuclear area. The Pentagon has been a minor player in the question of what our export policies should be and on the question of which individual export application should be approved. I think the Pentagon should be put into the process at the beginning in order to stop some of the exports that we are now putting the Pentagon in the process of stopping at the end, or dealing with at the end. I think we are seeing now that we have to deploy forces to confront what I contend is primarily an export problem. I think it would have been a better use of resources to put the Pentagon into the process much earlier. If we had, it is not clear that we would be facing quite the threat that we are facing today. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin follows:]

STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN

DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Committee on Armed Services on the subject of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and what bearing these capabilities may have on Operation Desert Shield.

I am a member of the University of Wisconsin Law School Faculty and director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, D.C., a project devoted to slowing the spread of nuclear weapons to developing countries.

I will address two questions: first, whether Iraq is a near-term nuclear threat, as the Bush administration has recently argued, and second, how we should respond to Iraq's nuclear program in both the short and the long term.

I. How Close is Iraq to the Bomb?

During the past week, President Bush and his top military advisors have said that Iraq might produce a nuclear weapon within six months to a year, and that we may have to go to war to prevent this from happening. The President told U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving that "Every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal--and that's another reason, frankly, why our mission is marked by a real sense of urgency." Last Sunday, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft said that letting the international embargo against Iraq run its course "raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons." Defense Secretary Cheney was more direct, saying that

"It's only a matter of time until he acquires nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them."

These statements apparently were based on a recent Special National Intelligence Estimate in which top U.S. officials reportedly predicted that Iraq could develop a crude nuclear device in as little as six months to a year in a crash program. Previously, experts inside and outside of the government had estimated that it would take Iraq five to ten years to develop any kind of reliable nuclear weapon. Given that President Bush has been under pressure to clarify the objectives of Operation Desert Shield and justify this massive commitment of force, I think it is important to ask why his administration revised its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program in the way that it did and at the time that it did.

Saddam's short-term options:

There are two methods by which Iraq conceivably could fulfill the Bush administration's most pessimistic forecast and develop a crude nuclear weapon within a year. In either case, since Iraq has no known ability to make nuclear explosive material, it would have to use such material imported from outside sources.

The first alternative would be to divert safeguarded uranium from international inspection to make a weapon. Iraq currently possesses about 12.4 kilograms of French-supplied uranium enriched to 93% U-235, the fissile isotope used to detonate nuclear weapons. France supplied this material to run the Osirak reactor that Israel destroyed in 1981.

The French uranium is in the form of fabricated plates 1.27 millimeters thick made of an aluminum and uranium alloy. The uranium alloy is sandwiched between two aluminum cladding plates. The plates are contained in 33 standard fuel assemblies, plus six control elements, plus some spares. The total quantity of weapon-grade uranium weighs 12.4 kilograms, or 27 pounds.

The alloy would have to be chemically broken down in order to get pure uranium. Also, the fuel has been lightly irradiated, which is an additional barrier. It means that the processing would have to be carried out behind shielding, or by a series of workers who would each get a small dose of radioactivity.

Iraq also has about ten kilograms of 80% enriched uranium supplied by the Soviet Union as fuel for small research reactors. Uranium enriched to this level can be used for nuclear weapons. However, even if the two fuels could be blended, twenty kilograms of enriched uranium is not enough to make a simple gun-type nuclear bomb of the type that destroyed Hiroshima. To make a bomb with its safeguarded uranium, Iraq would have to make an implosion weapon, which is a more complex design. There is no clear evidence that Iraq has mastered such a design.

Also, the French and Soviet uranium in Iraq is safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which inspects the material regularly to insure that it is not being diverted for weapons use. The IAEA inspected this uranium last week and a spokesman said on Tuesday that it "was where it should be, and none had been diverted."

If Iraq were to divert the French uranium to make a crude weapon, it would alert the world to its intentions, and would provoke preemptive action by the United States and its allies to prevent the construction of even one bomb. The six-month estimate has been generally interpreted to be predicated on Saddam taking this route. Secretary Cheney implied this on Face the Nation last Sunday when he said, "If he were to take that material [the French uranium], he could produce a crude device with it ... in a year or less."

The administration also seems to be assuming that Iraq would divert the material between inspections, which are only held once every six months. However, I spoke to the director of safeguards at the IAEA on Wednesday, and he told me that the IAEA stood ready to inspect Iraq's uranium monthly if Baghdad requested it to do so.

There is also a second possible explanation for how Iraq could make a quick bomb, which the administration has only hinted at thus far. Last Tuesday, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who was travelling with the President in Mexico, said that "The statements of the secretary of state and the president are based on information that there is substantial, unsafeguarded nuclear activity going on in Iraq." It is not clear whether this comment referred to Iraq's attempts to enrich its own uranium, which I will discuss shortly, or was meant to suggest that Iraq has obtained enough nuclear weapon material from an unspecified outside source to make a simple bomb without touching its safeguarded uranium.

If the administration is suggesting an outside source, it would be an extremely serious development for several reasons apart from the confrontation with Iraq. It would mean that somewhere in the world there is a clandestine source for nuclear weapon material that we do not know about. If the Bush administration does have evidence that Iraq has imported nuclear weapon material from a secret source, it should make this evidence public immediately and stop making vague insinuations about what Iraq might or might not do in the next six months. If Iraq has acquired enriched uranium from a foreign source, the problem is much bigger than keeping the peace in the Middle East. If the administration does not have such evidence, it should not make statements with such grave implications.

If, by one or the other of these alternatives, Iraq should produce a crude nuclear weapon in the next six months, there is another major problem with citing this threat as a cause for war. How could Saddam even be sure that this device would work, since there would be no opportunity to test it? It would surely be a reckless, desperate act for Iraq to threaten the United States, Britain, France, and Israel--all of which could flatten Baghdad with nuclear weapons--with one untested bomb. Saddam Hussein is a gambler who overreached himself when he invaded Iran and Kuwait, but there is no evidence that he is likely to commit nuclear suicide.

II. The Long-Term Threat

Let me turn now to Iraq's long-term prospects for acquiring nuclear weapons. This is where the real Iraqi threat lies.

Uranium enrichment:

According to U.S. intelligence reports, Iraq seems to have acquired enough technology to be able to produce a critical mass of enriched uranium within five to ten years, even if the current trade embargo is maintained indefinitely. To do so, Iraq will have to make about a thousand machines called centrifuges, which spin uranium gas at high speed and separate the unstable U-235 atoms from the stable U-238 atoms that make up over 99% of natural uranium. There is no question that Iraq is trying to do this, relying on imported technology.

Iraq has imported a stockpile of natural uranium from several countries around the world and has acquired key equipment for manufacturing centrifuges from German and Swiss suppliers. Saddam has brought in engineers from Germany to install and run the centrifuge-making machines, and has imported from German firms the materials to make centrifuge parts. Congressman Les Aspin recently released a "Persian Gulf Crisis Report Card," in which he gave Germany a "C" with the comment, "could contribute more," but in the nuclear area Germany has already contributed more than enough.

There are two key questions to be answered regarding Iraq's uranium enrichment potential: how quickly can Iraq manufacture more centrifuges, and how soon can it run them efficiently? Iraq already has a handful of centrifuges running experimentally, and the blueprints it needs to make more. But it takes about a thousand centrifuges to produce a bomb's worth of enriched uranium annually. There is a huge technological chasm between possessing blueprints and actually building and operating that many complex machines, which would fill a space roughly the size of a football field.

The Export Record

Exports have been absolutely central to the realization of Iraq's nuclear ambitions, and a review of how Saddam has gotten where he is today tells us what is wrong with our nonproliferation policy--and why going to war will not stop the bomb from spreading.

Baghdad's greatest nuclear shopping success has been in West Germany. In 1987, the German firm H & H Metalform sold Iraq at least three "flow-turn" machines--devices specially capable of making high-speed gas centrifuges. The flow-turn machine produces the rotor--the thin-walled portion of the centrifuge that rotates, one of the most difficult parts to manufacture. According to H & H, the deals were licensed by the German government. Two German dealers actually ran the H & H machines at Tuwaitha to produce centrifuges. West German officials also suspect that these dealers sold Iraq the designs for the centrifuges.

In early 1990, another German firm, Export-Union, sent Iraq 50 metric tons of "maraging" steel, a type specially developed to make centrifuge rotors. This sale was cleared by West German officials, who told Export-Union that the steel did not require an export license. From another Bonn firm, Iraq apparently bought the specially-designed "ring" magnets that hold the spinning centrifuge rotors in place.

After Germany, Iraq's next largest supplier was Brazil. Throughout the 1980s, Brazil helped Iraq obtain uranium. According to two former Brazilian government officials, Brazil agreed to ship Iraq 100 tons of pure uranium and uranium concentrate (the form in which uranium enters the enrichment process) in the early 1980s, knowing full well that Iraq intended to make atomic bombs. Three shipments were sent in 1981, but for fear of bad publicity, Brazil stopped the deliveries before all 100 tons had gone.

Brazil also prospected for uranium in Iraq, analyzed ore samples there, supplied nuclear material and equipment for laboratory tests, and designed an underground plant to make uranium concentrate, which has not yet been built. A firm in Rio, Natron Consulting and Designing, received $5-6 million for the design. Brazil may even have taught Iraqi engineers how to operate centrifuges. Several Iraqi technical teams visited

Brazil during the 1980s, at least one of which had access to the secret Aramar enrichment plant at Ipero, which also uses centrifuges--like Iraq's--based on German designs. Brazil's president, Fernando Collor, has just expressed his regret for these episodes, which he said transferred "nuclear technology" that was "potentially significant."

The Iraqi-Brazilian relationship appears to be a case of Germany's nuclear progeny playing together. Before making its flow-turn machine deal with Iraq, the German firm H & H had exported the same machines to the Brazilian Navy Committee, responsible for Brazil's uranium enrichment efforts. According to the German news magazine Der Spiegel, Walter Busse, an ex-employee of the West German company MAN, which make centrifuges, established a "dense network of relations between nuclear bomb builders in Iraq and Brazil on the one hand, and German contractors on the other."

Other countries also have helped Iraq's uranium enrichment effort. In December 1989, China was reported to be helping Iraq make ring magnets for centrifuge stabilization. China is known to have supplied similar magnets to Pakistan. Also in December 1989, Western officials were reported to be monitoring exchanges of personnel between Iraq and Pakistan's centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta.

Switzerland entered the picture in August 1990, when it was discovered that customs officials in Frankfurt had seized end caps for centrifuges on their way to Iraq from the Swiss firm Schmiedemeccanica. End caps, specially made from high-strength steel, are needed to seal the tops and bottoms of centrifuges. Schmiedemeccanica was working under contract to Germany's H & H. As usual, in addition to the caps, Iraq was trying to get the means to make them itself. The customs agents also seized machine tools for making end caps furnished by the Swiss firm Schaeublin.

Enrichment is only the final stage of the uranium fuel cycle, which is a complex and expensive process. It begins with the acquisition of natural uranium. Iraq has several hundred tons of natural uranium, which cannot be used directly for nuclear weapons but will be needed as feedstock for an indigenous enrichment capability. It apparently imported 100 tons from Niger and 130 tons from Portugal in the early 1980s, without putting the shipments under IAEA inspection. In addition, Iraq has purchased tons of low-enriched and depleted uranium on the world market.

If Iraq ever does produce nuclear weapon material, it would like to have the other parts of the bomb--the "detonation package"--already waiting. Saddam has used his worldwide purchasing network to acquire bomb parts as well as enrichment technology, and the United States has been an important source.

We are all familiar with his attempt last March to smuggle American-made nuclear weapon triggers to Iraq. The triggers consisted of special high-performance capacitors used to detonate warheads in the U.S. arsenal. The Iraqi agents were also interested in buying krytrons, the high-speed electronic switches used in combination with the capacitors to detonate nuclear warheads.

If Iraq someday reaches the point of a nuclear test, it will have American equipment specially designed to monitor the explosion. In 1987, the American company Tektronix sold Iraq a digital oscilloscope which, according to a company official, had nuclear applications. Oscilloscopes are uniquely able to process the rapid data from nuclear weapon tests. They are also used to develop missile guidance systems and to sort the data from missile flight tests. The oscilloscope was licensed and was shipped to SAAD-16, Iraq's largest complex for chemical, missile, and nuclear weapon research.

U.S. companies have also provided equipment to Iraq that has been used directly in its ballistic missile program, and may someday help deliver an Iraqi bomb. Hewlett Packard sold Iraq $1 million worth of electronic test and measurement equipment and general-purpose computers. Wiltron provided a scalar network analyser to test and develop microwave circuits for missile guidance radars. These sales were licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department between 1985 and 1987. If we go to war with Iraq, we may wind up bombing our own citizens, now held at Iraqi weapons sites, to destroy our own exports. And we would have to ask U.S. pilots to risk their lives to do it.

I strongly urge the Armed Services Committee to begin redressing this situation by increasing the Pentagon's role in nonproliferation policy decisions. The Secretary of Defense should have the power to concur in all exports of dual-use technologies and munitions, and also in re-exports by the Department of Energy. Under the current system, the export promotion agency (Commerce), the nuclear promotion agency (Energy), and the international harmony promotion agency (State) make these decisions without the help of the security promotion agency (Defense).

There are recent cases in which the Pentagon has intervened and blocked or slowed pending exports of nuclear and missile technologies, but in other cases DOD has taken scant interest in non-proliferation policy and has meekly accepted the export decisions of the Commerce and State departments. The best case is that of pending exports of supercomputers to Israel, India and Brazil. All of these countries have secret nuclear and missile programs and are ineligible according to our own export standards to receive supercomputers, which are the most powerful tool available for nuclear weapon and missile design. However, the Pentagon--which opposed these sales under the Reagan administration--is knuckling under to other agencies that are not as well qualified to assess the security implications of these transactions, and are simply concerned with placating other governments and promoting U.S. trade.

If the Defense Department wants to be a real player in nonproliferation policy, and not simply be tapped when it is time to send in the troops as the last line of defense against Third World nuclear weapons, it should show that it is willing to devote staff and initiative to these export decisions and keep weapons technology out of proliferator countries. The Defense Technology Security Administration, which was established to control technology transfers to the Soviet bloc, needs a new job. Congress should task it with providing technical support for export licensing decisions, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If we had devoted more of our military resources to controlling proliferation at the source in the past decade, we probably would not have to airlift other military resources to the Persian Gulf today.

Stopping the Bomb, in Iraq and Elsewhere

In summary, I would like to make three simple points. First, there is no real short-term risk of an Iraqi nuclear weapon--at least based on what the Bush administration has told us so far. The administration should be ashamed of itself for misleading the public about the Iraqi bomb; there should be a reasonable limit to governmental disinformation when the stakes are so high. If the administration has hard evidence that Iraq has diverted safeguarded fissile material or acquired unrestricted fissile material from outside, the president should make it public and give Congress a real basis for exercising its constitutional power of deciding whether to commit the nation to war.

Second, I believe that Iraq is a major proliferation risk in the long term, and that the current trade embargo may not be sufficient to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, I think our security would be better served by developing international efforts to contain Iraq's nuclear efforts as tightly as possible through nonmilitary means, with military strikes on nuclear facilities only as a last resort. We carried out a forty-year campaign to contain the Soviet Union and prevent war in Central Europe, so we should be able to organize a comprehensive system to contain Iraq, particularly since the Soviet Union is now on our side.

Third, a general war against Iraq, even to stop Hussein from making the bomb, would not solve the problem of nuclear proliferation. Iraq's pattern of arming through imports is being replicated around the world, and soldiers' blood is not a morally defensible means of export control. Reckless exports have given Israel, South Africa, India and Pakistan the means to make nuclear weapons, and have almost done so for Argentina and Brazil. As long as there are buyers with money there will be sellers of dangerous goods. Periodic wars, randomly triggered when a nuclear aspirant invades its neighbor, are not a reliable means of containing nuclear technology.

I hope that the Armed Services Committee will keep in mind that it is much easier to prevent nuclear proliferation than to cure it with troops, and I urge the Committee to implement the new role for the Defense Department that I have suggested. If Americans must die in Kuwait to stop the spread of the bomb to Iraq, we must insure that such a sacrifice is never required again.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Milhollin. Dr. Graham.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, JAYCOR, AND FORMER PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE ADVISOR

Dr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am a physicist and an engineer who has been involved with nuclear weapon design and effects for over 20 years. A great deal of confusion concerning the Iraqi nuclear weapons program has been caused by the widespread lack of understanding of nuclear weapon development. Therefore, I would like to state as clearly as possible what is entailed in developing a nuclear weapons capability.

By far the most critical and difficult nuclear weapon component to acquire is the fissile material. The majority of the effort in the U.S. Manhattan Project, which produced the first nuclear explosives, was devoted to the production of fissile material—both highly enriched uranium and a man-made element, plutonium.

Once the fissile material has been acquired, forming it into the correct shape and constructing the high explosive and other components of the weapon is a relatively straightforward operation that has been well known to physicists and associated technologists for the last 45 years.

To initiate the nuclear explosion, the fissile material is fashioned into a critical assembly with high explosives, either by compressing the nuclear material through implosion, as was done with the "Fatman" device, or through the use of a gun-like mechanism, as was done with the "Little Boy" device. Every single component of a nuclear weapon, other than the fissile material, everything else, is produced and used for a variety of purposes in industrialized countries and is generally available.

Here, for example, Mr. Chairman, is a picture of a pin dome gauge (indicating), which is used to measure both the symmetry and the velocity of a nuclear weapon type implosion as driven by high explosives, an important part of the nuclear weapon design, but a relatively easy one to measure. I have this picture because I found it on the wall of the Senate Armed Services Committee as I came in this morning. I believe it has been hanging there for several years. Anyone can get it from Los Alamos Graphic Arts. It's negative CN-765233. This is not carefully controlled technology, Mr Chairman. This is widely available.

To the extent that the proliferation of nuclear technology has been constrained, it has been the results of the unavailability of fissile materials and not the unavailability of other components, construction techniques, or designs.

There are two types of fissile materials used in simple nuclear explosives: as we mentioned, plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Plutonium is produced by exposing the common isotope of uranium, U-238, over a prolonged period to the intense neutron flux that is produced in the core of a sizable nuclear reactor. The large nuclear reactor is the most obvious facility associated with this type of fissile material production and, for that reason, an inspection regime has been established under the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, for monitoring the production and disposition of reactor products among those countries that choose to participate in this regime. Not all countries participate and not all facilities in the countries that do participate are inspected.

The fissile isotope of uranium, U-235, constitutes only 0.7 percent of natural uranium. To make weapons grade material, that concentration must be increased to the range of 90 percent, an operation which, even today, is very challenging technically.

In the Manhattan Project, the uranium enrichment was done by thermal diffusion and mass spectrographic processes and required the construction of enormous facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Subsequently, high speed gas centrifuges were developed to carry out this enrichment more efficiently and less expensively. Today, laser technology is a viable candidate for this purpose in the most technically advanced countries.

Each of these processes requires substantial technological effort and significant capital investment. Nevertheless, both plutonium and highly enriched uranium were produced in about 4 years by the U.S. in the early 1940s, while many other demands were being made on U.S. national capabilities as we fought World War II.

Nuclear weapons programs are among the most secret activities of governments. Therefore, it has proven to be exceptionally difficult to make accurate intelligence estimates of their status. That's why, for example, U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs tended to substantially underestimate their accomplishments during the early phases of development and through the first nuclear explosions.

Against this technical and intelligence background, I want to address the committee's interest in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq has been engaged in a variety of observable activities over the past decade which would suggest a determined effort to develop nuclear weapons. Its ambitions were cut short in 1981 when the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Osirak reactor facility at Tuwaitha, south of Baghdad. At the time, there was a significant international outcry against the Israeli strike. Today, the world has come to appreciate the security benefits of that Israeli action.

The technology at the Tuwaitha plant has been provided by a variety of international suppliers, including the U.S.S.R., France, Germany, and Italy. Iraqi physicists, chemists, and engineers have been trained in U.S. universities and graduate schools for many years, with full access to U.S. technological infrastructure, including instrumentation and supercomputers. After the loss of the

Tuwaitha nuclear facilities, Iraq could not convince anyone to help it rebuild the Osirak reactor, so it began to rebuild its indigenous capabilities piecemeal.

Administration officials have recently suggested that Iraq could develop at least one nuclear weapon within as little as 6 months to a year. This scenario assumes Iraq's use of IAEA safeguarded highly enriched uranium provided by France and the Soviet Union to Iraq. This scenario has been criticized as overly ambitious on two principal grounds. The first is that the materials are safeguarded and have been regularly, indeed, very recently, inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But the rest of the weapon can be produced without fissile material. Then the fissile material can be fabricated separately and inserted to complete the weapon. This fabrication and assembly took approximately 3 months when it was carried out for the first time 45 years ago in the Manhattan Project.

Mr. Chairman, there is no reason to believe that this is the least time possible. International Atomic Energy Agency inspections notwithstanding, the safeguarded material could be converted today to weapons use in a very short period of time.

Furthermore, in view of the number of nations that are able to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium today, I believe that it would be very difficult to develop a reliable estimate of the total amount of fissile material that has been obtained by Iraq. Therefore, I find little reason to take comfort in the International Atomic Energy Agency's recent declaration that the safeguarded material was accounted for whatever the declaration's factual basis.

The second criticism of this scenario is that it would be difficult for Iraq to build at least one weapon from so little material with no testing and no record of nuclear weapons work to depend upon. In response to this criticism, I would answer, first, that even the amount of highly enriched uranium that we are certain the Iraqis possess is not so little in terms of bomb requirements. Second, with respect to the technical difficulty of weapon design and testing, I would call the committee's attention to the Pulitzer Prize winning book, *The Curve of Binding Energy* by John McPhee, which documents a highly competent nuclear fission weapon design that was produced by a college undergraduate in less than one academic year.

A second scenario that has been advanced is that Iraq will require a much longer period of time, perhaps 5 to 10 years, to produce nuclear weapons from entirely indigenous sources. While this may be true, I also observe that no responsible authority is questioning that, if left unchallenged, Iraq will certainly have a substantial and entirely indigenous nuclear weapons production capability.

There are indications that Iraq may be working on both the near-term and the longer-term approaches to obtaining nuclear weapons. They may be attempting to mine uranium. They are probably building enrichment centrifuges. They undertook at least one concerted effort that we know of to import krytrons, nuclear weapons triggering devices, recently intercepted by British Customs working in cooperation with U.S. officials. The Iraqis have reportedly received help from other less developed countries as well as the more developed countries in the world.

In light of these activities, Mr. Chairman, I believe the wrong questions are being asked. Instead of asking for proof beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iraq has completed all the design, engineering, and non-nuclear testing work required to create a weapon, we should ask ourselves this question: why wouldn't Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, have done these things? It is difficult for me to see why a crude, non-deliverable nuclear device in 6 months should define the boundary of the soonest or the best effort that Iraq could mount.

It could be argued that Iraq has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, therefore, committed itself not to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq has also signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the First Use of Chemical Weapons. Its record on observing this agreement is also well known. Iraq is developing weapons in the chemical category, the biological category, and the nuclear category, and has demonstrated a willingness to employ these weapons, normally referred to as "weapons of mass destruction," not only against foreign armies but against its own population.

I believe that in the case of Hussein, the record demonstrates convincingly that neither treaties, international law, nor traditional norms of international behavior can be relied upon as mechanisms of restraint.

To those who look to sanctions and export controls, I would simply invite their attention to the record of the Missile Technology Control Regime in constraining Iraq. (I would note, parenthetically, as Senator Thurmond did, that the December 5 launch of an Iraqi-developed ballistic missile occurred substantially sooner than had been anticipated by the U.S. intelligence community.)

What should the United States do about a tyrant who has demonstrated his disregard for long-standing treaties and standards of civilized behavior, who is able to produce weapons of mass destruction and has used them, especially when, if left unchallenged, the future course of the development of these weapons is absolutely clear in all respects, other than precise schedule?

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe our government has yet answered these difficult policy questions. But it is clear that they must be answered, not only in the context of the present Iraqi threat, but also for what the future portends for our national security interests as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missile technologies continue.

Obviously, the destruction of Iraqi facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction should be given serious consideration. Furthermore, whatever policy decisions are reached concerning the present Iraqi capabilities and however those decisions may affect our developing diplomatic and military strategy, it seems to me that we will, sooner or later, understand the necessity to defend ourselves, our allies, and other peaceful nations against these terrible weapons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Graham follows:]

STATEMENT BY

DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM A PHYSICIST AND ENGINEER WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND EFFECTS FOR OVER 20 YEARS. A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION CONCERNING THE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE WIDESPREAD LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT. THEREFORE, I WOULD LIKE TO STATE AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE WHAT IS ENTAILED IN DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

BY FAR THE MOST CRITICAL AND DIFFICULT NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENT TO ACQUIRE IS THE FISSILE MATERIAL. THE MAJORITY OF THE EFFORT IN THE U.S. MANHATTAN PROJECT, WHICH PRODUCED THE FIRST NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES, WAS DEVOTED TO THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL--BOTH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND A MAN-MADE ELEMENT, PLUTONIUM.

ONCE THE FISSILE MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED, FORMING IT INTO THE CORRECT SHAPE AND CONSTRUCTING THE HIGH EXPLOSIVE AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE WEAPON IS A RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD OPERATION THAT HAS BEEN WELL KNOWN TO PHYSICISTS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGISTS FOR 45 YEARS.

TO INITIATE THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, THE FISSILE MATERIAL IS FASHIONED INTO A CRITICAL ASSEMBLY WITH HIGH EXPLOSIVES, EITHER BY COMPRESSING THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL THROUGH IMPLOSION (AS WAS DONE WITH THE "FATMAN" DEVICE) OR THROUGH THE USE OF A GUN-LIKE MECHANISM (AS WAS DONE WITH THE "LITTLE BOY" DEVICE).

EVERY SINGLE COMPONENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON, OTHER THAN THE FISSILE MATERIAL, IS PRODUCED AND USED FOR A VARIETY OF PURPOSES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN

CONSTRAINED, IT HAS BEEN THE RESULT OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FISSILE MATERIALS, AND NOT BY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER COMPONENTS, CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES, OR DESIGNS.

THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF FISSILE MATERIALS USED IN SIMPLE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES: PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. PLUTONIUM IS PRODUCED BY EXPOSING THE COMMON ISOTOPE OF URANIUM (U-238) OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD TO THE INTENSE FLUX OF NEUTRONS THAT IS PRODUCED IN THE CORE OF A SIZEABLE NUCLEAR REACTOR. THE LARGE REACTOR IS THE MOST OBVIOUS FACILITY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TYPE OF FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION, AND FOR THAT REASON AN INSPECTION REGIME HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR MONITORING THE PRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF REACTOR PRODUCTS AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES THAT CHOOSE TO PARTICIPATE.

THE FISSILE ISOTOPE OF URANIUM, U-235, CONSTITUTES ONLY 0.7% OF NATURAL URANIUM. TO MAKE WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL, THAT CONCENTRATION MUST BE INCREASED TO THE RANGE OF 90%--AN OPERATION WHICH EVEN TODAY IS VERY CHALLENGING TECHNICALLY. IN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, THE URANIUM ENRICHMENT WAS DONE BY THERMAL DIFFUSION AND MASS SPECTROGRAPHIC PROCESSES, AND REQUIRED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ENORMOUS FACILITIES AT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE. SUBSEQUENTLY, HIGH-SPEED GAS CENTRIFUGES WERE DEVELOPED TO CARRY OUT THIS ENRICHMENT MORE EFFICIENTLY AND LESS EXPENSIVELY. TODAY, LASER TECHNOLOGY IS A VIABLE CANDIDATE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

ANY OF THESE PROCESSES REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORT AND SIGNIFICANT CAPITAL INVESTMENT. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM WERE PRODUCED IN ABOUT FOUR YEARS BY THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 1940S, WHILE MANY OTHER DEMANDS WERE BEING MADE OF U.S. NATIONAL CAPABILITIES.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS ARE AMONG THE MOST SECRET ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTS. THEREFORE IT HAS PROVEN TO BE EXCEPTIONALLY

DIFFICULT TO MAKE ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THEIR STATUS. THAT'S WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS TENDED TO SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERESTIMATE THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT.

AGAINST THIS TECHNICAL AND INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND, I WANT TO ADDRESS THE COMMITTEE'S INTEREST IN IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

IRAQ HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN A VARIETY OF OBSERVABLE ACTIVITIES OVER THE PAST DECADE WHICH WOULD SUGGEST A DETERMINED EFFORT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ITS AMBITIONS WERE CUT SHORT IN 1981 WHEN THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE DESTROYED THE OSIRAK REACTOR FACILITY AT TUWAITHA. AT THE TIME, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY AGAINST THE ISRAELI STRIKE. TODAY THE WORLD HAS COME TO APPRECIATE THE SECURITY BENEFITS OF THAT ISRAELI ACTION.

THE TECHNOLOGY AT THE TUWAITHA PLANT HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIERS -- INCLUDING THE USSR, FRANCE AND ITALY. IRAQI PHYSICISTS, CHEMISTS AND ENGINEERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND GRADUATE SCHOOLS FOR MANY YEARS, WITH FULL ACCESS TO U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: INSTRUMENTATION, SUPERCOMPUTERS, AND SO FORTH.

AFTER THE LOSS OF THESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, IRAQ COULD NOT CONVINCE ANYONE TO HELP IT REBUILD THE OSIRAK REACTOR, SO IT BEGAN TO REBUILD ITS INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES PIECEMEAL.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE RECENTLY SUGGESTED THAT IRAQ COULD DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON WITHIN AS LITTLE AS SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR. THIS SCENARIO ASSUMES IRAQ'S USE OF IAEA-SAFEGUARDED HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PROVIDED BY FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS SCENARIO HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS OVERLY AMBITIOUS ON TWO PRINCIPAL GROUNDS. THE FIRST IS THAT THE MATERIALS ARE SAFEGUARDED AND REGULARLY -- INDEED VERY RECENTLY -- INSPECTED BY THE IAEA. BUT THE REST OF THE WEAPON CAN BE PRODUCED WITHOUT THE FISSILE MATERIAL. THEN THE FISSILE MATERIAL CAN BE FABRICATED SEPARATELY AND INSERTED TO COMPLETE THE WEAPON. THIS FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY TOOK APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS WHEN IT WAS CARRIED OUT FOR THE FIRST TIME 45 YEARS AGO IN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT. THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE LEAST TIME POSSIBLE. IAEA INSPECTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL COULD BE CONVERTED TO WEAPONS USE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

FURTHERMORE, IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT ARE ABLE TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TODAY, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP A RELIABLE ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FISSILE MATERIAL THAT HAS BEEN OBTAINED BY IRAQ. THEREFORE I FIND LITTLE REASON TO TAKE COMFORT IN THE IAEA'S RECENT DECLARATION THAT THE SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL WAS ACCOUNTED FOR, WHATEVER THE DECLARATION'S FACTUAL BASIS.

THE SECOND CRITICISM IS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR IRAQ TO BUILD AT LEAST ONE WEAPON FROM SO LITTLE MATERIAL WITH NO TESTING AND NO RECORD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORK TO DEPEND UPON.

IN RESPONSE TO THIS CRITICISM, I WOULD ANSWER FIRST THAT EVEN THE AMOUNT OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM THAT WE ARE CERTAIN THE IRAQIS POSSESS IS NOT SO LITTLE IN TERMS OF BOMB REQUIREMENTS. SECONDLY, WITH RESPECT TO THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY OF WEAPON DESIGN AND TESTING, I WOULD CALL THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO THE PULITZER PRIZE WINNING BOOK THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY BY JOHN MCPHEE, WHICH DOCUMENTS A HIGHLY COMPETENT NUCLEAR FISSION WEAPON DESIGN THAT WAS PRODUCED BY A COLLEGE UNDERGRADUATE IN LESS THAN ONE ACADEMIC YEAR.

A SECOND SCENARIO THAT HAS BEEN ADVANCED IS THAT IRAQ WILL REQUIRE A MUCH LONGER PERIOD OF TIME -- PERHAPS 5 TO 10 YEARS -- TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ENTIRELY INDIGENOUS SOURCES.

WHILE THIS MAY BE TRUE, I ALSO OBSERVE THAT NO RESONSIBLE AUTHORITY IS QUESTIONING THAT, IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED, IRAQ WILL CERTAINLY HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AND ENTIRELY INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY.

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IRAQ MAY BE WORKING ON BOTH THE NEAR TERM AND THE LONGER TERM APPROACHES:

* THEY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO MINE URANIUM.
* THEY ARE PROBABLY BUILDING ENRICHMENT CENTRIFUGES.
* THEY UNDERTOOK AT LEAST ONE CONCERTED EFFORT -- THAT WE KNOW OF -- TO IMPORT KRYTRONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRIGGERING DEVICES RECENTLY INTERCEPTED BY BRITISH CUSTOMS.
* THEY REPORTEDLY RECEIVED HELP FROM OTHER LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

IN LIGHT OF THESE ACTIVITIES, MR CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THE WRONG QUESTIONS ARE BEING ASKED. INSTEAD OF ASKING FOR PROOF BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT THAT IRAQ HAS COMPLETED ALL THE DESIGN, ENGINEERING, AND NON-NUCLEAR TESTING WORK REQUIRED TO CREATE A WEAPON, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES THIS QUESTION: WHY WOULDN'T IRAQ, UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN, HAVE DONE THESE THINGS? IT'S DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE WHY A CRUDE, NON-DELIVERABLE NUCLEAR DEVICE IN SIX MONTHS SHOULD DEFINE THE BOUNDARY OF THE SOONEST OR THE BEST EFFORT THE IRAQIS COULD MOUNT.

IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT IRAQ HAS SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND THEREFORE COMMITTED ITSELF NOT TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IRAQ HAS ALSO SIGNED THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION. ITS RECORD ON

OBSERVING THESE LATTER AGREEMENTS IS WELL KNOWN. IRAQ IS DEVELOPING WEAPONS IN ALL OF THESE CATEGORIES AND HAS DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NOT ONLY AGAINST FOREIGN ARMIES BUT AGAINST ITS OWN POPULATION.

I BELIEVE THAT IN THE CASE OF HUSSEIN THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES CONVINCINGLY THAT NEITHER TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NOR TRADITIONAL NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR CAN BE RELIED UPON AS MECHANISMS OF RESTRAINT. AND TO THOSE WHO LOOK TO SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS, I WOULD SIMPLY INVITE THEIR ATTENTION TO THE RECORD OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME IN CONSTRAINING IRAQ. (AND I WOULD NOTE PARENTHETICALLY THAT THE DECEMBER FIFTH LAUNCH OF AN IRAQI-DEVELOPED BALLISTIC MISSILE OCCURRED SUBSTANTIALLY SOONER THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.)

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO ABOUT A TYRANT WHO HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS DISREGARD FOR LONG-STANDING TREATIES AND STANDARDS OF CIVILIZED BEHAVIOR, WHO IS ABLE TO PRODUCE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND HAS USED THEM; ESPEICALLY WHEN, IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED, THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN ALL RESPECTS OTHER THAN PRECISE SCHEDULE?

MR. CHAIRMAN, I DO NOT BELIEVE OUR GOVERNMENT HAS YET ANSWERED THESE DIFFICULT POLICY QUESTIONS. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY MUST BE ANSWERED, NOT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT IRAQI THREAT, BUT ALSO FOR WHAT THE FUTURE PORTENDS FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AS THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTINUES APACE.

OBVIOUSLY, THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. FURTHERMORE, WHATEVER POLICY DECISIONS ARE REACHED CONCERNING THE

PRESENT IRAQI CAPABILITIES, AND HOWEVER THOSE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT OUR DEVELOPING DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY STRATEGY, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE WILL, SOONER OR LATER, UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY TO DEFEND OURSELVES, OUR ALLIES, AND OTHER PEACEFUL NATIONS AGAINST THESE TERRIBLE WEAPONS.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, Dr. Graham. Mr. Spector.

STATEMENT OF LEONARD S. SPECTOR, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. Spector. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last week, after months of saying little on the issue, President Bush and his senior advisors suddenly began to voice deep concerns about the Iraqi nuclear threat. The immediate response of a number of us, myself included, was to accuse the administration of overstating the danger of Iraqi nuclearization which appeared no more imminent last week than it had when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2 of this year. Implicitly or explicitly, most of us implied or indicated that the President was playing politics with the issue. In retrospect, however, I believe that the furor over the administration's statements clouded careful consideration of the issue and that a second, more dispassionate, look at this question is needed. In the end, I do not believe that Iraq's nuclear potential should necessarily push us into war. But I believe that it poses a threat of considerable gravity that must be taken into account by Congress and the administration as they determine our next moves in the Gulf.

During the past week, testimony presented to this committee has framed two principal alternative courses of action for the United States in the Gulf: going to war against Iraq in early 1991, or waiting for perhaps a year or 18 months to determine whether economic sanctions that have been imposed against Iraq will force it to leave Kuwait without further hostilities. How should Iraq's nuclear potential be figured into this balance as we weigh these alternatives?

As we have heard already this morning, Iraq's nuclear program poses two, quite distinct, threats: a longer term threat that might take perhaps 5 years to materialize; and one that will emerge perhaps during the next year and conceivably within 6 months, according to the intelligence estimates that we have seen reported in the press. I think we need to take both threats seriously.

Let me begin with the long-term threat. As Dr. Graham has just stated, the most difficult part of building nuclear weapons is acquiring the weapons grade nuclear material for the core, and the long-term threat is posed by the expectation that Iraq will develop the capability to produce such material indigenously with a program which has already begun. Eventually, this effort will allow Iraq to build a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. As I have detailed in the attachment to my statement, Iraq is making important progress toward developing this capability, even if the country remains years away from acquiring a nuclear force along these lines.

There is no question that Iraq was pursuing this effort aggressively before its invasion of Kuwait, and, even though the U.N. embargo has terminated Iraq's access to relevant high technology imports, few observers would question that Saddam Hussein is attempting to push this effort forward with all available materiel. Nor can there be any doubt that if Saddam Hussein remains in power after the Gulf crisis, he will continue to pursue this program to fruition with all the resources at his disposal. Eventually, we must assume that he will succeed.

Presumably, if Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait in the next year or so as part of a negotiated settlement of the crisis, Iraq will continue to be subject to an embargo on nuclear-related technology and perhaps other technologies as well. Unfortunately, however, although such an embargo is likely to be tighter than the export control system which was so leaky in the past, it will inevitably have weaknesses that Iraq will be able to exploit.

Simply stated, it must be assumed that if Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will acquire nuclear arms at some point in the future in the years ahead—a development that would carry the gravest consequences for global stability. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that war is the only means for addressing the long-term Iraqi nuclear threat. It has been widely suggested that if the economic stranglehold that has been imposed on Iraq is successful, it could well lead to an internal upheaval there that would bring to power new leaders prepared to withdraw from Kuwait and to end Iraq's aggressiveness in the region. In that context, as part of a settlement to the crisis, the United States should be able to demand, and to obtain, credible assurances that Iraq's new leaders will end their country's pursuit of nuclear arms and, in particular, that they will not construct sensitive nuclear plants associated with nuclear weapons. We have a similar understanding with South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt that certain nuclear activities are permissible but that sensitive plants are forbidden. We were also renegotiating a similar arrangement with Iran under the Shah.

To put the point succinctly, the ouster of Saddam Hussein may well be essential to avert the long-term Iraqi nuclear threat, but war is not the only means for achieving this result. Moreover, this threat would not materialize for a number of years. This time would permit the United States to pursue the sanctions option initially while holding the military option in reserve.

The short-term nuclear threat must also be recognized. I would say this is one that I, among others, tended to minimize in earlier comments on this issue. This threat stems from the fact that Saddam Hussein, as we have heard, already possesses sufficient French and Soviet weapons grade uranium to fabricate one nuclear device. This material would have to be processed and then fabricated into weapon components before a nuclear device could be readied. The steps would probably take at least a number of weeks; as we heard in the Manhattan Project, 3 months were required.

The material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection because Iraq is a party to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted an inspection and found no problems. Unfortunately, these inspections are carried out at 6 month intervals. This means that if at some point in the future Iraq secretly completed all of the steps necessary for the design and fabrication of a nuclear weapon, except those involving the nuclear weapons material, Iraq could wait until the IAEA had completed an inspection and then take the final steps needed to build a device without fear of being detected by the IAEA for a number of months.

The U.S. intelligence community has suggested that it would be at least 6 months before Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear device and that, even at that, it would still be a crude one with an uncertain yield. This would indicate that Saddam Hussein has not yet taken all of the preliminary steps to design and prepare the non-nuclear parts of a nuclear device. I have not, however, been privy to these intelligence documents and I do not know how firm that assessment is, but there is strong evidence that Saddam Hussein was actively pursuing the long-term option before August 2, which was an unmistakable signal of his interest in nuclear armaments. It would be imprudent to assume, therefore, that he is not now actively pursuing the short-term option. Indeed, we saw that there was an effort to obtain the triggers that would be used in nuclear weapons in Great Britain last March. I think all of us wondered why he was looking for nuclear weapon triggers when it would be so many years before he might have the nuclear material that he could produce himself. Perhaps he was indeed considering the short-term option.

Most observers, including myself, have tended to dismiss the importance of Iraq obtaining a single nuclear device. We have noted and have heard again this morning that for Iraq to use such a weapon would be suicidal, given our retaliatory potential. We pointed out that Iraq would not only lack the skills and experience to mount the device on a missile, but would probably be unable to deliver the weapon beyond its borders by aircraft, since these would have little chance of penetrating U.S., Saudi, and Israeli air defenses. Furthermore, the possibility that the device, which would be untested in its final form, could fizzle is another factor reducing the ominousness of this threat.

While there is some validity to these arguments, I now believe that they understate the gravity of the "single bomb" scenario. I think the easiest way to appreciate this is to ask what the reaction would be if Iraq refused the IAEA inspection scheduled for next fall and U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to advise the President or this committee of the whereabouts of Iraq's nuclear weapons material. Surely this would be considered a matter of the utmost seriousness, even if only one nuclear device were at issue.

We know the border between Jordan and Iraq is porous. Could we be confident that the nuclear device had not been smuggled out of Iraq to an unknown destination, perhaps in Europe? Could we be confident that Saddam Hussein had not used a civilian airliner to move the device abroad without detection? How would this uncertainty affect our willingness to begin hostilities? How would they affect our allies? Other nuclear scenarios could also be imagined that would be most disturbing.

We must also ask whether Saddam Hussein would be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq continued to attack Tehran with missiles, even though Iran was able to respond in kind; similarly, Iraq continued to use chemical weapons, even after Iran began to use them in response.

Today, moreover, all of us perceive that the invasion of Kuwait was the decision of Saddam Hussein, not the decision of the Iraqi people. Would we be prepared to kill thousands of Iraqi civilians as a response to his use of a nuclear device? Would we want to break the nuclear taboo ourselves at a time when we are seeking to establish a more peaceable world order that shuns weapons of mass destruction?

While the short-term Iraqi nuclear threat thus deserves to be taken considerably more seriously perhaps than it has been to date, it, too, need not propel us to war with that country. This threat does, however, introduce factors that should be addressed if the alternative of allowing sanctions to work is to be pursued over the next 12 to 18 months.

The key is maintaining confidence that we would learn of any attempt by Iraq to implement the single bomb scenario in time to stop it by military action. Today, U.S. intelligence agencies appear to be confident that Iraq has not completed the preliminary steps that would be necessary for constructing a nuclear device. At the same time, however, they apparently fear that such steps might be taken over the next 6 months. From that point on, and perhaps even before, the best means for retaining confidence that Iraq is not developing a nuclear device would be through frequent IAEA inspections of the nuclear material that we are worried about, so that we would have enough time to be aware of a diversion and still take action before the bomb might be in hand.

This could mean that what we need are inspections that might occur twice monthly, which would be quite onerous. It is not unheard of. There are installations around the world where there are continuous inspections. Perhaps we could have some kind of random inspection system that averaged out one inspection per month, so Iraq could never be sure when the inspectors would arrive. Whatever the choices, though, we should be pegging the frequency of inspection to the time that would be required for Iraq to take advantage of this option.

I would stress, in addition, however, that U.S. intelligence capabilities may be able to offer timely assurance that Iraq is not diverting weapons grade nuclear material, material whose current whereabouts are known. This would provide a suitable alternative to increased IAEA visits and would not require Iraqi cooperation. I am not able to assess the adequacy of our intelligence gathering capabilities in this regard. But I would urge the committee to do so as you pursue your deliberations. If, on the basis of increased IAEA inspections or by means of U.S intelligence gathering, the short-term threat of Iraqi nuclearization can be minimized, then concerns over this threat should not be grounds for rejecting the sanctions option.

I would like to pause here for a moment. There were some statements earlier on the panel about the possibility of additional weapons grade nuclear material having found its way to Iraq. I believe statements by administration officials earlier this week clouded that issue to some degree. There was a statement by Mr. Eagleburger in Monterrey, Mexico, implying that there might have been nuclear material that the IAEA did not observe. I think Marlin Fitzwater made a similar statement.

I understand that Wednesday, Mr. Boucher of the State Department did offer a clarification at a briefing. He stated that, and I will quote: "The International Atomic Energy Agency has announced that its recent inspection of Iraq found no evidence that Iraq's safeguarded nuclear material had been diverted from peaceful uses. We are satisfied that the IAEA inspection has adequately accounted for Iraq's known supplies of nuclear material. Nonetheless, we are concerned that Iraq has engaged in covert nuclear activities which could have significance for nuclear weapons development. These activities would not necessarily be subject to IAEA safeguards."

I believe that the "activities" he is referring to are the R&D on uranium enrichments that is the key to the long-term scenario. Those activities are not subject to IAEA safeguards because they are not appropriately subject to safeguards. Presumably there is no nuclear material there yet. But I think the statement is intended to state that, at least from the administration's point of view, all known supplies of nuclear material in Iraq were adequately accounted for. So, while there is always the possibility that Iraq has secret quantities of material that no one is aware of, I think it is not the administration's position, as I understand it, that such materials exist today.

What if we lack confidence in our ability to monitor Iraq's nuclear behavior? Here the choice, I would say, is more difficult. Again, I would not consider this to be a factor that should necessarily tip the balance toward military action today. But with each passing month, Iraq's potential to manufacture a nuclear device quickly would increase, adding substantially to our anxieties about Saddam Hussein's intentions. These uncertainties would have to be given increased weight in deciding between sanctions on the one hand and military action on the other as time passes.

In conclusion, both Iraq's long-term and short-term nuclear potential are deeply disturbing, and U.S. policy must address the risks that they present. Military action is plainly the most effective means for reducing these dangers, but it is not the only alternative available. We have just heard the President, of course, pursuing the diplomatic option very aggressively at the moment. Under these circumstances, the Iraqi nuclear threat deserves to be treated as an important factor in evaluating the options for future U.S. action in the Gulf. But, for the moment, it does not appear to be one that is decisive. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spector follows:]

Testimony

of

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Last week, after months of saying little on the issue, President Bush and his senior advisors suddenly began to voice deep concerns about the Iraqi nuclear threat. The immediate response on the part of specialists like myself was to accuse the Administration of overstating the danger of Iraqi nuclearization, which appeared no more imminent than it had when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2 of this year. Implicitly or explicitly most of us commenting on this matter suggested that President Bush was seeking to bolster his case for military intervention in the Gulf by playing to the public's anxieties over Iraq's nuclear potential, anxieties which had been recently highlighted in a New York Times opinion poll.

In retrospect, I believe that the furor over the Administration's statements clouded careful consideration of the issue and that a second, more dispassionate look at this question is needed. In the end, I do not believe that Iraq's nuclear potential should necessarily push us into war, but I believe it poses a threat of considerable gravity that must be taken into account by Congress and the Administration as they determine our next moves in the Gulf.

I.

The dangers that would be posed if Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear arms in the years ahead hardly need elaboration. Such weapons would dramatically increase Iraq's ability to intimidate its neighbors; would seriously constrain the capacity of the United States to defend its interests in the region; would make possible the wholesale destruction of oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia and other nearby states; and would expose Israel to the threat of nuclear terror. In the nearer term, Saddam Hussein's possession of even a single nuclear device would provide a potent political symbol and could have disturbing military consequences that I will discuss shortly.

During the past week, the testimony presented to this Committee has framed two principal alternative courses of action for the United States in the Gulf: going to war against Iraq early in 1991 or waiting, for a year to eighteen months, to determine whether the economic sanctions that have been imposed against Iraq will force it to leave Kuwait without further hostilities. How should Iraq's nuclear potential be weighed in deciding between these options?

Iraq's nuclear program poses two distinct threats, one that is perhaps five years distant and one that could well emerge during the next year -- conceivably in six month's according to Administration sources quoted in recent press accounts. Both threats must be taken seriously.

II.

The most difficult step in manufacturing a nuclear weapon is acquiring the weapons-grade nuclear material for the core of the device. The long-term Iraqi nuclear threat is posed by Iraq's on-going program to develop the capability to produce such material indigenously. Eventually, this effort will allow Iraq to build a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. As detailed in the attachment to this statement, Iraq is making important progress toward developing this capability, even if the country remains years away from acquiring a nuclear force.

There is no question that Iraq was pursuing this effort aggressively before the invasion of Kuwait and, even though the UN embargo has terminated Iraq's access to relevant high-technology imports, few question that Saddam Hussein is attempting to push this effort forward with whatever matériel is now on hand. Nor can there be any doubt that if Saddam Hussein remains in power after the Gulf Crisis he will continue to pursue this program to fruition with all the resources at his disposal. Eventually, we must assume that he will succeed.

Presumably, if Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait in the next year or so as part of a negotiated settlement of the crisis, Iraq will continue to be subject to an embargo aimed at curtailing its access to nuclear-related technology and equipment. Unfortunately, even though such an embargo is likely to be tighter than the export control regime that existed prior to August 2, it will inevitably have weaknesses that Iraq, with its long history of clandestine high-tech purchases, will be able to exploit. One frailty in the embargo that can be anticipated even now is that newly privatized concerns in Eastern Europe will be aggressively seeking customers with hard currency, while export control systems in their home countries are likely to be very rudimentary.

It is also likely that an embargo against sales to Iraq of advanced aircraft, heavy tanks, and similar offensive weapons will continue after any negotiated settlement that leaves Saddam Hussein in place. While this will undoubtedly weaken the country's conventional forces, it is likely at the same time to intensify Baghdad's appetite for nuclear weapons as a means to maintain -- and, indeed, enlarge -- the country's overall military capabilities.

Stated simply, it must be assumed that if Saddam Hussein remains in power he will acquire nuclear arms at some point in the years ahead, a development that would carry the gravest consequences for global stability.

This conclusion, however, does not mean that war is the only means of addressing the long-term Iraqi nuclear threat. It has been widely suggested that if the economic stranglehold that has been imposed on Iraq is successful, it could well lead to an internal upheaval there that would bring to power new leaders, prepared to withdraw from Kuwait and to end Iraq's aggressiveness in the region. In such a context, as part of a settlement of the crisis, the United States should be able to demand and obtain credible assurances that Iraq's new leaders will end the country's pursuit of nuclear arms -- and, in particular, that they will not construct the sensitive nuclear plants associated with such weapons.

To put the point succinctly, the ouster of Saddam Hussein may well be essential to avert the long-term Iraqi nuclear threat, but war is not the only means for achieving this result. Moreover, there would be sufficient time -- at least a number of years -- before this threat could come to fruition. This would permit the United States to pursue the sanctions option initially, while holding the military option in reserve.

III.

The short-term nuclear threat must also be recognized, however. This threat stems from the fact that Saddam Hussein already possesses sufficient weapons-grade uranium to permit him to fabricate one nuclear device. The material is in the form of fuel supplied in years past by France and the Soviet Union. As detailed in the attachments to this statement, the material would have to be processed and then fabricated into weapon components before such a device could be readied. These steps would probably take a number of weeks at least and possibly longer.

The material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection because Iraq is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Last week the IAEA conducted its regular inspection of the material and determined that it had not been tampered with.

Unfortunately, the inspections are carried out at six-month intervals. This means that if at some point in the future Iraq secretly completed all of the steps necessary for the design and fabrication of a nuclear weapon except those involving the nuclear-weapons material, Iraq could wait until the IAEA had completed an inspection and then take the final steps needed to build a device without fear of being detected by the IAEA for a number of months.

The U.S. intelligence community, according to recent press accounts, has indicated that Iraq will be unable to build a nuclear device for at least six months, and even then the device would be a crude one with uncertain yield. This would indicate that Saddam Hussein has not yet taken all of the preliminary steps to design and prepare the non-nuclear parts of a nuclear device. However, given the strong evidence that he was actively pursuing the long-term nuclear option prior to August 2 -- an unmistakable signal of his interest in nuclear armaments -- it would be imprudent to assume that he is not now actively pursuing the short-term option. Indeed, Iraq's attempt to smuggle parts for nuclear-weapon triggers out of Great Britain last March suggests that efforts have been under way for some time to design nuclear weapon components and acquire the non-nuclear components for nuclear arms.

Most observers, myself included, have tended to dismiss the importance of Iraq's obtaining a single nuclear device. We noted, for example, that for Iraq to use a single weapon would be suicidal, given the nuclear retaliatory potential of the United States, Britain, France, and Israel. We also pointed out that Iraq would not only lack the skills and experience to mount the device on a missile, but would also be unable to deliver the weapon beyond its borders by aircraft, since these would have little chance of penetrating U.S., Saudi, and Israeli air defenses. And, the device, which would be untested in its final form, might fizzle, another factor reducing the ominousness of this threat.

While there is a certain validity to these arguments, I now believe that they understate the gravity of the "single bomb" scenario. The easiest way to appreciate this is to ask what the reaction would be if Iraq refused the IAEA inspection scheduled for next fall and U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to advise the President or this Committee of the whereabouts of Iraq's nuclear-weapons material. Surely, this would be considered a matter of the utmost seriousness.

We know the border between Jordan and Iraq is porous. Could we be confident that the nuclear device had not been smuggled out of Iraq to an unknown destination, perhaps in Europe? Could we be confident that Saddam Hussein had not used a civilian airliner to move the device abroad without detection? How would this uncertainty affect our willingness to begin hostilities?

We must also ask whether Saddam Hussein would be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq continued to attack Tehran with missiles, even though Iran was able to respond in kind, and Iraq continued to use chemical weapons, even after Iran began to use them in response. Today, moreover, all of us perceive that the invasion of Kuwait was the decision of Saddam Hussein, not of the Iraqi people. Would we be prepared to kill thousands of Iraqi civilians as a response to his use of a nuclear device? Would we want to break the nuclear taboo, ourselves, at a time when we are seeking to establish a more peaceable world order that shuns weapons of mass destruction?

While the short-term Iraqi nuclear threat thus deserves to be taken more seriously, it need not propel us to war with that country. It does, however, introduce factors that should be addressed if the alternative of allowing sanctions to work is to be pursued over the next twelve to eighteen months.

The key issue is maintaining confidence that we would learn of any attempt by Iraq to implement the single-bomb scenario in time to stop it by military action. Today, U.S. intelligence agencies appear to be confident that Iraq has not completed the preliminary steps that would be necessary for constructing a nuclear device. At the same time, however, they apparently fear that such steps might be taken over the next six months. From that point on the best means for retaining confidence that Iraq is not developing a nuclear device would be through frequent IAEA inspections. Given that the time that Iraq would probably need to process its nuclear-weapons material and fabricate a nuclear device can be measured in weeks, fortnightly IAEA inspections would be needed to provide full reassurance that Iraq was not pursuing the single-bomb scenario, although a randomized inspection regime that averaged one IAEA visit per month might also do the job.

I would stress in addition, however, that U.S. intelligence capabilities may also be able to offer timely assurance that Iraq is not diverting weapons-grade nuclear material, material whose current wherabouts is well known. This would provide a suitable alternative to increased IAEA visits, and one that would not require Iraqi cooperation. Although I am not able to assess the adequacy of U.S. intelligence activities in this regard, I would urge the Committee to do so as you pursue your deliberations. If on the basis of increased IAEA inspections or by means of U.S. intelligence-gathering the short-term threat of Iraqi nuclearization can be minimized, concerns over this threat should not be grounds for rejecting the sanctions option.

What if we lack confidence in our ability to monitor Iraq's nuclear behavior? Here the choice is more difficult. I would not consider this to be a factor that should necessarily tip the balance toward military action today. However, with each passing month, Iraq's potential to manufacture a nuclear device quickly would increase, adding substantially to our anxieties about Saddam Hussein's intentions. These uncertainties would have to be given increasing weight in deciding between sanctions and military action as time passes.

IV.

Both Iraq's long-term and short-term nuclear potential are deeply disturbing, and U.S. policy must address the risks they present. Military action is plainly the most effective means for reducing these dangers, but it is not the only alternative available. Under these circumstances, the Iraqi nuclear threat deserves to be treated as an important factor in evaluating the options for future U.S. action in the Gulf, but for the moment, it does not appear to be one that is decisive.

The "Long Term" Scenario: Iraq Builds Capability to Produce Nuclear Weapons Material

Over the Next 5+ Years Iraq Constructs Facilities Needed to Manufacture Weapons-Grade Uranium and Builds A Small Nuclear Arsenal While Withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Steps	Comments
1. *Acquire natural uranium*	Status: Iraq already possesses substantial quantities of this material (yellowcake), purchased abroad during the late 1970s. It is also able to separate uranium from phosphates mined in the country, according to Administration sources. A recent press report states that Iraq is constructing a uranium mine, but this has been questioned.
2. *Build and operate a "conversion" plant to transform natural uranium into uranium hexafluoride*	Uranium hexafluoride is the material that is processed in an "enrichment plant" (see below) after being heated into a gas. Status: No such plant is known to exist in Iraq. Iraq is also said by Administration sources to lack the ability to produce fluorine in quantity, as required for such a plant. Foreign equipment and technical assistance would probably be needed to build such a facility. (Pakistan secretly imported such a plant between 1977 and 1980, with the help of a West German businessman.) After construction, additional time would be required to operate the facility to build up an initial inventory of uranium hexafluoride for further processing.
3. *Build and operate a "uranium enrichment" plant for improving natural uranium hexafluoride to weapons-grade*	Status: Iraq is known to be developing a uranium enrichment capability based on the gas centrifuge method. Iraq has obtained blueprints for such a facility and the technology and equipment needed to produce some needed components in quantity. It apparently lacks other key components, however, and as noted above does not possess the means for producing the feed for such a facility, uranium hexafluoride. Constructing and operating a full-scale enrichment plant containing 1000 centrifuges or more would be a daunting technological challenge for which Iraq would undoubtedly seek additional assistance from foreign sources. Pakistan required more than a decade – from 1974 to 1986 – to master enrichment technology and complete its centrifuge enrichment plant. If Iraq is now testing prototype centrifuges, as some reports indicate, its program would be at the same stage as Pakistan's in 1976-77. After construction of the enrichment plant, a year or so would required to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium for a first nuclear device.
4. *Convert uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal*	Status: Iraq lacks such a conversion capability but would be able to use the conversion plant noted above for certain process steps.
5. *Design nuclear device (Concurrent with Steps 1-4)*	Iraq probably could develop either a "gun"-type device, or a somewhat more complex "implosion"-type device, which uses nuclear weapons materials more efficiently. If, like other emerging nuclear powers, Iraq did not want to conduct a nuclear test, this would place added demands on Iraq's design efforts in order to increase confidence that the design will work. Status: It is possible that Iraq has already developed a design, but there is no specific evidence of this in the published literature.
6. *Fabricate and test non-nuclear parts (Concurrent with Steps 1-4)*	This requires the manufacture of: the high-explosive portions (lenses) of the bomb, electronic detonators, neutron generators, reflectors, etc., all to exacting specifications. In addition, this step entails repeated testing, with elaborate electronic equipment, of these components in dummy nuclear weapons to ensure that they work together according to design. Iraq must also develop the means to attach the bomb to an aircraft.

This step would require many months, and probably more than a year. It might also require the importation of certain controlled components or materials. This -- and Step 5 -- would not necessarily slow the overall program, however, since they could be conducted in parallel with the uranium enrichment effort.

Status: Iraq may have taken some of these steps already, but there is no specific evidence that it has done so in the published literature.

7. *Machine nuclear components and fabricate weapons*

This step would entail the manufacture of the nuclear cores for weapons and the final assembly, or near-final assembly, of the weapons themselves.

This step would probably require several weeks per device, but might be done more rapidly.

Note: Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the production of uranium hexafluoride and all further enrichment and conversion steps would have to be conducted under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection to verify that nuclear materials were not being diverted to military ends.

If Iraq acknowledged such activities and permitted IAEA oversight, it could, under the NPT, stockpile weapons-grade uranium, as long as the IAEA safeguards were applied to the material. Assuming it had secretly built the non-nuclear components in advance, it could then fabricate nuclear weapons rapidly in a crisis if it abrogated or withdrew from the treaty.

If Iraq proceeded clandestinely and did not declare that it was producing and processing these various materials, it would be in breach of the NPT.

The "Short Term" Scenario: Iraq Misappropriates Declared Nuclear Materials

Iraq Seizes Weapons-Grade Uranium Currently Under International Atomic Energy Agency Inspection and Fabricates a Single, Untested Nuclear Weapon

Steps

Comments

1. *Design nuclear device*

Iraq probably lacks sufficient nuclear weapons material for a "gun"-type device, necessitating design of a somewhat more complex "implosion"-type device.

The limited quantity of weapons-grade material will preclude a full nuclear test, placing added demands on design efforts in order to increase confidence that the bomb will work.

Time required: many months. Presumably some work of this kind has already taken place. It is possible that Iraq has already developed a design, but there is no specific evidence of this in the open literature.

2. *Fabricate and test non-nuclear parts*

This step requires the manufacture of: high-explosive portions (lenses) of the bomb, electronic detonators, neutron generators, reflectors, etc., all to exacting specifications. In addition, this step entails repeated testing of these components in dummy nuclear weapons, utilizing elaborate electronic equipment, to ensure that they work together according to design. Iraq must also develop the means to attach the bomb to an aircraft.

Time required: many months, probably over a year. Also may require importation of certain controlled components or materials. Iraq may have taken some of these steps already, but there is no specific evidence that it has done so in the published literature.

3. *Remove and process nuclear-weapons material*

Iraq is known to possess 12.3 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium (supplied by France) and several kilograms of 80% enriched uranium (supplied by the USSR). This is sufficient for 1 nuclear weapon.

The French uranium, in the form of lightly irradiated fuel plates, must be separated from its aluminum sheathing and radioactive waste substances must be removed. The uranium is already in metallic form.

	The Soviet uranium, in the form of uranium oxide fuel plates, must be similarly processed and also transformed into uranium metal.
	Time required: several weeks. All of the material is covered by IAEA safeguards; a recent inspection verified that none of this material had been tampered with. Iraqi removal of the uranium would be a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, if detected, would almost certainly provoke preemptive attack.
4. *Machine nuclear components and fabricate weapon*	Time required: Assuming that all preliminary design work, non-nuclear testing, and fabrication of non-nuclear parts were completed in advance, probably several weeks, but possibly a matter of days.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Spector. I am going to defer my time until Senator Glenn's normal rotation and would yield to Senator Glenn my time at this point since he has been very involved in this issue for a long time. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I have followed this matter since I have been in the Senate, and that has been some 16 years. I took it on at that time because it did not appear anybody was doing a lot in that area. So I have made matters of nuclear proliferation an issue of urgency all these years.

Sandy Spector, our witness, was on our staff of the Government Affairs Committee back in those days, following some of these matters, along with Dr. Weiss, who is behind me today. We continue to broaden our efforts to study and monitor proliferation. In fact, our latest work includes a monthly bulletin we publish in Governmental Affairs, "Proliferation Watch," which centers on Iraq this time. We have copies available here if anyone is interested in having it. "Proliferation Watch" details those countries that have supplied materials and/or equipment and/or technology to Iraq on unconventional technologies. We are not alone. Both Germany and France are significant exporters. So I agree with you. We should have done a lot in this area a long time ago. But we did not.

Having followed proliferation for some time and attending numerous briefings several times a year not only on Iraq but other places where there may be nuclear proliferation going on, I was really shocked when I heard some of the statements that implied a lot of things that I thought were not true. I thought they were overstatements.

The President, Mr. Eagleburger, and Mr. Fitzwater made statements. The President started off: "Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. That's why more and more your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency." Well, no one can quarrel with the fact that every day that goes by brings Saddam one day closer to a nuclear arsenal. But when is that? Is it in 15 years, 10 years, 5 years, 3 years? Whatever it is down the road, I cannot quarrel with the facts there.

The others are equally as meticulously correct with regard to fact. Secretary Cheney didn't go quite as far as the others. And Mr. Eagleburger: "It is not the case that all nuclear materials in Iraq are necessarily under IAEA safeguards." True enough. We have known that for years. That has not posed any problem. He added that, "the statements that have been made by the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President are based on fairly substantial evidence on our part that there is substantial unsafeguarded nuclear activity going on in Iraq." Well, okay. Safeguards deal with nuclear material; they don't deal with other "nuclear activity." So, once again, they are absolutely correct.

The following day, Marlin Fitzwater said the IAEA inspectors, "saw only what Iraq wants them to see. We don't believe they saw all the information." Once again, that's absolutely correct. There is no agreement that they would see everything, and we have known for years that they are getting miraging steel, they are trying to build centrifuges, they are trying to do all these things that we have followed for years.

So can I say that there was an absolute misstatement of fact, underlying fact? No, I cannot say that. But the overwhelming impression that was given by these administration statements is of an Iraq that is an imminent nuclear danger to us, almost immediately, and can be within just a very few months. That is what I quarrel with. That is the reason I spoke out publicly on it the other day and took disagreement toward such comments from the administration.

I think such statements are overblown. I publicly raised the question the other day as to whether the timing of these statements had something to do with public polls that reflected a growing rationale for attacking Iraq was justified by the looming possibility of an Iraqi nuclear threat. Fifty-four percent of the American people are more afraid of that issue than anything else. Now do I know the answer to that? No, I don't. But it raised enough hackles in some quarters of the committee that it was suggested that we have a special intelligence briefing that would address Iraqi proliferation and get us up to speed on the specifics of that situation.

We had that meeting in the early evening day before yesterday. Now, it was a very lively meeting. A transcript was taken of that meeting which I cannot release. It required a "Q" clearance to even be in that meeting, which is atomic clearance, which only very few staff members on Capitol Hill have and which Senators have. But if there can be any doubt as to what happened in that meeting and what the impression is of our intelligence experts who work on this day in and day out and who are up to speed on it as of today, I would just ask any Senator to go and read the transcript, read the questions, read the answers, and then give your impression and vote your own impression if that is required. I wish I could speak more on that. I cannot.

I come down to one final bottom line. Let's say that it all happens and he gets one bomb. Let's say the worst that we're talking about occurs and he gets one bomb. What's he going to do with the thing? Well, I should not term it a "bomb." It's a "nuclear device." Nobody has said so far a "bomb." It has been so referred to here, but that was a mistake. A nuclear device. Even the administration has said that if he had a device, that it would be that soon that a nuclear device would be coming into use, it would be of such size he probably would have to cart it around by truck.

Now, imagine an 18-wheeler that our forces, the Saudis, and everyone else sees driving down to Dhahran or the oil fields to do something down there. I think that just stretches the imagination a little too far. Now people who were critical of my comments the other day agreed that such a hypothetical situation is far-fetched, but you cannot guarantee that this is not true, and the intelligence people cannot tell us absolutely, 100 percent, that it is not true. Well, that approach, then, says they cannot guarantee me either that there isn't a nuclear weapon under the Capitol that is going to go off at 12:20 and we'd better get out of here, because they can't guarantee it 100 percent.

Nothing can be guaranteed to that level. But through the years all of the best estimates are that we are still on the right track, that Iraq is quite a ways from having nuclear weapons, that they have not developed the indigenous capability to enrich fuel or separate plutonium to the extent that would be necessary for a real weapons program, and that they have not been able to clandestinely smuggle in any weapons grade nuclear material from any other source. Then can you guarantee that they have not? No, I cannot guarantee. But every intelligence estimate cannot rely on a 100 percent guarantee basis, such estimates are made using the best intelligence that people have at that time.

So I would repeat what I said the other day. I think this thing has been overblown. For what purpose I cannot say. You are going to have to ask other people on that one. But all of the information that this committee developed out of our hearing the other day was such that I just don't see how any Senator can go and read that transcript and not arrive at the same conclusion that I do.

Now, I am very concerned about Iraq and their development of nuclear weapons. But if we are to make this a policy of the United States, that everywhere nuclear weapons are developed we're going to send in a lot of troops and attack, we're going to have a lot of places around the world to where we're going to have to send 400,000 people pretty quickly. I can tell you that. It's not all in Iraq.

How about Pakistan? We won't even cut off aid to Pakistan when we have known for years what they are doing. And every year I bring it up in the Senate for a vote and every year I lose badly. I get about 30 or 32 votes. I think we got 35 votes one year, 35 votes in favor of cutting off aid to a nation where we know what they are doing with regard to nuclear weapons. We could not even get the administration to say no, we will not certify this year that they don't have a bomb. We can't even get them to do that, and I get the same briefings that they get, basically.

So, if we are going to start off with every place that may be developing a bomb where there may be material brought in clandestinely, that may possibly be developing a nuclear capability, then we could tick off quite a number of nations, at least half a dozen, that we had better be watching very closely and be getting ready to send in the troops. I am very concerned about this. I am as concerned as the President, as Marlin Fitzwater, as Larry Eagleburger, and everybody else about this. I do not want to see this develop over the long haul. But I think that unfairly raising the specter of the danger of an immediate attack is just not realistic.

One other thing, Mr. Chairman. I know that I'm over my time already and I have not even asked a question. I will just use this as a statement time. If Saddam Hussein really wants to use weapons of mass destruction, he has thousands of tons of chemical weapons that he has shown he knows how to use. Just as a curiosity the other day, I asked for the wind patterns in the Persian Gulf. Do you know where the wind patterns in the Persian Gulf are? Here they are, month by month (indicating). The wind patterns basically are from the northwest to the southeast; from Iraq and Kuwait, south.

Now, if he wants weapons of mass destruction, he already has thousands upon thousands of artillery shells and ways of delivering chemical agents, as he did in the war against Iran. Why on earth would Saddam Hussein trot out something and we'd see it as a threat that has to be carted around in a great big truck? I don't know what he's going to do with it when and if he gets it, and if he sets it off against our 25,000 or 30,000 nuclear weapons that we could rain on him, we could dig a trench from Basra to Baghdad that he can't even fill up. We could irradiate his whole country, if he wants to do that.

They say he watches CNN. I guess we're on CNN today. I hope we are anyway. Send him a message today. That's what Dave Jones did the other day. If he wants weapons of mass destruction, he already has them in supplies and with us having, at best, not a very good capability to cope with them. Even our people in the field over there admit that. And here are the wind patterns. That is his weapon of mass destruction, not some artificial reason drawn up here that expands beyond what the real threat is at the moment.

So, Mr. Chairman, I will wait until the second round to ask my questions. That was obviously a statement and not a question. But I thought it was important to get that on the record.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. Let me say that we are 10 minutes this time on each rotation. It is my feeling that there are people who are going to want to go into detail on this and that we're going to have to have 10 minutes. Since we don't have everybody here today, that should allow us to do it. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, like you, I would like to defer the opening round of questions to Senator Thurmond, who is the ranking member of our subcommittee which deals most directly with this very important subject. Senator Thurmond.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, how long do I have?

Chairman NUNN. 10 minutes.

Senator THURMOND. How long was Senator Glenn's time? Did he take 10 minutes?

Chairman NUNN. That's my understanding.

Senator THURMOND. I just want equal time. That's all.

Chairman NUNN. I'll say this. Senator Thurmond will get exactly the length of time that Senator Glenn got, whatever that was.

Senator GLENN. Who was timing? How much time did I have? Somebody was timing back there, I hope.

Chairman NUNN. I think it was 10 minutes.

Senator GLENN. 10 minutes? Okay. I thought I went longer than that. I just got a lot in, I guess.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN COMMUNITY

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Graham, you have served in government for a number of years, including as Science Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush. Can you tell us whether there are substantial disagreements between intelligence analysts on this issue and nuclear weapons lab experts?

Dr. **Graham**. The answer to your question is yes, Senator Thurmond. I believe part of the frustration that your committee and Senator Glenn just reflected on this issue can be found in what I view as a major disconnect today between the intelligence community, on the one hand, which is expert at analyzing countries, and the nuclear weapons design community, on the other hand, which is expert in the technology of nuclear weapons.

I understand that you have been briefed by the intelligence community and I know that they do talk to the nuclear weapons design community. Nevertheless, I think there is a serious disconnect here, and I would strongly recommend that in a classified "Q" cleared session your committee call the members of the Nuclear Intelligence Panel, which include both current and past directors of our nuclear design laboratories, and ask them the questions about both the near-term and the far-term Iraqi capability. Ask them if it would take a truck to carry the nuclear weapons that the Iraqis could build today. Ask them if the Iraqis could build one, or if not one, what the number is. By all means, ask them how soon they could do it. I think you would find that discussion extremely informative.

REVIEWING ACCELERATED SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator **Thurmond**. I would like to ask this question of all three members of the panel—Dr. Graham, I will take you first, then I will go to Mr. Milhollin and then Mr. Spector. Because of the invasion of Kuwait, do you believe it is necessary to now consider certain accelerated scenarios for the Iraqi development of nuclear weapons which before were considered unlikely?

Dr. **Graham**. Senator, I think that gets to the motivational issue that the Iraqis and Saddam Hussein in particular have. I think it is clear to everyone that his motivation today to be able to challenge the United States is stronger than ever before. So I think there is great merit in reviewing scenarios which, in the past, we might have considered less likely in different circumstances; that is, the circumstances of Iraq not confronted with the massive Western deployment and Arab deployment across the territory of Kuwait. I think it is an excellent suggestion.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Milhollin, do you want me to repeat that or do you understand the question?

Mr. **Milhollin**. Perhaps you had better repeat it, Senator.

Senator **Thurmond**. Because of the invasion of Kuwait, do you believe it is necessary to now consider certain accelerated scenarios for the Iraqi development of nuclear weapons which before were considered unlikely? You don't have to elaborate too much. My time is limited. Just go ahead.

Mr. **Milhollin**. I would say that the motivation might be higher. But I think perhaps the capability might be lower. The embargo has resulted in taking a lot of people out of Iraq who probably were in a position to help Saddam Hussein. Certainly it cut off a lot of things coming in that he was relying on. So it is hard to know whether the fact of the invasion has made it easier or more difficult for him to make nuclear weapons.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Spector?

Mr. **Spector**. I would think the invasion of Kuwait does require you to take the short-term scenario more seriously. Most of us assumed prior to this that Saddam Hussein was going to work through the long-term option and try to stay in everybody's good graces by not tinkering around with IAEA safeguarded materials. Now I think we have to accept the possibility that he will seize these materials, at least as a threat that must be scrutinized carefully.

ABILITY OF IRAQ TO CREATE A NUCLEAR DEVICE

Senator **Thurmond**. I am going to ask all of these questions of all three of you. So that I won't have to repeat them, please listen to them carefully. Dr. Edward Teller said in the spring of 1945 that it was possible to go from available material to a device in 3 months by highly capable and dedicated people who had virtually no idea of what they were doing. Would Iraq be able to do that? Dr. Graham?

Dr. **Graham**. Yes, Senator. In fact, I believe there is no reason to take that as the shortest time that Iraq could do it. Forty-five years of technology has occurred since that was done the first time.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Milhollin?

Mr. **Milhollin**. With the material that has been stated is available to Saddam Hussein, I think it is very doubtful that he could make any kind of device that would work, even in a year.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Spector?

Mr. **Spector**. This issue is reflected in the safeguards standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. They, I believe, assume that a country could transfer weapons grade material into a nuclear weapon in a matter of weeks. So I think we have to assume that this is a distinct possibility and that the timeframe of 3 months might be the outer boundary; Saddam Hussein might well be able to do it in less time.

Mr. **Milhollin**. May I respond to that Senator? Would that be possible, at this time?

Chairman **Nunn**. I would be glad to yield Senator Thurmond some additional time. Don't take this out of his time.

Mr. **Milhollin**. The agency's time for inspection depends on how much material it is inspecting. If it were inspecting 25 kilograms of high enriched uranium, then the time would be shorter and we would see the agency going back every 3 weeks or so. But the fact is that the material is not up to that level. That is why we don't have more frequent inspections in Iraq than we presently do.

COMMERCIAL OIL WELL LOGGING DEVICE AS A NEUTRON GENERATOR

Senator THURMOND. Is it true that a commercial oil well logging device could serve as a neutron generator for initiating an Iraq bomb? Dr. Graham?

Dr. GRAHAM. Let me give you a tentative answer, Senator. I believe that is correct. I would like to take it for the record and double check. But there certainly are commercial devices available that could serve that purpose.

[The information referred to is classified and will be retained in the executive files of the committee.]

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Milhollin?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. The answer is yes. You can use a neutron generator that is used for well logging to detonate a nuclear weapon. But I think in Iraq, it is more likely that they would use beryllium and polonium for that purpose.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Spector?

Mr. SPECTOR. I really don't know the answer to that question.

DELIVERY OF DEVICE BY AN AIRLINER

Senator THURMOND. So far, the assumption has been that the Iraqis would have to use a bomber or a missile to deliver a device. What about an airliner?

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes, again, Senator. Most commercial airliners could carry the largest device that anyone can imagine the Iraqis producing. At the same time, I would also go back to my point about discussion with the Nuclear Intelligence Panel about sizes of devices.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Milhollin?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. Yes. I think you could push a large device out of an airliner. But I think also it could be that certain military aircraft have large bomb bays and could handle the size of device that Iraq is producing.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Spector?

Mr. SPECTOR. Yes. I would also agree that an airliner is a possibility. One other piece of evidence about sizing comes from the design that the Swedish nuclear establishment developed in 1958. That was a device weighing only 1,300 pounds, I believe. That was 30 years ago.

VIEWS REGARDING THE FPI INTERNATIONAL REPORT

Senator THURMOND. I hold in my hands a paper titled, "FPI International Report." The FPI Report is published in association with the International Security Council. Are you gentlemen familiar with that report?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. [Nods negatively.]

Dr. GRAHAM. [Nods negatively.]

Mr. SPECTOR. [Nods negatively.]

Senator THURMOND. The headline is, "Iraq Seen Already Having Nuclear Capability." "Iraq may now have the capability of deploying a couple of Hiroshima- or Nagasaki-scale nuclear weapons according to a number of analysts. These observers believe that, although Israeli pilots managed to destroy Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in their surprise bombing raid in June 1981, they did not destroy separately stored, already manufactured enriched uranium that amounts to enough to make about two 20-kiloton bombs. These are roughly the size of the weapons used against Japan in 1945."

"Jed Snyder, Director of Washington Strategic Seminars and a former government official who dealt with nuclear issues in the Reagan administration, told the New York City Tribune on November 12 that Iraq probably has enough for two nuclear weapons from material not destroyed in the Israeli raid. Snyder is a consultant at the Office of the Secretary of Defense but says his judgment is based on unclassified material."

Retired General Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Conservative Leadership Conference in Washington recently that he thinks the Iraqis have the material to fabricate several nuclear weapons. He said if he were now in his old job of intelligence chief at the Pentagon, and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared that he had nuclear weapons and threatened to use them, "I could not tell the Joint Chiefs, 'Don't worry. He is lying.' He just might have that capability," said the General.

"Graham said at the conference that it was known Iraq managed to save some of its nuclear weapons materials from the Israeli bombers, and these would be enough to make several nuclear bombs. He said Iraqi engineers might be able to put a rudimentary nuclear bomb atop a larger ballistic missile and threaten Israel or U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia."

"Leonard Spector, a nuclear proliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment and author of the recent book, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,* was recently quoted as saying,"—that's you, Mr. Spector—"that Iraq has sufficient fissile material for at least a single nuclear bomb." Did they quote you correctly?

Mr. **SPECTOR**. I think that's correct.

Senator **THURMOND**. "Seth Carus, a military analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Iraq likely has enough fissile material for one or two nuclear bombs."

Mr. Chairman, I won't take time to read this whole article, but I would ask unanimous consent that the rest of it be placed in the record.

Chairman **NUNN**. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

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Government officials would not comment on the issue, apart from noting that Iraq has been actively working to acquire nuclear weapons. The analysts said that by any rational risk calculation Hussein should not threaten, let alone use, such a tiny number of nuclear weapons given that the United States, Britain, France and Israel all have major inventories with which they could retaliate with massively disproportionate strikes at Iraq. But they cautioned that Hussein has shown a past propensity for high-risk gambles, so such a nuclear threat should not be ruled out completely.

"He [Hussein] has put his whole regime in jeopardy by the Kuwait invasion on the gamble that the United States would just posture. Maybe he would threaten a nuclear weapon on the same gamble that we would just posture," one administration analyst told the *Free Press International*.

The official also said there are reports of Iraq possessing a so-far undisclosed potential nuclear delivery system — a number of Soviet supplied SS-12 Scaleboard intermediate-range missiles. He said the Soviets proliferated these intermediate-range missiles more than previously known.

The official said if the reports are confirmed, those missiles would add considerably to Iraq's capabilities against allied forces in the Gulf. Any SS-12s equipped with nuclear, chemical or high-explosive warheads would be "far more threatening" against military targets than SCUD-type missiles.

The Washington Post reported in the spring of 1988 that Iraq possessed SS-12 missiles and that some of these were being fired against Iran, but most reports of that so-called "war of the cities" said that it was conducted solely with SCUD-type missiles.

Snyder told the *FPI* that he does not rule out the SS-12 report completely but that he is "a little skeptical." He said the Soviets are very alarmed about the proliferation of missiles of this range — which could be used against them — so it would be surprising if they supplied them to Iraq. The SS-12 would also require substantial continuing Soviet support, which he said he doubts they are giving.

Carus said he had no independent information on the SS-12 report but said that U.S. intelligence might fail to detect and identify such missiles. He noted that the now well-acknowledged presence of 72 SS-23 missiles in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria had come as a complete surprise earlier this year. "I do not have much confidence that we [U.S. intelligence] would know. They could have a couple of dozen well hidden from view," he said.

In a related development, U.S. defense experts noted recently that the Soviets may soften their stance on the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty because of increasing concerns about Third World ballistic missile threats.

The Soviets are reportedly considering allowing limited deployment of ground-based interceptors by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Keith Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy and a consultant to the director of SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, said the Soviets have more to fear than the United States from Third World missiles, because of their greater proximity to the Middle East.

"If you plot the arcs of the range of 2,000-km [1,250-mile] missiles you can see that large parts of the Soviet Union are covered ... There are many statements from the Soviets that they see this as a very real problem," said Payne.

Matthew Bunn, editor of *Arms Control Today*, the periodical of the Arms Control Association, said the Soviets are highly concerned about the threat from Third World missiles and might want to develop a number of Moscow-style missile defense systems to protect major urban areas.

He referred to Soviet suggestions that they would like to deploy up to five systems of the kind that the 1972 ABM treaty only allows around Moscow.

Moscow is defended against missile attack by 100 high-speed interceptor missiles designed to fly at high speed into the path of incoming missiles and destroy them.

Senator **Thurmond**. It goes on to explain that Iraq does have nuclear material. My time is about up, I think, isn't it?

Chairman **Nunn**. Yes. But I would give the witnesses some time, if you would like to get their comments on that. I would give you extra time for that, Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Graham, would you care to comment on the opinions expressed by those various people?

Dr. **Graham**. It is very difficult for me to comment in an unclassified hearing on those comments, Senator Thurmond, much as I would like to. What I would like to do instead is just say that I will respond to you on that subject. While I do not disagree with the thrust of those comments, I think more can be said about it. What I would like to do is respond to you in writing, if I may, at the classified level, the "Q" cleared level, and also, once again, recommend that you discuss that subject in a classified hearing with the Nuclear Intelligence Panel.

Senator **Thurmond**. Could you do that pretty quickly and get it to us?

Dr. **Graham**. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to is classified and will be retained in the executive files of the committee.]

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Milhollin?

Mr. **Milhollin**. I notice that I was left out of the persons quoted in that article. I think, I guess my response is that I don't agree with the statement that you could make a number of nuclear weapons with the amount of material that has been left over from the French supplies to the Osirak reactor. They only have 12.4 kilograms. It probably won't make one weapon in Iraq.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Spector?

Mr. **Spector**. I will stand by my previous statement that was quoted there.

Senator **Thurmond**. Yes, they quoted you in that. So I guess you stand by your statement, if it's correct.

Mr. **Spector**. That's right. The material is there. I don't believe that they have the bomb yet, and I think that was the purport of much of the testimony this morning.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Welcome to you, gentlemen. Let me start out by saying that I was very interested in the excellent statements and recap given by our friend and colleague, Senator Glenn, who has been foremost in this area for a long time.

I believe that the record will show that this Senator was one of those who publicly applauded the 1981 action by the Israelis when they went in and took out a facility that I thought needed to be taken out. I believe in each and every occasion, when measures to stop the proliferation of these kinds of materials have been offered by Senator Glenn on the floor of the U.S. Senate, I have been with him. I only say that to give a clear signal that this one Senator has been very much concerned about nuclear proliferation.

The overwhelming weight of the testimony that this committee has received this week from military experts has been along the lines that there is no reason for early offensive military action against Iraq until the embargo has been given a chance to work. When I talk about "early," I want to define that in my terms, at least, as the first 6 months of 1991.

Now, we are treading on potentially dangerous grounds here because there are those of us who have various information of a highly classified nature. Therefore, we have to be careful, I suggest, with not only our questions but also with the responses that we get from you.

I believe the reasons for these hearings from the beginning were to try to clarify as best we can what is the proper action in the Middle East for the United States at this particular juncture.

Now, trying to take this whole matter then out of academia, I think it is important to remember that Third World countries all around the world have been seeking and trying to get nuclear devices for a long time. I think we should also keep in mind that I think all of us are very much concerned about the long term—I emphasize the long term—concerns that I think we all have with regard to the possibilities of Iraq possessing a nuclear threat for an instant.

But, getting down to reality, the things that face us as Americans right now, I want to pose this question to each of you. From your knowledge—and I have no way of knowing how much knowledge each and every one of you has with regard to classified information—but from the knowledge that you have as to potential Iraqi nuclear facilities—do you believe that this fledgling nuclear capability is a reason to attack Iraq during the first 6 months of 1991?

I think the war drums are beating very heavily today. I think the testimony that you have given here today is going to be very widely distributed across the United States. What I am trying to do is to get some factual information, the bottom line, if you will, as to when you think, as experts in this area, we should be going to war.

I notice with great interest yesterday's statement by no less than the Vice President of the United States, with the full accord of the White House. If he is quoted correctly, the Vice President says the goals, with regard to Iraq, are saving the people of Kuwait from further barbarism, protecting the U.S. military from potentially greater casualties if Iraq President Saddam Hussein has more time to prepare for war, and protecting the world from "nuclear blackmail," if Iraq is allowed to develop such a capability.

NECESSITY OF U.S.-LAUNCHED ATTACK ON IRAQ

Again, we come back to the matter of timing. I guess the heavy weight that this one Senator is bearing right now—it is the most weighty decision that I have ever had to wrestle with in 20 years of public service—is whether it is necessary for the United States to launch an attack in the first 6 months of 1991 because of the potential nuclear capability of Iraq? Let's start with you, Mr. Milhollin.

Mr. MILHOLLIN. My answer is no, that it is not necessary to launch an attack on Iraq within the first 6 months of 1991 in order to achieve these three objectives of protecting Kuwait, protecting U.S. forces, and protecting the world against nuclear blackmail.

I would like to add to my response, if I could, by sending a message to the Iraqis, since it was suggested a moment ago that they may be watching. On Wednesday, I telephoned the Director of Safeguards at the International Agency and discussed the problem with him. He said that the agency stands ready to do monthly inspections or any frequency of inspections that Iraq requests, to assure the world that this material we have been talking about is not diverted. So I think that this short-term nuclear threat could be substantially diminished if the Iraqis simply invited the agency to come in every month, which the agency would do. So I hope that the Iraqis are watching and that they will ask the agency to come in on a monthly basis.

I would like to go ahead and elaborate a little bit more on my answer to your question. I think if we launch a war against Iraq to forestall the building of one crude device which might not work or be deliverable, we will certainly kill a lot of people in Kuwait. We will kill a lot of civilians; we will kill Iraqi soldiers; and we will kill our soldiers. We are certain to suffer those casualties. As I said already, the casualties one might suffer from an untested bomb will certainly be lower. I think protecting U.S. forces is not either a reason for attacking now because an untested bomb may never produce a single U.S. casualty, whereas a war certainly would.

Finally, to protect the world against nuclear blackmail, I think that problem is a long-term one that we are never going to solve with a war in the next 6 months. If we want to solve that problem, we are going to have to devote more resources in the intelligence community and otherwise to the problem of proliferation and stop treating it as a back burner issue, which we have done for the last 10 years.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you. Then your answer is no?

Mr. **Milhollin**. My answer is no.

Senator **Exon**. Dr. Graham?

Dr. **Graham**. Senator Exon, I believe when we look back on the history of this era from some time in the future, we will all conclude that it would have been very strongly in our interest to have destroyed the Iraqi nuclear weapon capability, chemical weapon capability, and biological weapon capability within the shortest time possible, and certainly within the next 6 months. Allowing despots such as Saddam Hussein to retain and develop weapons of mass destruction is, in my view, unconscionable and will eventually lead to widespread death, both in the Mideast and elsewhere, if he is allowed to continue.

I am not a military tactician. And so, when you say "warfare," I am not exactly sure what I would propose. But I suspect the destruction of those facilities does not necessarily involve massive tank charges across the Arabian desert. But it probably does involve substantial use of both manned and unmanned air resources.

Senator **Exon**. So your answer then is yes?

Dr. **Graham**. Emphatically, yes.

Senator **Exon**. Emphatically, yes. Mr. Spector?

Mr. **Spector**. I think my answer will be "not necessarily." I think you have a number of factors that have to be weighed in favor of going to war to eliminate other challenges to the United States. Plainly, one of the benefits of military action will be wiping out this nuclear capability that is so fearsome and, even though it is still in its incipient stages, so troubling for the long-term. I do not believe that it necessarily tips the balance. I think there are other factors that ought to loom higher on the agenda. But this should be weighed as one of a number of factors.

In particular, during the next 6 months, the short-term threat is probably not going to be upon us. The intelligence community has suggested 6 months or longer. So I think if you are only talking about the next 6 months, you can probably say that, in terms of a genuine threat, we are not going to have to confront one. But as months go on and we get to perhaps the year or 18 months that have been discussed as the time that would be needed to allow sanctions to work, then I think the threat of a weapon being in Saddam Hussein's hands becomes more serious. That is why in my testimony I urged that we have more frequent inspections of the materials, so that we can have greater confidence that they are not being misused. With that kind of inspection regime, I think we could tolerate holding back and letting the sanctions option go forward. But as I say, and as has been suggested, if you have military action, surely one of the objectives ought to be to take care of these capabilities.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I see that I have a no and a yes. What is your vote, Mr. Spector?

Mr. SPECTOR. When I said "not necessarily," I did not mean it facetiously. This is a factor which surely has to weigh in the balance. But I do not believe it is a decisive factor.

Senator EXON. So that is a yes, a no, and a maybe. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to agree with something that Mr. Milhollin said initially in his opening statement, that there has been little effort made to control the export of technology, including nuclear technology.

I also want to associate myself, at least in part, with what Senator Glenn has said, because he indeed has been a leader in the effort to try to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology, initially with India, in which I joined with him, and then with Pakistan. I might point out that the President has finally decided to cease aid to Pakistan. But it was not without substantial begrudging support that he came to that conclusion. We had a situation with Pakistan in which it was in violation of the Symington standard, which was seeking an enrichment capability. That was waived. We changed it with the Afghan loophole. It tried to illegally import from the United States material to build a bomb, the so-called Solarz standard. That apparently was waived. It very likely possesses a nuclear explosive device. The so-called Cranston standard there was about to be waived as well. I think what we are seeing is that we are paying the wages for our sins of the past in not seeking to prevent the export of this technology.

It also applies to chemical weapons. We knew for years—for years—that Iraq was building a chemical weapons capability. We knew from whom the help was being given. We did very little to prevent that at that time, not raising it to a public level of outcry. In fact, once they finally used it, we did little more than slap them on the wrist.

As a matter of fact, after they used the chemical weapons, not only did we not give them more than a verbal slap on the wrist, but we actually increased our trade with Iraq, to the point where they became our second largest trading partner in the Arab world. So I think we have a lot to account for in that respect.

The same might be said for Libya. We knew, for example, that the Germans were helping to supply the Libyans with a chemical weapons capability. And even though it was denied by the Germans at the very highest levels of government, nonetheless it went forward to the point where Libya now possesses a chemical weapons capability. So I think we have to do much more, as you have suggested, Mr. Milhollin, to prevent the export of this kind of technology.

We have been involved in what I would call a behavior modification program with respect to Saddam Hussein. This is a polite way of calling appeasement by another name. I think we have learned our lesson, hopefully, this time.

The problem that I have, however, with what is being discussed is that we are saying that we really cannot discuss the classified information because it is classified; and yet, we then render our personal opinions as to what that says. Saying, "if you would only read what we have read or if you would have access to it, you would come to the inevitable conclusions that we have come to, that there is incontrovertible evidence that Iraq does not possess the capability of developing a nuclear weapons device in the near-term," is something I have a problem with, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how we handle it, but it seems to me that we send a signal by saying that we have read the classified information and come to a conclusion that says they don't have that capability. There may be disagreement on that. I think whether one is watching CNN—which is getting one heck of a plug during the course of these hearings—or not, I think there is a division of opinion on that. But also, we have a situation in which we are pleading in the alternative.

Senator Glenn is not an attorney and I think he would thank heaven that he is not. He is sitting next to a couple of them, however. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. But he has been engaging, like many have been engaging, in what we call, "pleading in the alternative."

We say there is no evidence that Iraq can achieve a nuclear weapons capability in the near-term; that, in the alternative, even if he does, it's not sufficient to go to war over because there are plenty of nations around him that have a sufficient nuclear deterrent; and, besides, even if he would not be deterred, he already has sufficient weapons of mass destruction on hand. So we have had it three ways now: no evidence that; but even if he acquires it, it's not a sufficient threat because we have a nuclear deterrent; and, by the way, he's got plenty of weapons on hand that can cause us trouble.

It overlooks, I suggest very respectfully to my friend, Admiral Crowe, who testified just a day or so ago, that chemical weapons in all probability are not the weapons of choice for Saddam Hussein. I think that Admiral Crowe suggested that they are not nearly as mortal as a bomb or a bullet.

So to suggest on the one hand sending a message to Saddam Hussein that you have plenty of weapons of mass destruction, would then tend to counter what Admiral Crowe has indicated that there are problems with chemical weapons. Whether we are dealing with persistent chemicals or non-persistent, you also have the survivability, the potential survivability from chemicals that you do not have with bombs.

Saddam Hussein has already indicated that one of his plans would be to inflict as much large-scale damage upon U.S. forces in as short a period of time as possible very early on in any kind of conflict. That would not, in my judgment, rule out the use of one or two crude nuclear devices if he were able to acquire them. So I think we have to be a bit careful in how we approach this with respect to whether he would use them or not.

The fact that we have an adequate chemical weapons deterrence would not be sufficient, I would suggest, for us to respond in kind. It has been speculated that he might go to war and use chemical weapons against our forces. I have heard no witness, either public or private, suggest that we would retaliate in kind. So I am not sure that just because we have chemical weapons, that that necessarily would deter him from using them. And I am not satisfied that, just because he would have a crude nuclear device, that we would respond with nuclear weapons. I have not heard that advocated.

I would like to come back to the statement I read before, referred to in "Jane's," a Soviet intelligence review with respect to the missile that was fired off last year by Iraq. I would just take a moment to read what the "Jane's" publication states: "Initial reaction in the West to the reports concerning El Abid were confused. Western intelligence officials appear to have known nothing concerning the El Abid. Even when Iraq publicly announced the test 2 days after the launch, U.S. officials were unaware of the existence of El Abid, or that it had been fired, and, indeed, many U.S. officials were skeptical of reports themselves."

"As the United States scrambled to find out what had happened, a number of reporting errors were made. The U.S. Department of Defense claimed that the third stage of the booster went into a low earth orbit for several revolutions. Although this claim was incorrect, it clearly demonstrates the confused response by officials in the United States to the Iraqi launch."

"Although considerable work needs to be done before Iraq is able to place satellites into orbit, the development of a clustered motor is an impressive technical achievement."

I refer to this because I think we have to raise this issue with some degree of caution; that even though we now suspect or speculate or even conclude that they do not have that kind of capability, we have been proven wrong time and time again with respect to a variety of things that they have been able to achieve. They have surprised us time and time again with their technological capability. I think we have to take that into account as we debate this issue about the relevance and the importance of whether or not he has the capacity to go to a nuclear capability in the short-term or the long-term.

This brings me again to a sort of pleading in the alternative approach that has been adopted by a number of witnesses. On the one hand, it has been argued he does not have the capability to move to a near-term nuclear capability; that even if he did, it would not present that great a threat because we have adequate nuclear deterrence. The question I would like to raise is what would it do if he were to acquire, either near-term, mid-term, or long-term, let's say 5 years from now, a nuclear capability? This is for any of the witnesses. What would that do to the regional balance which we have talked about at great length during the course of these hearings?

What would that do to other nations? Would Saudi Arabia then feel under pressure to acquire some kind of tactical nuclear device, presumably produced by the West? Would Syria then be inclined to seek a similar capability? Would Egypt, Jordan, and down the line? Or would they then, as has been suggested by some, rely upon a U.S. umbrella? Would the United States have sufficient deterrent capacity to say that there is no need for the other nations in the region to have this capability? In every other facet of modern warfare, when one nation has acquired a capability the others then have to have it.

We had AWACS in the region; the Saudis needed to have it. We have had chemicals in the region; the Libyans had to have it. The Syrians had to have it. Iraq had to have it. So would those countries in that region be willing to accept a U.S. nuclear deterrent? I raise that point in conjunction with what has been our experience in Europe.

We have had a nuclear umbrella over all of NATO. Yet, how many on this committee have heard the issue of decoupling discussed over the years with respect to West Germany? The West Germans, one of our staunch allies—and I assume they continue to be, even though they have made a rather meager contribution to this effort in terms of the Persian Gulf crisis—nonetheless, the West Germans were not content to have this promise of a U.S. umbrella, as far as a nuclear deterrent. They demanded that we have as many as 200,000 or 300,000 troops in Europe as a tripwire, to make sure that we would not be decoupled. So I raise this as a potential.

U.S. UMBRELLA AS NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Is it going to be sufficient for the United States to say we have the deterrent over here in the event Saddam Hussein acquires a nuclear capability in the long-term? Mr. Milhollin, Dr. Graham, and Mr. Spector, would you respond.

Mr. MILHOLLIN. I think the real long-term threat to the regional balance is an independent manufacturing capability, rather than simply one bomb which may or may not work, which may or may not be made.

Once Iraq is able to make critical masses, that is, make equivalent quantities of high enriched uranium secretly, then you face the prospect that it is going out in the world where you don't know where it might wind up; you face the prospect of building an arsenal, which is really useful militarily, perhaps. I think if you are talking about building one bomb that might not work, what you have then is a target for other people to shoot at.

Saddam's practice has been to achieve independence. He was not simply content to import chemicals. He went on to import chemical-making factories. The same is true of his nuclear strategy. He wants to be able to build his own bombs, and a lot of them. If that happens, I think that it is going to drive other rival Arab States in the same direction. So I think that is something that we should do everything we can to prevent.

But I think it is fair to point out that Saddam is not the first link in the nuclear chain in the Middle East. If you hear what the Libyans and the Iraqis say about nuclear weapons, they say they are just trying to catch up with Israel. The United States and the West have tolerated Israel's program for a long time, and now we are beginning to see that it does not just stay in Israel, that it provokes reactions elsewhere. So, yes, it is a chain reaction, if you will. And I think we need to break the chain.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to deprive the other two witnesses of a chance to answer the question.

Chairman NUNN. Okay. Go ahead.

Dr. GRAHAM. Thank you. I would say, first, that Mr. Milhollin's statement, which he has repeated several times, that they could at most have one bomb of low reliability, is devoid of technical foundation. I won't go any further than that. But, again, I encourage you to go on to the classified level and a briefing that I do not believe you have yet had.

Second, I would say that within 5 years, your timeframe, the Iraqis, on their current course of ballistic missile development, will certainly have the ability not only to threaten their immediate neighbors, but to have an intermediate range ballistic missile capability, which will threaten all of Europe and part of Asia, and soon thereafter will have a ballistic missile capability that will threaten the United States as well. This is absolutely clear to the neighbors of Iraq today, as well as to the United States.

I think there is no doubt that, given our current national strategy of mutual assured vulnerability, where we are defenseless against ballistic missiles fired at us, at our cities, at our facilities anywhere in the world, the countries in the area and out of the area of Iraq will see the problem with the Iraq nuclear and ballistic missile capability as one which they can only contend with by having their own nuclear and ballistic missile capability.

We have seen brush fires of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation build around the world--China, India, and Pakistan are examples. I think we will see a firestorm of ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation occur within the next 5 years if Saddam Hussein is allowed to retain the capability that he is building today.

Mr. SPECTOR. Senator Cohen, I would say that we will probably see everything you have suggested. We will probably see proliferation; we will probably see an American alliance backed up by American nuclear deterrence and American forces in the region as part of that; and perhaps we will see tactical American nuclear weapons in the region.

There is already evidence, for example, that Iran is responding to the Iraqi nuclear potential. Admiral Brooks testified about 1½ years ago that Iran is now actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Syria is so far down the line technologically that it is going to be quite a while before it could move along. But are we going to feel comfortable protecting Syria in some alliance against Iraq? I doubt it. I think they are going to feel a bit naked.

Perhaps in terms of protecting Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Israel, deterrence might work and we might be able to bring it off. But there are going to be these other places to which the bomb will surely spread.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Cohen. I believe Senator Kennedy is next.

CHANGE IN IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me understand this correctly, what has changed in the Iraqi nuclear program in the last 5 months, or in our assessment of that program, to prompt the sudden dire warnings from the senior administration officials about the imminence of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability? I think I heard one of you make reference earlier in the questioning that it was really the judgment within the intelligence community that they had not anticipated the capability to move to a crash program. Am I correct on that? Let me hear from each of you what has changed? What has changed so dramatically? Or do you believe that things have not changed?

Mr. **Milhollin**. I think, first of all, if the invasion had not happened, we would be in a more dangerous situation today because Saddam Hussein would not be facing an embargo and he would be building away merrily in private, and our ineffective export control policies would still be in effect. So now we have the embargo, now we have the invasion. But I believe, as I said, the real threat from Iraq is the long-term threat of an independent manufacturing capability in 5 years. I do not see anything that indicates that that has changed since the date of the invasion, and certainly nothing has changed since the date of the New York Times poll on November 20 that seemed to trigger these remarks. So I guess I don't see a change.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you. Dr. Graham.

Dr. **Graham**. Senator Kennedy, I believe nothing has changed that I am aware of in terms of Iraq's potential technical capability to build nuclear weapons, both in the near-term and in the more distant-term. I do not speak for the intelligence community or for the administration, but, in my own personal view, if anything has changed, it is that since August 2, Saddam Hussein's motivation to be able to meet the United States with all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological—has probably increased.

Senator **Kennedy**. The technical capability has not, but the will has? Is that your answer?

Dr. **Graham**. Yes, Senator. In my view, the technical capability that he has now he has had over the last recent period of time.

That is not where any change has occurred that I am aware of. On the other hand, motivation is a very significant issue in this field.

Mr. SPECTOR. I would agree that the motivations have changed and it appears, at least judging from the tidbits that one picks up in the press, that American intelligence estimates have changed somewhat. At the end of August CNN quoted a U.S. intelligence report which said that Saddam Hussein would need a year or two to accomplish this near-term scenario. Now we are hearing reports that 6 months is the closest estimate. Now, of course, some time has elapsed and perhaps there have been some additional activities. But I think the implication is that people may have seen some progress of some type being made and may be focusing on the motivation factor. I am not familiar with any specific change, however.

FUTURE IRAQ NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask a question relevant to what Secretary Cheney and other senior officials have said and whether you believe it is justified. Is it really the case that, absent armed intervention in Iraq proper, that a small Iraqi nuclear arsenal is inevitable in the next few years? In other words, is the Iraqi program already beyond the point of no return, or can a combination of export controls, stiff sanctions against export control violators, yet forestall the emergence of an Iraqi nuclear arsenal for perhaps a decade or more, until a more permanent political solution could be found to the problem of nuclear proliferation in the region?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. This is difficult to answer because it depends on reports that are contradictory and which are based on thin information. My impression is that the import program in Iraq has been more successful than most people give it credit for, and I do not think we can have confidence that the embargo will work in the sense that it will stop the bomb program by itself. I think that we can look forward to a high risk that Saddam Hussein will succeed, despite the embargo. On the other hand, I think that the economic and diplomatic effects of the embargo may do the job, and it may bring him down, coupled with a U.S. military presence there, before the time when the real risk becomes a reality.

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Kennedy, I believe that no combination of export control, embargo, blockade, or other related activities will, in fact, prohibit Saddam Hussein from obtaining nuclear weapons within the foreseeable future. Given our inability to predict even our own economy and the rather erratic results of diplomatic effects in the past, I am very uneasy about depending upon those to keep Saddam Hussein from obtaining nuclear weapons in the future.

Mr. SPECTOR. I would agree that we cannot rely on a post-crisis embargo, since there will be a tendency to go back to business as usual and leaks will start again. I don't necessarily feel that Iraq will go all the way and produce nuclear weapons. Much depends on who the leadership is. You may have a change of leadership by virtue of this current economic embargo that puts so much pressure on the government that Saddam Hussein is removed from office and there is considerable talk about that. I think that is the key.

IRAQ URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM

Senator **Kennedy**. Let me ask you, Mr. Spector, when did the U.S. Government become aware of the Iraq uranium enrichment program and what initiatives did the U.S. Government undertake to cut off the foreign assistance to that program?

Mr. **Spector**. I am not in the government and I am not privy to classified information. I think the initial indications we saw were probably shortly after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War. Those are the first that I recall. I think a lot of information came out because of prosecutions and investigations that were taking place in Germany regarding some of the leakage of materiel that was for that program. I think that would be the approximate time.

Senator **Kennedy**. Do you know if any initiatives were taken by the government to stop it or halt it?

Mr. **Spector**. My impression is that we were constantly demarching Germany and some of the other countries involved, and were monitoring this fairly closely. We were not always successful in persuading export officials elsewhere to take a strong stand.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Wallop, I believe, is next.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that it would be my intention to ask if we could have the briefing of which Dr. Graham speaks.

Senator **Exon**. I listened to that and I have not had a chance to talk to the chairman about that or to the ranking member. But it seems to me like that is a good suggestion.

ACCURACY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PREDICTIONS

Senator **Wallop**. I thank you. Dr. Graham, you have touched on this, and Mr. Spector, you can comment as well. How accurate has the intelligence community been over the course of time with regards to timely predictions of capability? We get predictions that they are or are not working, that they may or may not be doing something. But with regard to reaching conclusions about when things might take place and what the capability might that be, how accurate has the intelligence community been?

Dr. **Graham**. Senator Wallop, in these highly technical areas of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, given both their technical complexity and their great secrecy with which they are pursued by all countries, the intelligence community has, in general, tended to estimate a longer time required for the development of a substantial capability than has actually been experienced historically when the countries pursued the nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles, longer by years in most cases. On the other hand, I do not want to berate the U.S. intelligence community by itself. I would point out, for example, that the Japanese military Imperial High Command knew nothing of weapons that could vaporize substantial parts of a city until they observed that happening in 1945.

Mr. **Spector**. Again, I am going to have to qualify my remarks by saying that I am not privy to intelligence information. I think Dr. Graham's comments are very appropriate when one looks at the initial nuclear programs of the major powers. As we go to the more recent efforts of countries like Pakistan or perhaps India or South Africa and so forth, I think the quality of intelligence has been better. And, in fact, we have gone to the other extreme in some instances of predicting a nuclear arrival years before it has actually occurred. The Pakistani case comes to mind where, in 1979, there was a prediction that Pakistan was on the verge of having nuclear weapons; it really didn't reach that stage until about 1986, however. Maybe that is another cautionary tale about the quality of intelligence in this area. But it can, in a sense, provide evidence for both points of view.

Senator WALLOP. Dr. Graham, you evinced some skepticism when Mr. Spector tended to discount the potential existence of covert supplies of fissionable material. I would like to give you an opportunity to express that skepticism.

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes. I believe Mr. Spector was quoting the administration. I don't speak for the administration, so I can say just exactly what I think in this matter. There are several countries in the world, certainly India, Pakistan, China, as well as European countries, that produce weapons grade fissile material. Not all of that production capability is under International Atomic Energy Agency or other controls. In fact, a substantial amount of it is not. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that we know where all of that material is.

Senator WALLOP. I believe it is the case that we didn't know where all of ours was down at Rocky Flats. [Laughter.]

Dr. GRAHAM. I think we knew it within the fence, or at least hoped it was within the fence, Senator Wallop. But you make a good point. [Laughter.]

Dr. GRAHAM. Accounting for it is not always easy. At the same time, one of the unfortunate aspects of arms control and other related constraints in these areas is that, as you restrict the supplies, the price that people who are determined to get these materials are willing to pay goes up and up and up. And so, at some point it becomes extremely remunerative for someone to sell them, to smuggle them, to divert them, to run them through multiple channels and so on, but to sell them. So the incentive to provide them goes up as the supply channels go down. I am afraid we may have seen some of that within the last few years.

KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED TO MAKE NUCLEAR DEVICES

Senator WALLOP. You made the statement—I think it is in your statement—about Mr. McPhee's book, describing how a college student with just available materials was able to design what was considered by the design community to have been a capable device. Would you comment, one, on how big that device might have been? Would it have required a great big truck? And two, how difficult would it be to make a device using the enriched material that Iraq already has? Isn't it true that it would be possible to make a low yield, quite dirty, bomb with high fallout content somewhat more easily and quickly than the conventional bomb designs to which we committed ourselves as a country?

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes. It would be easier and quicker to make a crude device that made use of what we would consider very old technology. At the same time, much of the basic science that is required to make nuclear explosives, once you have the fissile material, is in general knowledge among physicists and other scientists. And so, going even beyond the very crude device is not at all beyond the scope of imagination; similarly, making a very reliable device, even reliable without extensive testing of a nuclear nature, is certainly within the realm of the standard physics Ph.D. capability today.

Senator **Wallop**. Mr. Spector, I would say hats off to you for the statement that you made and for the skepticism that caused you to review some of your initial reactions to these things.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESSING NUCLEAR POTENTIAL

Your last paragraph on page 12 is interesting. It says that both Iraq's long-term and short-term nuclear potential are deeply disturbing, and U.S. policy must address the risks they present. "Military action is plainly the most effective means for reducing these dangers, but it is not the only alternative available." Doesn't that depend a little bit on the cheerful daydream that you have expressed that maybe if we wait long enough, somebody will overthrow Saddam Hussein or he'll choke on a piece of cabbage?

Mr. **Spector**. Well, I don't think I am the only witness that has appeared before this committee this week to suggest that the sanctions option is going to have a dramatic impact on Iraqi behavior. I think the standard wisdom is that if Saddam Hussein is forced to pull out of Kuwait, his hold on Iraq is going to change. If he pulls out of Kuwait, his status within Iraq and his ability to perhaps maintain his position as the head of government may be undermined. And, in fact, that is why many people have said he won't pull out. Thus, I believe there is a connection between the sanctions option and the expectation that we may get a change of government in the end. I do not see this as merely a pipedream.

In the near-term, one way to deal with the nuclear problem in a serious fashion, without the military option, is to increase the frequency of IAEA inspections so that we can know, at intervals shorter than 6 months, that the material has not been tampered with. Every few weeks, or perhaps every month would be best.

Senator **Wallop**. But that depends on your assumption that these covert supplies are non-existent.

Mr. **Spector**. That is correct. You would at least be able to deal with this problem partially. If you believe there are covert supplies, you've got a much more difficult problem. I can only say that it is my understanding that the best judgment of the U.S. Government—at a point when the administration is trying to make the case that Iraq's nuclear potential is very, very serious—the U.S. Government is not claiming covert supplies are a problem. The U.S. Government's view apparently is that there are not unknown supplies or undeclared supplies of weapons grade material in Iraq. There is always the residual problem that we might not know about any such stocks; but at least the administration, which is trying to make the case that we take the nuclear issue seriously, is not using that argument.

Senator **Wallop**. But isn't it true that one need not be prepared to detonate a nuclear device for it to be an effective tool of diplomacy and foreign policy, particularly in a region like that? What would the reaction of our regional allies be to blackmail or terrorist deployment of a single device? Wouldn't they seek to restrain the U.S. response?

Mr. **Spector**. Yes. I agree that would be very, very damaging. Implicit in my statement was that if we had a clear indication that movement was taking place to seize this material and manufacture a weapon, military action would be very much in the picture and would be appropriate.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Senator Wallop. Senator Bingaman.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The decision to deploy troops to the Middle East, to Saudi Arabia, was a result of the invasion of Kuwait. It was not the result, at least as I understand it, of the activities that related to nuclear weapons capability in Iraq. All subsequent decisions that have been made to increase troop strength there have been a result of the invasion of Kuwait, not a result of any information that relates to their nuclear weapons program.

All of the witnesses we have had up until this panel have essentially brought in the threat of potential nuclear capability as another threat that should be dealt with if we militarily dealt with the invasion of Kuwait, if we used the military option to try to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

NEED FOR MILITARY ACTION

Dr. Graham, as I understand what you are saying, you are almost making a case, or I think you are making a case here, for the proposition that we should take military action to deal with the capability or growing capability of Iraq to produce nuclear weapons, and maybe chemical and biological weapons, regardless of what we do about the invasion of Kuwait. Is that an accurate statement?

Dr. **Graham**. Yes, Senator Bingaman. That's an accurate statement. I believe, again, from the perspective of history, that we will conclude that Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capability was by far the most severe threat to the nations of the world today and that the confrontation that has occurred, caused by his invasion in Kuwait, in fact has increased his incentive and initiative to develop those weapons of mass destruction and to be able to use them sooner.

Senator **Bingaman**. So your advice would be that we should initiate military action against Iraq to deal with this problem independent of what we do about the invasion of Kuwait, independent of any conventional military action, bombing or otherwise, that might be appropriate to deal with the troops now in Kuwait? Is that right?

Dr. **Graham**. Yes, that is exactly right, Senator Bingaman. I believe we should destroy the weapons of mass destruction and the production capability that Saddam Hussein has to build more of them as rapidly as possible. I believe we can do that without major loss in life by ourselves or by our allies.

Senator BINGAMAN. That same sort of issue was dealt with by General Odom this morning in his testimony, where he pointed out the obvious point, that there are no nuclear weapons in Iraq today. He then said it would seem to be a mistake to make a potential problem the focus of our strategy, instead of the real problems that now exist. You're advising that we do just that, make a potential problem the focus of our strategy, rather than the invasion of Kuwait itself? Is that right?

Dr. GRAHAM. That goes beyond my view. I was asked only to address the Iraqi nuclear program, Senator Bingaman, and that is what I have been trying to do, not the larger military situation in that area. However, I would say that it is not obvious to me that Iraq has no nuclear weapons today, and I do not see the benefit of waiting until they have nuclear weapons or have more nuclear weapons or have more biological and more chemical weapons before we take action against them. I believe we should do that as soon as possible. Personally I believe we should have done it before now.

Senator BINGAMAN. And that is a result of your concern that they have or are developing a ballistic missile capability to deliver weapons, as you indicated, in Europe, Asia, and potentially the United States as well?

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes. And, of course, in their region they can deliver them by aircraft, and they have demonstrated—Saddam Hussein has certainly demonstrated—a willingness to use them against both neighboring countries and, in the case of the Kurds, against his own people.

FREQUENT INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. Milhollin suggested—I thought it was a constructive suggestion—that perhaps Iraq could agree to international inspections of this fissile material on a more regular basis, to allay some of the concerns about them producing a nuclear weapon. I understood Mr. Spector to say that he felt that that would allay a lot of the concerns. Is that an accurate reflection of what you said?

Mr. SPECTOR. Yes, for the near-term threat, not the long-term threat, because that is going to be building and building over the years.

Senator BINGAMAN. "Near-term" meaning what period?

Mr. SPECTOR. I say "near-term" to refer to this problem of Iraq's seizing the existing material that could be put into a weapon very quickly. If you could inspect the materials much more frequently—I have suggested every 2 weeks, or perhaps randomly on a monthly basis—you would at least have timely warning. This would enable us to learn of a diversion in time to react, before the material had actually been transformed into a device. We would need rather frequent inspections to accomplish this.

Senator BINGAMAN. In your view, is this near-term that you are talking about, the year or 18 months that have been discussed by other witnesses, a potential period of time to allow sanctions to stay in place? If this inspection occurred on this more frequent basis, would it sufficiently allay your concerns about nuclear capability that we could allow sanctions to run for 18 months?

Mr. **Spector**. I think that frequent inspections would go quite a way toward addressing the problem, although the point that Senator Wallop made regarding unknown materials would remain a potential issue here. I gather that unknown materials are not being treated as a serious issue within the administration. But I think the inspections would provide the flexibility to set the nuclear issue on hold, at least for a year, while the diplomatic options are pursued.

Senator **Bingaman**. Mr. Milhollin, I understand your position is that the nuclear concern is not a justification for military action in the near future because there is no real likelihood that Iraq will have a nuclear capability in the near year to 18 months. Is that accurate?

Mr. **Milhollin**. That's accurate, Senator. Also, I would like to point out that even the administration is not using a figure lower than 6 months. And so, if the agency were to inspect on a monthly basis, that would certainly give us all the warning even the administration says we need. So, taking the administration at its word, I don't see how anyone could be nervous if the inspections were monthly.

Dr. **Graham**. If I might interrupt, I could tell you one way someone could be nervous, and that is to not have a great deal of confidence in the 6 month figure that the administration has put out to this point. That is unfortunately the position I find myself in, Senator. I believe that to have an inspection regime work, you have to first know that the French and Soviet material, the fissile material that we know the Iraqis have, is in fact all the material they have. You have to know that the inspection is complete and comprehensive, and you have to know how quickly the Iraqis can convert that inspected material to bombs. I think all of those are very uncertain areas.

Senator **Bingaman**. So you are basically saying that this potential of them having covert supplies is sufficiently great that it does not matter how often we inspect, we won't be inspecting all of the material we ought to be inspecting? Is that right?

Dr. **Graham**. I certainly don't know how to put that concern to rest. Amrom Katz, who was one of the great fathers of verification in nuclear and other areas, once said something that is profound, but still a tautology. He said we have never successfully found anything that other countries have successfully hidden. We find ourselves in that dilemma here, I'm afraid.

Senator **Bingaman**. Well, it's always hard to prove a negative, and I guess that is what you are basically saying.

MILITARY ACTION ELIMINATING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator Exon asked each of you if you felt that the progress that the Iraqis had made to date in their nuclear program justified us pursuing a military attack in the next 6 months. One answer was no, one answer was yes, and one answer was maybe so but we didn't know, as I understood it. Do all of you agree that if we determine to pursue a military action against Iraq some time in the next 6 months or a year, part of that military action should be eliminating the nuclear capability or potential nuclear capability, to the extent that can be done in a military action? Is everybody agreed that that is a priority that ought to be addressed if a military action is initiated? Mr. Milhollin?

Mr. **Milhollin**. Yes. I agree. I think that would be a side benefit of military action, although I guess I would have to argue that if you add up a bunch of side benefits, it does not necessarily come out to a sum which puts you over the line for going to war.

Senator **Bingaman**. So your point is that this can be dealt with in other ways?

Mr. **Milhollin**. My point is that it can be dealt with in other ways. I guess I could go a little bit farther and say that so far, the American public has had a little difficulty figuring out exactly why it is we are going to war. So I would say adding a side benefit here does not solve that general problem.

Senator **Bingaman**. My time has expired. Would either of you want to respond to the question, briefly?

Dr. **Graham**. I think that would not be just a side benefit. In my view, it is certainly a major benefit to the United States to destroy not only their nuclear capability but also their chemical and biological capability as rapidly as possible. I think when we say "going to war," we often think of loading the troop ships and sending people somewhere else for 4 years. What I am talking about are military strikes against specific military facilities in this country. I think we should talk to the Iraqis at the same time. There have been many cases in the past where talking and destroying the military potential of a country have been very effective. I think that might occur here.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Senator. Before I recognize the next Senator, just a brief question of clarification.

POSSIBILITY OF IRAQ POSSESSING A NUCLEAR DEVICE

Dr. Graham, in answer to one of the questions posed by Senator Bingaman, I took it that your response indicated that you feel or have an inclination, at least, that Iraq has a nuclear device at this time?

Dr. **Graham**. My statement was, or was meant to be, at least, Senator, that I can find no technical reason—and remember that I am a technologist; I am a physicist and an engineer from the nuclear weapons design and effects community—that they could not have a nuclear device at this point in time if they wish to do so. To go beyond that, I think it would be better if we moved to a classified session.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator Dixon.

Senator **Dixon**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my own personal appreciation for the important contribution all three of you have made to the deliberations of this committee. I assure you that the point that I will express and the questions that I will ask will have nothing to do with classified information.

I think it is fair to state at the conclusion of the hearings of this week, late on Friday, that the overwhelming evidence is that we are in the Persian Gulf in force, that the embargo and the sanctions are biting, that they are taking effect, and that the initial policy of the President to go in there and to impose an embargo was correct. For months I have been saying that I think, beyond that, the next thing to do is to undertake negotiations. I have stressed that with all the witnesses this week and suggested that following a policy where we are not going to talk as long as they don't get out of Kuwait sort of puts us in an impasse and that we ought to seriously pursue the question of negotiations. We are the most powerful nation in the world, maybe the one superpower in the world today. We are there in overwhelming force. The embargo and the sanctions are working. Let's talk.

Now, I am delighted to say that a little more than an hour ago, the President, in a press conference, said that our government will receive Iraqi representatives here for discussions and that Secretary Baker will be going, if it is acceptable to Mr. Hussein and others, to Baghdad some time between December 15 and January 15 for the purposes of discussions. I applaud that. I think it is the right course of conduct. I would suggest that being there in overwhelming strength, as we are—there is no dispute about that—coupled with an embargo that is working—and while there are some disputes about how well it is working and how long it will take, it is clear that it is working, everybody supports that—and now talking can solve this problem short of war.

REGULAR INSPECTIONS AS PART OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS

Now, I think it has been clear here that if we employ the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, which I understand is an arm of the U.N., to go over there for regular inspections as part of a negotiation process, that would at least protect our interests in the short-term, let's say for the next 6 months. I would ask whether, other than Dr. Graham, the other two of you agree with that.

Mr. **Spector**. Yes. I think that would do the job.

Mr. **Milhollin**. Yes, I agree.

Senator **Dixon**. So, then, for at least two of the three witnesses, you would say that if we are in a negotiating process where we have several goals—first, get him out of Kuwait; second, restore the legitimate government; probably get reparations for damages done, money stolen, and so forth; interrupt the chemical capability and the potential nuclear capability—these monthly inspections are adequate, or maybe at least every couple of weeks, to deal with the problem at hand while we see whether negotiations are better than war. That at least two of you agree to?

Dr. **Graham**. [Nods negatively.]

Mr. **Milhollin**. I would say that if negotiations are going to begin, that would make it unlikely that Iraq would be unwilling to agree to more frequent inspections. I mean, I would predict that that would be a reasonable thing for Iraq to do.

Senator **Dixon**. Then if I could just center on you for a moment, Dr. Graham, because you differ with that, may I ask you this question.

ADVOCATING IMMEDIATE STRIKE

Are you then advocating, notwithstanding any other questions here, some kind of immediate strike, whether it is a surgical strike, whether it is ground forces, or whatever it is, to positively, without question, now interrupt the potential nuclear capability that Saddam Hussein may have in Iraq? Is that your advocacy?

Dr. **GRAHAM**. Absolutely, Senator Dixon.

Senator **DIXON**. Then I ask you this. Do you advocate that with respect to every other nation in the world hostile to the interests of the United States? If you do not, why not?

Dr. **GRAHAM**. Not every other nation. I don't advocate it with respect to every other nation——

Senator **DIXON**. Well, why not? Why not North Korea? Is North Korea friendly, Dr. Graham?

Dr. **GRAHAM** [continuing]. I will try to tell you if you will let me answer you, Senator. I can't do it otherwise.

Senator **DIXON**. Good. I'll wait.

Dr. **GRAHAM**. I will not advocate it with respect to all other nations in the world at this point in time because I don't believe we face a military confrontation with all other nations in the world at this point in time, and we don't face adversaries elsewhere who have used weapons of mass destruction against their neighbors and against their own people at this point in time. It is certainly an option for the future and, in my view, it is a far better option than living in a world where a wide number of despots and irresponsible leaders have weapons of mass destruction that they can deliver on us, our allies, and other peace-loving nations.

Senator **DIXON**. Then let's consider those options for the future. I believe that it is the opinion of some—and you are in a better position to judge that than this Senator—that North Korea has some nuclear capability. Is that true?

Dr. **GRAHAM**. North Korea is building a plant that appears to me to be capable of producing plutonium, which is one of the fissile materials for a bomb. It has also joined the IAEA. But they refuse to allow the IAEA inspectors to come in and view their facilities. That is not a good sign.

Senator **DIXON**. Yes. As a matter of fact, my judgment would be that they are in a more advanced position than the Iraqis.

Dr. **GRAHAM**. No, I don't believe that's true, Senator. But I——

Senator **DIXON**. Let's try China. How do you like China?

Dr. **GRAHAM** [continuing]. The situation with China is clearly beyond any kind of surgical removal——

Senator **DIXON**. You bet it is.

Dr. **GRAHAM** [continuing]. That the U.S. could conduct——

Senator **DIXON**. It's a big country with hundreds of millions of people and lots of nuclear capability. We'd better bomb them tomorrow morning.

Dr. **GRAHAM** [continuing]. Excuse me, Senator. I will try to answer if you will let me. The situation in China was one where we had exactly the situation we are in today but about 20 years ago, and we chose to do nothing about it. Therefore, we face the situation you describe today, where we have a massive nuclear deployment with ballistic missile capability that can be used against us or anyone else in the world.

Senator **Dixon**. Well, then, Dr. Graham, I draw from your conclusions with respect to Iraq that we can't wait another second. We have waited 20 years with China. It is a big country with hundreds of millions of people and lots of nuclear capability. It strikes me that we'd better bomb today.

Dr. **Graham**. I have said that we should destroy the nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities of Iraq as rapidly as possible, Senator, and I will stick by that.

Senator **Dixon**. But you would exclude China, North Korea, and other potentially dangerous countries from that obvious hostile design of yours?

Dr. **Graham**. I would deal with each one of these on a case by case basis. As I said, China, I think, is beyond retrieval in this situation, although it was not once. North Korea, in my view, is not there yet. But it might be sometime. I think this is a serious enough matter that it has to be viewed not as a broad policy considering the circumstance, but as a very specific and thoughtful and careful policy applied on a case by case basis.

Senator **Dixon**. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield at this point in time because my friend, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, is going to elaborate upon this line of questioning. But when I leave here, I hope the President and his administration are watching because if it is important to bomb Iraq today on account of a potential possession of a crude device, we had better get working on China the first thing tomorrow morning.

Senator **Exon**. Senator Dixon, thank you very much. I know that the Senator from Tennessee has been waiting patiently. The rules, though, in all fairness require the recognition of Senator Warner next, if he is prepared to ask his questions at this time.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been absent to work with certain members on our side in preparation for a meeting with the President this afternoon. I would defer to the Senator from Tennessee. I am going to be able to stay here now and complete this session. I will reserve my comments toward the end and such questions as I may have.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Senator Warner. That is very courteous of you. I am pleased to recognize the Senator from Tennessee.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much for your courtesy. In spite of the length of this proceeding, I would raise the specter of a second round. I think these questions are so important I am willing to stay, even though I would understand if the witnesses were exhausted.

Senator **Exon**. For the clarification of the committee, we are planning to have as brief a second round as possible, provided our witnesses can stay. Is there any objection from the witness table? [No response.]

Senator **Exon**. If not, the Senator from Tennessee is recognized.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Before I get into my line of questioning, I have a brief follow-up to the points that Senator Dixon was making.

LOCATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Dr. Graham, if you are correct and Iraq may already have nuclear weapons, then we would not know where to bomb in a bombing attack, because if they already have nuclear weapons, what would be required would not be a surgical strike against one or a few nuclear sites, but an attack that would destroy the entire country. This is because if he already has them, we don't know where they might be located. Correct?

Dr. **Graham.** We know, Senator, where his nuclear weapons production capability is. Nuclear weapons storage facilities are different from production capabilities, but nevertheless possible to locate. On occasion we may not find them all. But we will take out the vast majority of his nuclear weapons capability. And then we genuinely will be in the better position, from our point of view, that my colleagues have described where, in fact, Saddam Hussein would have at most one or a very small number of nuclear weapons and that's it. And he would realize that. That is a far better position than we are in today.

Senator **Gore.** Well, I am not going to take the time to pursue that particular point. I would simply say that I think most would disagree with your analysis on that. Maybe we can come back to it.

I want to pull back from the narrow give and take that we have just had and talk about the overall context of this issue. I hope very much that this controversy serves to elevate the level of attention paid to the problem of nuclear proliferation in the world today. We have been ignoring it, or virtually ignoring it, for far too long.

Senator Glenn and others have taken the lead in attempting to address this problem. Earlier this year, when the committee passed the Bingaman-Gore-McCain non-proliferation measure with specific attention to ballistic missile technology, the administration vetoed major provisions of that in the banking bill.

This issue now must be joined, not in a partisan way, but in a bipartisan way. As I said in a hearing the other day in this committee, we need a set of bilateral policies with every single country serving as a potential source of dangerous technologies which can be acquired by nations like Iraq, and really bear down on a determined effort to prevent the spread of these technologies. Let me also say that however this crisis in the Persian Gulf is resolved, I believe that we must deal with the Iraqi nuclear program.

Let me say in an even broader context that I strongly supported the President's initial decision to respond to this invasion. I supported and do strongly support the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf. And now, after the U.S. Security Council decision, Congress needs to address the issue in much the way that the Security Council has.

I applaud the President's statements today about the opening of discussions with Iraq. I share the hope of all Americans that they will be successful. But the country faces a difficult decision now: do we move toward a military option during the window between January 15 and the onset of bad weather later in the coming year? One of the factors which influences that decision is our assessment of Iraq's near-term nuclear program. Another is our assessment of Iraq's longer-term nuclear program.

Now, the President, in his press conference today, took specific issue with statements that I made yesterday about his administration's characterization of what is going on in Iraq and what is not going on in Iraq. Let me say on that point that I believe we should be extremely concerned about Iraq's nuclear program. I also agree that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq should elevate the kind of urgency that we apply to the analysis done of Iraq's nuclear program. I also believe that if warfare comes, either by deliberate decision on our part in advance or in response to some new military provocation by Iraq, then our targeting list should include at the top of the list Iraq's nuclear facilities, as well as their chemical and biological facilities. I think we should be grateful, along with the rest of the world, that Israel's strike in 1981 purchased at least a decade in this respect. Now, this is not to say that we should automatically assume that Iraq now has nuclear weapons, as you believe may be the case, Dr. Graham.

The statements earlier this week by spokesmen for the administration left an impression with the public that I believe is clearly wrong. I want to specify exactly what I am talking about. I am not charging that anyone in the administration intentionally told an untruth. I also believe, incidentally, that any president has a duty to try to marshall public support for goals that he or she believes to be in the best interests of this country. But, in doing so, there is an obligation of candor which must be borne by the President.

Anyone challenging statements that are misleading in this area has the disadvantage of not being able to reveal classified information, and I will not reveal classified information.

Second, one cannot prove a negative. You cannot prove that something absolutely does not exist.

Third, there is complexity, including a very big difference between a crude nuclear device that has to be delivered by an 18-wheeler or in some other cumbersome way, which device, if it existed, should concern us and should affect our decision-making process, but which is very different from the second set of issues which arises if we conclude they have a nuclear weapon deliverable in conventional military fashion or a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Now, to the precise point with which I disagree with the administration. Secretary Eagleburger said that it is safe to assume that Iraq has nuclear materials of a kind that give rise to a short-term development program for nuclear weapons outside the IAEA safeguards. It's safe to assume, he said, that they have such material. He went on to say that there is "substantial evidence" that Iraq has such materials on hand with which to make nuclear weapons or a nuclear device in the short-term.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS OUTSIDE IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM

Now, Mr. Milhollin, are you aware, without getting into any classified information—you three are witnesses who are familiar with everything that happens in this area, and yet you deal with the publicly available information and you are used to doing it—of any substantial evidence that Iraq has nuclear materials outside the

IAEA safeguards program with which it could make a nuclear device in the near-term?

Mr. **Milhollin**. No. I think what Mr. Eagleburger must have been referring to is some natural uranium that Iraq has outside of safeguards. But nobody could make a bomb with that in the near-term. I must say that to juxtapose the two statements, that you could make a bomb quickly and that Iraq has materials outside of safeguards, implies that you could make a bomb with the materials outside of safeguards quickly. But he didn't say that and I don't think he can say that because it simply isn't true.

Senator **Gore**. That's my conclusion. Now let me say this. In fairness to Secretary Eagleburger, one must point out the difference between the precise words he used and the relationship between his words and the context of the exchange he had with members of the press corps in Mexico City. The context was clear. The administration was being questioned about the implications by the President during his Thanksgiving Day statements in Saudi Arabia that there may be a nuclear weapons arsenal in Iraq in less than a year. The implication was made. The reporters were pursuing this question. Let me read the exchange.

Chairman **Nunn** [presiding]. Senator Gore, I don't want to interrupt, but your time has expired and Senator Warner is next.

Senator **Gore**. I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, or, rather, the indulgence of the ranking Republican member. The President of the United States personally addressed this matter in his press conference today and challenged my characterization of it.

Chairman **Nunn**. I would yield you my time or half my time. The question is when. I don't want to keep Senator Warner waiting.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, if I may say the following, it is an important point. I am perfectly willing to join in a unanimous consent request to allow the time to do the following: finish the question and then make certain that each of the witnesses has an equal opportunity to respond to the question, because I believe there is a diversity of viewpoints that would be forthcoming from this panel, and I think we are entitled to the benefit of that diversity of viewpoints. So the Senator would be given the time to finish his question and then allow each of the witnesses to respond.

Chairman **Nunn**. Without objection, we will proceed in that fashion. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the courtesy of my colleague from Virginia.

Now, in the context of the effort to clear up this misunderstanding, Secretary Eagleburger was asked about the possibility of near-term development of nuclear weapons by Iraq. He said: "If you will notice the report by the IAEA inspectors, it was specifically with reference to nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards, and those they indicated have not been, as far as they can tell, used for other than acceptable purposes. But that does not assume that all nuclear materials in Iraq are necessarily under IAEA safeguards. I think it would be safe to assume, in fact, that that is not the case."

"Question: Can you quantify that in any way?"

"Eagleburger: I can't."

"Question: Just how much of a nuclear capability of these nuclear materials may not be under IAEA?"

"Eagleburger: All I can say is that the statements that have been made by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President are based on fairly substantial evidence on their part that there is substantial unsafeguarded nuclear activity going on in Iraq."

Now, there is, as Mr. Milhollin said, a uranium ore mining program, a processing program, which is different altogether from the kinds of materials that are clearly relevant to the questions being pursued in this exchange. Again, I do not charge that there was a deliberate misrepresentation. But there was a misleading impression given.

Mr. Milhollin, you have spoken to this, and, Dr. Graham, if you would, respond and then Mr. Spector, to this specific question: Do you know of substantial evidence that there is nuclear material in Iraq which could be used in the near-term to build a nuclear weapon or device?

Senator **Warner**. Would the Senator yield? The quote is "activity," not "material." I mean, if we are going to ask the question, let's ask it——

Senator **Gore**. There are two quotes, I would say to the Senator. There are two quotes. The exchange began with a discussion of "materials," nuclear materials. The second quote refers to nuclear "activity." I have attempted to carefully avoid charging a——

Senator **Warner**. But the specific quote to which you refer as a possible misrepresentation, I think the question ought to be framed as to that quote.

Senator **Gore**. Let me frame the question as I wish to frame it, but let me avoid any implication——

Senator **Warner**. We're talking about fairness and candor here now.

Senator **Gore**. Yes, indeed. If the Senator will allow me to conclude my statement here, I am not charging that Secretary Eagleburger intentionally told an untruth. What I am attempting to counter is the impression which came out of his statement in the context in which it was given. The impression which was given by this specific——

Senator **Warner**. I think you have had sufficient time to——

Senator **Gore**. If the Senator would let me conclude on this point, I think it is an important nuance here. The impression given was that nuclear materials which could be used to create a nuclear device in the near-term are possessed by Iraq now; that there is substantial evidence of that fact. Now, I grant you that the precise words of Secretary Eagleburger did not charge that in great detail. But the impression given by his statements in the context in which they were given gave precisely that impression. It has subsequently been referred to by a number of people.

So my question is not based on the exact language of what Secretary Eagleburger said. My question is in my own words and derived from the impression which I believe was given, intentionally or inadvertently—perhaps it was inadvertent—by the administration. The question is as follows, Dr. Graham and then Mr. Spector. You have already answered, Mr. Milhollin.

IRAQ POSSESSING NUCLEAR MATERIALS OUTSIDE IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Do you have or are you aware of substantial evidence that Iraq now has nuclear materials in its possession outside of IAEA safeguards which could be used to build a nuclear device or weapon in the near-term?

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Gore, this is obviously an issue of great sensitivity in terms of intelligence, national technical means of collecting intelligence, and of nuclear weapon technology, also a very sensitive matter. I will say what I believe I can today. But then I have a suggestion at the end of it.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me. If you would yield just for a minute, we might be dealing with classified material, which we are not permitted to deal with here in this open hearing.

Dr. GRAHAM. And I must tell you that I feel extremely constrained in my answer to this question because this is an open hearing. But I will try to say something. I am sure it won't be satisfactory to any of us, but I will do what I can today and make a suggestion.

First, as for what I would like to say, I have no reason to disagree with the statement which Secretary Eagleburger made, nor do I have any reason to disagree with a reasonable interpretation of that statement. To go beyond that, I would suggest, first, that you pursue the closed discussion with the Nuclear Intelligence Panel, and, second, of course, that you bring up the issue with Secretary Eagleburger. I'm afraid that's all I can say today.

Senator GORE. Well, if you could give a yes or no answer, do you have substantial evidence that they have such materials in their possession now?

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Gore, I tried to be very careful and explain to you why I could say what I could and why I couldn't say anything else.

Senator GORE. Well, can you say yes or no?

Dr. GRAHAM. I cannot say yes or no for the reasons that I explained. I will say it again, though. I have no reason to disagree with Secretary Eagleburger's statement nor to disagree with a reasonable interpretation of that statement.

Chairman NUNN. Might I add again for the benefit of everyone who may be interested in this that we are in open session and we do have to be aware of the classification. We have had closed sessions on this point and we have asked most, if not all, of these questions in closed session of our intelligence community. So I would leave it at that. Do you want Mr. Spector to answer?

Senator WARNER. Yes. That was a stipulation and I would like to have him respond.

Mr. SPECTOR. I hope my comment will clarify Mr. Eagleburger's statement; but it will make even more murky the statement of my colleague here.

My understanding is that the statement in question was a misstatement, that what Mr. Eagleburger meant was "activities." He meant "activities" in the first paragraph and he meant "activities" in the second paragraph. We all know that there are unsafeguarded activities in Iraq. Mr. Eagleburger is at such a senior level in the administration that he cannot be expected to be familiar with the nuances of this matter. He is not a technical expert on these matters, and he may simply have used the wrong term. It is a mistake any of us could make. Mr. Boucher of the State Department issued a clarification the next day which declared that all known nuclear materials in Iraq were subject to IAEA safeguards. So I think there was a misstatement that had a big consequence. My understanding is that Mr. Boucher's clarification reflected the administration's views on this particular matter. I did not hear the President's comment.

Senator **Gore**. But on the question itself——

Mr. **Spector**. I have no information to suggest that there are undeclared stocks of weapons-relevant nuclear materials in Iraq.

Senator **Gore** [continuing]. Are you aware of any such evidence?

Mr. **Spector**. I am not. But I am not at all privy to classified information.

Senator **Gore**. Alright. Thank you very much.

Chairman **Nunn**. I think all of us need to be aware of this classification business. When I say "all of us," I am not talking about just this committee. The administration needs to be careful also. When top executive branch officials make statements that are based on classified matters and then Congress is put into a situation of not being able to deal with those in any forum because Congress itself and members of the committee do not have any right to declassify, it makes it a very awkward situation and causes a tendency for things to start getting leaked out, which are very important.

This is not a matter of simply Iraq. This is a matter of sources and methods and a lot of other things that come into play here that go to our intelligence community's capability of dealing with these types of issues in Iraq and in other countries in the world. So I would caution all of us, including those in high-level positions in the executive branch, that no matter what the tactical advantage might be from day to day, there is a larger, national security consideration here that has to be paramount. We can damage that very badly in trying to gain one-upmanship on a very temporary basis with very little long-term effect. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. President.

Chairman **Nunn**. That's "chairman," "chairman," "chairman," "chairman!" [Laughter.]

Senator **Warner**. I just want to tease you a little now and then. We have to have a little levity in these hearings somewhere along the line, Mr. Chairman. We've worked together now for 12 years and I'm entitled to a little levity.

Chairman **Nunn**. Yes, but one more time and I'm going to consider it an endorsement. [Laughter.]

Senator **Warner**. Touche. Mr. Chairman, I had intended to go into some detail on this issue and read Secretary Cheney's statement and National Security Adviser Scowcroft's statement. But I don't feel that's necessary at this time. I think that these witnesses have, in a very responsible way, tried to answer this question.

I would urge my colleagues not to deal with nuances and impressions and to be a little cautious. I copied another phrase down that Senator Glenn said, "all these statements." I'm not sure you meant "all." I think the Secretary of Defense's statement was very carefully couched. I think National Security Adviser Scowcroft's statement was carefully couched. I have them here and I ask that they be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman, at this point.

Chairman Nunn. Without objection, they will be.

[The information follows:]

- Sunday, November 25, 1990
· CBS's "Face the Nation": Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense

CBS "FACE THE NATION"
WITH HOST, TERRENCE SMITH
INTERVIEW WITH:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RICHARD B. CHENEY
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1990

MR. SMITH: Joining me now is the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. Mr. Secretary, welcome. A pleasure to have you here.

The President has been sending us signals of impatience. He said just this week that he is getting quote "tired of the status quo." What's the message here? What's he trying to tell us?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think he's been very direct in terms of stating what the policy is and what our objectives are. And we are in a position now where we are working very aggressively to deploy sufficient force in the Persian Gulf region so that we've got the capability to use militay force should that be required.

Simultaneously, we are working the diplomatic front, working through the United Nations as well to try to make certain we hold the coalition together and that we achieve our objective of stopping Saddam Hussein.

MR. SMITH: But if I told you I was tired of the status quo, that would suggest that I'm about to do something. Is that the message?

SEC. CHENEY: I wouldn't read any more into it than what's intended. I think the President's been very clear and very direct. We've worked very hard throughout this whole process to make certain we function as part of an international community under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council in consultation with the Congress, and we're continuing that policy.

MR. SMITH: I think a lot of people are asking a question, which is what's the hurry here? The Marine Commandant, General Gray, a man in your shop, has said that time is on our side, not on Saddam Hussein's. So, why the hurry? Why not wait?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think the situation we're faced with, Terry, is that it's not clear whose side time is on. You can find evidence that it clearly is going to make life more difficult for Saddam Hussein as he tries to wrestle with the economic sanctions.

On the other hand, there are prices to be paid as well from the standpoint of trying to maintain that international coalition. The problems -- the economic problems -- are equally difficult for those nations that used to trade with Iraq. Tough for Turkey; tough for Jordan; tough for Egypt. Significant problems in Eastern Europe as the Eastern European governments try to make the transition to democracy and to market economies; they are faced with the very heavy burden that they have to bear now as a result of what's happened to the international oil markets.

So, there are a number of factors working on both sides, and I don't think you can come to the conclusion that time is automatically on our side. It may be, but it's not clear.

MR. SMITH: This administration adopted a policy. It was, basically, economic sanctions, embargo of Iraq, and a demand that they withdraw from Kuwait. Is this an indirect way of saying that that policy has failed?

SEC. CHENEY: No, I think we've been very successful to date, very successful in stopping Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. He has not come farther south to take Saudi Arabia, a major achievement.

We do have international support for significant sanctions that have been imposed and are being enforced. But it's also clear at this point that we need to make certain that Saddam Hussein knows that if he does not, in fact, comply with those resolutions, if he doesn't get out of Kuwait, that he faces the prospect of military force and that we have the capability to use that option should it be required.

MR. SMITH: He -- Saddam Hussein said this week, or his government announced, that they would send another 250,000 Iraqi troops into Kuwait to strengthen their forces. Have you, through our intelligence gathering, any evidence of any movement like that?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we've watched over the months as he's built up his forces in Kuwait -- he started with about 170,000 when he invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, he's now up well over 400,000, but we think he's put most of his really capable forces in Kuwait already. That is to say, what he's bringing on line now probably are not very high-quality forces, and not necessarily an asset for him.

MR. SMITH: Have you seen any evidence of their moving -- of their being deployed? Is he -- in other words, was it real or was it a statement?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think at this point it's a statement. But it's -- it will take him time if he's going to beef up his forces there. He'll -- it'll -- it's not something that he can do overnight. He's got to mobilize reserves, he's got to move units from northern Iraq down to the southern part of the country, down near Kuwait, and it's not the kind of thing that would happen overnight. We'll continue to watch it. It obviously is an indication more than anything else that he has absolutely no intention of complying with the UN resolutions: he has no intention of giving up Kuwait.

MR. SMITH: You see no change in that?

SEC. CHENEY: I haven't seen anything yet.

MR. SMITH: The President stressed this week on several of his stops in Saudi Arabia with the troops, the Iraqi growing nuclear capability and the prospect of a nuclear threat from Iraq. It made me wonder, why is he raising that now? Are we working from some new information, intelligence or otherwise, that suggests that he's closer today than he was a few months ago?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think he is closer today than he was a few months ago in the sense that he's making steady progress working this problem. We've known for a long time from public sources that he was trying to acquire nuclear weapons. The British intercepted devices intended to trigger a nuclear weapon in shipments to Iraq just last spring. We also know from intelligence sources that he's working this problem very hard.

The President made reference to it, but it shouldn't be a surprise to anybody.
This man has developed ballistic missiles and used them· developed chemical weapons and used them; is trying to develop biological and nuclear weapons; has tested missiles at longer ranges than just a

short-range SCUD. It's only a matter of time until he acquires nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them, and that has to be, I think, an element of concern as we decide how to deal with the problem.

MR. SMITH: You say he's continued to make progress on this in the last few months despite the embargo, despite the sanctions?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, it's not clear at this point how effective the embargo can be in this regard because he's been working the problem for some time. He may have already --

MR. SMITH: What's he done in the last few months to --

SEC. CHENEY: Well --

MR. SMITH: -- to enhance that capability?

SEC. CHENEY: -- I think what we've seen is an effort to develop the capacity internally to be able to produce highly enriched uranium, and that's a prerequisite to being able to produce a nuclear device. It's a problem he's been working on for years. I would argue that he's farther along in 1990 than he was in 1989 down this track, and that he'll be farther along in '92 or '93 than he is in 1990.

So, nobody can put a specific timetable on it. There are a lot of estimates; they range -- worst case assumption, a matter of a year or less to having some kind of a crude device, to one of five to ten years in terms of having a deliverable weapon. The experts are all over the lot. What we do know is he's doing everything he can to acquire the capability.

MR. SMITH: The worst case scenario, that year or less, could involve a time period in which American and other troops are deployed nearby.

SEC. CHENEY: Well, this is -- again I don't want to overemphasize what capability he would have during that period of time. He has some fuel now that he has previously acquired in a reactor that is subject to safeguards -- can be visited by the International Atomic Energy Agency. If he were to take that material, he could produce a crude device with it. It wouldn't be anything you could deliver from an airplane; it wouldn't be anything that would be weaponized in the sense that we think of a nuclear weapon, but it would be capable, for example, of doing some damage, of producing some kind of a yield -- a very crude system.

You advance down the spectrum to a much more sophisticated capability of developing his own highly enriched uranium, developing the missiles to deliver it, the kind of warhead that would be required that would be small enough for that. And that clearly is what he's working on.

MR. SMITH: So if you see any signs of progress in that regard, then the alarm bells go off.

SEC. CHENEY: Yeah, but again, we're talking about a relatively brief period of time here. One way or another, within a few years, Saddam Hussein is likely to acquire nuclear weapons. He's acquired chemical weapons, and he's used them. He's working on biological weapons. He's not yet used those, but we think if he had them, he might well try to use those as well.

This is a man, who, as the President said when he was in the desert last week, who's used every weapon he's ever acquired against his adversaries and, in some cases, in the case of chemical weapons, against the Kurds inside Iraq itself. He's not to be taken lightly.

MR. SMITH: Well, that really raises the stakes because that would mean that even if Saddam Hussein were to do what we ask, which is to withdraw from Kuwait, he would still have his military capability, and perhaps nuclear, intact. How would this coalition that the US has organized deal with that situation?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think you clearly -- if he were to -- come into compliance and withdraw from Kuwait, you still are going to have to worry about the problem of his acquisition of sophisticated weapons. And that's going to require, I think, a far more aggressive set of sanctions than anything we've seen up till now. That means the sanctions wouldn't go totally away. You're going to try to deny him any further access to the kind of technology he would need to develop this capability.

That would require major international effort to achieve it. It might well require some kind of inspection, but clearly, it woudl require an agreement among the nations of the world that this man is not going to be allowed to succeed.

MR. SMITH: This week, when President Bush met with President Asad of Syria, he got some criticism on the grounds that many people believe that the Syrian regime has been behind specific acts of terrorism against Americans. So, I would ask you how can you justify that kind of a meeting to let's say the parents of anyone -- children killed on Pan Am 103 or Marines killed in Beirut? Two incidents in which the Syrians are implicated.

SEC. CHENEY: I think the President made it very clear that we by no means sanction the past behavior of -- of Asad and the Syrian government. But, at present, we're in a position, where having Syria on the northern border with Iraq, participating in the military coalition that's been arrayed against Saddam Hussein is a very useful situation. And I am more concerned immediately about the parents of the young men and women we've got deployed in the Gulf today. And anything we can do to add the weight of Syrian military to the situation that Saddam Hussein's faced with raises the possibility that we might, in fact, be able to hold down American casualties or avoid conflict altogether. So it's -- it's worthwhile working that coalition even though we certainly don't approve of Hafiz Asad.

MR. SMITH: Can you count on those Arab allies in that coalition to actually join in any sort of offensive action against another Arab state?

SEC. CHENEY: I think the -- you have to evaluate each nation based upon their own commitment and their own position, and there are a good many Arab nations who have been absolutely crucial in this effort, the Saudis obviously, certainly the Eygptians. And I think we've got a high degree of confidence that they're strongly supportive of the policy and that they are as committed as we are to getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

MR. SMITH: We have developments coming up this week in the United Nations where the United States is seeking a resolution. We understand a draft is now being circulated, if that's correct, in which they will seek broad authority for using force in some fashion to enforce the UN resolutions against Iraq, perhaps with the phrase, "all means necessary" or whatever. Is that going to happen? What's your forecast?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I'm reluctant to make forecasts about what the United Nations will or won't do, but clearly, the President and Jim Baker have been working very, very hard to put together this coalition. We will have a debate in the United Nations this week. I wouldn't be at all surprised but what it addresses that very subject of an additional resolution, and I wouldn't want to predict the outcome.

MR. SMITH: Do you need it? Do you need a UN authorization?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, you can get a variety of debates on that point. I think from a legal standpoint, no. I think from the standpoint, though, of trying to maintain the international coalition and pursue the policy that the President set out for us here, and that is working as part of the international community, I think it would be a very useful step.

MR. SMITH: Okay. Secretary Cheney, thank you very much. Thanks for coming in this morning.

- Sunday, November 25, 1990
  ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley": Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor

ABC "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY"
WITH HOST, DAVID BRINKLEY
JOINED BY SAM DONALDSON AND GEORGE WILL

INTERVIEW WITH:
BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1990

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, thanks for coming in. Glad to --

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: -- see you as always.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now first of all, bring us to date. What's happening in the Middle East that we should know about?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: The President has just finished consultations with two of the primary allies, members of the coalition in the Gulf, the -- King Fahd and President Mubarak, and both of them urged that he -- that he see President Asad and so he did that. And I think it was an important thing for him to have done, and I think the coalition by and large is in good shape.

MR. BRINKLEY: Both of them insisted on a peaceful settlement. They're not very eager for any sort of military action, are they?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well I don't think anybody's eager for military action, but neither are they eager to have this drawn out over an indefinite period of time with all the hazards. This international coalition is a disparate group of people; there are all sorts of tensions and pressures one way or another, and I think there is a common feeling, not only within the coalition but I think within the members of the -- (inaudible) -- that it needs to be -- it needs to be brought to an end.

MR. BRINKLEY: This is unfair question, but I'll ask it anyway. Tell me in terms of percentages what you think the chances of war really are.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I really wouldn't -- I really don't want to do that --

MR. BRINKLEY: I thought you wouldn't.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: -- but let me say this. It is my judgment that the best chance to avoid war is to confront Saddam Hussein with the prospects of war.

MR. WILL: You suggest, General, that the President went to see Asad because the President of Egypt and the leaders of Saudi Arabia suggested it. Is that your implication?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, not solely, but the visit was not scheduled before -- before we left on the trip and I think that they did have something to do with his seeing him.

MR. WILL: The President's moral characterization of this enterprise in the Middle East is that Saddam Hussein is a terrorist, an aggressor and a killer of his own people. That describes Mr. Asad to a T. Is there some danger, as the Israelis think, that we are now doing with Asad of Syria what we did in cozying up to Saddam Hussein of Iraq before he began to run wild?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well I don't think we cozied up to Saddam Hussein. There always is some danger when you deal with people who have unsavory aspects, as does President Asad.

MR. WILL: Do you disagree with my charaterization of Asad?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't. No, I don't, but I think, you know, in this particular instance, he does have sizable military forces which he is prepared to use which make an important contribution, and he significantly widens the spectrum of Arabs opposed to what the Iraqis have done.

MR. WILL: Can you tell us if either the Secretary of State or the President, in their dealings with Mr. Asad, have asked him to either expel from Damascus or, better yet, turn over to us, Ahmed Jibril, who is suspected of being -- and there's considerable evidence, I gather -- of being connected with the bombing of Pan Am 103?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Without getting too explicit, yes.

MR. WILL: What did he say?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: He said, "We'd like some proof."

MR. WILL: Do we have it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We're discussing that with him at the present time.

MR. DONALDSON: General, next Thursday, there'll be a what -- a meeting of the Security Council to act on a resolution. And it is said that we have now abandoned the idea of putting in the words about the use of force, but will use some other words to make it clear that's what the resolution would authorize. Tell us what kinds of words we want to use.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, you know, I can't tell you what words will be used because that will be a part of the negotiation which has been going on for some time, and will conclude presumably this weekend. But it will be something like taking the necessary means to enforce the 10 UN resolutions which, so far, Saddam Hussein has ignored.

MR. DONALDSON: And it will be understood that if you say "the necessary means," that means military force if necessary?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That's correct.

MR. DONALDSON: Now if that resolution passes and the President then has that authorization, will he still feel the need to abide, I guess, by the Constitution and go to the Congress, if, in fact, we're going to declare war on Saddam Hussein?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It's a complicated question. The President consulted --

MR. DONALDSON: I thought it was -- if I may, General, I thought it was a rather simple question.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, no. It's a complicated question because there is a perennial issue between the Congress and the President, and there has been for 200 years on the constitutional role of each in the making of war. And without -- that's the complicated part of it because the Constitution is ambiguous on that point.

MR. DONALDSON: But are you challenging the premise --

GEN. SCOWCROFT: The President has consulted very, very closely every step of the way here, and he intends to continue.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you challenging the premise that it is the Congress that has the right to declare war?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm not.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you believe the President does?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, but the President is Commander-in-Chief as well.

MR. DONALDSON: So your premise is he can conduct a war, just simply not declare it.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Even the War Powers Act does not say that the President does not have the right to move troops into areas of conflict.

MR. WILL: General, granted that there's a broad, gray area here, and grant that presidential discretion and close calls get respected, but it's one thing for Jefferson in an age when Congress was dispersed all over bad roads in this country to send ships to deal with the Barbary pilots -- pirates, rather. And you have 400,000 American troops at a standing start in the desert. Wouldn't that seem to be a pretty clear case where Congress ought to speak first?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think the President is working with the leadership in Congress, and will try to keep them fully apprised and in discussions with them, as he's had before -- consult with them.

MR. WILL: Let me recur to the UN question. Sam asked if it gets passed then, do -- is it our position that before we can legitimately exercise force, since we've now made something of a cult of the multilateral aspect of all this -- that before we can use force, we need the UN resolution to legitimize it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, no, it is not our position. No.

MR. DONALDSON: General, let me ask you about the idea that the President brought up in the Gulf, that Saddam Hussein is nearing the point where he'll have a nuclear weapon. A, how long before you think he'll have a nuclear weapon?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: The estimates -- and I'm not an expert on that, the estimates range from months to as much as 10 years.

MR. DONALDSON: But you say months to as much as 10 years. So you say within a few months he could have it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: There are some nuclear experts who feel that's the case.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, we're basing policy, I take it, on what we think to be the case.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No. I think the point the President is making is that for those who say, "Let sanctions run a year or two years, whatever," raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons which would dramatically change the character of any conflict.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. Building one bomb or one nuclear device is one thing. Having a number of nuclear weapons is quite another. Do you really believe that Saddam Hussein will have an array of a nuclear arsenal within a few months?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Building even one could make a significant difference for troops fighting in the --

MR. DONALDSON: Well, is that a reason -- may I ask, General, is that reason to go on the offensive against Saddam Hussein, all other things being equal? That is, we need to take him out before he obtains nuclear capacity. Are you putting that forth as the reason why we should go to war?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm putting that forth as -- as a reason that has to be considered among other reasons when we look at the possibilities of conflict and the danger to -- to our and the coalition troops.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, are we sufficiently concerned with the fact that the country we are confronting has a taste for terrorism? Blowing up airplanes; truckloads of bombs driven by a suicide driver; machine guns at airports, that sort of thing. Isn't that something we should consider?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes. It is something that we should consider.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, how do we deal with it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: And we have many indications that he's doing what he can to prepare terrorist attacks. Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: We -- what we have heard is that he has gathered a whole raft of terrorists into his country, and they are standing around awaiting instructions.

MR DONALDSON: General, if we have a war --

MR. BRINKLEY: Is that right?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MR. DONALDSON: Sorry, excuse me -- if we have a war, how bloody do you think it'll be? How many American casualties do you think we'll suffer?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to estimate the number of casualties.

MR. DONALDSON: But isn't that one of the considerations also? Wouldn't it be?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Of course.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, we've got a few seconds.

MR. DONALDSON: Could I just --

MR. WILL: On the range of -- if our intelligence says between a few years -- a few months and 10 years for nuclear weapons, we must be basing it on one of something in that continuum. Are we basing it on a worst case, that it might be soon? And if so, we lived confronting the Soviet Union with 13,000 nuclear weapons for a number of years. Does possession of a nuclear weapon radically change the calendar by which we calculate when we must choose to use force or not?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe that the chief impact of the timing of his obtaining nuclear weapons is that, in terms of casualties, for example, it could dramatically change the casualties we might face were we to use force. And there's every indication. You know, there are enormous inhibitions about the use of nuclear weapons by the major powers. But nobody else has used gas in the way he has either. So --

MR. WILL: But General --

MR. DONALDSON: General, I know you can --

GEN. SCOWCROFT: -- I think one has to assume --

MR. BRINKLEY: Time's almost up, Sam.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, may I --

GEN. SCOWCROFT: -- that he might be more willing to use nuclear weapons than -- as any other power.

MR. DONALDSON: I know you can't estimate casualties within a few numbers. And I'm not asking for that. But there are some people who say, of course, airpower will do it and we'd have a pretty bloodless war when it came to American casualties. And others believe that, in fact, American troops would have to get in there on the ground and root out the Iraqi army. And that's why I asked you what estimate you make of the possibility of American casualties.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think we have to estimate that he has a -- a large army, fairly sophisticated technologically, and battle hardened by and large, and that he will not be an easy opponent to deal with. Now, it may turn out that way because he's never faced airpower such as he's facing now. Never had to fight without air superiority.

MR. BRINKLEY: General --

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We'll have to wait and see.

MR. BRINKLEY: -- thank you. Thanks for being with us. Come again.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: My pleasure.

Senator WARNER. Therefore, I will not go into this matter in further detail. I would like at some appropriate time to join the chairman in giving some concluding remarks today.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, we would be glad to do that. You could do it now or we could defer. What I hope we can do is to have one more round, which would be abbreviated, if possible. I will defer to Senator Glenn and then we will come back.

Senator GLENN. I don't have another round of questions, Mr. Chairman. I think most of the questions I had have been taken care of this morning. I would be glad to yield whatever time I have to Senator Gore if he wants me to. I would only make one statement and it is this.

There was some reference made back to me referring to the truck type bomb. I don't know who did that, but it sort of stuck here. I want to make sure that I was not the one that said that the bomb would have to be delivered on a truck. It was somebody in the Pentagon who, in referring to the differences between weapons or deliverability of these things, referred to a truck. I have been repeating that since then. I presume they knew what they were talking about out of their estimates.

So I will yield whatever time Al might want out of my time.

Senator GORE. I appreciate that, Senator Glenn. I wanted to refer to the State Department clarification which Mr. Spector mentioned earlier. I would like to read the text of that again. In seeking to clarify the statement by Secretary Eagleburger, Mr. Boucher said, and I quote: "We are satisfied that the IAEA inspection has adequately accounted for Iraq's known supplies of nuclear material."

Now, again, one cannot prove a negative. Let me repeat that I am extremely concerned about what Iraq has underway in its nuclear program. But when we address the very difficult, extremely difficult question of whether or not to launch a war, and when this issue is raised as one of the justifications for answering that question in the affirmative—yes, let's go to war—then I think it is very important that we have a clear understanding of what is likely, what is probable, what they probably have and what they probably don't have. I just think that the overall impression which was given by the administration was that they may very well have a great deal of capability that we had been led to believe previously that they did not have. I did want to take objection to that.

I would like to make one other point, Mr. Chairman. I know that we will be hearing a great deal about this issue later on in the budget deliberations next year when the SDI program comes up. I want to note for the record that Congress put in more money for the ATBM program, designed to deal with a near-term threat like that which would be posed from some state like Iraq that got a ballistic missile, than the administration had requested. I mention this because I know that is a keen interest of yours, Dr. Graham. You now work in the private sector on SDI programs and were President Reagan's Science Advisor when the SDI program was initiated; or you were in that position when President Reagan was pursuing the SDI program. I know this question has already received a great deal of interest from SDI enthusiasts, some of whom are here in the hearing room. Dr. Teller's principal assistant is here.

I'm sure we'll be hearing a lot more about the fact that, as you say, Dr. Graham, Iraq may already have an arsenal of nuclear weapons and may already have the ability to deliver them onto American cities. I do not believe that is the case. I don't believe it is the case. I don't think that we should assume that there is no reason for extreme concern about what they are trying to get in the way of a nuclear capability.

Again, however this is resolved, whether by discussions, as the President announced today, or by military action subsequently, I believe we must deal with Iraq's nuclear program. Then I believe we must move to a very vigorous program of export controls and non-proliferation policies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

I appreciate your yielding, Senator Glenn. I will yield back the remainder of that time.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Nothing, thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just have one brief comment, and maybe it will elicit a suggestion from members of the panel. Regarding the rather fast development first with the United Nations action of yesterday and then the rather dramatic press conference with the President this morning, things are rapidly changing, I think for the better. It seems that, for whatever reason, we are making some progress. I simply want to point out that with all of the concerns that we have with the nuclear capability of Iraq now or in the future, I would simply point out that we should make it clear that the action of the United Nations yesterday and the statements that the President made this morning in his press conference unfortunately do not address the concerns that we have expressed here today.

The original U.N. Resolution 660 was again affirmed yesterday by subsequent action. The only addition to it was that force was authorized, if necessary. Neither that original U.N. resolution nor the action that was taken by the United Nations yesterday or the statement by the President this morning went beyond condemning Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, demanding that Iraq withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait, and calling upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations immediately for the restoration of their differences and the return of the legitimate government to power.

I only bring that up, Mr. Chairman, because I do not believe, at least in my view, that these developments address the concerns that have been expressed here today, concerns which I believe are legitimate. So I would simply say that I hope we move forward. But if we are able to come to some kind of accommodation on all these matters and prevent warfare under what has been mandated by the United Nations, that does not address, in my opinion, the concerns talked about here today.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to say that these hearings have been constructive and have contributed to the national discussion regarding the critical issues in the Gulf. As I have said before, this crisis is not just the President's problem. It is the Nation's problem. It is as much a responsibility of Congress, a co-equal branch of the government, to participate in this decision-making process as it is for the President.

Members of Congress continually refer on an individual basis to our powers under the Constitution: the power to declare war, the power of the purse. But the time has come for us to act as a body and act responsibly. That is why I believe that these hearings have reinforced my view, and hopefully the views of others, that Congress can get together, as we have gotten together as a committee, to assess the facts coming from the public sector witnesses. On Monday we will receive the official administration perspective and take into consideration these facts, as a committee, and then hope to report to Congress as a whole, certainly our body, the U.S. Senate.

This is a fast-moving decision train. We witnessed that this morning in the midst of our hearings, with the President making very dramatic statements, making decisions respecting how to solve this problem in the Gulf. Either we join him in the engineer's cab and help direct this train in the right direction, hopefully away from conflict—I join with you and the other members of the committee in that. At the same time, it must be the common consensus between the executive branch and the President and Congress acting as a body—or otherwise, we are just so many passengers on that train, collecting our paychecks and going home.

So I thank the members of this committee for their constructive participation in this dialogue and for preparing a record for the benefit of the entire Senate. I hope this serves as an example of how Congress can act very responsibly.

I again, and I will do so this afternoon when I am privileged to join others in meeting with the President, will assert my view that it is time for us to get together as a body now and state our goals and hopefully state them in a manner consistent with the objectives of the President. He is entitled to know that. The service persons in the Gulf are entitled to know that. And the other nations which have joined are entitled to know that.

I anticipate that, if the President does decide to call for a special session, he will lay before us a draft resolution which will simply provide Congress with an affirmative statement on what the United Nations has accomplished over these many weeks and months with their resolutions, the most recent one of yesterday, and to state in that resolution that the United States will likewise join in using all necessary means to bring about the peaceful fulfillment of the goals stated in those resolutions. We could further state that the President will continue his consultation with Congress, as he has in the past, as he will be doing today. Otherwise, this train will pass down the track and, again, we'll just be so many passengers on it and not have exercised and fulfilled our constitutional responsibility. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. I appreciate your cooperation and the cooperation of all members of the committee. I think we have had a very constructive week of hearings.

I thank each one of our witnesses here today—Mr. Milhollin, Dr. Graham, and Mr. Spector. This afternoon's hearing has been a most important hearing and we thank you all for being here.

I would say that I assume there will be discussions, Senator Warner, with the President and with the leadership of Congress about whether to have a special session and, if so, when to have that session. I assume that the President will let us know this afternoon if he is making a request that we have a special session, and also would let us know what additional authority he seeks from Congress under the Constitution.

At this stage, I don't know of any presidential request for additional authority. But certainly Congress has a role here. Congress has a responsibility here. A lot of us individually have said what we thought on the subject this week and in previous weeks. I have personally had a chance to meet with the President on at least two occasions, and I have told him on each one of those occasions my own views. He has listened very carefully. I have met with Secretary Cheney. I have met with General Powell. I have met with Brent Scowcroft. I have met with a number of them. I have no complaints about consultation.

I did feel that, when the President made a basic shift in the military mission and basically put a large number, or declared his intent to put a large number, of forces there, which some of us perceive as putting a time clock on what I call "strategy number one," that is, the sanctions strategy, having that time clock tick away, I felt then and still feel that there should have been more consultation, not just with me but with many other members of Congress at that time. I know that there has been considerable consultation with other countries of the world. Secretary Baker has been all over the world and I think that is commendable. I believe that what the United Nations has done, the action they have taken, is also commendable and constructive.

I believe that in every one of the conversations with the leaders of the countries of the world there has been considerable discussion about what "all necessary means" indicates. I am sure that there will be many of us in Congress who also want to hear from the President on that and hear from him on the question of timing. Most importantly, I think that many of us, particularly after the testimony we have heard this week, have a lot to expect in the way of sanctions. A lot of us believe that those sanctions have a great deal of promise to work. But I would add also that I think the threat of force and the threat of being able to use force at some appropriate time is also an important ingredient in this overall measure.

So we look forward to continue a dialogue with the administration, and it is my hope that we will be able to come out of this with some kind of consensus that is in the national security interest of this Nation. Senator Glenn or Senator Exon, do you have any further comments?

Senator **Exon**. Nothing further, thank you.

Senator **Glenn**. No, thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. No, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I think you have put your finger on that threat of force. I would only say with respect to that, that there must be no doubt about Congress and the people of the United States, as well as the President, being unified, if that is the only option which in these collective judgments can be exercised. I continue to believe that if we remain together and hang together steadfastly, then we can avoid conflict.

Chairman **Nunn**. I thank the Senator. We have a number of inserts for the record. Without objection, I will insert in the record at this point three papers on the Iraqi nuclear issue that have been submitted to this committee: an issue brief by the Congressional Research Service titled, "Iraq and Nuclear Weapons," by Warren Donnelly, Senior Specialist, dated November 28, 1990; an analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists titled, "The Iraqi Nuclear Threat," by Peter Clausen, Director of Research, dated November 28, 1990; and a press release by the Nuclear Control Institute titled, "Present Assessments Understate Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Potential," dated November 30, 1990.

[The information referred to follows:]

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CRS Issue Brief

Iraq and Nuclear Weapons

Updated November 28, 1990

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Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

ISSUE DEFINITION

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

- Background
    - U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with Iraq
    - Iraq's Nonproliferation Commitments
    - Iraq's Nuclear Materials Inventories
    - Suspicions Concerning Iraq's Nuclear Intentions
    - Recent Views on Iraq's Nuclear Capability

- Analysis
    - Iraq's Limited Nuclear Capability
    - Iraq's 12.5 Kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium
    - International Control of Nuclear Exports
    - Effect of the U.S. Security Council Embargo
    - Some Implications for U.S. Interests
    - Congressional Response
    - Issues for Congress

CHRONOLOGY

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

Iraq and Nuclear Weapons

SUMMARY

On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, causing a continuing crisis in the Middle East (see CRS Issue Briefs 90109, Iraq: U S. Economic Sanctions; IB90116, Oil and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait; IB90071, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: U.S. Policy and Options; and IB90118, Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: A Review of Events). This issue brief looks at Iraq's nuclear activities and suspicions that Iraq is seeking the ability to make nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, Iraq cannot now make nuclear explosives and probably will not be able to do so for many years. As a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq has pledged not to acquire or make nuclear weapons. It permits inspection of declared nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify these materials are accounted for.

Nonetheless, except for the embargo, Iraq could use its oil wealth to buy the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons. It has a cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians and some nuclear laboratories, some uranium resources, two small nuclear reactors, and a laboratory-scale reprocessing capacity, but it has no industrial-scale capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium or uranium. Its large test reactor, the Tammuz 1, was substantially damaged by an Israeli air raid in 1981 and has not been rebuilt. News reports indicate Iraq is trying to import the wherewithal to build a gas-centrifuge type uranium enrichment plant, which presumably could produce weapons-grade uranium-235. Iraq still has the 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for that reactor, possibly enough for one nuclear bomb. However, this fuel is periodically inspected by the IAEA and is accounted for.

On the whole, if Iraq could import the technology, materials, and supplies needed for uranium enrichment, and if it could successfully build and operate such a facility without interference from abroad, it probably could produce weapons-grade uranium and make crude but destructive nuclear bombs in perhaps 5 to 10 years. Major policy concerns for the United States are (1) how to dissuade Iraq from producing weapons-grade fissile materials and (2) how to further tighten world restrictions on the supply of the means to produce these materials.

During his Thanksgiving visit to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, President Bush warned on Nov. 22, 1990, that Iraq may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons. "Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of the situation and the gravity of that threat."

ISSUE DEFINITION

On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, thereby increasing tensions in the Middle East and concern about Iraq's alleged efforts to get the means to make nuclear weapons. If Iraq were to acquire nuclear weapons, this could further threaten U.S. oil and security interests in the Middle East, Israel's security, and continuation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This issue brief examines recent signs of an Iraqi interest in nuclear weapons, Iraq's present ability to make them, and its nonproliferation commitments. For historical background, see CRS Archived Issue Brief 81001, Nuclear Energy: Iraq's Nuclear Energy Program and Intentions.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background

To make nuclear explosives in the 1990s, a nonweapons state would require access to weapons-grade plutonium or uranium, to special parts and equipment, and to the technology of nuclear explosions. Plutonium can be produced by exposing normal uranium to neutrons within a reactor and then chemically separating out the plutonium, i.e., reprocessing. Weapons-grade uranium, 90% or more U-235, can be separated from natural uranium (which is largely U-238) in several ways. The technique being widely developed today uses a centrifuge. Some of the equipment needed for reprocessing or enrichment is clearly for that purpose only. However, many items made for other industrial processes can be used for production of these materials -- so called dual use items.

As for the technology of nuclear explosives, this is now 45 years old, and much of it probably has become known or could be replicated.

Apparently, in 1988 Iraq decided to acquire the means to produce enriched uranium, choosing the uranium gas centrifuge process. Fragmentary news items since then indicate a clandestine scheme to buy the needed technology, materials, equipment and supplies, and also items useful for the manufacture of nuclear explosives, such as electronic components for the triggers of nuclear explosives.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, its efforts to acquire or make long-range missiles, and its claim to have chemical weapons have increased concern about a further spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Also, if Iraq were to make nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT, this could give some other states reason to reconsider their nonproliferation commitments and perhaps complicate or prevent extension of the NPT in 1995.

In March 1990, speaking of attempts to smuggle special electronic parts to Iraq, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, "This issue raises once again our concern for the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. It continues to pose a serious risk to U.S. interests and it continues to exacerbate regional problems." He called on nuclear suppliers "to exercise special restraint in providing materials to this region of the world ... we continue to urge that all states adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

There have been several responses in Congress to the alleged smuggling. On March 28, Senator McCain called for hearings and legislation on nuclear and biological warfare technology proliferation no later than this fall (*Congressional Record*, Mar. 28, 1990: S3351). On April 2, Senator Bingaman addressed the dangerous implications of the sale of Chinese missiles to countries in the Middle East and the seizure of the nuclear trigger components in England, and urged completed action by Congress on bills to significantly reduce access of developing countries to missiles and missile technology (*Congressional Record*, Apr. 2, 1990: S3710).

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with Iraq

As a matter of policy, the United States does not cooperate with Iraq's nuclear program. "The Sub-Group on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), an interagency committee, reviews license requests on the Department of Commerce's nuclear referral list and rejects all those which it determines will contribute to Iraqi capabilities to develop nuclear weapons." (Statement by John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Near East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Apr.. 26, 1990)

Iraq's Nonproliferation Commitments

Iraq is a charter nonnuclear-weapons member of the NPT, which entered into force in 1970. It also ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1964.

Under the NPT, Article II, signatory nations are "not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosives, directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." If allegations in the indictment are proven, it would appear that Iraq had violated the treaty.

Also, under the NPT Article III, a nation is committed to place all of its nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards to verify that these are not diverted to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Iraq concluded an agreement with the IAEA for application of NPT-type safeguards effective in February 1972 and has permitted regular inspections ever since.

Under the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Iraq pledged not to carry out any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water.

Iraq's Safeguards Agreement

Iraq has an NPT-type safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency that covers all nuclear materials in Iraq. It does not apply to facilities that do not contain fissile materials. On the other hand, there was informal agreement at the fourth review conference for the nonproliferation treaty that the IAEA be urged to take full advantage of its rights for special inspections under the Iraq safeguards agreement to search for unsafeguarded fuel cycle facilities or equipment (see Chronology at 09/14/90). However, this idea was not adopted by the subsequent 34th General Conference of the IAEA.

Iraq's Nuclear Materials Inventories

Iraq still holds 12.3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 93% U-235 contained in fuel for the Tammuz-1 reactor, which is periodically inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that it can be accounted for. The IAEA safeguards report on Iraq, based on an inspection in April 1990, indicated that in addition to this material, Iraq has smaller amounts of 80% enriched uranium and a small amount of 36% enriched uranium, both supplied by the USSR. Iraq also has a relatively large stockpile of natural, low-enriched and depleted uranium acquired from Portugal, Niger, Brazil, Italy, and West Germany. The regular IAEA inspection in November 1990 revealed no discrepancies (*New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1990).

Suspicions Concerning Iraq's Nuclear Intentions

The most dramatic response to suspicions about Iraq's nuclear activities came on June 7, 1981, when Israel bombed Iraq's Tammuz-I reactor. Israel's stated reasons at the time were threefold:

-- Iraq was close to realization of its plans to acquire a military nuclear capability;

-- Iraq's maintenance of a state of war with Israel and its persistent denial of Israel's right to exist; and

-- the failure of Israel's diplomatic efforts to prevent the extension of foreign assistance to Iraq in the implementation of its nuclear program.

More recently, there have been suspicions that Iraq has been developing long-range missiles and also nuclear warheads to go with them. For example, an article in the *Washington Post* on Mar. 31, 1989, from Jerusalem by Glenn Frankel said that Iraq was secretly engaged in a crash program to build nuclear warheads. Attributed to "well placed Israeli sources," it argued the goal of Iraq's program was to produce and test such a warhead within 2 to 5 years, and that Iraq had the technological capability to construct a nuclear weapon. A State Department press advisory on Mar. 31, 1989, commented that "We remain concerned about the danger that Iraq may seek to develop a nuclear weapons option in the future," and supported negotiation of a nuclear weapons-free zone for the Middle East.

Recent Views of Iraq's Nuclear Situation

President Bush, during his Thanksgiving visit to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, warned on Nov. 22, 1990, that Iraq may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons. "Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of the situation and the gravity of that threat" (*New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1990:16).

Within a few days of President Bush's comments, Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Adviser Scowcroft appeared separately on television news programs on November 25 where both made clear their view that Iraq is trying to make nuclear weapons and that it is only a matter of time until it acquires them and the capability to deliver them; time estimates ranged from a worst case of one year or less to estimates of 5 to 10 years (see Chronology section).

The most comprehensive non-governmental examination of Iraq's nuclear situation since it invaded Kuwait in August 1990 appears in Spector's new book, *Nuclear Ambitions*. As he sees it, sometime after the end of hostilities with Iran in August 1988, Iraq renewed its quest for nuclear weapons, apparently initiating efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability (p. 186). However, in view of the long lead times required "...it is highly unlikely that Iraq will be able to acquire them before the mid- to late-1990s" (p. 198). Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that it has indeed launched a program to achieve this goal.

Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the National Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, and an aide to Senator McCain, in a June 1990 study on proliferation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, concluded that in the long run, Iraq is likely to succeed in obtaining at least some fissile material -- probably U-235 from gas centrifuges; that Iraq almost certainly has most of the basic technology needed to make a nuclear weapon, although it does not seem to have the technical base to make a small weapon without extensive testing; and that it is possible that Iraq could assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons by the mid 1990s.

Michael Eisenstadt, recently with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in a paper -- still in press -- for the Institute concluded that Iraq has the most advanced and ambitious nuclear weapons program in the Arab world. Giving details about Iraq's efforts to get the wherewithal to produce weapons grade U-235, he notes reports that Iraq is working on design of an implosion type explosive. In his view, Iraq will eventually achieve a nuclear weapons production capability within 10 years.

Analysis

Iraq's Limited Nuclear Capability

Iraq probably has some uranium resources but no factories to produce weapons-grade plutonium. While it has two nuclear reactors, both are small -- the 800 kilowatt Tammuz II reactor, which was supplied by France, and the 5 megawatt IRT-2000, pool-type research reactor, which was supplied by the Soviet Union. Iraq's 40 megawatt Tammuz I reactor was destroyed by Israel by an air attack on June 7, 1981. Iraq also has a small, laboratory scale, reprocessing capability but no substantial source of spent fuel to reprocess.

As for highly enriched uranium, Iraq has no enrichment plant. However, Iraq apparently plans such a plant, using uranium centrifuges. Pakistan's success in buying the wherewithal to build centrifuges shows both the limitations of international controls over supply of sensitive nuclear technologies and what can be accomplished by a determined government.

Unless Iraq can obtain weapons-grade fissile materials from external sources, many years would probably be required before Iraq could build, start up, and operate production facilities long enough to produce materials for even a small nuclear arsenal, if that were its intention.

Iraq's 12.5 Kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

There is some debate whether Iraq could make one or two nuclear explosives from its 12.3 kilograms of HEU. For example, David Albright of the Federation of American Scientists concludes that under certain circumstances, Iraq could make a bomb from this material. How much Iraq would need would depend upon its ability to make uranium metal parts, shape high explosives, and make other parts. If Iraq could develop an implosion device and reduce material losses during manufacture, it might be able to make a uranium bomb with under 15 kg. On the other hand IAEA safeguards director, Jon Jennekins, recently said that even if Iraq had as much as 25 kilograms of U-235, it would not necessarily mean there would be enough for a nuclear weapon. Without substantial nuclear infrastructure, much more fissile material might be necessary to fabricate a working explosive (*Nuclear Fuel*, Aug. 20, 1990: 8).

Assuming the IAEA is correct, it would make little sense for Iraq to seize the 12.3 kg of safeguarded U-235 unless it had produced enough additional material to make one test and several additional first generation bombs. Tensions in the Middle East and between Iraq and the United States and suspicions about Iraq's nuclear intentions would greatly increase if this material were to disappear.

Iraq has gone out of its way to reassure that its weapons grade uranium has not been diverted. On Nov. 15, 1990, the IAEA disclosed Iraq had invited IAEA inspectors to verify that Iraq's U-235 had not been made into a nuclear weapons (*New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1990: A1, A13).

On November 27, the IAEA announced that routine safeguards inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities were carried out in November 1990 and that "no change has taken place" in the status of nuclear material under safeguards in Iraq since the last inspections, which were performed in April 1990 (IAEA Press Release 90/26, Nov. 27, 1990; *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1990: A14).

International Control of Nuclear Exports

The NPT recognizes Iraq's right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without limitation. The United States and other major nuclear supplier states in 1976 agreed to voluntary guidelines (The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines) which call for restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities (i.e., for reprocessing or enrichment), technology and weapons-usable material, as well as encouragement of alternatives to national enrichment or reprocessing plants (IAEA press release PR 78/2, Jan. 16, 1978). However, these commitments are voluntary, there is no formal organization to enforce them, and there are no formal sanctions for violations. Also, the lists of items covered focus upon those needed for production of fissile materials rather than other items needed to make warheads. (A detailed list of such items would be a convenient "shopping list" for a country that might wish to make nuclear weapons.)

A recent restatement of U.S. policy, in the last annual nonproliferation report to Congress submitted by President Bush in 1990, said that the United States in working with other nuclear suppliers will "...continue to stress the need for extreme caution in any transfer of sensitive nuclear materials, technology, and equipment."

Effect of the U.S. Security Council Embargo

At the opening of the IAEA's 34th General Conference in Vienna in September 1990, director general Hans Blix noted that the embargo approved by the UN Security Council Resolution 661 had made it impractical for the IAEA to extend aid to Iraq in the light of its invasion of Kuwait. This led to a statement by the Iraqi delegate that any disruption of IAEA technical aid to Iraq would lead to an explicit call for a full reassessment of relations, which U.S officials termed a "veiled threat" to withdraw from both the IAEA and the NPT. If Iraq were to do so, there would be no further confirmation of the status of its inventory of weapons grade uranium.

Some Implications for U.S. Interests

An overt or a secret Iraqi attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would be the first violation of the NPT by a nonweapons member. Were this to happen and no sanctions be applied, other members of the treaty might well question its value and problems could develop over extension of the treaty in 1995 on terms favorable to U.S. interests. Also, such an Iraqi venture could trigger an open or secret nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which could be seen as destabilizing and increasing chances that these weapons might be used in this region. On the other hand, some might argue that a situation of deterrence would result since neither side could be certain that in a preemptive attack it could destroy enough of the other's nuclear, or chemical, arsenals to escape a devastating counterattack.

Congressional Response

No hearings on Iraq's nuclear activities have been held since the invasion of Kuwait. However, on August 16, Chairman Dingell of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce subpoenaed DOE documents related to the nuclear weapons program, including information on Iraqi attempts to acquire nuclear weapons technology and materials. These documents were to be provided by September 4.

Issues for Congress

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and suspicions about Iraq's nuclear activities pose several issues for Congress:

1. What can be done to dissuade Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles to deliver them?

2. How can existing international controls be strengthened to make it more difficult for Iraq and other nonnuclear weapons states in tense regions to obtain the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons and also the missiles to carry them?

3. What can be done to get new nuclear and missile suppliers such as China to present a united front on controls for exports of the wherewithal to make such weapons and missiles?

CHRONOLOGY

11/27/90 — Vienna. The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that: "Routine safeguards inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities were carried out in November 1990. Based upon the information collected during these inspections it has been concluded that no change has taken place in the status of nuclear material under safeguards in Iraq since the last inspections which were performed in April 1990. (IAEA Press Release 90/26, Nov. 27, 1990; *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1990: A14)

11/26/90 — Washington. According to a senior U.S. official last week, nuclear facilities in Iraq are "not prime targets" of Operation Desert Shield. "While there may be good reasons for going to war with Iraq," one well placed official said, "Iraq's nuclear program isn't one of them." (*Nuclear Fuel*, Nov. 26, 1990: 6)

11/25/90 — Secretary of Defense Cheney, appearing on CBS News, Face the Nation, said "Well, I think he [Hussein] is closer today than he was a few months ago, in the sense that he's making steady progress in working this problem. . . We also know from intelligence sources that he's working this problem very hard." Also, "It's only a matter of time until he acquires nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them, and that has to be, I think, an element of concern as we decide how to deal with the problem." (CBS News Transcript)

— National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said on ABC News, This Week with David Brinkley, "The estimates -- and I am not an expert on that-the estimates are from months to as much as ten years." As for whether Hussein would have an nuclear arsenal within a few months, he agreed he did not really believe this. But "Building even one could make a significant difference for troops fighting in the region." (ABC News Transcript)

11/22/90 — Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. President Bush, visiting the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, warned that Iraq may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons. "Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of the situation and the gravity of that threat." He said, "No one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons or who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he hasn't used."

— Administration officials have been saying that Mr. Hussein might develop atomic weapons in less than two years, (*New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1990:16)

11/18/90 — Unless stopped, Iraq could have A-arms within 10 years according to American, British, and Israeli intelligence experts. Iraq has acquired a nuclear weapons capacity that could enable it to begin manufacturing and using a small stock of nuclear missiles, shells and bombs within a decade. (*New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1990: 1, 14)

11/15/90 — Vienna. The International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed that Iraq had invited a team of inspectors to verify that Iraq's small stock of highly enriched uranium had not been made into a nuclear weapons (*New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1990: A1, A13).

11/04/90 — The CBS program 60-Minutes featured a segment on suspected uranium mines in Iraq.

10/29/90 — A West German government report of last August said that two former employees of MAN Technologies GmbH, which designs gas ultracentrifuges, were suspected of playing "an important role" in procuring centrifuge technology for Iraq and "tried without success to recruit additional centrifuge experts" for that country. (*Nuclear Fuel*, Oct. 29, 1990: 10)

10/18/90 — Justice officials in Germany and Switzerland were looking for the source of design specifications used in ordering equipment intended for gas ultracentrifuges, which were being shipped to Iraq's Ministry of Industry when it was stopped by customs officials. (*Nucleonics Week*, Oct. 18, 1990: 7)

10/13/90 — According to freelance film maker Gwynne Roberts, evidence, including photographs by a Soviet spy satellite, indicate Iraq has uranium mines in its northern Gara mountains. (London Press Association, Oct. 13, 1990; FBIS Oct. 13, 1990)

10/04/90 — Brazil. President Fernando Collor de Mello revealed last week that Brazil had provided Iraq clandestine nuclear assistance since 1980. (*Nucleonics Week*, Oct. 4, 1990: 6)

09/27/90 — Vienna. A U.S. official called Iraq's statement that it could reconsider its commitment to the IAEA if the agency does not restore technical assistance a "veiled threat" to withdraw from both the IAEA and the NPT. (*Nucleonics Week*, Sept. 27, 1990: 3)

09/26/90 — Moscow. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov expressed "certain concern" over Iraq's hint that in view of the cancellation of IAEA technical assistance it may stop cooperation with the agency and would not accept international inspections to monitor operation of Iraqi nuclear plants. (TASS/FBIS Sept. 26, 1990)

09/20/90 — Jerusalem. David 'Ivri, director general of Israel's Defense Ministry, said Israel must make every effort to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring a nuclear capability. (Jerusalem Domestic Service, Sept. 20, 1990. In JPRS-TND-90-018S, Oct. 16, 1990: 8)

09/19/90 — Washington. The Carnegie Endowment released the new book by Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions*, which observed that sometime after the cessation of hostilities with Iran in August 1988, Iraq was believed to have renewed its quest for nuclear weapons, and apparently initiated efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability. (p. 186)

— Vienna. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Kital, head of the Iraqi delegation to the IAEA, warned that any disruption of IAEA technical aid to Iraq would naturally lead to an explicit call for a full reassessment of relations. (Baghdad INA, Sept. 19, 1990. In JPRS-TND-90-018S, Oct. 16, 1990: 7)

09/17/90 — Vienna. In his opening remarks to the 34th General Conference of the IAEA, Director General Hans Blix noted that the embargo approved by UN Security Council Resolution 661 had made it impractical for the IAEA to extend aid to Iraq in the light of its invasion of Kuwait.

— *The Wall Street Journal* quoted Leonard Spector as saying that the NPT was not enough to safeguard the world against a maverick like Saddam Hussein. The NPT allowed countries to do nuclear work ostensibly for peaceful purposes. "So Saddam Hussein could continue his nuclear research program without violating the treaty until he is just weeks from being able to produce a bomb." (Sept. 17 1990: A10)

09/14/90 — Geneva. The Fourth NPT Review Conference adjourned without consensus on a final document. Nonetheless, agreement was reached on many points. One potentially affecting Iraq was a statement to urge the Agency not to hesitate to take full advantage if its rights *including the use of special inspections*, as contained in its safeguards agreement with Iraq. This could enable IAEA inspectors to search for unsafeguarded fuel cycle facilities or equipment alleged to be under construction, including centrifuge equipment. (*Nucleonics Week*, Sept. 20, 1990: 1, 12; see also NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/add.3(a), p. 5 as released at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna).

09/11/90 — Washington. President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress regarding the crisis in Kuwait. With respect to Iraq's nuclear activities, he said "Our interest, our involvement in the Gulf, is not transitory... Our role, with others, is to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense. *And something else: To curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missiles and above all, nuclear technologies.*" (emphasis added) (*Congressional Record*: H7416)

09/05/90 --- The House Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on the impact of the Iraqi invasion on energy and economic security.

08/21/90 --- Swiss officials confirmed that they were investigating two Swiss firms in connection with an attempt to export to Iraq end caps for centrifuge tubes for a uranium centrifuge plant. Sources also said Iraq might be getting centrifuge know-how from the Brazilian Air Force's Aerospace Technology Center (CTA). (*Nucleonics Week*, Aug. 23, 1990: 13)

08/20/90 --- Iraq was actively seeking technology for development of an unsafeguarded gas centrifuge complex, nonproliferation experts, diplomatic sources and customs officials said this week. (*Nuclear Fuel*, Aug. 20, 1990: 2)

--- The latest IAEA safeguards report on Iraq indicated that in addition to 12.3 kg of 93% fuel, supplied by France, Iraq had smaller kilogram amounts of 80% enriched fuel and a small amount of 36% enriched fuel, both supplied by the USSR. Iraq also had a relatively large stockpile of natural uranium, low-enriched uranium, and depleted uranium, acquired from Portugal, Niger, Brazil, Italy and West Germany. (*Nucleonics Week*, Aug. 20, 1990: 8,9)

08/14/90 --- *Energy Daily* reported the views of three experts on Iraq's nuclear status: Milton Hoenig -- Nuclear Control Institute; Leonard Spector -- Carnegie Endowment; and Michael Eisenstadt --- the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Summarizing, it said: "If pushed to the wall, Iraq could quickly construct a primitive but effective atomic bomb." (*Energy Daily*, Aug. 14, 1990: 3)

--- A lengthy article in the *Boston Globe* described Iraq's nuclear program; claimed Saddam Hussein "has spread out and buried his nuclear research sites." (*Proliferation Watch*, August 1990)

08/13/90 --- The *Los Angeles Times* reported U.S. Government licensing of export of dual-use commodities sent to Iraq with possible nuclear and missile uses; claimed "The sales occurred with assistance from both the Commerce Department and State Department, sometimes over the objections of the Pentagon." (*Proliferation Watch*, August 1990)

08/12/90 --- Brazil. The Rio publication *Jornal do Brasil*, described Brazilian supply of uranium and uranium exploration services to Iraq in the 1980s.

08/09/90 --- Vienna. No additional safeguards measures will be taken by the IAEA at nuclear facilities in Iraq, according to agency officials. Intelligence information suggests that "Iraqi designs to acquire nuclear weapons capability do not appear to be centered upon seizing fissile material under IAEA safeguards," according to one western official. (*Nucleonics Week*, Aug. 9, 1990: 2, 3.)

08/02/90 --- Iraq invaded Kuwait.

07/02/90 — Washington. The Pakistan Embassy denied a report in *U.S. News & World Report* of June 4 that "Pakistan may be contributing to the Iraqi nuclear effort." "Pakistan is doing so such thing, since it neither has nuclear-weapons technology nor is interested in acquiring it." (*U.S. News & World Report*, July 2, 1990: 7)

06/04/90 — Washington. According to *U.S. News & World Report*, the official U.S. estimate is that Iraq will not be a nuclear power for 5 to 10 years. However, an increasing number of U.S. intelligence officials, as well as British and Israeli experts, believe Iraq could acquire a nuclear capability in as few as 2 to 5 years. Also, "a growing body of evidence" suggests that Iraq's nuclear program is getting considerable foreign assistance from West German companies, China and perhaps Pakistan. U.S. Intelligence officials say Pakistan may be contributing to the Iraqi war effort by providing Baghdad with vital expertise and technology for its uranium-enrichment program, in return for cooperation on acquiring restricted items. (*U.S. News & World Report*, June 4, 1990: 49, 50)

05/08/90 — President Saddam Hussein of Iraq asserted that Iraq had acquired a secret American electronic device [capacitors] that could be used to detonate a nuclear bomb and that it was now able to make the detonators itself. The Bush Administration said it was looking into Iraq's claim but did not know if it was true. (Paul Lewis, *New York Times*, May 9, 1990: A5; *Arms Control Reporter*, 1990: 453.B.83)

05/07/90 — Vienna. At the request of Iraq, the IAEA published the following statement on a recent safeguards inspection in Iraq:

> ...Routine safeguards inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities were carried out in early April 1990. The Department of Safeguards sent the Resident Representative of Iraq to the IAEA detailed statements of conclusions on May 2, 1990. In these statements, based upon the data collected between March 1989 and April 1990, the conclusion was reached that all material under safeguards has been accounted for. (IAEA Office, United Nations, New York)

04/26/90 — The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, held a hearing on US.-Iraqi relations.

04/02/90 — President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in a speech on Baghdad radio said that Iraq had acquired advanced chemical weapons and threatened to annihilate half of Israel if it moved against his country. He denied that Iraq had acquired nuclear weapons, but said that its new chemical arsenal is as powerful as nuclear weapons. (*New York Times*, Apr. 3, 1990: A1)

04/--/90 — *Der Spiegel* recently reported that Iraq might be constructing a centrifuge enrichment plant for enriching weapons-grade uranium with the use of illegal exports of machinery from a West German company. However, it was unlikely that Iraq would be able to produce the enriched uranium for a weapons before the turn of the century. (*Arms Control Today*, April, 1990: 27)

03/29/90 — A State Department spokesman said the United States believed there was no "near term" possibility of an Iraqi nuclear weapon. (*Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 30, 1990: A18)

— Richard McCormack, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, called in Iraq's Ambassador Mohamed Al-Mashai to tell him that Iraq's clandestine efforts to buy nuclear bomb technology "will clearly have an adverse affect" on Iraq's relations with the United States.

03/28/90 — Heathrow. Customs officials arrested five people for attempting to smuggle 40 U.S.-made nuclear trigger components to Iraq via London. In Washington, a Customs spokesman said the arrests resulted from an 18-month investigation by U.S. and British customs officials. (*Associated Press*, Mar. 28, 1990)

12/11/89 — London. According to the *Financial Times Mid-East Market*, Iraq was trying to build a nuclear bomb via a network of companies in Europe, some owned by Iraq, that were procuring a wide range of equipment and technical expertise. The Iraqis apparently had decided to make their bomb with highly enriched uranium to be produced with centrifuges.

04/18/89 — Geneva. Rahim Abd al-Katl, head of the Iraqi delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, called for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East with the condition that all parties acceded to the NPT, including Israel. (FBIS-ME, Apr. 19, 1989)

04/06/89 — Nonproliferation experts questioned the validity of recent reports, based heavily on Israeli intelligence, that Iraq was engaged in a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. (*Nucleonics Week*, Apr. 4, 1989: 2)

03/30/89 — Jerusalem. According to the *Washington Post*, Iraq was secretly engaged in a crash program to build nuclear warheads for use with a strategic missile also under development, according to well-placed Israeli sources. The goal of the secret program was to produce and test such a warhead within the next 2 to 5 years. (*Washington Post*, Mar. 31, 1989: A1, A32). A State Department press guidance said, in part, "We remain concerned about the danger that Iraq may seek to develop a nuclear weapons option in the future."

02/22/89 — Washington. Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, testified to the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, House Committee on Armed Services, that Iraq was "actively pursuing" a nuclear weapons program, although he provided no details.

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UNION OF
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THE IRAQI NUCLEAR THREAT

Peter Clausen
Director of Research
November 28, 1990

Saddam Hussein's nuclear-weapons program is increasingly cited by Bush administration officials and others as a major rationale for military action against Iraq. According to this argument, the Iraqi bomb effort is well advanced, poses an imminent threat to regional and global stability, and should therefore be preemptively destroyed. Otherwise, it is argued, Iraq's nuclear capability will inevitably grow and present the world with a far greater danger in the future.

The case for an urgent military solution to this problem is very weak, however. While Iraq is clearly pursuing a nuclear-weapons option, there is little evidence that it is close to being able to produce bombs. Moreover, the Persian Gulf crisis and the ending of the Cold War have created conditions under which non-military responses to the threat are increasingly available and promising. Instead of overreacting to the immediate crisis, the international community should approach the Iraqi case as an opportunity to enact a more effective long-term non-proliferation strategy for Iraq and other aspiring nuclear powers.

Background

Hussein's nuclear program dates from the mid-1970s, when Iraq purchased the large Osirak research reactor from France. Although Iraq had signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and the reactor would have been subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there were strong indications that Hussein hoped to develop nuclear weapons. In June 1981, Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor in an air strike. The US and other nations condemned the strike as unjustified given that any Iraqi nuclear threat remained years in the future.

Although dormant for a number of years following the Israeli raid, Iraq's program was revived in the late 1980s. At that time Iraq began acquiring materials apparently intended for the construction of a gas centrifuge plant to enrich uranium. Like Pakistan, which built a similar plant in the 1980s, Iraq has employed a variety of clandestine tactics (such as front companies and falsified end-use documents) to evade supplier-nation export controls. In the last two years, several attempts by Iraqi agents to smuggle centrifuge materials or components (including specialized steel, magnets, and vacuum pumps) have been uncovered in the US, West Germany, and other countries. In March 1990, Iraqis were also caught smuggling krytrons--electronic switches used to detonate nuclear bombs--out of London. These developments have led analysts to conclude that Iraq is attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons based on highly enriched uranium (HEU).[1] In addition to exploiting lax export controls in Western countries, Iraq may have received assistance in enrichment technology from China, Pakistan, and Brazil. Iraq's nuclear-weapons research is conducted at three dispersed sites.

Status of Iraq's Program

Most experts estimate that Iraq is between five and ten years away from being able to produce nuclear bombs. These estimates predate the August invasion of Kuwait and the economic blockade of Iraq that has been in effect since then. In light of Iraq's near-total dependence on Western technology, the embargo--combined with the adoption of more rigorous export-control procedures by countries from which Iraq has obtained components--can be expected to lengthen the lead-time. Pakistan, which enjoyed several advantages over Iraq, required more than a decade to reach a nuclear capability from the time that it began its uranium-enrichment project in the mid-1970s.

To make HEU bombs, Iraq would need to acquire a supply of uranium, convert it to uranium hexaflouride gas, enrich this material to weapons-grade levels, and then convert the enriched material to metallic form and machine it into warhead cores. In addition, it would need a workable warhead design and various non-nuclear components, including specialized high explosives and a precision triggering package for detonating the implosion-type device that Iraq is thought to be pursuing. To be confident of such a device, it would probably need to conduct at least one nuclear explosive test.

The pacing factor in this sequence is the production of weapons-grade uranium--that is, the construction of an enrichment plant and the processing of feed material through it. Both steps are multi-year undertakings. Although Iraq has acquired components for individual centrifuges, it is not believed to have begun construction of a full-scale enrichment facility. Such a plant would be large and difficult or impossible to conceal from satellite surveillance. To sustain a minimal bomb production rate (one or two devices per year), it would need to contain at least a thousand centrifuges. (Some unconfirmed reports indicate that Iraq may now have components for 26 machines). Once completed, the plant would need to operate continuously for a period of years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a small number of nuclear devices.

Iraq is already in possession of about 12.5 kg. of HEU--somewhat less that the minimum amount generally considered necessary for a single weapon--in the form of a fuel charge for the destroyed Osirak reactor. This fuel is subject to IAEA safeguards. On November 27, the Agency announced that it had just completed an inspection--at Iraq's invitation--and determined that all the material was properly accounted for. Iraq could not divert this material to military uses without the knowledge of the international community. Even then, it could at best fabricate a crude explosive device that, as administration officials have conceded, would not be a deliverable weapon. As a result, most experts discount this option as a plausible nuclear-weapon path for Iraq to take.

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[1] Weapons-grade HEU contains up to 90% or more of the isotope U-235. It is produced by "enriching" natural uranium (which is mostly non-fissile U-238 and contains only .7% U-235). In centrifuge enrichment, natural uranium in a gaseous compound is repeatedly fed through "cascades" of precision, high-speed centrifuges, which separate the isotopes by mass to produce a progressively higher concentration of U-235.

The Pakistan Analogy

The experience of Pakistan offers a yardstick for assessing Iraq's prospects. In 1975, Pakistan began obtaining technology for a centrifuge plant. By early 1978, US satellite reconnaissance showed that construction of a full-scale plant was underway. (Iraq has not yet reached this stage.) The plant was completed and began operating in 1984, and was producing weapons-grade uranium by the end of 1986. Since then, Pakistan is assumed to have produced enough fissile material for two to four weapons per year. In October 1990, US aid to Pakistan was suspended when the Bush administration was unable to certify that the country did not "possess" a nuclear device.

In sum, Pakistan required over ten years to progress from the initial acquisition of centrifuge components to the production of weapons-grade material. During this time, US-led technology-control measures by supplier countries delayed Pakistan's progress, as did the formidable engineering problems of constructing and operating a gas-centrifuge facility.

Several factors suggest that Iraq may have an even more difficult time than Pakistan in moving from the first stages of a weapons effort to the attainment of a nuclear option:

- Pakistan has a considerably more sophisticated scientific and technological infrastructure than Iraq, including a large cadre of Western-trained nuclear engineers. (Pakistan conducted a peaceful nuclear research and power program for about 15 years before deciding to pursue a weapons option.)

- The director of Pakistan's enrichment project (Dr. A.Q. Khan) had worked in a European centrifuge plant, from which he appropriated designs and blueprints to guide the acquisition of components and construction of the facility.

- Stopping the Pakistani bomb was not an overriding priority for the US and other Western countries, notwithstanding their export-control efforts. Pakistan enjoyed a privileged status in US foreign policy because of its role in helping the anti-Soviet resistance forces in Afghanistan. Repeatedly, the US looked the other way while Pakistan advanced toward a nuclear capability.

- Iraq, already more dependent on outside assistance, faces technology-denial measures that are more concerted and comprehensive than those imposed on Pakistan. While the embargo will not be 100 percent effective, it is likely to cause more difficulty for Iraq's nuclear progress than Pakistan experienced.

The Alternatives to Force

Iraq remains in the early stages of acquiring a nuclear capability. Furthermore, it reached this point in large part due to lax and negligent Western export control procedures and the apparent willingness of some Third World countries to collaborate with its efforts. Since August, the climate for Iraq's pursuit of the bomb has become much harsher.

In addition to UN-mandated economic and trade sanctions, controls against clandestine technology transfers have been tightened. Germany, the source of much of Iraq's chemical-weapons and nuclear technology, has adopted new export control laws designed to prevent future lapses. Brazil, which has given both nuclear and missile assistance to Iraq, has suspended such cooperation. China and Pakistan--possible sources of enrichment aid--are officially supporting the UN embargo. And the US--which until August was actively promoting technology exports with nuclear uses to Iraq--has established new procedures for Defense Department review of exports.

These developments alone cannot permanently deny Iraq a nuclear capability. However, they offer a strong chance of delaying such a capability to the outer range of current estimates, if not beyond. In these circumstances, the destruction of Baghdad's nuclear program is one of the weakest rationales for resorting to military force against Iraq.

If the current crisis is resolved short of war, there will be a number of options for dealing with Iraq's nuclear program:

- The tighter export controls enacted in response to the crisis should be continued, and cooperation among supplier countries intensified.

- The US and other major powers should press for special IAEA inspections of Iraq's suspected nuclear-research sites. The recent NPT review conference called for such inspections, urging the IAEA "to take full advantage of its rights."[2].

- A negotiated settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis and broader Middle East issues should explicitly deal with the interacting nuclear, chemical, and missile threats in the region, and establish verifiable confidence-building measures to cap and reduce them.

- The global nonproliferation regime should be extended and strengthened (for example, by requiring UN sanctions against violators of nonproliferation commitments) when the NPT comes up for renewal in 1995.

The US and other nations have seldom made nuclear nonproliferation a top-priority security objective. Instead, they have followed a pattern of complacency punctuated by peaks of concern in response to sudden crises. The Persian Gulf crisis and the end of the Cold War offer a chance to break this pattern and to implement a firm, consistent strategy against proliferation for the long-term. There is ample time for such a strategy to blunt the Iraqi nuclear threat.

Peter Clausen, UCS Director of Research, was a nuclear proliferation specialist in the Department of Energy from 1978-82, and has written widely on the subject. He is the author of a forthcoming book on US nonproliferation policy.

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[2] The NPT safeguards agreement signed by parties to the treaty authorizes the IAEA to conduct special inspections at sites where weapons work is suspected, in addition to inspecting those facilities declared by the host country. Until now, this special authority has never been exercised.

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For Immediate Release
Friday, November 30, 1990

PRESENT ASSESSMENTS UNDERSTATE IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POTENTIAL

Official and unofficial estimates that it would take Iraq at least six months and probably years to build an atomic bomb are "dangerously ill-informed," according to Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute.

These estimates, Leventhal said, do not take into consideration that the time needed to convert the uranium-aluminium fuel that Iraq now possesses for a research reactor into pure uranium fuel for a bomb is only one to three weeks. These estimates also do not take into consideration evidence that Iraq has been designing and developing the non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons in advance of having the essential nuclear ingredients---highly enriched uranium or plutonium---ready to place in them. Finally, these estimates do not consider the plausibility of Iraq now acquiring or having already acquired substantial quantities of these weapons materials by clandestine means from poorly protected civil nuclear facilities in other countries---especially in western Europe and Japan---or even possibly from willing suppliers in the Third World.

"It is remarkable," Leventhal said, "that non-proliferation experts inside and outside the U.S. government have been so fast to trash President Bush's statements about Iraq's short-term nuclear potential as nothing more than political opportunism. It is ironic that when the White House finally wakes up to the long-neglected proliferation danger in Iraq, unnamed non-proliferation officials in the government, as well as former senior officials and independent experts, downplay the danger by suggesting that the President is merely playing to public concerns reflected in opinion polls."

Leventhal said that the new U.S. intelligence assessment, which apparently provides the basis for the President's concerns and for Defense Secretary Cheney's estimate of Iraq being as close as six months to a bomb, may itself be flawed.

"This U.S. assessment appears to contain a worst-case scenario of Iraq needing six months to build a bomb from the time it seizes the French-supplied research reactor fuel that is now under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," Leventhal said. Six months represents the time span between routine visits to Iraq by IAEA inspectors to make sure the fuel is still there, but the IAEA officially states---based on the advice it gets from an international team of safeguards experts---that the time needed to convert this reactor fuel into weapons fuel is only one to three weeks. If Iraq has the components of an implosion device---save the nuclear core---completed and ready to be assembled, Iraq could have a bomb within the one-to-three-week conversion time.

Iraq now has 12.3 kilograms (27 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium contained in the uranium-aluminum fuel plates provided by France for use in the French-built Osirak research reactor. The fuel has been in storage near Baghdad ever since Israel destroyed the reactor with a bombing raid in 1981 before the reactor went into operation. This amount of highly enriched uranium is enough for at least one implosion device. An additional 18.7 kilograms (41 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium would be needed for a crude gun-type device utilizing two critical masses of this material weighing a total of 31 kilograms (68 pounds). (This is the amount of 93%-enriched uranium that would be needed, utilizing a beryllium reflector. See attached analysis.)

There is ample evidence that Iraq is designing and building components of nuclear weapons, Leventhal said. A Congressional investigation disclosed that Iraq had received, by June 1989, 18 reports from U.S. national laboratories relating to the detonators and chemical explosives used in nuclear weapons. U.S. and British customs officials have stopped illegal exports of electronic capacitors and a vacuum furnace applicable to building nuclear weapons, but Saddam Hussein later displayed Iraqi capacitors (high-speed electronic triggers needed for an implosion device) based on an American capacitor that he suggested was smuggled successfully from the U.S.

"The bottom line question," Leventhal said, "is whether Iraq now has enough material to build nuclear weapons. If Iraq does, it would be foolhardy to assume that it lacks the technical wherewithal to explode nuclear weapons with it. Only a year ago, U.S. experts were caught by surprise and expressed disbelief when Iraq claimed to have launched a three-stage rocket capable of carrying satellites into space, only to have to eat their words when U.S. intelligence confirmed the launch. We cannot afford to be caught off guard again, this time by Iraqi nuclear weapons.

"It is clear that Iraq has enough highly enriched uranium for one implosion device. What is not clear is whether it has obtained enough uranium or plutonium for a few or several such devices, or enough uranium for less sophisticated gun-type devices (which require more material but are easier to detonate). Expert assessments have focused almost exclusively on Iraq's nascent industrial capacity to produce its own bomb material---a capacity that apparently has not grown sufficiently to produce such material in quantities needed for weapons. These assessments have ignored the possibility that Iraq could use or may already have used its highly sophisticated clandestine purchasing networks, or its terrorist surrogates, to obtain bomb-grade uranium and plutonium from abroad.

"If indeed there is no evidence of diversions of nuclear bomb materials to Iraq, this does not mean such diversions have not occurred---only that none has been detected. By definition, a successful diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from an IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facility is one that goes undetected.

"The Achilles heel of the global non-proliferation regime is the legitimate place that bomb-grade uranium and plutonium have been given in civilian nuclear programs despite the inadequacy of international safeguards and national protective measures on this material.

"Because of measurement uncertainties, hundreds of kilograms of plutonium are 'unaccounted for' in large civilian nuclear fuel facilities each year, but always the IAEA determines, in the absence of evidence of a diversion, that none of the unaccounted-for material has been diverted. The materials accounting measures used by IAEA inspectors are supposed to detect the loss of one weapons quantity of plutonium---8 kilograms (17.6 pounds)---in a year, but the IAEA admits that it cannot meet its own detection goal in large plutonium plants. The best it can do in meeting its own goal of a 95% confidence level of detection and only a 5% probability of a false alarm is to detect a loss of about 250 kilograms (550 pounds) of plutonium a year in such a plant. Any loss less than that could go undetected.

"Thus, the undetected loss of a very small percentage of the total inventory of plutonium in a major industrial state like France, Germany or Japan---where plutonium is processed and stored in multi-ton quantities---would represent a very substantial amount of bomb material for Saddam Hussein. It is by no means implausible that a plant worker or manager, acting under duress or by reason of bribery or ideology, could successfully remove substantial quantities of plutonium from a safeguarded plant into the hands of an Iraqi agent.

"A number of civilian facilities, known as critical assemblies, contain large amounts of pure plutonium and highly enriched uranium in metallic form---the ideal material for nuclear weapons that, according to the IAEA, can be converted into weapons components in as little as 7 to 10 days. The material is often stored in the form of many thousands of foil-thin metal coupons, which present IAEA inspectors with a materials-accounting nightmare.

"At one such facility, the fast critical assembly in Japan, there are some 325 kilograms (715 pounds) of plutonium metal and 180 kilograms (396 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium metal acquired from the U.S. defense program for breeder fuel experiments. A few years ago, U.S. inspectors became so alarmed by lax physical protection measures at the facility that the Sandia National Laboratory was called upon to develop a crash improvement program.

"Beyond the possibility of undetected diversions of bomb material to Iraq from civil nuclear programs in Europe and Japan, there is also the possibility that Third World countries with advanced nuclear programs---such as China and Pakistan---might have supplied highly enriched uranium to Iraq. Such friendly clandestine transfers would be more likely to be detected by intelligence methods, however."

Leventhal said present assessments of Iraq's nuclear potential "reflect the dangerous tendency to 'mirror-image' the adversary---that is, to assume that he will act the way we act. In this case, the assumption is that he will not have nuclear weapons until he has done what we and every other weapon state have done: build an industry to produce the needed material. Thus, too much emphasis has been placed on analyzing how far Iraq has gone in importing essential industrial materials and components and building the gas centrifuges of a uranium enrichment plant; too little emphasis has been placed on the possibility that Iraqi agents have acquired bomb materials undetected from abroad."

"In this regard," Leventhal said, "present assessments of Iraq's nuclear weapons potential are dangerously ill-informed."

Short of military intervention now being considered by the Bush Administration, Leventhal proposed a number of remedial measures:

First, the frequency of IAEA inspections in Iraq should be increased to coincide with the conversion time of the highly enriched uranium fuel---that is, inspections should take place weekly, or at least once every three weeks, to verify that the material has not been removed from safeguards for use in a bomb.

Second, the IAEA should exercise its "special inspections" safeguards authority to seek out and enter facilities where fissionable material might be located.

Third, all civilian nuclear facilities in the world possessing weapons quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be placed on special alert, and extraordinary measures should be taken to protect against diversions.

Fourth, Iraq, now a party in good standing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be condemned in a resolution signed by the 140 other parties to the Treaty for its blatant disregard of its pledge not to seek or to develop nuclear weapons.

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Uranium Requirements for a Gun-Type Device

In this analysis, a gun-type nuclear device is based on the assembly of two critical masses of highly enriched uranium metal. The uranium components in the gun-type design are surrounded by several inches of metal to reflect neutrons and reduce the quantity of uranium that is needed. Beryllium, natural uranium or tungsten are possible reflectors. The Hiroshima (gun-type) bomb used a tungsten carbide reflector.

The amount of uranium in a reflected critical mass depends on the enrichment of the uranium and the choice of reflector. With a 4-inch thick beryllium reflector surrounding a sphere of 93-percent enriched uranium, the critical mass of the enriched uranium is 15.5 kilograms, or 31 kilograms in two critical masses. For either a tungsten or natural uranium reflector, the reflected critical mass of 93-percent enriched uranium is about 25 kilograms, or about 50 kilograms for two critical masses.

A compact gun-type weapon would use beryllium as the preferred reflector material, but use of beryllium, a highly toxic material, is probably beyond the capability of a terrorist group. The extent of Iraq's activities to acquire and use beryllium are not known. Iraq is known to have a sizeable stock of natural uranium.

The nominal yield of the gun device is about 10 kilotons, equivalent to ten thousand tons of TNT. The minimum or "fizzle" nuclear yield is probably on the order of some several hundred tons of TNT.

Iraq's Needs Using Various Enrichments

Iraq is known to have 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium in Osirak reactor fuel that currently is under International Atomic Energy safeguards. Should Iraq withdraw this fuel from safeguards and recover the highly enriched uranium metal, it would have enough material for an implosion device. To make a less sophisticated gun-type device, Iraq would need to acquire the following additional quantities of highly enriched uranium to make up two critical masses for a beryllium-reflected gun-type weapon:

93-percent enriched. Iraq would need an additional 18.7 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical masses totalling 31 kilograms.

80-percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 24 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium to the 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched from the Osirak fuel to obtain two reflected critical masses totaling 36.3 kilograms of net 84.4-percent enriched uranium. Iraq is reported to have about 10 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium on hand in fuel for a Soviet-design research reactor.

36 percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 82 kilograms of 36-percent enriched uranium to the combined 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium and 10 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium to obtain two reflected critical masses totalling 104.3 kilograms of net 47-percent enriched uranium. Iraq is understood to have at least several kilograms of 36-percent enriched uranium in research reactor fuel.

For a gun-type device using a tungsten or natural uranium reflector, Iraq would need to acquire an additional 37.7 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical masses totaling 50 kilograms. Correspondingly larger quantities of 80-percent and 36-percent uranium would be required to make up two critical masses.

The values given here do not take into account possible uranium conversion and fabrication losses which in some cases may be as high as ten percent.

Milton Hoenig
November 29, 1990

Chairman NUNN. These hearings are adjourned until Monday morning at 9 o'clock, at which time we will hear from Secretary Cheney and General Powell.

[Whereupon, at 2:19 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Shelby, Byrd, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Daniel G. Sakura, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Douglas George, Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Claire M. Kelly, special assistant; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Mary J. Kampo, Cindy Pearson, Melissa Ann Ramsey, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Nancy E. Soderberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; C. Richard D'Amato, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher K. Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Patrick F. McCartan, assistant to Senator Wilson; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Thomas G. Moore, assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order. The Armed Services Committee meets this morning for the final segment in our initial series of hearings designed to assist Congress and the American people in examining our policy in the Persian Gulf. These hearings are complementary to a series of hearings that will begin tomorrow in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Thus far, the committee has heard from Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Energy, and former director of CIA; from Adm. William Crowe and Gen. David Jones, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; from former Secretary of the Navy James Webb, Dr. Edward Luttwak, and former assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle; from former director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General William Odom, and from a number of experts on the Iraqi economy, on economic analysis and sanctions, and on Iraq's potential nuclear capability, chemical capability, and other regional issues.

This morning we are pleased to welcome Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell. We had planned to complete our hearings last week, and we had invited Secretary Cheney and General Powell to be our initial witnesses last Tuesday. They preferred to appear today, and we extended our hearings into this week to accommodate their preferred schedule.

Before I get into the specifics of today's hearings, I would like to note on behalf of all of us on this committee, and I believe we can safely speak for the entire Senate and the Congress, the pride that we have in the professionalism and the skill with which the deployment to the Persian Gulf has been and continues to be carried out by all segments of our Armed Forces, including an impressive performance by our Guard and Reserve forces.

We are particularly grateful for the sacrifices and the dedication of the men and women in uniform, as well as their families, and Mr. Secretary and General, we hope you will convey that deep appreciation on behalf of this committee, at least, and I think the entire Congress, to all the men and women under your command.

A great deal of the focus of our hearings to date relates to several key questions: (1) the level of our force build-up; (2) the pressures that such a large force has on our logistics capability and our ability and willingness to pursue a patient policy; (3) the impact of the economic sanctions, with a lot of ramifications of that, of course; (4) the nature of U.S. goals and objections, and (5) the best course of action to advance our long-term interest in the region.

We have had a lot of discussion and a lot of questions about each one of those topics. There are, of course, differences of opinion on this committee and probably throughout the Nation on these questions. As we discuss these difficult issues and these differences, it is important that the fundamental points of agreement in this committee, and I also believe in the Congress and the American public, not be overlooked:

1. There is broad support for President Bush's deployment of military force to the Middle East for the purpose of deterring fur-

ther Iraqi aggression, defending Saudi Arabia, and enforcing the United Nations embargo against Iraq.

2. There is broad praise for the President's leadership in rallying unprecedented U.N. support and leadership in condemning Iraq's invasion and continued brutal occupation of Kuwait.

3. There is strong hope that the recently announced meeting between top U.S. and Iraqi officials will produce Iraqi compliance with the U.N. mandate and a peaceful resolution.

4. There is also broad support for the underlying U.S. and U.N. policy: Iraq must leave Kuwait.

The continuing question is whether Iraq leaves Kuwait without a war, or following a war. In the final analysis, Iraq will have to answer this question.

As I made clear at the outset of these hearings, in my opinion, the question for our Nation is not whether military action is justified in response to the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. I believe that military action is justified.

The question is whether it is necessary and wise at this time, or whether the U.N. embargo has a reasonable chance of accomplishing our goals. The real debate in this committee, and I believe in the country, is whether to continue to punish Iraq slowly with a U.N. embargo, or whether to punish Iraq with direct military action, in order to accomplish the U.N. mandate.

Before hearing from Secretary Cheney and General Powell, I would ask Senator Warner for any comments he would like to make this morning.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming the witnesses.

Secretary Cheney, you and I and Chairman Nunn and others were present at the White House Friday evening, when we had a very historic meeting between the leadership of the Congress and the President, and we covered a number of the issues which I presume you will discuss with us this morning.

At that meeting, the President repeatedly sought from the congressional leadership their assessment as to whether or not the Congress could join, in a sense, the very historic step taken by the United Nations showing a unity between the 14 nations that voted for that resolution in the United Nations and the Congress in reinforcing the strong signal that must be sent to Saddam Hussein.

Regrettably, it was the judgment of the leadership that the 101st Congress—that is, the present one—should not undertake that, and perhaps some reconsideration would be given when the 102nd Congress convenes early in January. But, for the time being, the Congress as a body will sit out this situation.

It is left to the committees of the Congress, acting independently, to perform some service, presumably on behalf of the Congress as a whole. It is my fervent hope that these independent committee actions will send a message that Congress is joining with the United Nations, with the leadership given by the President of the United States, providing some signal of unity.

It would be the worst of all situations if these independent actions by the committee undercut in any way the dramatic initiatives now being undertaken by the President and by the Secretary of State to explore diplomatic conclusions to this crisis. During the course of that meeting, the President made clear, and I assume that you will make clear today, that the decision to augment our forces was done as a part of a very carefully thought-out plan to leave it absolutely clear in the minds of our allies who have joined us there in the desert, to the world community and the United Nations, that he has not—the President—made any decision to use force. But he did make the decision to unequivocally send a strong signal that we are going to have a credible military force in place if that option at some future date becomes necessary to exercise.

Over the weekend, Hussein went on French television and made a specific reference to the Congress in his brief statement. I think we should keep in mind the fact that what we are about to undertake here today with you is something that is being clearly observed and watched in Iraq, and around the world.

I am confident this committee, under the leadership of our Chairman, will provide a very constructive dialogue with both of you today and hopefully at the conclusion of this day's hearing we will send a strong signal, that we are joining with the leadership of the President in sending that strong signal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you, and General, we are pleased to have you. Again, as I mentioned to you before the hearing, do not feel rushed in your opening statements. We have nothing more important than this today, and we look forward to hearing from both of you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD B. CHENEY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee. These are extremely important proceedings. This is a subject that is as difficult and complicated and, I think, potentially as significant as any I have been involved with or dealt with during my 20-some years in public life, and I am certain that statement is probably valid for most of us who are wrestling with these very difficult challenges.

I would propose, Mr. Chairman, to submit for the record the written testimony, and then proceed to make an oral presentation. General Powell also has some remarks he will make, and then I will close briefly, and at that point we would be happy to entertain questions from the committee.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, both your entire statements will be part of the record.

Secretary CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is easy sometimes with the passage of time—the weeks and the months roll by, and we wrestle with the intricacies of complex military deployments, and reserve call- up questions, and diplomacy. I think it is easy to forget with the passage of time the sense of outrage that I think all Americans felt last August 2 when Saddam Hussein invaded his neighboring nation of Kuwait. I would like to hark back to that just for a moment, if I might, because I think it is very important to keep perspective on what is at stake in the policy deliberations that we are now engaged in.

Of course, Saddam Hussein has operated as sort of your traditional dictator. There were patterns which many people identified at the time that were similar to the way dictators operated in the 1930s.

He martialed large forces on the border with Kuwait. He threatened to undertake action if the Kuwaitis did not pursue the policy he wanted them to pursue with respect to oil price and production, but on the side quietly he reassured everybody he really had no intention of invading Kuwait, it was just a matter of saber-rattling. Of course, it was a lie. It was not true, and on August 2 he did, within a matter of hours, using over 100,000 Iraqi forces, capture Kuwait.

Since the invasion he has expelled literally hundreds of thousands of Kuwaitis. The Iraqis under his command have raped, pillaged, and looted the entire country. Kuwait has been annexed, now, as Province 19 of Iraq. He has done all he could within the available time to literally obliterate from the face of the earth any sign at all that there ever was a Kuwait. At present, as we meet this morning, there are upwards of 450,000 Iraqi troops deployed in Kuwait and Southern Iraq, some 3,600 tanks, and the pillaging continues.

In addition to the sense of outrage that Americans felt at Saddam Hussein's actions vis-a-vis Kuwait, of course, there has been the subject of hostages. There have been so many hostages that it has been difficult for the public to focus the way we have in the past, as a Nation, on the hostages held in Lebanon, but of course Saddam Hussein ranks as one of the world's all-time great hostage takers. As we meet this morning, there are thousands of foreign nationals held hostage inside Kuwait and Iraq who are not allowed to leave, and hundreds of Americans in both countries, either holed up in their embassy in Kuwait or staked out on strategic targets inside Iraq and Kuwait, or in hiding, unable to get out.

The world responded in August, and subsequently through the United Nations, in what I think has been an extremely efficient and decisive manner.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

#660 Aug. 2

Condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Demands immediate withdrawal

#661 Aug. 6

Imposes economic sanctions against Iraq

#662 Aug. 9

Declares the annexation of Kuwait null and void

#664 Aug. 18

Calls for the immediate release of foreign nationals

#665 Aug. 25

Authcrizes the use of force to halt maritime shipping to or from Iraq

#666 Sept. 13

Establishes guidelines for humanitarian aid

#667 Sept. 16

Demands that Iraq protect diplomatic and consular personnel

#669 Sept. 24

Considers aid to countries hurt by sanctions

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

#670 Sept. 25

Confirms that the economic embargo against Iraq includes air traffic

#674 Oct. 29

Calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of fooc to those held against their will

#678 Nov. 29

Authorizes member states to use all necessary means to uphold previous Security Council resolutions unless Iraq withdraws from Kuwait by January 15

I would like to just quickly run through the resolutions that the United Nations Security Council has adopted—12 of them in all, now—to express the sense of outrage the world felt and also to encourage Saddam Hussein to withdraw.

We had resolutions that condemned the invasion of Kuwait, demanding the immediate withdrawal; imposed economic sanctions; declared the annexation of Kuwait null and void; called for the immediate release of all foreign nationals; authorized the use of force in the embargo operations; established guidelines for humanitarian aid; demanded that they protect diplomatic and consular personnel; and considered aiding countries hurt by sanctions as well.

Of course, finally, in the last point, Resolution 678, a historic resolution last Thursday, November 29, when for the first time in 40 years, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of all means necessary to implement its policy, its demand for the complete and total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This is only the second time in the history of the United Nations they have taken such action.

The question arises repeatedly—why should the United States care? I have had people suggest that this is a distant part of the world, it is not a part of the world that we need to concern ourselves with, that this is a new concern on the part of the United States, to worry about what happens in this far-away land. But I would like just briefly to reference statements by previous Presidents, beginning with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1945 in a meeting with King Abdul Aziz near the end of World War II, and subsequently nearly every administration, every President, Republican and Democrat alike, has reaffirmed the U.S. strategic interest in this vital part of the world.

PAST POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

No threat to your kingdom (Saudi Arabia could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States)

Harry S. Truman to King Abdul Aziz
Letter of October 31, 1950

The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East

House Joint Resolution 117, March 9,1957
"The Eisenhower Doctrine"

I can assure your majesty of the constancy of our strong interest in Saudi Arabia's security and welfare

Richard M. Nixon to King Faisal
Letter of August 31, 1973

PAST POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force

Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address
"The Carter Doctrine" January 23, 1980

The United States, as I and my predecessors have affirmed, considers the stability and security of Saudi Arabia to be vital to the national security interests of the United States

Ronald Reagan to King Fahd
Letter of September 16, 1987

You see the quotes here from Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon. Most recently, of course, from President Carter. "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Finally, of course, President Reagan's letter to King Fahd in 1987. We all remember the action of the United States, that this committee was involved in, in Operation Earnest Will, in safeguarding the access of the United States and other nations to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War.

What was new and different on August 2, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, was that, whereas before we had always assumed that in order to threaten our strategic interest in the area what was required was for someone to threaten Saudi Arabia, on August 2 it became clear that, once Saddam Hussein had taken Kuwait and deployed the biggest army in the region—the world's sixth largest army, that was unopposed—and there was no counterbalancing force there—in effect he put himself in the position to dominate the Persian Gulf, to dominate the Middle East, and obviously also put a choke-hold on the world's economy.

The situation with respect to our strategic interest is vital in part because of energy. There is a chart that I think captures what is significant about the Persian Gulf from the standpoint of oil. [Chart]

WORLDWIDE PROVEN OIL RESERVES



Secretary CHENEY. If you look at the chart, you will see outlined in blue the percentage of the world's proven oil reserves that reside in the Persian Gulf. Those are reserves that are proven up. That is, we know what is there. We have been able to measure it.

But if you include the reserves in Saudi Arabia 28 percent, in Iraq and Kuwait 22 percent, and in the other regions, the other nations of the Gulf—in the Emirates and in Iran, et cetera—in excess of 70 percent of the world's proven oil reserves reside in the Persian Gulf. That is contrasted with some 3 percent in the United States, 6 percent in the Soviet Union.

There should not be any doubt about the consequences of allowing a man like Saddam Hussein to control the world's supply of energy. Obviously, were he to do so, he would have a choke-hold on the world's economy. He would be able to control production levels and price. He would be in a position to blackmail any nation which chose not to do his bidding.

One of the most significant concerns is not just the fact that if he were to control the Gulf he would be able to affect production and price. One of the most significant questions we have to ask is, what he does with his oil wealth. One of our concerns is not just that he would control the resource, but rather he would use the revenues derived therefrom in ways that would be threatening to the rest of the world, and we have a pattern of experience to look at.

The fact, of course, is, that Iraq is not a have-not nation. It is potentially one of the world's richest nations. Iraq itself possesses, second only to Saudi Arabia, oil reserves—proven oil reserves, some 11 percent of reserves, and currently has about 5 percent of production. Iraq's oil income last year was $20 billion.

During the period of time in the 1980s, we look at what happened to the wealth that has flowed to that part of the world to pay for oil. We see in Saudi Arabia a nation that has used the riches to develop its own economy, improve the standard of living of its people. Kuwait invested $50 billion in the 1980s in economic investments around the world.

Of course, Iraq, earning revenues roughly comparable to Kuwait, spent $50 billion on armaments in the 1980s, so at the end of the decade, instead of a strong, healthy economy and a high standard of living for his people, Saddam Hussein had acquired one of the world's largest military arsenals—thousands of tanks, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons—and had embarked upon programs to acquire biological and nuclear capability.

That is what he has done with the wealth that he already possesses, and it does not take a great leap of imagination to know what he would do were he to succeed in his current effort to hold Kuwait and to be the beneficiary of the enormous wealth that is represented in that part of the world.

The U.S. response has been, I think, extremely successful to date, and certainly on behalf of the administration, Mr. Chairman, we want to thank the members of this committee for the support for the objectives that the President has laid out. It is worth repeating those objectives once again, that our goal and the goals of the United Nations involve getting Iraq out of Kuwait and restoring the legitimate Government of Kuwait, in protecting American lives and obtaining the release of all the hostages now held by Iraq, and doing everything we can to restore security and stability to the region.

We have pursued a multifaceted approach to this policy. We have exercised, I think, in the efforts of the President and Secretary Baker, one of the more successful diplomatic ventures in recent times. I think it shows in the success of the U.N. Security Council vote just last week, and also in the coalition that we have been able to assemble to deal with the situation we are faced with.

I think it is important to recognize that, not only have we moved politically and diplomatically, but also with respect to economic sanctions—and I will come back to that in a moment, because I know it is key—but also on the basis of significant U.S. military force.

What I would like to do, if I may, Mr. Chairman, because I think this goes to the heart of the debate over how long we can wait to achieve our objectives, is spend a few minutes focusing on the map that is against the far wall.

That's a very big map. I learned a lesson as Secretary of Defense: when you make a request for things, frequently you get it. I said earlier that I told the staff I would like a big map, and I got a very big map. [Laughter.]

Secretary CHENEY. But I think it is useful in terms of helping focus our attention on the response that the U.S. has generated, upon what's at stake, and also upon the prospects for being able to hold this together.

The heart of our effort, if there is a theme underlying U.S. policy over the last four months, has been the fact that we have not "gone it alone," if you will. We have not operated unilaterally. But we have, indeed, functioned as part of a world-wide international coalition.

This coalition did not exist on August 2. It has been assembled through the leadership of the President and the diplomatic skills of my colleague, Jim Baker. I think it is formidable, indeed.

If we look at the map, of course, the heart of the problem that we faced on August 2 was when Saddam Hussein had a couple of hundred thousand troops in Kuwait, he was within 200 to 300 miles of the bulk of the Saudi oil facilities and oil supplies. Nearly all of the oil production of Saudi Arabia is over there on the Persian Gulf. Again, remember Saudi Arabia has some 28 percent of the world's proven reserves. He was within a few hundred miles more of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the other Gulf oil producing states.

As of August 2, when he took Kuwait, the only thing between Saddam Hussein and those oil fields was a battalion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. There was no significant military obstacle to his further move south.

I personally am convinced that if we had not responded as rapidly as we did, he would, indeed, have continued his aggression, and it was only the speed of the U.S. response that gave him pause and gave us the opportunity to deploy the forces that are now in the field.

Saudi Arabia was crucial. Until the Saudis agreed to invite U.S. forces on to their territory, there was absolutely no way the United States could respond with sufficient military force in order to safeguard our interest in that part of the world.

You cannot operate, even if you do, from an aircraft carrier against heavy, massed land divisions, armored divisions, as the committee well knows. The key to the military strategy was to have access to Saudi Arabia and, subsequently, to the other nations of the Gulf—Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.

We were able to achieve that.

Also key to the strategy was Egypt, because, of course, if you look at Egypt, it is important to remember that President Mubarak has been, along with King Fahd, one of the outstanding leaders of this venture. But Egypt is the home of half of all the Arabs in the world. It also, of course, is the location of the Suez Canal.

The only logistical task that I can think of that would have been more difficult than what we have already done, Mr. Chairman, in deploying forces to Saudi Arabia would have been to try to deploy forces in Saudi Arabia if we could not use the Suez Canal. This is because, of course, we would have had to come clear around the Horn of Africa.

In addition to that, Egypt was key because President Mubarak provided the leadership that led to the support of the Arab League with the majority of the members of the Arab League joining and supporting King Fahd and supporting the President in our deployment of forces to the region. Egypt also has been vital in the military sense, in terms of sending significant forces of their own to be deployed in Saudi Arabia.

If we look at the situation from the standpoint of the nations around Iraq, one begins to see that it is a fairly disparate group. Certainly, if you had told me six months ago that by December, 1990, the United States would be on the same side of an issue in the Middle East with Iran, and Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet Union, and Egypt, I would not have believed it. But the fact is, the effort that is now underway, from an economic standpoint, turns very much as well upon the capacity and willingness of those nations around Saudi Arabia to participate in the venture.

To the east of Iraq, of course, is Iran, a major oil exporter. Currently, there is no way to move oil from Iraq to Iran. But if Iran were not part of the coalition today, it would be a relatively simple matter to build a pipeline from southern Iraq over to southern Iran, commingle Iraqi production with Iranian production, and sell it on the world market, thereby breaking the embargo. It is important that Iran stay as a part of the coalition.

If we go to the north, to Turkey, President Ozal has been one of the leaders in the effort. Turkey shares a border with Iraq. Turkey has suffered significantly as a result of this venture because only about half of their lost revenues from closing the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean has been replaced.

Syria, of course, has now been a significant player. There is a pipeline across Syria which is also closed, and Syria is deploying troops to Saudi Arabia to support the effort.

Jordan is a key player in the operation simply because of their geographic location. I will come back to the Jordanian situation in a moment.

The point is today, Mr. Chairman, in the Gulf states, with the single exception of Yemen, to the north of Iraq and virtually the entire region, where we have nations bordering Iraq, we have been able to assemble a coalition to put together both the military support, the public opinion support through the Arab League and Egypt, and the economic support to bring maximum pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein.

The debate we have had focuses to some extent—and I want to spend just a moment on that, if I might—on the question of if we have been this successful to date, if we have been able to assemble this kind of coalition to enforce an embargo against Iraq, why not wait indefinitely, then, for the sanctions to work?

I will say just a word about sanctions. General Powell may want to say a word or two more in his presentation.

But we think, at this point, that we have been able to shut off Iraqi ability to export oil. The only oil that we know of that is leaving the country is a small amount that moves by truck to Jordan. It's basically in payment for past debts owed. But it does not appear at present that Saddam Hussein can earn any foreign exchange by exporting oil.

We think we have shut down much of the flow of goods into Iraq from outside. We don't think it is totally successful. But, clearly, he cannot get anything through the Persian Gulf or through the Red Sea. There's a little bit of air traffic going in and there's some smuggling, no doubt. There's probably always smuggling in that part of the world.

And, given the price and the value of commodities now, it is probably even more profitable.

But, basically, in terms of major international commerce, we think we have been able to pretty well dry that up.

The question that comes up with respect to sanctions, though, is I think it is important for us to focus upon what our objective is. Of course, that is the goal of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

So, when you talk about sanctions and about sanctions working, I think it has to be with that caveat—that "sanctions working" does not mean just destruction of the Iraqi economy. It means getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. That is our goal; that is our objective. That is why the sanctions have been employed.

In terms of trying to assess whether or not that will happen, we have to look at several things. We have to look at circumstances inside Iraq. There are different pieces of evidence. But I think the overwhelming conclusion I reach in assessing the situation is that we do not have an indefinite period of time to wait for sanctions to produce the desired result.

He does have a command economy. We have watched over the years during the Iran-Iraq War, when he was able clearly to divert resources from the civilian side of the economy to the military side. There is no question about his ability to do it. He continues to do it today.

Iraq has been through an 8-year war with Iran. They clearly have the capacity to hunker down, if you will, and operate on a subsistence basis. It has been suggested that, if you compare the pain, the economic pain, that he feels now, with the pain that the population felt during the Iraq-Iran War, today the pain is not as significant as it was then. Of course then, not only were they faced with the burden of the war, but they were also faced with the propositions of casualties and attacks on Iraqi territory.

We think we clearly have been successful in closing off the flow of spare parts, military supplies from the Soviet Union and France which, previously, were his major suppliers.

But with respect to food and agriculture, the picture is somewhat murkier. Many have argued that the sanctions will work because Iraq previously has imported a very significant portion of their agricultural commodities. But if you analyze the situation carefully, it would appear that he has the capacity to significantly increase his agricultural expansion. Iraq is not a desolate country by any means. In the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates, there is a lot of good farmland, and there were three occasions in the last 25 years when they have been able to double from one year to the next the total amount of cereal production, for example, in country.

The key to bad agricultural performance in the past and significant imports has been bad management of the economy. It has a Stalinist economy, and the Iraqi agricultural sector did not work any better than the Soviet agricultural sector has worked. But he is now offering prices 40 percent higher than previously to Iraqi farmers to produce, and the expectation has to be that they will be able significantly to expand their food production, and that the prospect of the embargo on agricultural commodities going into Iraq, while it is not going to be that appealing a diet, does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle for them.

Another key element from the standpoint of the sanctions that we have to keep in mind is that sanctions do not impose pain just on Iraq. They impose pain on everybody who used to do business with Iraq.

So, to say that we are going to shut off the flow of commerce, it is important for us to remind ourselves that commerce is a two-way street, and that when you close the pipeline from Iraq across Turkey, Turkey loses the value and the benefits and the earnings of having operated that pipeline, a significant loss to a nation that obviously is very important to us and a key partner in the coalition.

When we close down trade between Iraq and Kuwait on the one hand and Jordan on the other, we are affecting approximately 50 percent of the Gross National Product of Jordan. That is, about 50 percent of Jordanian GNP in the past has been tied up in trade with Iraq and Kuwait. That trade, for all intents and purposes, has been shut down today. While there is still some smuggling going on, Jordan does give indications that they are doing their best to comply with the international sanctions.

We can look at issues that the President has talked about in terms of the situation in Eastern Europe. President Havel told the President when he was in Czechoslovakia recently that the cost to Czechoslovakia of the continued crisis in the Gulf is about $1.5 billion a year, significant for the Czech economy.

In Poland, where I go tomorrow for a visit, information I have is that the Polish economy was scheduled to receive about 20 percent of its oil from imports from Iraq. That was payment by Iraq of past debts owed to the Polish Government. That is no longer available.

So at the same time, the Poles have to make up that difference by purchasing oil on the world market. They are also faced with two other important considerations.

One is the fact that the Soviets are going to a hard currency system for the oil they sell to Poland as of the first of January because of their own internal economic problems. And, of course, the third key point is that the Poles are right smack in the middle of one of the most difficult economic transitions any nation has ever attempted.

So there are consequences, costs, if you will, to the rest of the world and to our coalition partners in the venture. The evidence is not all on the side of the notion that we can wait indefinitely for sanctions to work.

There are other problems that have to be kept in mind as we contemplate what the right course of action might be. While we wait for sanctions to work, Saddam Hussein continues to obliterate any trace of Kuwait and her people. While we wait, he continues to dig-in in Kuwait, to send more forces south, to deploy and mobilize additional manpower, to dig more formidable fortifications. So it is possible that at some point the military effort that might be required to get him out will be more difficult in the future than it is today.

While we continue to wait, he also continues, obviously, his efforts to improve his weapons arsenal. He continues to work to see if he can acquire more weapons of mass destruction.

And, while we wait, he continues to hold hundreds of Americans hostage.

So, the questions, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that have been asked by this Committee and that have been addressed over the last few days are vital ones. But the notion that we can, in fact, wait a year or two, as some have suggested, that we can wait indefinitely for him to withdraw, comes back again to a couple of very basic fundamental propositions. Can we make the judgment that sanctions will achieve the desired result of forcing him out of Kuwait?

I don't know. I don't think we can make that judgment. They might. But then again, there is a lot of evidence that they won't.

Will the coalition hold? Will this relatively fragile, complex enterprise that we have organized internationally produce the kind of ongoing support, international effort for the next year or two that it has for the last 4 months? Will the economic pain be greater for Saddam Hussein than it will be for members of the coalition or for some of our other friends around the world?

Will we be in a better position ourselves, as a coalition and as a nation, to use military force in the future than we are now?

I think it is important, Mr. Chairman, as I close and before I ask General Powell for his presentation, for us to keep in mind the consequences if we fail. If Saddam wins, if he keeps Kuwait, if the coalition falls apart, if economic sanctions do not work, if we do not use military force, if that is the only way to achieve our objective to force him out, then we have a hell of a problem. This is because, of course, he will, given his current location and his ability to dominate the Gulf, constitute a significant threat to the world economy. He clearly will constitute, and does today, a significant threat to our friends in the region, especially to those Arab governments who have had the courage to stand by us to try to stop Saddam Hussein.

He clearly represents a threat to Saudi Arabia, to the Gulf State governments and, I would argue as well, to President Mubarak's government in Egypt.

We have already had, of course, one assassination in Egypt since the onset of this crisis. We don't know who is responsible. But we do know that the President of the Egyptian Parliament was assassinated.

He clearly constitutes a significant threat to Israel. The United States has a long-standing, deep commitment and an important strategic relationship with the State of Israel. If I were to look at that part of the world today, I would have to conclude, and I think most people would, that the most significant threat to Israel is Saddam Hussein.

My own personal view is that it is far better for us to deal with him now, while the coalition is intact, while we have the United Nations behind us, while we have some 26 other nations assembled with military forces in the Gulf, than it will be for us to deal with him 5 or 10 years from now, when the members of the coalition have gone their disparate ways and when Saddam has become an even better armed and more threatening regional super power than he is at present.

Mr. Chairman, with that, I would ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, for his presentation.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Cheney follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY
Secretary of Defense
Concerning Operation Desert Shield

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am glad to be here today with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss Operation Desert Shield. A review of the events in the Persian Gulf region since early August clearly shows why we have arrived at the policy we're pursuing in the Persian Gulf.

In the early morning hours of August second, an Iraqi ground, air, and naval force of some 140,000 men launched a blitzkrieg attack against the small, peaceful country of Kuwait. Within a matter of hours, Iraqi forces were in Kuwait city. Within days they were arrayed on the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia, deployed for further aggression. This unprovoked aggression was a blatant violation of the United Nations charter and all accepted principles of international relations. It directly threatened the stability and security of the entire Persian Gulf, a region in which the United States and the rest of the world have a vital interest.

On the sixth of August, I flew to Saudi Arabia at the President's direction to confer with King Fahd bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud. Following my meeting with the King and his senior advisors, the government of Saudi Arabia invited the United States to send troops, and the President ordered the commencement of Operation Desert Shield, a deployment of U.S. military forces unparalleled in recent times.

U.S. security interests in the Gulf region have been obvious to every administration since World War II, when the Allies recognized the importance of Persian Gulf oil resources to the war effort and the necessity of keeping those resources out of the hands of the Axis. Indeed, the establishment of a resident U.S. diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia and the historic meeting aboard the USS Quincy between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz were testimony to the importance of U.S. and Allied interests in the security of Saudi Arabia.

After World War II, it became apparent that the Persian Gulf was equally important to the economic and political welfare of the free world in peacetime. It soon became settled U.S. policy to ensure that no hostile power should dominate this vital area. President Truman told King Abdul Aziz in 1950 that "no threat could arise to your kingdom that would not be of immediate concern to the United States."

President Carter recognized the importance of the area in his 1980 State of the Union Address, when he pledged that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

After the Iranian revolution of 1979, it appeared that Iran might be able to dominate the region. But the principal threat is now Iraq. Even though threats to the region shift over time, what has not changed is the critical importance of the area to the United States and the rest of the world. President Reagan repeatedly assured the Saudis and the other moderate gulf nations of our determination to support their security. He deployed U.S. forces to protect free navigation in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1984, he wrote King Fahd that "the security and well-being of Saudi Arabia are matters of vital interest for the United States."

And just last Friday President Bush, in noting the importance of the Persian Gulf to the free world, repeated what he has been saying since he first ordered troops to the region: "We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. We're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein."

The reasons that made the Gulf a concern of every President from Roosevelt and Truman to Carter and Reagan are equally compelling today: Persian Gulf countries possess nearly two-thirds of the world's proven crude oil reserves. Last year they accounted for more than one-fourth of the world's oil production and about one-third of the free world's. Oil is the source of more than half of global energy consumption and will probably become even more important over the next decade. It provides more than ninety percent of the energy needed by the ships, trucks, and airplanes that move food, raw materials, and industrial products to consumers, farms, and factories around the world. It is no exaggeration to say that the world's economy is fueled by oil.

Secure energy supplies are a fundamental interest of the entire world. The poorest countries are among the most seriously at risk from an unreliable supply. Putting Gulf oil supplies, or even a large share of them, into the hands of a single hostile power would pose a clear and present danger to the economic welfare and the political stability of regions as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific rim, and newly liberated Eastern Europe.

It is simply not acceptable for any hostile country to be in a position to manipulate the availability and cost of energy, and so have the power to disrupt the world's economy and create political instability.

The response of the United States and the world community to Saddam Hussein's invasion must be seen in light of the world's dependence on the region's energy and in the context of the past forty-five years, during which U.S. policy has recognized the singular importance of this region. It has been in pursuit of this interest that one American president after another, Democrat as well as Republican, has sought close military and political relations with Saudi Arabia and the other moderate countries of the Arabian Peninsula.

By the summer of 1990, Iraq had been at peace for less than two years, following the August 1988 cease-fire in its ten year war with Iran. While that war brought great destruction, it also left Saddam with a war-hardened military force -- disciplined, organized, and tough. Saddam proved he was willing to subject his forces to high levels of casualties for small gains. He had developed and used chemical weapons, developed biological agents, and continued to create a nuclear bomb.

Saddam Hussein also became increasingly vocal about the oil and financial policies of the other Arab states of the Gulf -- the very policies which kept world oil prices moderate and stable. Contrary to Iraq's claims, this was never a situation of "haves" versus "have-nots." With the world's second largest oil reserves, Iraq is, or should be, a very rich country. It has fifty times more oil in reserve, per person, than the United States. Yet under Hussein, the beneficiaries of this immense oil wealth have not been the Iraqi people. The country's wealth has been diverted to wage war, develop nuclear and other special weapons programs, commit aggression, and fuel Saddam's dreams of power and domination. By summer 1990, Hussein had actually driven his oil-rich country $60 billion into debt.

On June 26, he warned Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates that they must curb what he called "excess" oil production. The tone of the warning raised the specter that Iraq might use its military might against its neighbors -- ironically the same countries who supported Iraq in its war with Iran. Although the threats and intimidation continued to escalate, Hussein assured President Mubarak, King Fahd, and the world at large that he had no intention of invading Kuwait.

Even as Hussein provided these smiling assurances in late July, Iraq began moving troops to the Kuwaiti border and making more overt threats toward both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. In response, the UAE asked for, and President bush approved, the deployment of KC-135 tanker aircraft to enhance the effective range of the UAE's air defense fighters. But Kuwait itself did not respond militarily to Iraq's moves, fearing that its actions might be construed as a provocative, as Iraq's elite Republican Guards moved to the border.

At the same time, Iraq and Kuwait met in Jeddah to discuss Iraq's stated grievances. There, Saddam's representatives repeated their assurances that force would not be used. As we now know, this was merely an elaborate charade. Iraqi tanks were rolling toward the border before the talks were even broken off. It took the Iraqi army only a few hours to reach Kuwait City. Within a few days, Hussein's forces had effectively occupied the entire country.

The world response to the invasion was quick, severe, and virtually unanimous. Iraq's claims of an indigenous uprising and later its annexation of Kuwait were soundly rejected. On the very day of the invasion, the fifteen countries of the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, which condemned the aggression and called for Iraq's immediate withdrawal. The United Nations and its members continue to recognize and deal with Kuwait's legitimate diplomatic representatives. The Kuwaiti government in exile has been given control of its overseas assets.

The unanimity of world reaction is clearly expressed in the UN Security Council Resolutions condemning the invasion, imposing strict economic sanctions, authorizing the use of naval power to enforce the sanctions, condemning the taking of hostages and the mistreatment of the diplomatic missions in Kuwait, and taking a number of other measures. These culminated in the authorization last Thursday to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the previous resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Our response was equally decisive, and fully in keeping with the UN Charter and the actions of the UN Security Council. The President began by imposing immediate economic sanctions on Iraq, freezing Iraqi assets and protecting Kuwaiti assets so they could not be pilfered by Iraq or the bogus provisional government in Kuwait.

When I met with King Fahd in Jeddah on August 6, I assured him of four things: we would move quickly; we would deploy enough force to get the job done, not merely a token force; we would stay as long as necessary; and we would leave when the Saudi government asked us to go. In turn, the King explained to me the longstanding confidence he had in the U.S. government, a trust built up over decades of association between our two countries in political, economic, and military affairs.

From the first, President Bush clearly stated the objectives of U.S. policy:

- Achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- Restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait;
- Protecting American lives; and
- Enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf region.

These objectives have not changed.

The mission the President gave the armed forces is equally clear: to deter further Iraqi aggression, to defend Saudi Arabia if deterrence failed, to enhance the indigenous military capabilities of friends in the region, and to enforce economic sanctions through a multinational interdiction effort.

On August 7, Iraq's Army was on the Saudi border with nothing but the vastly outnumbered Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to keep it from moving all the way to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was clear that Saddam Hussein's word was not to be trusted.

Something had to be done to put credible military force on the ground, and the only country that could do that was the United States.

Having decided on the deployment of U.S. forces, we rejected the idea of a gradual, calibrated buildup. We also rejected the concept of a modest trip wire force, since we did not want to send just enough troops to provoke an Iraqi attack without being able to defend against it. We intended to present a credible deterrent and to convey to Saddam Hussein that we were serious.

At the same time, we were conscious that the United States should not and could not be the only country to respond militarily. The President began immediately to work with Saudi Arabia and the Kuwaiti government-in-exile to assemble a multinational force. Military forces from 27 countries are now directly involved either in Desert Shield or in the maritime enforcement of economic sanctions. All the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including free Kuwait, have ground forces in Saudi Arabia. Other countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have sent major ground forces as well. Saudi and other Arab forces are on the front lines facing the Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders.

The United Kingdom and France and a number of our other allies have also dispatched significant military forces to the region. The Soviet Union has cooperated at the United Nations, ensuring unprecedented unanimity in the Security Council. An old friend in the region, Israel, has acted coolly and responsibly despite repeated Iraqi provocations and has avoided any action that could undermine the broad-based international coalition against Saddam Hussein.

In addition to military contributions, there have been numerous pledges of financial support for U.S. operations from countries in the region as well as from major industrial states who have not been able to make a military contribution. These pledges and contributions, running well into the billions of dollars, have helped offset the incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield. Countries in the region have also assisted with financial support. This has been a truly multinational effort. It is not the United States versus Iraq. It is Iraq versus the world.

In the four months since August, we have completed the initial buildup of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Forces from other countries continue to arrive. General Powell will be describing this deployment in detail in his statement. I firmly believe that without this operation Iraqi forces would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait.

Despite the pain he is inflicting on his own people, there is no indication that Saddam Hussein is open to a peaceful resolution of the problem he has created. His repugnant hostage policy; his threats to use terror and chemical weapons against Saudi Arabia and Israel; the brutalizing of Kuwaitis and the looting of their country; and the continued mistreatment of diplomats all suggest that he does not yet realize that he cannot prevail.

It appears, in fact, that Saddam believes time is on his side. This view is reinforced by his continued efforts to find ways around the sanctions and his attempts to break the international consensus against him. He apparently believes that we and our allies do not have the staying power to see this crisis through to a successful conclusion. The trickle of hostage releases, his propaganda campaign against the presence of "infidels" in Saudi Arabia, and Saddam's manipulation of the well-meaning Western political figures who go to court him are obvious attempts to destroy the solidarity of the forces arrayed against him. At the same time, with every day of occupation, the Iraqi army continues the looting and destruction of Kuwait and continues to build up its military power.

It is therefore essential that we present him with the prospect of a serious Iraqi defeat. Thus on November 8, the President announced that it was necessary to deploy additional U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf region and sought to obtain Security Council agreement to the use of military force, should that prove necessary to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. These steps do not mean that we have decided to go to war with Iraq. We hope that Saddam Hussein will see the light and settle this matter peacefully.

But to ensure that he fully understands the urgency of leaving Kuwait, and to be sure we have overwhelming power to deal with him if necessary, we are backing up our diplomatic effort with credible military power. We have not put any upper limit on deployments and we are basing our strength in the region on the advice of the commanders on the scene and the ever increasing size of Iraq's forces in Kuwait. And to achieve our required buildup, we have for now set aside the question of troop rotation.

The President's decision in early November was not a fundamental change in administration policy. It is a logical development from the principles he established at the outset of the crisis. Our objective remains the restoration of Kuwaiti independence under its legitimate government. Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure are our preferred means of achieving this objective. But as the President has repeatedly stated, we are not ruling out any options.

The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the most difficult our nation can make. In the end, our armed forces belong to the American people. For that reason, it is important that our citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf. In any situation as complex as this, involving a host of American political and economic interests, there can be no single reason for our actions. The President and the international community have responded to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait because a constellation of conditions came together, involving matters of principle, interests, and military necessity. Taken separately, each reason is compelling. Together they constitute the powerful case for the President's policy.

The first reason behind President's policy is the prospect for further aggression.

Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United States. Iraq is governed by a regime that will say or do virtually anything to achieve its ends. On the first day of the invasion, for example, Saddam announced that he had entered Kuwait at the request of indigenous revolutionaries, none of whom could even be produced. The Iraqi government then announced that it would start withdrawing troops on August 5. As we know, that did not happen. Iraq began organizing a so-called "provisional government of Kuwait," which, for a few days, it referred to as the legitimate government.

Then, on August 8, Iraq announced the annexation of Kuwait, the first time any United Nations member had ever attempted to wipe another completely off the map. Iraq insisted that Kuwait had always been a part of Iraq, despite the fact that no government of Iraq had ever exercised authority over Kuwait, and despite the fact that the Baghdad government, led by the Baath party to which Hussein himself belongs, explicitly recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1963.

Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized. Kuwait's national property has been systematically stolen and shipped to Iraq. Iraqi colonists have been brought in to take the place of Kuwaitis who have fled or been murdered.

Finally, to support his contention that Kuwait no longer exists, Hussein is attempting to starve out our diplomatic mission in Kuwait City. This violates every principle of humanity as well as the rules of diplomatic immunity. At this time, the American and British embassies persevere. However, not a single country forced to evacuate its Embassy, in fact no country at all, has recognized the annexation of Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal. Reports submitted to Congress and the United Nations tell such stories as these atrocities: six Kuwaiti youngsters hanged at their college for distributing leaflets; four people shot for having a camera and photocopy machine; a family of seven shot when they were found to have a U.S. passport, not theirs; a food co-op manager shot for refusing to display a photograph of Saddam Hussein; and two youths shot in front of their parents. Reports of vicious torture are common.

We simply cannot believe Saddam Hussein when he tells us his intentions are benign. If he gets away with swallowing Kuwait, his appetite for conquest will hardly be satisfied. At the very least, Iraq would wish to hold sway over the politics and economics of the region.

We should remember that Iraq was willing to engage in a nearly decade-long war with Iran, and take approximately half a million casualties in the process. The gains from that conflict were so minimal that once the international community responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saddam traded them away in an effort to secure his border with Iran, so he could concentrate on Kuwait.

Then there are the hostages. Iraq has been willing to take and use hostages on an extraordinary scale. Some hostages are used as human shields to protect Iraqi military assets, some are used as bargaining chips to help soften up members of the coalition and cause splits in the alliance. If Iraq is willing to use humans in this way, we have every right to wonder who or what it might choose to hold hostage in the future. Saddam's ballistic missile program gives him the option of one day holding entire cities hostage.

As for the hostages he now holds, Saddam should free them all immediately and unconditionally. And second, we hold him responsible for their safety and well-being. We will never forget or forgive if anything should befall our fellow Americans in his hands.

If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger. But the next time we face this regime, its military power will be even greater. It will come armed not just with 5,600 tanks, a million man army, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. In the future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range-missiles to deliver them.

Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way.

The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies.

The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil is quite real. With Kuwait's oil assets, Iraq now controls more than ten percent of the world's oil production capacity and one-fifth of the world's proven oil reserves. With control or influence over Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states, Iraq would dominate over sixty percent of the world's oil reserves. That is a powerful lever in the hands of a single regime, no matter what its political leanings, to manipulate the availability of petroleum.

There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.

First, is his control of supply. Because oil is fungible, it does not matter who gets oil from what source. What matters is the overall supply in relation to demand. In addition, the world economy is increasingly interlinked. When some nations' economies decline, others will also feel the pinch.

Consider the impact Iraq could have on the world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. Iraq could create wild swings in prices, swings that would fit its current political intentions and economic needs. The mere ability to threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.

The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue. Counting just its own oil reserves, Iraq is a very wealthy nation. Before the invasion, Saddam was earning $20 billion a year from oil exports. This wealth went to pay for its war with Iran and build its military capability. It is reasonable to assume that increased oil wealth taken from Kuwait would be used to enhance Iraq's military arsenal, especially its chemical, biological, and nuclear capability.

So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war.

The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era.

As the President said on November 8, when he announced additional troop deployments, "Iraq's aggression is not just a challenge to the security of Kuwait and other Gulf nations, but to the better world that we all have hope to build in the wake of the cold war." If Iraq can succeed in this kind of action, when virtually the entire world condemns it, a very strong signal will be sent to all aggressive regimes that brutality pays.

Invasions and aggressions far from our shores sometimes seem insignificant. They seldom are. In fact, the international response to aggression sets the tone of world politics for years to come. Just look at the weak response to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. While there was generalized outrage, the League of Nations could only agree to impose relatively weak sanctions. The League failed to impose oil sanctions or to deny the movement of Italian troops and equipment through the Suez Canal. Essentially, Mussolini was given a free hand in Ethiopia. The world was to see a lot of that kind of aggression in the years to come.

Now, it is not necessarily the case that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait foreshadows a new world conflict. But it is clear that how we -- and the rest of the world -- react to naked aggression can set the stage either for greater peace and cooperation, or more violence.

Our interests and our goals are clear in this case.

From the first, our approach has been to liberate Kuwait by backing international sanctions with military force. Sanctions will have an effect, but they alone cannot be counted on to convince Iraq that its occupation of Kuwait is doomed, since Saddam's only concern would then be either how to get around the embargo, or how to break up the coalition that make sanctions effective. And what would be left of Kuwait after months of waiting while Iraq continued to loot and plunder? Not only do we need a military force in Saudi Arabia to deter and defend, we must have the ability to take offensive action if need be.

The Iraq Army and people should understand how grave a situation they have allowed Saddam to place them in and to see that they cannot win. At every opportunity, we will demonstrate renewed international unity and disrupt Saddam's strategy of "wait and divide." Finally, we will show those few countries that sympathize with Iraq that they, along with Saddam Hussein, are bound to be the losers in this confrontation. Each of these steps will contribute to making Iraq realize that the best possible solution is to withdraw peacefully now.

If, however, we take an approach of relying solely on sanctions, we would cede that initiative to Iraq. Such a policy would give Hussein a long breathing space in which he could concentrate his efforts. Because he could ignore the possibility of a military option, he could use the breathing space to work around the embargo, break up the alliance, enhance his military strength in Kuwait, and move ahead on his nuclear weapons program.

Those who would have us rely indefinitely on economic sanctions alone need to face the possibility that they will fail to achieve our aims. Such a failure will have very serious consequence and those consequences must also be faced.

The additional problem with the sanctions-only approach is that it has costs for us as well as Hussein. In some way, time works against a complex multi-national coalition. What's more, the economic impact of the embargo is felt by our friends as well as our enemy. And the nations that feel the economic effects first, such as Turkey, Egypt and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, may be the ones least able to absorb the shock. It is not so clear that time is altogether on our side.

It has been suggested in this regard that the United States is certainly strong enough to sustain sanctions for as long as we desire. Our strength, however, is not the issue. The issue is Saddam Hussein's willingness and ability to withstand an embargo and what steps he will be able to take during the time the embargo is in force. Moreover, we are not the only nation that must hold the line on sanctions. Again, time can work against a complex international coalition.

We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanctions are working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.

So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against communism was hopeless, proves that we can persevere when we must. But the nature of our democratic institutions and the open debates we conduct can convey serious misimpressions to those who do not understand that a free and democratic government is one of our nation's greatest strengths.

But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about. They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence.

In closing, I want to say a word about the core of our military effort in the Gulf. I think all of us would agree that our greatest strength is our men and women in uniform. Their quality is our most fearsome weapon against tyrants like Saddam Hussein. I believe it represents the Pentagon's greatest success story since the end of the war in Vietnam. Having talked with the men and women in the Gulf, I know that they are prepared and willing to do whatever we ask of them. Our job, the job of this Administration and this Congress is to make sure that our decisions do not betray the trust our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have put in us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WORLDWIDE PROVEN OIL RESERVES



COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN PLACE SUPPORTING OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Argentina
Australia
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Egypt
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Kuwait
Morocco
Netherlands
Niger
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Spain
Syria
UAE
United Kingdom

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General Powell.

STATEMENT OF GEN. COLIN L. POWELL, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

General Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here today and participate in these very, very important proceedings.

In my prepared statement, I have detailed our deployments and I have laid out the status of our forces in the region. What I would like to do in my oral statement is to build on Secretary Cheney's comments and provide you some insight into our military planning, why we recommended what we did, and the underlying military rationale for our deployments and our campaign planning.

Gentlemen, as you know, military planning, the establishment of military objectives, and military deployments are not decided in a vacuum, sitting over in the Pentagon in the "tank" with just the Chiefs.

What we do in the military flows directly from political decisions that have been made and from the overall national security strategy that has been set forth by the President.

Further, military strategy is just one element of overall national security strategy, a strategy that contains diplomatic, political, economic, public diplomacy and many other elements.

The fact that military planning must flow from clear political direction is not a new theory. Although we may have had to discover it in recent years, I think history will show that it drove Eisenhower, Marshall, Pershing, Grant, and Washington, and you can discover that theory in the works of Clausewitz and many other military experts over the years.

President Bush and Secretary Cheney clearly understand this principle, and in the several crises I have been involved in over the 14 months that I have been Chairman, the JCS and our field commanders have received clear political guidance to use in the development of the military component of our overall national security strategy.

For example, in Panama last October, the Chiefs did not recommend the use of military force to support an aborted coup because it would not have supported clear political objectives of restoring democracy in Panama or protecting American lives and interests.

Yet, 2 months later, we did recommend the use of military force, in December of 1989, because we saw that the use of military force would be decisive in achieving clear, political goals.

In this current crisis, the President has stated our political objectives very clearly, clearly enough, it seems to me, to gain the support of the American people; clearly enough to put together a broad and diverse coalition of nations; clearly enough to have gotten support for the U.N. resolutions which Secretary Cheney discussed a few moments ago.

The President presented these objectives to the Congress, to the nation, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a Joint Session of Congress on the eighth of August. Secretary Cheney has already described them, but allow me to do so once again in light of the controversy over whether our political goals have been clearly stated and whether they have remained constant over time as the basis for us in the Pentagon to conduct our military planning.

The President indicated at that session on August 8 four simple principles which he said guided our policy.

"First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

"Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.

"Third, my administration, as has been the case with every president, from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

"Fourth, I am determined 'said the President' to protect the lives of American citizens abroad."

Based on these clear goals, the initial direction given to the armed forces was to deploy sufficient force to deter further Iraqi aggression and to go beyond deterrence to defend successfully against such aggression should deterrence fail.

The President also made it clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the nation at that time and over the last several months that he intended to preserve all of his options to include an offensive military option should that ever be necessary to achieve our objectives and the objectives of the coalition, the objectives so clearly stated in the U.N. resolutions.

When we began our deployments on August 7 of this year, we had only a naval presence in the region, consisting of the Joint Task Force Middle East and the recently arrived Independence carrier battle group.

We immediately began deployments to the region to put in place combined air/land/sea capability to accomplish our assigned mission.

I need not, at this time, detail our deployments. They are described in my statement and are very well known to members of this committee.

Let me say, however, that in going from 10,000 troops in the area to our current level of 240,000, our Armed Forces executed in an outstanding way one of the greatest deployments in American military history.

As part of our deployments, we also contributed ships to the multinational naval force that is now enforcing the U.N. resolutions to intercept sea commerce to and from Iraq.

When we began our deployments in August, we advised the President of the force levels needed and the amount of time it would take to deploy the force, this initial deterrence and defense force capability. We told him that we expected to have the force in place by early December. And, in fact, on November 1, I was able to report to the President that General Schwarzkopf had advised us that he believed he had the combat capability in place, in the region, to successfully defend against any Iraqi attack.

He also made the point that the logistics tail would take several more weeks to catch up. But, as of November 1, he reported accomplishment of that initial goal.

Although described as defensive, the force we have assembled in the Gulf clearly has an offensive capability. If Iraq had attacked during this period of time or should it attack in the very near future, we are prepared to respond both defensively and offensively, taking the battle to them to defend the region.

Our response to such an attack, both our defensive and offensive response, might be sufficiently effective, as some have speculated, not only to serve the purpose of defense, but also to cause the

Iraqis to withdraw. But this is purely speculative. Such a result could certainly not be promised to the President and certainly not guaranteed.

The purpose of our initial deployments were defensive in nature.

During the course of our buildup, as the Secretary has mentioned, we were joined in our efforts by forces from over two dozen countries. Over the past four months, the Iraqis have also significantly built up their forces. From an initial invasion force of about 140,000, they have steadily built up to over 240,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait, and over 450,000 troops in what we call the Kuwaiti theater of operations, consisting of both Kuwait and southern Iraq.

As we reported our progress to the President during the fall, he made it clear, once again, that he wanted to preserve all of his options.

In late October-early November, as we started to approach the force level required for a successful defense, I consulted with our commander, General Schwarzkopf, I consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those force levels required above the defensive level to provide an adequate offensive option should the President ask for it and should it eventually be required.

We presented those recommendations to the President and, as you know, on November 8, he accepted those recommendations and announced his decision to the Nation.

Phase II of the buildup began that day. And, as of this day, it is very well underway, Phase II being to provide the President, to provide the nation, to provide the coalition adequate offensive option should it be necessary to use such an option.

In deciding what force level would be required for such an option, we considered many factors. But the most important of these were the mission we might be assigned and the potential enemy we would be going against.

The offensive mission, the military offensive mission, relates directly to the political objective of removing the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The mission is not to punish. The mission is not to retaliate. The mission is not to see if Saddam Hussein will change his mind.

The mission is to take action to achieve our political objective if Saddam Hussein does not change his mind.

Many experts, amateurs and others in this town believe that this can be accomplished by such things as surgical air strikes or perhaps a sustained air strike. There are a variety of other, nice, tidy, alleged low-cost incremental, may-work options that are floated around with great regularity all over this town.

The fundamental fatal flaw in all such strategies is that it leaves the initiative in Saddam Hussein's hands. He makes the decision as to whether or not he will or will not withdraw. He decides whether he has been punished enough so that it is now necessary for him to reverse his direction and take a new political tack. Those strategies may work. But they also may not. The initiative is left in Saddam Hussein's hands.

These strategies are not decisive. They are not success oriented. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated for 10 years his willingness and his ability to absorb punishment, to callously expend Iraqi lives, and to care not a wit about what happens to the citizens of his country.

Another flaw in such strategies is that it allows Iraq to concentrate essentially on one threat, as you pull apart these alternative strategies, an air threat. I know the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq are quite different from the triple canopy jungles of Vietnam or the forests of Germany, and I have no question about the competence and ability of our United States Air Force to inflict terrible punishment. But one can hunker down. One can dig in. One can disperse to try to ride out such a single dimensioned attack. Recognizing that such attack will do grievous damage to the defenders after such strategy has been executed, the decision is still in the hands of the defender to decide whether or not he has had enough punishment.

Such strategies are designed to hope to win; they are not designed to win.

General Schwarzkopf, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I believe strongly that if the Armed Forces of the United States are asked to go into combat to achieve a decisive, political objective, we must implement a decisive military strategy that seizes the initiative, one that is designed to win.

The second factor in our consideration is the enemy. We do not over-estimate or under-estimate the capability of the Iraqi armed forces. We have studied them very closely. We understand their strength; we understand their vulnerabilities. We must have a military strategy, and I believe we will have a military strategy that uses our strengths against their vulnerabilities, avoids their strengths, and protects us against attacks directed against our vulnerabilities.

Based on our analysis of the mission, the enemy, other factors, we recommended and the President approved a force buildup capable of accomplishing the mission which seizes the initiative and which forces the Iraqis to consider the consequences of a combined, overwhelming, air/land/sea campaign against a powerful coalition force. The question they will have to consider is do they move it or do they lose it.

I don't want to understate the difficulty of deploying or sustaining such a force. It is a daunting challenge which is taxing us. But it is a challenge which is very, very manageable, in my judgment.

I also want to emphasize that the President has asked us for an offensive option. He has not decided to use it, and he has not directed us to use it.

After this buildup is completed, the President retains all the options he had before the buildup. The force can be built up further or built down, depending on the mission and the situation. Issues such as rotations, sustainment, production base impact and the overall impact on our force will have to be dealt with in due course. But the Chiefs and I believe we understand those issues and know how to manage our way through them.

I also do not want to create the impression with the Committee that by pushing for a combined air/land/sea campaign, we are adopting a strategy of "cannon fodder," where we are just going to run into fortifications without thinking our way through this. Every American life is precious to us. We will use our technical advantages; we will use capabilities that will be seen or unseen to the Iraqis. They will not be dealing with 15-year old Iranians. They will be dealing with a very, very powerful, capable force that is fully up to the task that has been given to us.

We do not want a war. We are not looking for one. The President does not want one. The Secretary doesn't want one. No one in uniform wants one. No American wants one. Certainly no loved one waiting at home wants one.

War is a terrible thing with unpredictable consequences. But my job and the job of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders involved in this operation is to make sure that, if it is necessary to go to war, we go to war to win. That is the surest way to achieve our objectives and to minimize casualties.

I also want to note that the views I am expressing today represent the views of our responsible military commanders and all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notwithstanding some uninformed statements by some of your witnesses last week, the JCS have been completely involved in the development of our strategy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President on August 15 in the Pentagon, shortly after the initial buildup began, and they met with the President last Saturday at Camp David. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, I represent to the Secretary, the President, and to the other members of the National Security Council the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the views of the unified commanders. I spend hours daily with the Secretary of Defense doing that, and I meet regularly with the President and with his other advisers.

I have religiously conveyed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in substance, tone, and tint to the President throughout this entire period and to the Secretary of Defense. I have also faithfully carried back to the JCS the views of the Secretary and the President.

I have met some 30 times together with my colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the last four months in the course of this operation. Obviously, I see them individually on a very regular basis and talk to them constantly in the course of the day.

General Schwarzkopf has met three times with the President to include a one-on-one meeting in Saudi Arabia when the President visited at Thanksgiving. I talk to General Schwarzkopf every day.

I can assure the Members of this Committee that the Goldwater-Nichols Act is working as the Congress intended, is alive and well, and the political leadership of this nation is enjoying solid, competent, military advice from myself as well as from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commanders.

Let me also say a word about the impact of sanctions and the concept of patience.

The sanctions are having an impact, as the Secretary indicated, and I believe it is a serious impact. But no one, as the Secretary also indicated, knows if and when they will work. We will know they worked only when Saddam Hussein tells us they have worked by withdrawing.

Once again, the initiative is entirely in his hands, and he has demonstrated over time his ability to absorb a great deal of punishment.

If Iraq does not have to take military pressure seriously and is given 12 to 18 months of grace, they can put their army into somewhat of a state of hibernation and stretch their sustaining capability if they don't have to keep it finely tuned in anticipation of possible military action.

Meanwhile, while we are waiting, the nation of Kuwait continues to suffer terribly. The world economy suffers.

The Secretary I think has very articulately laid out the impact on all of the other nations who formerly traded with Iraq.

And so, waiting is not without cost as an option. In the final analysis, how long to wait is a political, not a military, judgment. The armed forces of the United States must be and will be ready to accomplish whatever mission is assigned to it, whether the answer to the waiting period is 4, 5, 6, 12, or 18 months.

Mr. Chairman, let me close, as I always do, by expressing my appreciation for what our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen and coast guardsmen are doing on Operation Desert Shield. I want especially to note the superb contribution of our Reserve forces. I always want to take note of the sacrifice being made by those loved ones who remain behind anxiously.

As we discuss issues of peace and war this morning, let no one listening to these proceedings doubt the pride we have in our GIs and the full support we will give them, whatever the future holds.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Powell follows:]

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL, USA
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to review Operation Desert Shield with you. Since 11 September, when I last appeared before this Committee, our deployment of land, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf region has proceeded apace.

Today, I plan to describe in some detail that truly remarkable deployment effort, summarize the support we are receiving from the rest of the multinational coalition arrayed against Iraq, discuss the coalition itself and the current status of other measures we have undertaken to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait--foremost being the economic sanctions regime--and provide an assessment of Iraqi forces and capabilities in and around Kuwait. I also plan to give you my assessment of US forces involved in Desert Shield.

Initial Mission and Deployments

On 6 August, 4 days after 140,000 Iraqi soldiers brutally invaded Kuwait and appeared to be driving onward toward Saudi Arabia, Secretary Cheney met with Saudi King Fahd to assess the situation and brief the King on what support the United States could provide. Subsequently, King Fahd requested US assistance to protect and defend his country and, on 7 August, at the direction of the President, US forces began deploying to the region.

All initial and subsequent US military deployments have been undertaken in support of US national security objectives as clearly laid out by the President. These objectives, which have not changed, include:

- Complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

- Restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait;
- Protecting American lives;
- Enhancing stability and security in the region.

Our military objectives are directly linked to these national security objectives. The first and most critical threat we had to face was that the Iraqi army might, indeed, continue into Saudi Arabia. Our initial mission, then, was to move US forces quickly into position to deter an invasion and defend Saudi territory.

Later, when the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions calling for a range of economic sanctions against Iraq, the US military's mission was adjusted to support the multinational coalition's maritime interception effort.

Because of the tremendous distances involved, our deployments were staged to get the most critical elements into the theater first. The emphasis was on providing an immediate deterrent presence with air, naval, and light ground forces while heavier ground forces were moved by sealift.

By 8 August, two days after the order was given, carrier battle groups led by USS Independence and USS Eisenhower were already on station in the area. Units of the 82nd Airborne Division and a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron were en route to Saudi Arabia. F-15s from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, with their superior air-to-air capability, were also en route. There can be no question that, once King Fahd requested our assistance, the determined and rapid response of our most mobile, ready forces fully accomplished the mission of deterring any further aggression by Iraq.

Other forces quickly followed. Marine Corps units were married with their heavy equipment pre-positioned at Guam and Diego Garcia--an extremely successful operation that demonstrated the past wisdom of that approach.

Additional naval forces were introduced. The USS Saratoga battlegroup, including the battleship Wisconsin, deployed from the United States on 7 August and eventually replaced USS Eisenhower. An additional carrier battlegroup, led by USS Midway, replaced USS Independence. USS John Kennedy has also joined our naval forces in the region. Additional Marine units were also deployed.

Other, heavier ground forces began to be airlifted as their tanks and combat equipment began the long trek by sea. These units included: the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Mechanized Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 2nd Armored Division. In order to move forces as quickly and efficiently as possible, 38 ships from the Ready Reserve Fleet were activated, the Military Airlift Command's fleet was fully utilized and, for the first time in history, we activated a portion of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

There can be no doubt that this was one of the largest and most successful deployment operations in our nation's history. No other country could have attempted or even contemplated doing what we have accomplished.

To put it in some perspective, to date, the United States has airlifted over 200,000 personnel and some 210,000 short tons of equipment. Over 90% of the MAC fleet is committed and over 6,400 missions have been flown. This is comparable to moving the entire city of Richmond, Virginia, 8,000 miles to the Saudi desert.

By the sixth week of Operation Desert Shield, we had already moved by air the equivalent of the entire Berlin Airlift--an operation which had taken place over 65 weeks. As of today, we have airlifted enough cargo to equal 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts.

To provide another comparison, more personnel and equipment were moved in the first three weeks of Operation Desert Shield than were moved in the first 3 months of the Korean conflict.

The sealift portion of the deployment has been equally as impressive. Over 120 ships are committed. Currently, some 37 ships are en route to the Persian Gulf region. Over 2 million measurement tons of equipment have been shipped to Saudi Arabia. And this operation is ongoing. Additional units ordered by the President are just now beginning the long journey; their equipment is being moved to depots and ports for shipment. I can also inform you today that the additional M-1A1 tanks we had ordered from Europe prior to the President's 8 November decision, have now all arrived in theater to supplement our other tanks already there.

The Coalition Effort

As the President has often stated, this is not the United States versus Iraq, it is the world against Iraq. To date, some 25 nations have responded to the requests of the Kuwaiti and Saudi governments for military and economic assistance. Over 35 nations are expected to provide military support by the time all coalition forces already committed arrive. Contributions range from ground forces, to naval assets, to certain specialized equipment, to economic aid for countries in the region hardest hit by the crisis.

Of particular note are the contributions of many small, poorer nations. For example, Bangladesh, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zaire have all sent or are in the process of sending ground forces or medical teams to Saudi Arabia. Several of Eastern Europe's emerging democracies, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have also offered or provided assistance. Australia has provided naval forces. Latin American countries, led by Argentina, are also coming on board.

Of course regional Arab nations have played the major role in providing additional allied forces. Together, Egypt and Syria, once their expected deployments are completed, will have provided significant forces, including up to 50,000 troops, over 300 tanks, and hundreds of other armored vehicles. Most of the other Gulf states have also contributed troops and combat aircraft to the coalition.

Host-nation support provided by the Saudis and other allied nations has been superb. Besides providing much of the support for the US presence on their territory, the Saudis have also committed some 150,000 troops, hundreds of tanks, and over 300 modern combat aircraft. They have also provided sealift for Egyptian and Syrian forces, equipment to several of the other allied contingents, and, of course, billions of dollars in economic aid and credit to various countries in the coalition.

Thirteen NATO countries are active members of the coalition force. Of these, France and the United Kingdom are the largest contributors. Each has sent a substantial contingent of troops, armor, aircraft, and ships to the region. These include some of their most capable forces: the British 7th Armored Brigade--the "Desert Rats" of World War II fame, who will be joined soon by additional armored forces that, combined with those already in Saudi Arabia, will constitute the British 1st Armored Division--and elements of the legendary French Foreign Legion.

Overall, the message this truly unprecedented multinational force has sent to Saddam Hussein has been and remains strong and unwavering. With over 200,000 allied troops en route or in place alongside US forces, a credible collective security force stands ready to defeat Saddam's aggression.

Maritime Interception Effort

One of the key elements of the coalition's effort to isolate Iraq is the ongoing maritime interception of ships bound for Iraq to ensure compliance with UN sanctions. Implementation of these sanctions by the over 100 warships from 14 different navies involved--an enormously complex operation--has clearly been one of the most successful such undertakings in history.

To date, more than 4,200 ships have been intercepted by US and allied ships. Of these, over 500 were boarded and 20 diverted for not being in compliance with the UN sanctions. Allied forces are beginning to rotate crews and ships, demonstrating continued and long-term support for this effective multinational effort. A multinational naval conference was held in September to streamline operating procedures and improve communications and interoperability between the various naval forces. We expect these very successful consultations to continue.

Coalition Command Relationships

Providing a robust, effective command and control structure for this large and diverse a force is difficult and complex. The multinational command and control is an evolving process but, thus far, has been very successful. Although a unified command structure is desired, coordination and cooperation (recognizing and accommodating national sensitivities) between the multinational forces have provided an effective force to deal with the changing situation.

Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, is the commander of all US forces participating in Operation Desert Shield. The joint force under USCINCCENT is organized with a US Army component commander (USARCENT), an Air Force component commander (USCENTAF), a Naval component commander (USNAVCENT), and a Marine component commander for Marines ashore (USMARCENT).

USCINCCENT has primary responsibility for all US operations in Desert Shield and is supported by the other combatant commanders and numerous federal agencies.

Multinational military command relationships have been established in order to carry out two multilateral efforts: defense of the Saudi Arabian Peninsula and a Maritime Interception Force effort to ensure compliance with the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665.

In the defense of the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, air, land, and sea components of a multinational force have established two major command structures. Close coordination exists between the Saudi-led combined Regional Force (Arab nations who have entered into bilateral agreements to assist Saudi Arabia) and the US force. French forces have been aligned to reinforce the Regional Force, while UK forces have been attached to assist US forces.

Coordination between the multinational ground forces is achieved in a centrally located coordination center where detailed plans and support are worked out and exercised. This arrangement is working very well and is the basis for control of forces through national command structures.

Joint and combined training is ongoing to improve the readiness of the multinational force, and exercises like Imminent Thunder are executed to ensure effective command and control and the integration of the force.

Air operations over the Saudi Peninsula are coordinated through USCENTAF to ensure integrated air defense and unified use of air resources. Like ground operations, command and control of the air effort is exercised daily, and the potential is fully tested in periodic training operations.

Naval operations are focused on both the defense of the Saudi Peninsula and the maritime interception effort. USNAVCENT coordinates naval operations in the Persian Gulf and assists with the coordination of the multinational interception force in the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea.

Command and control of the two multinational efforts has been achieved through close coordination and the clearly defined chain of command of national forces. National Force Commanders are cooperating on all issues and are carrying out their responsibilities within their assigned national areas of responsibility. I would be happy to discuss command and control further in closed session.

Readiness of Our Forces

Next, I would like to provide my assessment of the readiness of our forces in the Persian Gulf. It is important to remember that our first and most critical task was to project sufficient combat forces to provide an immediate, credible deterrent against further Iraqi aggression. We recognized from the beginning that, once that mission was accomplished, we would need follow-on forces and equipment to provide the best, most sustainable capability.

For example, significant improvement has been made over the past several weeks in reaching the levels of critical munitions stocks that the CINC would like to see. I am confident that we will be able to meet all of the CINC's requirements, including those for the additional forces now flowing into the region. I would be happy to discuss this issue in more detail in closed session.

Our equipment readiness has exceeded expectations (and the worldwide DoD standard) and thus, must be considered exceptional, given the harsh demands of the desert environment. In many cases, aircraft and ground equipment readiness rates exceed those of units in CONUS. Specific readiness rates are, of course, classified, and can be provided in closed session.

We now have sufficient meals on hand for the current force and fully expect to be able to support the entire Phase II force as it deploys. With the substantial host nation support (HNS) being provided, new wells that have been dug, and additional water supply ships and desalination plants being provided by ourselves and our allies, we can now meet 100% of our current water requirement and expect to be able to meet the requirements of additional forces when they arrive.

The Saudis are committed to provide US and other coalition forces with significant quantities of fuel free of charge. Specific quantities and arrangements are classified and can be discussed in closed session.

Current Iraqi Threat

I would like to bring you up to date on the Iraqi forces deployed in and around Kuwait. As of today, Iraqi forces in the area number over 450,000, including approximately 3,800 tanks, 2,200 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 2,500 artillery pieces. Over 50% of those forces are in Kuwait with the remainder in Southern Iraq able to serve as reinforcing elements.

Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater of operations remain in defensive positions and continue to dig in, although this force is capable of shifting to offensive operations with little notice. Their forward line consists of infantry divisions dug in along the Saudi border and along the Gulf coast. There are heavy divisions behind them and a strategic reserve of armored divisions further north along the Iraq-Kuwait border.

The forward-deployed forces are supported by a series of man-made obstacles, including: barbed wire, minefields, anti-tank trenches, and infantry fortifications.

As you know, Saddam recently announced plans to reinforce this already large Iraqi force with an additional 250,000 troops. While we have, as yet, seen no solid evidence of these forces moving into the region, we continue to monitor this very closely. With over 450,000 troops already deployed forward, it is not clear that adding additional numbers of less capable units will add significantly to his combat capability.

In fact, it could actually present him with some new vulnerabilities, for Saddam must also remain vigilant with respect to his northern and western borders with Turkey and Syria. He, of course, also has a long, armed border with Iran in the East.

We believe that Saddam will continue to strengthen his defensive positions by constructing and improving fortifications and obstacles. While Iraq certainly has sufficient forces in the theater to conduct offensive operations, the Iraqis would first have to reposition a number of forces which, along with other indications, would provide us with some warning of impending attack.

In addition to its significant conventional armed forces, which represent the sixth largest army in the world, Iraq also possesses a substantial chemical weapons capability which it has not hesitated to use, in violation of international law, against both Iran and its own Kurdish population. Iraq has a variety of means to deliver chemical weapons, including: artillery, rockets, missiles, and aircraft.

However, the relative inaccuracy of Iraq's missiles, as well as the significant defensive measures against chemical attack undertaken by the coalition, suggest that Iraqi chemical weapons are not so much a substantial threat to military forces, but instead are useful primarily as a terror weapon against innocent civilians.

Finally, Iraq is also developing biological weapons agents and working feverishly to obtain a nuclear capability.

Additional US Deployments

Iraq's continued buildup of forces in and around Kuwait and the need for us to maintain a full range of options--to include an offensive option if needed--led the President to make the decision on 8 November to order additional US forces into the region. These additional forces include substantial land, sea, and air components:

- Two additional armored divisions, (1st and 3rd) and elements of a third (2nd - forward), as well as the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the US VII Corps headquarters, all deployed in Germany;
- 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Ft. Riley, Kansas;
- Other combat support and combat service support units from the US and Europe;
- An additional Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and its maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS), and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from Camp Pendleton, California;
- An additional three carrier battle groups (CVBGs) centered around the carriers USS Roosevelt, USS Ranger and USS America and their escorts, as well as the battleship USS Missouri and its battle group;
- An additional 14 fighter squadrons, 2 bomber squadrons, and 11 support squadrons of transport and aerial refueling aircraft that will support multi-service operations.

In addition, Secretary Cheney ordered the call-up of three Army National Guard units: the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Georgia, the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi, and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Louisiana. After these units go through an initial training period, they will either fill in behind active units that have deployed to the Gulf or, possibly, be deployed themselves as part of Operation Desert Shield.

Nor is this necessarily the end of our deployment effort. I will continue to review the situation, in close consultation with the Saudis and USCINCCENT, and make recommendations to Secretary Cheney and the President on additional forces, if and when they are deemed necessary.

The Contribution of Reserve and National Guard Forces

There are several points I would like to stress concerning the use of our Reserve and National Guard component in Operation Desert Shield.

Desert Shield presented this nation with the first large-scale practical test of the Total Force Policy. As a result, we have learned some important lessons and gained some valuable insights that can only serve to strengthen the policy and, consequently, our national defense.

Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of this operation. As you know, during the early weeks of August some 10,000 reserve volunteers per week provided such critical functions as airlift and tanker support. It is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces would not have been possible.

The authorization by the Secretary of Defense to call up 50,000 Selected Reservists was made because we needed the support and they stood ready to provide it. The fact that the Secretary of Defense has since increased the number of reservists called to active duty to over 76,000 is a measure of the importance of the Guard and Reserve in times of crisis.

The subject of Reserve combat forces has already been addressed, but allow me to say that I am very familiar with the three combat brigades that have been called up--the 155th, the 48th, and the 256th. After their period of start-up training, which was always a part of the activation concept, I expect them to be fully capable of assuming any combat mission to which they may be assigned. The flexibility which these units provide is considerable.

To summarize, the success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept.

Troop Morale

Let me touch on several issues which I will group under the heading of troop morale.

Having been to the region twice since Operation Desert Shield began and having met with hundreds of these brave men and women, and having been in a number of similar situations myself over my 32 year military career, let me tell you that the morale of our troops there is very good.

Certainly they miss their loved ones, and holidays like now are especially tough. But they know that they have an important job to do. They are proud of what they are doing and they know that the American people are behind them in their mission. I am fully confident that this force, truly the most capable, well-trained, well-educated force this nation has ever sent into harm's way, can handle anything that may come along.

To prepare for any possible mission and to keep morale as high as possible, our troops are training very hard in joint and combined operations--to include live-fire exercises.

Not surprisingly, our troops are very interested in news from home and we have taken a range of steps to make sure that they continue to get it. Since Operation Desert Shield was initiated on 7 August, the Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) has developed a postal system to provide mail service to our troops. Despite some initial problems, the MPSA and US Postal System have worked well together to improve mail delivery to our deployed forces.

Currently, all personnel within the Desert Shield AOR are able to send mail free-of-charge. The volume of mail being processed has increased dramatically. On 24 August, about 5,000 pounds per day were being dispatched. That volume has increased dramatically to its current total of some 600,000 pounds per day. Over the next few weeks, as Christmas packages begin arriving, we project that the daily volume will increase to 800,000 pounds (400 tons) per day, or about 3 1/2 pounds per person. An indication of the quality of the mail service is that the average letter is taking only 8 to 10 days to arrive in Saudi Arabia from the United States.

Some other statistics: well over 100,000 books, 35,000 Red Cross messages, and over 1,000 VCRs and TVs have been sent. Recreational facilities have been built or are under construction. We are now investigating locations for rest and recreation of our forces in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Armed Forces Radio began beaming 24 hours a day to our forces in the region on 12 September. Low-cost telephone contracts have been awarded to provide 426 telephones to US forces in Saudi Arabia (beginning at the end of January) to allow our troops to call their loved ones back home.

I am not suggesting that problems do not exist. They do. Any of you who have visited the region know that it is a stark and difficult environment in which to operate. In addition, Saudi Arabia is a traditional, Islamic culture very different from our own and, since we are there as their guests and at their invitation, we must pay strict attention to their rules and customs. I have been very proud of the conduct of our troops--they have been diplomats in the truest sense of the word. Senior Saudi officials, as well as other Saudi citizens, have expressed to Secretary Cheney and myself their gratitude and appreciation for our troops' behavior.

We continue to receive questions on rotation policy, so let me just reiterate what Secretary Cheney has said. Additional forces announced by the President on 8 November are meant to augment and not replace US forces in the region. Any rotation plans are currently on the shelf while we build up our force. So, we do not believe it is necessary to make any decisions with respect to rotation at this time.

Overall Assessment

- In summary, let me provide you with some of my personal impressions of Operation Desert Shield.
- The rebuilding of our military forces that has occurred over the past decade, with the emphasis on modernization of aging combat equipment, training and readiness, has paid off. The speed and precision of the US response to Iraq's aggression, when requested by our friends in need, has awed the world.
- As part of our training, we had undertaken to build relationships with countries in the Gulf region through regular, joint exercises and other activities designed to ease problems of interoperability in times of crisis. Previous operations such as Bright Star in Egypt have also paid off. Experience we gained in the Kuwaiti reflagging operation (Earnest Will) gained us valuable experience in operating effectively with other navies and contributed immeasurably to the success we are now enjoying in implementing the UN economic sanctions.
- Our streamlined command and control structure, much of which is a direct result of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, has paid off.
- This has been a superb effort by a dedicated and professional force. Let neither friend nor foe doubt that we are committed to the successful completion of our mission, and will remain deployed and ready so long as our friends in the region request our presence.

Chairman NUNN. General, let me thank you and the Secretary. On that latter statement about support for our GIs, I think you speak for all of us, for everyone here and for everyone in America. We appreciate both of your testimony.

I would say to both of you that I think you have laid out here your reasoning. You have laid out your reasoning on the time element. You have laid out your reasoning, General Powell, on the overall deployment of forces. I think this is very helpful testimony that will enable us to begin to understand more where you are coming from and what your policies and strategies are.

On the last point, General Powell, you said waiting is not without cost. No one knows when the sanctions will work, and so forth. I think you clearly laid out the implication that perhaps they would not work. But maybe that was not your meaning.

The whole question of time and whether time is on our side is, to me, enormously important.

General Schwarzkopf, our commander in the field, was quoted in the Los Angeles Times on November 29—just a few days ago—stating as follows: "At the present, I think time is on the side of the world coalition. I really don't think there is ever going to come a time when time is on the side of Iraq, as long as the sanctions are in effect, as long as the United Nations coalition is in effect."

He went on to say, "If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the sun for another summer, that's not a bad alternative."

Now, it sounds as if he was quoted accurately. But I have not checked with him on this quote. If he was quoted accurately, it sounds to me as if you and the Secretary are coming from a different direction, at least by implication, than the commander in the field.

Could you tell us whether you disagree with this statement or whether this is one that you would identify with, General Powell.

General POWELL. I also do not know the accuracy of that statement. But it does not surprise me. I think what General Schwarzkopf is saying is use as much time as you think is available; use as much time as is possible before the cost of using additional time is too high to bear.

There were a lot of "as long as's" in his statement with respect to the coalition, with respect to other factors. So I wouldn't criticize General Schwarzkopf or in any way disagree with him.

What I would say is that we don't know if the sanctions will work. I hope, more than anyone, that they work quickly. I hope they work in as short a period of time as possible. We just don't know.

Chairman NUNN. If we have a war, we are never going to know whether they would have worked. Are we? That's the major point here. I mean, the way you find out whether sanctions work or not is to give them enough time to work.

Let me turn, Secretary Cheney, to you.

You make a very valid point, I think, about the hardship on these other nations out there—Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and also Eastern Europe. I was in Eastern Europe not long ago, in fact, during the time right after August when this whole episode, this brutal invasion, came about. There is no doubt about the fact that, unless there is help for these countries, then patience is going to be very hard to obtain and the sanctions are going to be hard to maintain, and the United Nations action is going to be hard to maintain.

But what I hoped and understood was going to happen was that Saudi Arabia and the other oil producers, who have enjoyed such a very large windfall in profits, a lot of which has been paid for, by the way, by the American consumers of petroleum, that they were going to help these other countries. Saudi Arabia alone, according to figures I have received, has gotten an additional $30 billion beyond what they would otherwise have received since August. I understand that there will be another $20 billion in the next 4 months.

You mentioned Poland's problems and Czechoslovakia's problems and Turkey's problems, and Egypt's. If you add all of those up, it does not come to anything near the windfall profits to Saudi Arabia alone. To me, if we have the country we are primarily defending not sharing the windfall profits, and the fact that they are not sharing the windfall profits to the extent they need to be ends up putting so much pressure on us that we feel we have to go to war instead of letting the sanctions work, then that, to me, is an unacceptable kind of situation.

So I would make that observation and ask you, Mr. Secretary, do you know what the Saudi Arabians are doing with this money and whether they are, indeed, willing to help Poland, willing to help Czechoslovakia and other East European countries, and whether they have actually delivered on their promises to countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan?

Secretary CHENEY. I would be happy to comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

Again, implicit in your question is the assumption that sanctions will work given sufficient time. I think that is a big assumption.

There is a big difference between saying that we know if we use military force we could achieve our objective. It may be if we wait a year or two, economic sanctions will get him out of Kuwait as well. But I think we always have to come back and remind ourselves that there is no guarantee, given five years, that sanctions will force him out of Kuwait. It might. But there is no certainty there.

With respect to the question of burden-sharing, I think the efforts the administration has made and my colleagues, Jim Baker and Nick Brady, in rounding up financial support from nations around the world to support our effort in the Gulf are as unique as I know in the annals of the nations. The fact of the matter is we have gone out and worked very closely with a large number of nations around the world, and they are indeed stepping up and contributing.

We might want to urge others to do more, and I think we probably will be, given the increased size of our deployment. But the Saudis are bearing a very significant burden in this exercise. They are contributing significantly to our cost in terms both of cash and host nation support in-country. They will be providing transportation, fuel, water, et cetera, for our forces that are deployed there as well in the future.

As their deployment goes up, their costs will go up at the same time.

They are paying significant amounts to finance the support and the movement of Egyptian forces, and Moroccan forces and Syrian forces, and the other forces that are coming in to participate in Saudi Arabia.

A number of other nations are participating as well. The Kuwaitis, the United Arab Emirates, and the Japanese are nations that have contributed financially and in kind services to the operation.

We might argue about how much they should contribute, whether or not they are to contribute more. I would be happy to provide the Committee with the details as we go through this country by country.

Chairman **Nunn**. We would appreciate that.

Secretary **Cheney**. But the fact is, for the record, that this administration has gone a very long way, and our colleagues in this enterprise, the Saudis and others, have gone a very long way toward helping pick up what obviously is a significant burden.

Chairman **Nunn**. Could you furnish for the record those figures for each country?

Secretary **Cheney**. I'd be happy to.

[The information follows:]

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS' RESPONSIBILITY SHARING CALENDAR YEAR 1990

$ MILLIONS

	COMMITMENT TO DESERT SHIELD COSTS	CASH AND IN-KIND RECEIVED**
SAUDI ARABIA	HOST NATION SUPPORT*	987
KUWAIT	2500	2250
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	1000	280
JAPAN	2000	426
GERMANY	1072	337
KOREA	95	4

* NO-COST FOOD, FUEL, WATER, FACILITIES, AND LOCAL TRANSPORT FOR ALL US FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND SURROUNDING WATERS.

** IN-KIND RECEIPTS THRU OCT 31. FIGURES DO NOT REFLECT SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AND LIFT CURRENTLY IN THE PIPELINE.

AS OF NOVEMBER 29, 1990

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For the benefit of the committee, do I understand that each member will have 8 minutes?

Chairman **Nunn**. You and I are taking 6 and the rest 8.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Secretary, on the question of sanctions, you have made it very clear that no one yet has said that sanctions alone will work. And, indeed, the President made the decision that sanctions had to be backed up with a credible military option if that option, in fact, has to be used at some future date.

Now, there have been cries to give time for the sanctions to work. I don't know that the President has ever said he will not give time. Certainly in my judgment he has not. But now we have another very dramatic development, the political, diplomatic initiative, the discussions between the Iraqi Foreign Minister coming to the United States and, hopefully, at some subsequent date, the Secretary of State going to Baghdad.

So we have parallel tracks, in my judgment: the preparation, the continuing preparation of a credible military option and, at the same time, the political discussions—not negotiations, but discussions.

The question to you is this. If the cry arises to slow down the formation of a credible military option, are you going to continue with your current level and program of buildup to establish what you and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have decided and recommended to the President as a credible military option? Are you likely to slow it down in any way to foster or enhance in some manner the political-diplomatic discussions?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think, Senator, the best way to describe it is very much as you have, that we have a multi- faceted or multitrack approach here. We have the economic sanctions on and working at present, being in force. We are going forward with our military deployments, and we, as a result of the President's announcement last Friday, are also making certain that we exercise the diplomatic alternative as well.

Let me emphasize with respect to the diplomatic front a point that needs to be made, that the President made when he announced it last Friday and that many of the administration have reiterated in recent days.

It is that Jim Baker's mission to Baghdad does not involve negotiating anything other than what is embodied in the U.N. resolutions; that only complete and total withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of all hostages is acceptable as an outcome.

We believe, in making the decision the President made to deploy additional forces, that the additional force is required if you hope to be able to persuade him to withdraw, the more credible the threat of what he is faced with, the greater the likelihood that he will perceive that he needs to withdraw, and, at the same time, you take the same actions, increase the buildup; if diplomacy fails, if sanctions fail, if you have to use military force, then you want to make absolutely certain, as the Chairman said, there is no question about what the outcome will be.

So we believe that we are, in fact, exercising every single piece of leverage we can think of internationally and unilaterally to achieve the desired objective and we're moving on several fronts simultaneously.

Senator **Warner**. My question then to you, General Powell, is this. I listened carefully to your comments about the November 8 decision to augment our forces, and you elaborated in your comments beyond your written statement, and I think that was very important. You used the phrase, "I consulted with my military commanders, the CINCs," primarily General Schwarzkopf, and that you consulted with the JCS. It clearly confirmed what you and I had discussed prior to this meeting today, that this decision to augment the forces on November 8, a decision which was widely criticized by many here in the Congress as a major shift in policy, a major change in our military approach to the situation, that that decision was not something unilaterally made by the President in a vacuum. It was a decision that was made as a consequence of deliberate consultations between yourself, the members of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President over a significant period of time.

General POWELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. I judge from what you say that you had a large role in making these recommendations. It was not simply the President ordering you to produce the troops. It was, rather, your coming to the President and saying Mr. President, to implement the goals that you have set out, goals which have been consistent since the second of August, it is my recommendation and that of my fellow military commanders that you take these steps, and it is those steps that you began to implement on the eighth of November.

Am I not correct?

General POWELL. You are correct, Senator.

I went to Saudi Arabia at the direction of the Secretary in late October. I spent two days with General Schwarzkopf and all of his subordinate commanders and reviewed the situation in detail. I assessed what their requirements would be. They laid them out for me.

I came back. The Joint Chiefs and I discussed them. We presented them to the Secretary. We briefed the Secretary on it, and then we took that information over to the President for his consideration.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, we are on the threshold of possible diplomatic solutions and we all hope that it can be done that way, done in a peaceful manner to resolve this problem.

But there seems to be a curious paradox arising in some of these discussions. I want to draw on your last comment here. "It's better to deal with him now, while we have the U.N. support, while we have the world opinion behind us, and, hopefully, the Congress of the United States behind us, and we have the troops in place than 2 or 3 years hence."

This leaves the question: if we were to reach a diplomatic and political solution, do we intend to leave him with some forces intact? I mean, how are we going to deal with this situation in a peaceful avenue, which we hope to approach, and, at the same time, reach the goal that you have outlined here—better to deal with him now, while we have the very three or four essential things in place?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, obviously, Senator, what is required long-term is going to depend a lot upon how the current crisis is resolved. I would argue that if we are successful in getting him to withdraw, if he comes into compliance with the U.N. resolutions and there is no conflict, which is certainly what everyone hopes, then it will be important for us to continue to address a couple of continuing concerns. One is making certain that he does not do it again. That probably involves strengthening the indigenous military capabilities in the region. It will involve, I think, consideration and discussion, as well, of what kind of role the U.S. wants to play. We have had naval forces in the Gulf since 1949. We obviously have a very different situation there today, with forces on the ground, air and ground forces. What would be required long-term and how that might be structured would have to be worked out in conjunction with our allies in the region. We have not had any such discussions yet.

From an international standpoint, I think it would also be appropriate for us to look perhaps at peacekeeping forces, to make certain that he knows he would be taking on the combined might of the world if he were to launch such aggression as he has in the past. It would be important to work the sanctions question to see to it that we protected our ability to deny him certain crucial technologies that he requires to develop his nuclear capability, et cetera. So some kind of post-crisis arrangements clearly would be required, if we are going to insure that this does not happen again in the future.

Senator **Warner**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I have a procedural announcement here. At 11 o'clock, we will take approximately a 5-minute break to give the witnesses a little time. Whoever ends the questioning at approximately 11 o'clock, we will then take a 5-minute break. Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Welcome, gentlemen.

You have given us some very interesting testimony here this morning and I have listened to it very carefully.

Can you better outline for us right now what you have not in the past 10 or 15 minutes, and that is what would be lost or how would the interests of the United States be harmed if we simply waited to give the embargo and its sanctions time to work?

Secretary **Cheney**. I would be happy to touch on that, Senator. I tried to touch on some of that in my opening remarks.

First of all, there is no guarantee that if you wait and let sanctions work, that will ultimately produce the result of his getting out of Kuwait. A lot of the debate, it seems to me, as I have mentioned before, is this assumption that, given sufficient time, sanctions will produce the desired result. That is a very big assumption.

Having said that, a delay I think entails certain costs. It clearly says that we are going to allow hundreds of Americans to continue to be held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait for however long you want to wait. It says that he will have that time to continue to dismantle what's left of Kuwait, to continue to drive the Kuwaitis out of Kuwait; that he will have that time to continue to work, if he can, on improving his own military capabilities. If you give him endless time, perhaps he knows you are not going to come at him from a military standpoint. As General Powell mentioned, he would be in a position to stand down his force and send some of the troops home on vacation, operate at a significantly lower tempo and extend his ability to surge his forces later on should that be required. Continuing to wait indefinitely, giving sanctions time to work, also creates significant additional pressures for the members of the coalition. It means that the major U.S. military presence in the region on the ground, several hundred thousand strong, would continue. It means that the political situation inside the Arab world could be changed. It presents him with the opportunity to continue to try to erode the cohesion of the coalition. It means that economic problems will continue to mount for the nations that suffer as a result of the embargo on Iraq, such as Jordan, Turkey, and Eastern Europe.

The point we have tried to make isn't that a decision has been made at this point to use the military option, but that the notion that some have suggested, that it is a clear, clean-cut choice, either military action or economic sanctions, isn't a clear, clean-cut choice, but, in fact, there is a price to be paid in several respects for waiting for the sanctions to work.

Senator Exon. Mr. Secretary, you, the General, and many of us were at a meeting at the White House some time in August. I don't remember the date. The invasion was August 2, and I believe that this must have been some time between the 10th and the 15th, somewhere in there.

Was not the signal clearly given by the President at that time that we were over there under Operation Desert Shield and that we had no intention whatsoever at that time of using force?

Is that a fair representation of what we were told by the President and you and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time?

Secretary Cheney. I would state it differently, Senator.

The statements we made repeatedly and that were referenced by General Powell this morning were that our initial mission that we were given by the President, from the standpoint of military force, was to deter further Iraqi aggression. It meant getting something on the ground as fast as we could. Second was to have sufficient forces there to be able to defend Saudi Arabia and the other nations should deterrence fail. Third was to use the military forces in the region, especially our naval forces, to enforce the embargo, the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

That was our very clear-cut military mission. It was given us in the early days of the crisis. It was referenced, I believe repeatedly, in public statements by me and, I think, General Powell as well. It also was all we could do in those early days.

From the moment that King Fahd signed off on the deployment of U.S. forces and I called back from Jiddah to the President and he authorized me to proceed with the deployments, I then notified General Powell and General Schwarzkopf. It was 14 hours until the first units arrived. That was a unit of F-15s, out of Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.

In those early days in August, we could not have defended the kingdom, I do not believe, had there been further aggression. But we were able to get something on the ground and, through August and September, we steadily built up. As General Powell has indicated, once we reached the end of that first phase deployment, that is when General Schwarzkopf reported that he then had sufficient forces, he felt, to guarantee that he could perform his mission.

What subsequently occurred was a decision by the President to continue the deployment to send additional forces in order for us to be able to guarantee that we had offensive, clear-cut offensive capability as well—not that he had made a decision to use it yet, but that we were to deploy the forces so that that option was available, should it be required.

Senator EXON. Our time is extremely limited, so I won't pursue that any further because I have another key question that I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary.

It seems clear to me, as one who was there at that meeting, that there had to be a significant change in policy, at least with regard to timing, between that meeting in August and November 8, 2 days after the election, when the new deployment decision was announced. Maybe somewhere during the discussions this morning, we can find out what caused what I think was that rather abrupt change in policy to an offensive military posture.

Let's go to the matter of command and control. We have had several questions about that and I have asked several questions about it, both in open and closed meetings that we have had.

The last I remember being advised was that, while we were in a defensive posture, there would likely be different commanders and a lack of overall command and control. But if we went into an attack mode, either to defend ourselves from an attack by Saddam Hussein or from the standpoint of us making a decision that it was time to attack, that at that time we would have a central command and control that would be under our commander, General Schwarzkopf.

Does that still hold, or is that inaccurate?

Secretary CHENEY. I would defer to the Chairman to respond to your question, Senator.

General POWELL. All U.S. forces are under the direct command of General Schwarzkopf, reporting directly to the President through the Secretary of Defense. British forces are also under General Schwarzkopf's direct operational control.

All other forces in the region are under the operational control of the Saudi armed forces and the person of Prince Khalid.

Prince Khalid and General Schwarzkopf are co-located in the same building in Riyadh. They work very closely together. They hold joint briefings. There is centralized planning taking place for all possibilities.

But, at the moment, there is not a single command and control structure because we have not yet put together a single political arrangement that would form the basis for a single command and control arrangement.

But, because of the close coordination that is taking place, because of what is happening on the ground, I am comfortable, Senator, that, should something occur, the coordination mechanisms that are in place provide the basis for shifting over to a formal system that would serve the interest of the coalition well and would provide an effective command and control system to deal with any kind of operation, whether it be defensive or offensive.

That comes across I know not as cleanly as you would like or I would like. But it is not an arrangement that was designed in a war college. It is something that has been put together on the ground over time and is getting better and better with each passing day and week.

Senator EXON. My time is up. But it seems to me that your answer is that if an attack should be launched by Saddam Hussein right now, we do not have a decision made at this time as to who would be in charge of the multi-national forces in the region.

General POWELL. If an attack should be launched by Saddam Hussein right now, I am confident that there are mechanisms in place which would insure that we would respond in a coordinated, cohesive way.

Senator EXON. But you can't tell me who would be in charge?

General POWELL. General Schwarzkopf would be in charge of U.S. forces and Prince Khalid, at the moment, is in charge of the regional forces that have been committed to the defense of the kingdom.

Senator EXON. It doesn't sound very good to me, General.

Thank you for your answer.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my prepared statement be made a part of the hearing record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Senator Exon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is the culmination of a series of hearings on our Nation's role in the Persian Gulf crisis. The Senate Armed Services Committee, the full Congress and the American public have benefited from this important series of hearings. Because of the testimonies provided by our witnesses last week, an informative debate has taken place on, among other matters, the effectiveness of economic sanctions on Iraq, United States military capabilities and options in the Gulf region, and the status of Iraq's short-term and long-term nuclear weapons program.

The administration has carefully crafted international support to economically and politically isolate Iraq as a result of its brutal takeover and subjugation of Kuwait. Working through the United Nations, the United States quickly responded to the invasion and led the world in standing firm against Saddam Hussein. President Bush and his administration should be commended for its quick and decisive actions in mobilizing the Nations' leaders against Iraq and putting in place the economic embargo which will hopefully liberate Kuwait from its invaders.

The American military deployment to Saudi Arabia was, in my opinion, necessary and crucial at deterring further Iraqi aggression in the region. The United States is the only nation capable of doing what had to be done in the days following August 2. I believe the reasons for being in the Gulf region are sound; yet, I am concerned by the recent "Americanization" of the conflict and the growing perception that war is no longer the last resort in removing Hussein's army from Kuwait.

More specifically, I am concerned with the shift in administration rhetoric and policy to use offensive force for reasons, such as Iraq's potential nuclear capability or its large conventional military strength, which are beyond those listed in United Nations resolution 660 or any other measure approved by the International Community. I am disappointed that the military force in Saudi Arabia is predominantly American. When the President's deployment level is ultimately reached, American troops will represent over 70 percent of the ground forces facing Iraqi tanks. While many Arab states express a desire for an "Arab solution" and have a combined military power superior to Iraq, their military commitment in this crisis is inadequate. Likewise, nations, such as Japan, Germany, Spain and Italy, which depend on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil are no where to be found when it comes to defending their interests. Furthermore, the economic assistance pledged by Western nations to those in the region adversely effected by their compliance with the embargo is wanting and slow in reaching the countries.

The ultimate short-term and long-term success of reining in Iraq's rogue actions depends on a truly international effort. Yet, during the 4 months after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the fight against Saddam Hussein has changed from an American-led international fight to an American fight blessed by the International Community. After listening to last week's witnesses, I believe the military option should be preserved but kept as a last resort. The longer sanctions are allowed to work, the more the Iraq economy suffers and its military might deteriorates.

War with Iraq is not inevitable. Time and patience are still effective weapons in the Gulf crisis and will continue to be after January 15. While economic sanctions work their course, America's military option will not diminish unless rotation of troops is made difficult because of overdeployment—a concern I have as a result of the President's decision to increase our force level in the region to 430,000.

I want to welcome Secretary Cheney and General Powell this morning. Their efforts and those of the brave men and women in our Armed Forces during this crisis have been exemplary and kept Saddam Hussein in check. Gentlemen, as always, I look forward to your thoughtful views on the future of our Nation's military involvement in the Gulf.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen is next under our rule.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Powell and Secretary Cheney, the last time you appeared before us I had occasion to refer to the Peloponesian War. Someone reminded me that that's sort of like oxtail soup—going too far back to get a good thing. [Laughter.]

So I decided that perhaps I should be a little more modern in my references.

As we know, President Bush feels very strongly that there are some parallels between Hitler's march through Eastern Europe and the reaction in Britain at that time. The question was raised, who is going to be willing to die for Danzig?

I went back and read some of Manchester's biography of Churchill and came across an interesting observation, which I would like to read to you.

It says, "The present is never tidy, or certain, or reasonable, and those who try to make it so, once it has become the past, succeed only in making it seem implausible. Among the perceptive observations and shrewd conclusions of the Churchills and Sergeants were the clutters of other reports and forecasts completely at odds with them. All of it, the prescient and the cockeyed, always arrives in a promiscuous rush, and most men in power, sorting through it, believe what they want to believe, accepting whatever justifies their policies and convictions, while taking out insurance, whenever possible, against the truth that may lie in their wastebaskets."

One of the fundamental purposes of these hearings—and I must say there has been some discontent expressed, not by the administration, I might add, but some voices are saying that these hearings have sown confusion at home, doubt abroad, given aid and comfort to the enemy, and jeopardized the cohesion of the international alliance that currently exists. I would say that that simply is not the case. It would be an absolute abdication of our responsibility to simply follow a course that has been articulated by the President without a thorough examination.

It is the duty and the burden of the President to inform the citizenry, to persuade them of the correctness of his proposed action, and to inspire us to follow it.

I don't think he could have two better advocates to try to make that case before us today.

There are two fundamental questions that have been raised and that have to be asked. One is why go to war in 6 weeks or longer? Second, what kind of war is it going to be?

What makes sorting out the truth difficult is that we have had such a diversity of opinion. With respect to sanctions, some have expressed certainty about the effectiveness of sanctions. I would say one in particular.

Others have expressed their belief that they will work. Still others say they hope they will work.

We had at least two witnesses who said they doubt very much that they will work.

We have had military experts—Secretary Schlesinger, General Jones, Admiral Crowe, General Odom, Jim Webb—all of whom questioned the wisdom of going forward in the near future with military action.

In today's Washington Post, Secretary Richardson and former Secretary of Defense, Secretary Weinberger again expressed some reluctance to move forward with war at this point.

That is part of the reason why it is essential that we go through this particular process—I know that you share that view—to try to build a consensus to sort out who is right or wrong or more wise or less wise.

But the second question is if we should go to war, the President has said it will be a short war. I would simply observe that history is littered with the bones of optimists and soldiers who thought that they were headed for a short war.

The question I would have is what do you or the President contemplate in terms of the duration of a short war in which no holds are barred and which the American military is not going to fight with one arm tied behind its back?

General POWELL. Senator, I am torn between my desire to be forthcoming with the Committee and my responsibility not to give out any information that would violate——

Senator COHEN. We can take it in Executive Session, if that is the case.

General POWELL. I would rather do most of it in Executive Session. I don't want to give out any timeliness here.

But, just to follow up for a moment——

Senator COHEN. Just give it in Executive Session. That's okay.

General POWELL. All right, sir.

Senator COHEN. Let me say that there is one issue that I think is of paramount importance, and that is the specter of Saddam Hussein acquiring nuclear weapons. That has been minimized by some as being politically inspired.

I must say that there is a contradiction in terms of the rapidity with which Saddam Hussein could acquire a nuclear device and its ultimate utility.

One of the things that is troubling to me is we seem to be engaging in a lawyer's exercise of pleading in the alternative. On the one hand, we say he doesn't have a nuclear device; but even if he doesn't currently, he could not develop one for at least 6 to 8 months, possibly 10 years; but even if he could develop it within 6 to 8 months or possibly 10 years, it would be a crude bomb that could only be carried on a truck or a 747; and even if it were more sophisticated than a crude bomb, if he developed a nuclear arsenal, he would never use it because he, like the Soviet Union and China, would face a massive nuclear retaliation.

It seemed to me a striking curiosity, to say the least, that we now have a capacity to obliterate Iraq, and that does not seem to have deterred him thus far. The notion that he would have more consideration for his people after he acquires nuclear weapons than before strikes me as a dangerous self- delusion.

I would like to pose a couple of questions to you.

Jim Webb, former Secretary of the Navy, said the Committee should ask for immediate, detailed briefings on the status of ammunition accounts measured against their probable rate of use, projected casualty rates, the viability of in- theater medical assets to care for the wounded, the availability of pre-trained manpower to replace those killed, wounded or sick, the projected availability of strategic airlift for Medivac, troop replacements during initial stages of conflict, and an assessment of our security commitments in other regions of the world should we be required to further cannibalize military units already in place overseas.

I would hope that before we complete this set of hearings, that you would furnish that for the record, so that we would have an accurate assessment of exactly what is involved.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen, without taking this out of your time, we do have a list of questions along that line—we are trying to narrow them down—that I have talked to Secretary Cheney about. Rather than getting into that kind of detail, which probably would better be handled in Executive Session, anyway—I think it probably would—we are going to submit those for the record and work with the Secretary on that. We have talked about it.

That does not come out of Senator Cohen's time.

Senator COHEN. If I could, on pages 12, 13, and 14 of General Odom's testimony last Friday, he raised also similar questions about stocks of smart munitions, their cost, the fact that we don't have many of them, and a variety of other questions about the effect of military capability that we would have. If you could, also include that as part of the request.

Chairman NUNN. We have gone over all of that. I will have the staff work with Minority staff on this. We will have a compiled list.

Secretary CHENEY. We would be happy to respond, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Could I inquire, Secretary Cheney? We hear a great deal about the hostages in Iraq, but very little about the Americans still hiding and seeking their way through Kuwait right now.

What is the status of those hostages in Kuwait? What is the impact of the sanctions on them?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, we receive reports from varying sources, some of them open and some of them classified, Senator, on the situation in Kuwait. There are, I guess, several pieces to it. There are a number of Americans still holding out in our embassy in Kuwait City. There are additional large numbers—we protect the number for obvious reasons—of Americans who are in Kuwait in hiding in many respects. Their situation continues to grow more desperate.

From time to time, someone comes out or gets out who is able to convey to us information about what the living conditions are. Of course, there is a lack of food, a lack of medical care, a lack of freedom of movement. Their lives are at risk. Oftentimes when they are found—and periodically they are found—they are sent to Iraq and staked out on a strategic site. Oftentimes the Kuwaitis, who have been courageous enough to provide assistance, have suffered significantly at the hands of the Iraqis for having had the courage to help the Americans.

Senator COHEN. If I could just ask this final question, Secretary Kissinger has written in the past that high military officers have an innate awe of their commander-in-chief and it tempts them to find a military reason for what they consider to be barely tolerable. Contrary to some of the public mythology, they rarely challenge the commander-in-chief. They seek excuses to support not to oppose him.

General Powell, is that your experience? We've had a situation in which my colleague, Senator Thurmond, raised the issue with General Odom, that sometimes we get different testimony from people while they are in the military and then when they get out of the military, they have an entirely different viewpoint.

Do you stand in awe of the Commander-in-Chief, or is this your best military recommendation in terms of the current buildup in the Gulf?

General POWELL. It is my best military recommendation. I have known our Commander-in-Chief, the President, as Vice President, when I was National Security Adviser. I am not reluctant or afraid to give either the Secretary of Defense, the President or any other members of the National Security Council my best, most honest, candid advice, whether they like it or not, and on some occasions they do not like it.

Secretary CHENEY. I will confirm that. [Laughter.]

General POWELL. Which part, sir?

Secretary CHENEY. All of it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my welcome to our witnesses this morning.

Secretary Cheney, you have testified that our original military mission was to defend Saudi Arabia and that later on an offensive capability was decided to be provided, and for a number of reasons.

When precisely was the decision made to provide that additional offensive capability that you have described? Was that early November, that decision?

Secretary CHENEY. The decision was announced I believe November 8, Senator.

The decision was made a few days before that. I would have to check the record. There were a series of meetings at which these subjects were discussed. I think it is important for the committee to understand that this wasn't a sudden, sharp shift in terms of my thinking, anyway, internally; that we had been looking at military options and what kind of military force we could muster, what kind of actions we could undertake from the very beginning, back in September and October: what would we do if he came south? How would we respond to various events? What kind of air and ground capability did we have?

So there is a continuing process through there as you evaluate what you have, you look at what he's got, you listen to the advice from our military, senior military commanders. Out of that emerged a decision where the President, in effect, said go, deploy the additional forces, and that's what we announced November 8. I would say that the key decision-making time was late October.

Senator LEVIN. Just to summarize, even though the thinking had been in process for some period of time, the actual decision to add this mission or to change that mission, however you want to phrase it, was a few days prior to November 8?

Secretary CHENEY. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Let me get to the sanctions. There has been a lot of discussion about that. I want to see if I can understand both your thinking a little better on that.

You have indicated that sanctions might work and that they might not work, and there is a lot of evidence—I believe you said, Mr. Secretary—that they won't work.

In your opinion, is it more likely than not that they will work within a year to two?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I have a bit of a bias where sanctions are concerned. It is based upon trying to find historical antecedents where they have produced the kind of result that we are interested in trying to achieve here. That is very hard to do.

Sanctions have a sort of spotty track record. We have used them in many cases with varying degrees of success.

If the President were to ask me today, can you guarantee that these sanctions will work within a year or two, the answer is no, I cannot. I can guarantee that we can keep the ships at sea, that we can keep interdicting the oil exports, et cetera, subject to all of those conditions I mentioned in my testimony and to try to maintain the coalition. But I cannot, nor can anyone else, give you anything more than the kind of opinion that Senator Cohen mentioned. Opinions are all over the lot, and my testimony this morning I think is designed in part to point out that there are a lot of reasons to think that the costs of trying to make them work may be greater and that they may, in fact, not produce the result.

Senator LEVIN. I didn't ask you for a guarantee for the reasons you give. What I am asking you is whether or not, in your opinion, sanctions are more likely than not to work within a year to two if we pursued that alternative, keeping our military option open?

Secretary CHENEY. My personal view, Senator, is that, given the nature of the regime, given Saddam Hussein's brutality to his own people, given his very tight control over that society, his ability to allocate resources to the military, their ability to produce their own food basically inside, given those, he can ride them out.

Senator LEVIN. What did you mean in late August when you said, Secretary Cheney, that sanctions have some reasonable prospect for success?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, I think it was based upon the notion that we would be able to marshall the kind of international effort with our naval forces that would block oil traffic, that would deny him the ability to acquire goods in international commerce.

I guess the new information I would say that I have seen in recent months that leads me to have questions about whether or not they will work is this. We saw, for example, the abortive effort to ration gasoline back then. But that subsequently has been canceled. They have gone back to not rationing gasoline. He fired the minister who put it in.

The analysis that shows, in fact, that they are likely to be able to significantly expand their food production, and that was not available early on. Also, there is the extent to which, even with the sanctions in place for the last few months, he has been able to mobilize a couple of hundred thousand additional personnel to deploy in southern Iraq and Kuwait. So, even though we have had sanctions on since August, we have seen this constant, continual military buildup in the Kuwaiti theater of operations.

I guess all of those things lead me to have some doubts about whether or not they will produce the desired result.

Senator **Levin**. Do you have greater doubt now than you did in late August as to whether sanctions can work?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think that would be a fair statement.

Senator **Levin**. General, do you believe it is more likely than not that sanctions can work in a year or two?

General **Powell**. I really cannot make an informed judgment on that, Senator. I do not know.

Senator **Levin**. Mr. Secretary, at a time in early August, or I guess in September, the estimate was made by the administration that it would cost about $15 billion a year to support U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. Since then, the decision was made to add about 150,000 troops.

Can you tell us how much this additional deployment will cost in fiscal year 1991, and if there are any additional commitments since this decision was made on the part of the Saudis, the Japanese, or anybody else, to increase their contribution financially to it?

First, I need the cost figure. Instead of $15 billion, now that we are planning on sending 150,000 troops additionally, how much would that figure be in 1991?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, I don't have a number for you this morning. They are working within the Department to try to develop it. It is a complex computation because of the reserve elements that are being called up. We will get it for the Committee as quickly as possible, as soon as we have a good, firm estimate.

[The information follows:]

Cost of Added Desert Shield Deployments

In September, DOD estimated the incremental costs of Operation DESERT SHIELD for fiscal year 1991 to be $15 billion. That was based on our force level assumptions at that time and in the absence of hostilities. We now are developing new estimates based on the higher force levels announced by the President in mid-November.

The many variables affecting DESERT SHIELD cost estimates include: the size and deployment phasing of forces, price of oil, stockage levels of ammunition and other supplies, tempo of operations, and Reserve callup scenarios.

As provided for in the Budget Summit Agreement, the administration plans to submit a fiscal year 1991 supplemental appropriations request for incremental DESERT SHIELD requirements.

Senator **Levin**. Do you have an approximation?

Secretary **Cheney**. I would not want to offer that out of a concern that it would be misleading. Then I would have to come back and say well, on X date you said it would be X amount and it was more.

Senator **Levin**. Do we have any commitments from the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, or anyone else to add to the original commitments that they made since this decision was made in early November?

Secretary **Cheney**. We do. I am specifically aware of the fact that the Saudis will continue to provide the kinds of host nation support for the new, bigger force that they had committed to for the old, smaller force, which would be a significant additional contribution.

Senator **Levin**. How about in actual dollars?

Secretary **Cheney**. I would have to check that, Senator.

[The information follows:]

Through October 31, the Saudis have provided $987 million worth of host nation support to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and in surrounding waters.

Senator **Levin**. You're not aware of any additional commitments by the Saudis, other than that one in-kind contribution?

Secretary **Cheney**. That's very significant.

Senator **Levin**. But they also made a commitment above the in-kind contribution for that original deployment.

Secretary **Cheney**. For the transportation and so forth. Yes, sir.

Senator **Levin**. My question is have they increased that commitment above the in-kind commitment for the larger troop deployment?

Secretary **Cheney**. I can supply that for the record, Senator. But I could not tell you specifically the dollar amounts at this time.

[The information follows:]

The Saudis have agreed to continue to provide the same type of host nation support—that is, cost-free water, fuel, local transportation, food, and facilities. The host nation support arrangement is not tied to any particular level of forces in Saudi Arabia and its surrounding waters. The Department of Defense is still in the process of estimating its total costs for the deployments.

I do know that the Saudis have agreed in connection with this deployment to provide the same kind of host nation support for the larger force that they did for the smaller force.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator McCain is next. At the end of Senator McCain's questioning, we will take a 5-minute break.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank both of you for being here. Obviously your presence here is of great importance, not only to this committee but to the American people.

First of all, I would just like to follow up on this sanctions issue, which I am sure will dominate not only the debate here but the debate throughout the country.

We had several witnesses who, frankly, said, "sanctions are working."

I wonder if you have any evidence of that, Secretary Cheney?

Secretary **Cheney**. That sanctions are working?

Senator **McCain**. Yes.

Secretary **Cheney**. I think, again, I would come back to the definitional problem.

If your goal with the sanctions is to get him out of Kuwait, I don't see any evidence that he is leaving Kuwait. To the contrary, I see evidence that he continues to strengthen his position in Kuwait, add more forces, add more fortifications.

If, by sanctions working, it is meant that we are having an impact on his economy, I think that that is without doubt, true; that we are denying him the ability to earn foreign exchange by selling oil, that is without doubt, true; that we are having an impact on his industrial capabilities, I think all of those things are clearly true.

But it is one thing to say we are having an impact on his economy and it is another thing to say that sanctions will force him to withdraw from Kuwait.

Senator McCain. Could we talk for a minute about an aspect of this sanctions issue which I think has not surfaced, or it has to some degree, but I don't think it has been thoroughly examined. It would be very painful for all of us, being a nation founded on Judeo-Christian ethics, as to the impact of sanctions over time on civilians—on women, on children, on noncombatants and the prospect of television pictures of children with swollen bellies and people starving. I think we would all agree that, before Saddam Hussein would agree to leave Kuwait, the conditions would have to be very extreme. I don't think there is any doubt about that.

Don't you think that the American people would be very concerned about the effects, the true effects, the real effects of sanctions on women, children, and noncombatants in that nation?

Secretary Cheney. I would think that would indeed be the case, Senator.

I think not only would it have an impact on American public opinion, but I would expect it would have an impact upon our coalition partners as well.

That is one of the resolutions on the list that I showed at the outset from the United Nations, that they have taken the action of making specific provision for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq.

It is not our desire to create that kind of starvation, obviously, for the Iraqi people.

Senator McCain. Clearly, Saddam Hussein has already used that issue.

Do you have confidence that the "humanitarian assistance" would flow to the noncombatants instead of to the military personnel?

Secretary Cheney. We have no way of knowing that, Senator, given the nature of the state he operates. It is not clear that humanitarian assistance that might be provided would, in fact, arrive where it is needed and might not be diverted to the military.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Secretary Cheney, several witnesses also said that Saddam Hussein has shown "a willingness to negotiate." Do you share that view?

Secretary Cheney. I have not seen it yet. It will be interesting to see what develops out of the President's initiative of last Friday.

He has made numerous statements. He said within a few days after he took Kuwait that he was about to withdraw from Kuwait. At one point, remember, he set up a puppet government and said this was a response by the Iraqis to a revolution inside Kuwait. All of that, of course, was not true.

He subsequently annexed Kuwait and made it part of Iraq.

We'll have to see whether or not he is interested. But, to date, I have not seen any significant evidence of it.

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Cheney, I am disappointed. First of all, I share the view of my friend from Maine that we are having these hearings and I think they are very important. I think this Committee has clear oversight.

I also believe that the 535 Members of Congress also have clear responsibilities, and I am very disappointed and continued to be disappointed that we don't have a session of Congress. Many Americans probably do not know that the leaders of Congress can call Congress back into session. The President does not have to do so. So I place responsibilities in both branches of government.

I firmly believe, and I hope you share the view, that, before military action began, the Congress of the United States, in toto, would have to be involved in a decision of that magnitude.

I am concerned about pay and allowances for our service men and women. I hope you will address that issue in the upcoming session of Congress. The numbers we have show that there has been a 12-percent real decrease in salaries of the men and women in the military. I think it would be very appropriate for you to bring this to the attention of the Congress as soon as possible. Also, measures that need to be taken to accommodate and assist the dependents in these periods of dislocation and separation need to be addressed.

This brings me to the next point. There is great conjecture as to whether this increased deployment will force upon us abandonment of any kind of rotation policy. The question is can we maintain this size of force that we are presently building up for an indefinite or a significant length of time without reimposition of the draft?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, we have no plans at present to seek reimposition of the draft. We do not believe it is necessary.

The issue of rotation policy is basically on the shelf. That's the way I've described it at present. The purpose for that is that we cannot achieve the level we would like to achieve in terms of the forces in-country if we use the new forces as replacements, instead of reinforcements. We want to leave what we have there and add to it to achieve the level that the Chiefs have recommended is required to have that military capability.

To date, of course, the longest period of time that anyone has been deployed to the Gulf is a little less than four months. So we have not had to implement a rotation policy yet. At the appropriate time, clearly we are prepared to take a look at it.

But, for now, the question of rotation policy, as said previously, is on the shelf. We have not announced, and do not plan to announce in the near future, a specific rotation policy.

Senator McCAIN. General Powell, I hope that also when Congress comes back into session, you will help us revisit this whole issue of personnel cuts.

As you know, we are presently scheduled over a 5-year period to dramatically reduce the size of the armed services personnel. In fact, we were even contemplating, as you know, reductions in forces involuntarily. Now we find ourselves in a position where we are involuntarily keeping people on active duty.

So, clearly, I think that has to be an issue of prime importance, as soon as possible.

Would you agree with that?

General **Powell**. Yes, sir. We'll be ready to do that when the hearings come up in the winter and spring.

Senator **McCain**. Secretary Cheney, this whole issue of the nuclear acquisition to my view neglects, somewhat, the reality that Saddam Hussein already has chemical weapons which he has already used, both on his own people and in the battlefield.

Do you remain concerned, particularly in light of a recent test that took place in the last couple of days, that he would deliver chemical weapons not only on the battlefield but into neighboring Arab or non-Arab countries?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, Senator, we obviously are concerned about his chemical capabilities and his ballistic missile capabilities. He has not previously used, in an operational sense, the two together; that is to say, the ballistic missiles he used in the war with Iran were equipped with conventional warheads.

We have to assume that he has developed or is developing the capability to put chemicals on his ballistic missiles. This would obviously give him the ability to hit cities, to hit targets inside the region.

We have a chart here which you may want to pull out that is a backup. It is interesting because it shows the areas he can hit outside Iraq with his existing missile capabilities.

With respect to the nuclear question, there has been this claim made.

Well, we'll go to this for a second.


IRAQI MISSILE THREAT RANGES
435 mi
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CASPIAN SEA
TURKEY
CYPRUS
LEBANON
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IRAN
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ISRAEL
JORDAN
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
SAUDI ARABIA
BAHRAIN
QATAR
EGYPT
RED SEA
U.A.E.

You can see the inner black ring is the basic SCUD range. The outer ring is the SCUD variants that he has developed internally. It would allow him to shoot from inside Iraq, obviously, to northern Saudi Arabia, to most of Jordan, a good part of Israel, Syria, southern Turkey, Iran, et cetera, and places down in the Gulf.

We also know that he has tested a multi-stage ballistic missile, which would mean an even longer-range capability.

On nuclear issues, the administration has been accused of somehow trotting out the nuclear threat only because some polls showed the American people were concerned about the nuclear threat.

Well, I am glad the American people are concerned about it. But if you went back and looked at most of the statements or speeches I have made on the subject over the last four months, and that the President has made and that General Powell has made, we nearly always mention nuclear capability, the fact that he has been working on it, the fact that we know from public, as well as classified sources, that he has spent a lot of time and effort trying to acquire that capability.

Nobody can tell you specifically when he will have it.

But I have not found anybody yet who can tell me that he is not trying to get it and that it would not be a significant problem for us.

If we were involved in this current deployment, trying to deal with Saddam Hussein, trying to get him to withdraw from Kuwait, trying to maintain that coalition that we have been able to put together, it would be a whale of a lot more difficult if he were sitting there with ballistic missiles or aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that this whole issue of proliferation—and I am disappointed that the administration vetoed recently a very important piece of legislation—I would suggest that we revisit that legislation, that we revisit this issue, so that we can prevent this kind of situation from evolving in many places throughout the world and not just Iraq.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I would identify myself with your remarks, Senator McCain. I think that may be the primary national security issue that we face in this country for the next 5 to 20 years. We are going to have to look not just at Iraq but at many nations.

Mr. Secretary, General Powell, we will be back here at 5 after the hour. What you may be looking for is directly behind me.

Secretary Cheney. Coffee.

Chairman Nunn. Right.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order. Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Cheney, you are a former Member of the House of Representatives and you are fully aware of what the Constitution says with regards to the war-making power. I think all of us have been impressed by the efforts of the President and the Secretary of State to try to win international approval and support for the United Nations declaration. It is one that I support.

But the President still refuses to ask the one body that the Constitution requires him to ask, which is the United States Congress, about the declaration of war. A declaration is not required to react to provocation to American troops or to American citizens, but we are not talking now about a defensive military action.

Yesterday Secretary Baker suggested more ominously that if President Bush does go to war he expects that Congress will rally around the President after he has committed the troops to combat. One would gather that the President effectively is thumbing his nose at Congress; he is really daring us to act if we disagree with him. He is telling us that the decision of whether to go to war is his, and his alone, to make. He apparently is not going to let Congress interfere with him.

Now, barring an act of provocation, do you agree that the President must obtain the approval of Congress in advance before the United States attacks Iraq?

Secretary Cheney. Senator, I do not believe the President requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf. The President has made it very clear that he wants to consult extensively with the Congress on this subject. We spent almost two hours in meetings on Friday afternoon with Chairman Nunn and Senator Warner and other members of the House and Senate on the subject. We have spent—I cannot count the amount of time we have spent consulting on the issue.

But there have been some 200 times, more than 200 times, in our history when Presidents have committed U.S. forces, and on only five of those occasions was there a prior declaration of war. So I am not one who would argue in this instance that the President's hands are tied or that he is unable, given his constitutional responsibilities as commander-in-chief, to carry out his responsibilities.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, Mr. Secretary, we are not talking about Libya, not about Grenada, not about Panama. We are talking about 440,000 American troops who are over there. We are talking about a major American military involvement, if it becomes necessary to do so. Do I understand from your response that you are prepared to tell the American people now that, barring provocation by Saddam Hussein, you believe he and he alone can bring this country to war?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I would argue, as has every President, to my knowledge, certainly in modern times, that the President, as commander-in-chief, under Title II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, has the authority to commit U.S. forces and that in this particular instance, given the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the request for U.S. assistance to defend Saudi Arabia, the request from the legitimate Government of Kuwait to help defend Kuwait, given the authorization, the vote—not authorization but certainly the vote by the United Nations in support of that effort, that the President is within his authority at this point to carry out his responsibilities.

He has made it clear that he would like very much to have the enthusiastic support of the Congress of the United States. Congress, in its adjournment resolution, specifically provided that the leaders could call them back into special session to address this issue. But I cannot, as Secretary of Defense, make a statement or a commitment that would limit the President's constitutional prerogatives as commander-in-chief.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, you know very well, Mr. Secretary, that this is a shared responsibility—that he has the authority as the commander-in-chief and that clearly inscribed in the Constitution is that the Congress has the power to declare war.

The Constitution does not reference the consultation procedures with certain Members, and, as distinguished and important as that is, it talks about declaring war. What we are talking about here is declaring war, and I gather from what you are telling the American people this morning that, when the judgment is finally made by this President that war is going to be necessary and essential, you are not prepared to urge the President of the United States to bring that issue to the Congress of the United States and have the Congress of the United States either vote in support or vote against.

I think that is clearly mandated in the Constitution, but, as I understand your answer here this morning, you are not prepared to make that recommendation to the President of the United States.

Secretary CHENEY. Well, the advice I give to the President I give to the President, Senator. It is obviously his prerogative to receive advice from any sources.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, would you give him that advice?

Secretary **Cheney**. As a general proposition, I can think that the notion of a declaration of war to some extent flies in the face of what we are trying to accomplish here. And what we are trying to accomplish is to marshal an international force, some 26, 27 nations having committed forces to the enterprise, working under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, and that having put together an international venture, an international force, and international support for the proposition of using all means necessary to implement the policy of the United Nations. I am not sure why you would want to have the United States go out and unilaterally on its own turn this into an Iraq-U.S. war.

Senator **Kennedy**. Because, Mr. Secretary, that is what the Constitution provides and, as you very well know, once the bullets start flying, it is going to be Americans versus the Iraqis. I mean, do you take any serious issue or does General Powell at what percent of the casualties are going to be American?

Secretary **Cheney**. There is no question, Senator—we have said it repeatedly—that the bulk of the military capability in the Gulf is U.S. force. There would not be a coalition out there today if the U.S. had not provided the leadership. But there also are significant other forces there as well.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, are you differing that the overwhelming casualties are going to be American casualties?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, again we hope that we can resolve this matter without conflict. We hope we can resolve it without U.S. casualties or casualties of any other nation. We think the best way to do that is to pursue the course that we have embarked upon, continue to provide evidence of the international effort that has been mounted to persuade Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait, and simultaneously to deploy sufficient force to make certain he understands what the alternative is.

Under those circumstances, it would obviously be beneficial to have an expression of support from the Congress for the President's policy. But that is a decision at this point that I think the Congress has spoken to, and the leadership basically has concluded that they would not like a special session.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I think all of the American families have to be enormously distressed to find out that this authority about whether their children are going to go to war comes from some United Nations resolution rather than the Congress of the United States.

Secretary **Cheney**. It comes from the President's constitutional responsibilities as the commander-in-chief under Title II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Let me just announce where we are on time. The Secretary has to be at the White House at 1 o'clock. So I would say that we have got until 1 o'clock; is that correct?

Secretary **Cheney**. Yes. I would like to leave a few minutes before that.

Chairman **Nunn**. We have 11 more Senators and Senator Byrd and Senator Thurmond, because of the particular rule that we have in this Committee, are the last two. I would ask everyone to understand as I bang the gavel from here on that unless we keep within the time, Senator Byrd and Senator Thurmond will not have their time. [Laughter.]

So I wanted to let you know in advance where the Chairman is coming from on this matter. Senator Wallop.

Senator Wallop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that an opening statement that I had be inserted in the record.

Chairman Nunn. Without objection.

Senator Wallop. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that one of the things that is contained in that statement is that I was amused or bemused to read in yesterday's Washington Post of a startlingly new military concept called the doctrine of invincible force. I do not know where I have been. I just came from Wyoming, like you, Mr. Secretary, but I always thought that all military commanders, from Alexander to Napoleon to General MacArthur, believing in amassing as much force as possible before committing to battle, and that only Congress and the Washington Post could with so much common sense take on the trappings of new military doctrine.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, I was distressed by the Chairman's question about if we had a war, we will never know whether sanctions would have worked, because it seems to me that a military man has more judgments to make than does a politician. All of us have the luxury of promising magic even if we cannot deliver on it.

But my question is, when do the dangers of failure of sanctions exceed the danger of patience? It seems to me at some moment in time the military capability of the opposing side is given preeminence over the safety and security of the new military doctrine of invincible force. Would you care to comment, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Cheney. I am sorry, Senator, I am not clear what the question is.

Senator Wallop. The question is this. When does the danger of failure of the sanctions exceed the danger of patience over them? In other words, if they fail and you are now exposed out there, something has to be done. We either have to come home or we have to commit in less than ideal circumstances—a moment not of our practical military timing but that of Congress and Saddam Hussein.

Secretary Cheney. Well, clearly we get into the area of speculation in terms of how sanctions will work, how long it will take them to work, the status of his forces, the status of our forces. We are prepared, obviously, as a department and the services, to do whatever it is the President asks us to do in terms of having this capability, and I would be reluctant to try to point out a particular time when the effort to get sanctions working begins to undermine your ability to maintain the military option.

I would point out that to a large extent the same kind of effort that is required to maintain the sanctions also supports our military effort, and to the extent that you had an erosion of that coalition that is crucial to the sanctions you would also have probably an erosion of the coalition that is crucial to the use of military capability.

Senator **Wallop**. But it is a judgment one constantly has to weigh. I mean, you would have to make a judgment as to your military capability almost on a daily basis, I would assume.

Secretary **Cheney**. That is correct.

Senator **Wallop**. It seems like there is a kind of singular view that sanctions only are going to hurt Iraq and it seems to me that is a profound navel-gazing exercise—and I do not mean military naval. Around this table, it would seem to say that we have gasoline. There are no lines. It went up 5 cents, but that was just taxes. Who is hurting? So what is the problem? As though there is no judgment that might be made in the democracy of Turkey, the democracy of Britain, the democracy of Egypt.

These things have serious consequences on those governments, do they not?

Secretary **Cheney**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **Wallop**. Well, in light of the missile test, is it not regrettable that we do not have missile defenses?

Secretary **Cheney**. The point that I think needs to be made and that you have made previously, Senator Wallop, is that we are faced here, although it is a Third World situation, with a fairly sophisticated military threat. The proliferation of ballistic missiles around the world is growing. We estimate some 15 nations will have ballistic missiles by the end of the decade.

Clearly, I think a significant requirement for us in the future is to develop, obviously with the support of the Committee, the capacity to deal with that kind of threat, which today is extremely limited. Our ability to deal with it is extremely limited.

Senator **Wallop**. Let me ask you one last question. If Saddam Hussein complies with all the relevant U.N. resolutions and withdraws his forces from Kuwait and releases all his hostages, but at the same time retains power, keeps his military forces essentially intact and continues to develop a ballistic missile arsenal and the weapons, nuclear weapons, will such an outcome be in the interest of the United States, in your opinion, and is that what you mean when you say our next principle is to restore stability and security in the region?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think clearly we would feel that our effort had been successful if we are able to achieve the objectives we have laid out and do it by peaceful means—he withdraws from Kuwait, et cetera. I think there would be a continuing set of requirements, though, that I tried to mention earlier, that under those circumstances we still are going to have to address the issue of security for our friends in the Gulf—and there will be a continuing threat to their security—and we also have to address the question of additional improvement in the sophistication of his military arsenal, which would have to be taken under advisement, worked internationally to develop and maintain sanctions to deny him that capability.

Senator **Wallop**. Well, if those governments in the Gulf exist by sufferance of Iraq—in other words, he gets out with his capabilities intact—would it not be the case that he could pretty well control not only the access to the world's oil supplies but use them principally to advance these more modern capabilities that now cause us such concern?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think that is true, Senator. We were in a situation on August 2, once he took Kuwait, where he had control of the Gulf. Now he does not because of the countervailing force that we put over there and the coalition we have assembled against him.

The other theme that has to be looked at is that we know how he uses oil wealth. He uses it to develop a big military arsenal. That is what he has done throughout the 1980s, when he imported $50 billion worth of armaments. If he had control of those resources, we have to assume that he would use them the same way in the future that he has in the past—that is, to develop perhaps long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles and the weapons to go with them.

Senator **Wallop**. He has also showed himself, has he not, as a master of psychological warfare? I mean, you had the big parade yesterday with children carrying not signs in Arabic but signs in English. You had the resupply of the embassy. You have the playing off the fears that are so obvious around at least one side of this table.

It seems to me that at the moment in time when he returns with his powers intact and that question of stability in the region unanswered, that we can expect more of that very able performance that he has used so far.

Secretary **Cheney**. This clearly is an area where we are going to spend a lot of time and effort and energy in the years ahead, Senator.

Senator **Wallop**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Wallop.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wallop follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP

Secretary Cheney, General Powell, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here this morning. At first, I felt it was a not a good idea for you to come and lend credibility to what I fear has been a futile exercise. Like many things we do in the Congress, these 5 days of hearings have been a means to avoid genuine responsibility for U.S. policy in the Gulf crisis, while at the same time creating the impression that we are doing something meaningful.

I suppose it's also good you're here to balance the testimony of a parade of witnesses who, except for a few, seem to have been selected to support the preconceived positions of the majority.

I was amused—or bemused—to read in yesterday's Washington Post of a startling new military concept, the so-called "Doctrine of Invincible Force." I had always thought that all military commanders, from Alexander to Napoleon to the present, believed in amassing as much force as possible before committing to battle. Only in the Washington Post could such fundamental common sense take on the trappings of a newly discovered military doctrine.

The Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, to whom Robert E. Lee himself deferred as the best combat commander in the Civil War, said it best. According to Forrest, the key to victory was to get there first with the most men.

But you will note that in addition to invincible force, there is an equal element of timing in this doctrine. Forrest understood that having the most men was useless if you failed to act promptly.

General Douglas MacArthur, another military genius, echoed the thought. He said, "The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words—too late."

It seems to me that in all such crises there is a pivotal moment in time in which the outcome hangs briefly in the balance. During this pivotal moment the side acting most promptly may gain a permanent and decisive advantage. The "moment" may last only a few minutes or hours, or it may last for days. But regardless of its duration, success demands leaders with clearsightedness and resolute character who will seize the moment.

I feel our country has such leaders in you gentlemen. I'm confident that our military forces—and this operation—could not be in better hands.

But I also fear that decisions made at a higher level than yours may deprive us of the chance to seize the pivotal moment, and may seriously jeopardize our success. Much of the testimony we have heard this week adds to my concern in this regard.

I believe the Iraqis may understand this better than we do. They have cleverly integrated psychological and political warfare into their military strategy in order to forestall us. Saddam has what he wants, and time is on his side, not ours. Iraq need but hold on a little longer—whether by entangling us in protracted negotiations, by brilliant strokes like the resupplying of our Embassy in Kuwait, or by the periodic release of hostages.

But war—and we are in a war whether we want to admit it our not—is rarely forgiving of mistakes, and especially of forfeited opportunities, of lost time. I hope you will both keep this in mind as you advise the President, and as you continue to direct this operation so critical to our national interests.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Cheney, a lot of the debate and testimony we received last week centered on the potential costs of war, in going to war. And I have interpreted your comments this morning as more focused on the costs of waiting than on the costs of war, although obviously both have been alluded to. I think the decision eventually comes down to how you weigh those costs of war versus the costs of waiting.

One statement you made at the end of your testimony I thought was interesting. In your view it would be better to deal with him now than it will be 5 or 10 years from now. I believe that is what you said.

I guess my question would be whether you would make the same statements with regard to a year from now. Would it be better to deal with him now than it would a year from now, weighing these same costs of waiting versus costs of war, as you assess them?

Secretary CHENEY. I guess a couple of questions come to my mind as a result of your question, Senator. Are you assuming at the end of a year you have achieved your objectives—he gets out of Kuwait, he releases all the hostages, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator BINGAMAN. I am assuming that we do not know—just the very same assumption that I think you had when you said that you would rather deal with him now than deal with him 5 or 10 years from now. You made that statement without knowing for sure what will happen in the next 5 or 10 years, and I am saying, without knowing what will happen in the next year, would it be preferable to deal with him now or wait a year?

Secretary CHENEY. I suppose that turns on the issue, Senator, of the degree of certainty you want to have about the success of our venture. I walk back to the first proposition, and I have been struck by it this morning—Senator Nunn made references to it; others have as well—that there is a very high degree of consensus on our objective. I have not heard any member of the committee yet say we do not want him out of Kuwait, that we do not have to be concerned about this part of the world, et cetera, et cetera.

What I sense the difference is over is this fundamental question of whether or not if we wait to act will we achieve our result without having to use military force. Of course that is a huge question that at some point the President will come to grips with, and perhaps the Congress as well.

But my point of my testimony this morning that you had reference to is that we have now, as a result of four months of effort, created a very strong position for the United States and our allies, with the coalition, with the deployment of forces, with the economic sanctions, with the international approval of the use of all means necessary to achieve our objective.

One of the things I think we have to weigh in making that big decision is whether or not we will have that very strong position a year or two from now, if we wait that length of time to see whether or not he will withdraw as a result of the economic sanctions that have been imposed. And it is a matter of weighing alternatives and options. I cannot tell you how the President will ultimately come down.

Right now we are pursuing every single track. We are making it very clear that we would like to have him withdraw, comply with the U.N. resolutions. The President has not made a decision to use military force at this point. But that option is going to be there very shortly.

Senator BINGAMAN. General Powell, in your statement, I believe you referred to the fact that the decisions that have been made to date give us the option of either further building up or building down, or remaining in our present posture in the future, and really none of the options are foreclosed. Is that a reasonably accurate description?

General POWELL. Exactly, Senator. The President has directed us to give him an offensive option, should it be needed, but we have not been directed to use it and obviously he has all the options he had before he directed us to put that option in place.

Senator BINGAMAN. One of the suggestions that the Committee heard last week from General Odom went as follows, and let me just read you three or four sentences from his testimony and get your reaction to that, either of you.

He said: "We could proceed on the present buildup course, eventually achieving stockage levels and force levels that are adequate. After a time, we could build installations in Saudi Arabia to hold the stocks and weapons in storage, much as we have done with POMCUS stocks in Europe. The troop strengths could be greatly reduced, leaving only a small manning structure in place with intelligence warning or, if we decided to pursue the offensive strategy at a much later date, we could fly troops back to Saudi Arabia in a few days or weeks.

"In other words, we could create a capacity to regenerate our combat power rather quickly. That would allow us to extract ourselves from the problem of morale. We could have an offensive posture that could be maintained for a long time."

I would be interested in your reaction to that suggestion.

General POWELL. I do not share my good friend's view. I think that is sort of a dodge. It says at the end of the day we will not do it. We will walk away.

One of the answers I kept waiting for last week as I tuned in from time to time on the testimony that was being presented is we have waited 12 months or 18 months.

Chairman NUNN. General, would you talk right into that mike?

General POWELL. We have waited 12 months or 18 months. At the end of the day, will the consensus be there to use military force if that is what is required to achieve our objectives? The concern that is going through my mind is a lot of people who are counseling patience think the President is being patient at this time but he is also making it clear that it may be necessary to use military force to achieve our objectives.

And to those who are advocating greater patience, that is a reasonable position, but it is not always clear whether at the end of that extended period of patience they are also advocating the use of military force or be willing to support the use of military force, should it be necessary at that time to achieve our objectives.

Senator BINGAMAN. I guess where I need to ask you to clarify your answer a little bit is, clearly the option to use military force would still be there a year from now or 18 months. You are saying that maybe the political will would not be there a year from now or 18 months? Is that what you are suggesting?

General POWELL. I am suggesting, along the lines that the Secretary did, that we have in place now a solid coalition. It is not clear to me that a year or a year and a half from now, after we have left our stocks in place and disbanded this force and distributed it to the four winds, people will view us with the same seriousness that they view us now, and whether you can, as Bill Odom suggests, pull that force back together in a few days and throw it into combat.

I seriously disagree with that assessment. In the process, you would continue to have a Kuwait that is being occupied, a Kuwait that is being ravaged, and the down sides that the Secretary talked to.

Senator BINGAMAN. Then I gather your position is that the offensive posture that we are now preparing to have in the Gulf with this latest deployment that the President announced is something that cannot be maintained for a long period of time. Is that an accurate statement?

General POWELL. No, I am not saying that. I think we can maintain an offensive posture for some reasonable period of time. I do not have a time frame in mind now. It is a demanding challenge to put that force over there, and we would have to see over time what level of force would be required over time as we see the adjustments made by the Iraqis to ensure that we had a credible offensive option.

But I think it could be maintained for some period of time.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator Gorton.

Senator GORTON. Mr. Secretary, on page four of your written testimony you outline the objectives of U.S. policy as they have been set out by the President, and in words almost identical to those used by Senator Nunn last Tuesday at the outset of these hearings. Those goals, as you describe them, are, first, achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second, restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait; third, protecting American lives; and, fourth, enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf region.

Which of these objectives, in your view, have been gained today, December 3, by the use of sanctions?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, to date I guess I would have to say, Senator, that he clearly is not out of Kuwait yet. He has not released the hostages. The legitimate Government of Kuwait has not been restored. And I do not know that the Gulf is a more secure and stable place today than it was. I suppose you might argue it is as a result of our force deployments, but certainly not as a result of sanctions.

Senator GORTON. So at best one of the four goals, in part?

Secretary CHENEY. And I am not sure sanctions contributed to that. But clearly we have not seen the result of sanctions yet in terms of affecting his behavior.

Senator GORTON. Which of these goals, Mr. Secretary, do you believe are likely to be attained by sanctions, unaccompanied by a credible threat of the use of force?

Secretary CHENEY. My view, Senator, is that having the military option, the credible threat of the possible use of force, is an integral part of the total policy, which also includes sanctions. I think if it were just sanctions alone, we would reduce the likelihood that he ultimately would comply peacefully and get out of Kuwait.

I think having both provides for the strongest policy.

Senator GORTON. That threat of force, in order to be credible, is it not necessary that the opponent, in this case Saddam Hussein, believe that it will in fact be used if the objectives are not otherwise attained?

Secretary CHENEY. I think that is correct.

Senator GORTON. In your view and in view of what you know and have learned during the course of the last four months about Iraq and Saddam Hussein and their attitudes, do you view it most likely that this credible threat of force, together with sanctions, the threat of force unused, is likely to succeed only when it is perceived by Saddam Hussein that no other alternative except conflict remains, and then very likely only at the last minute?

Secretary CHENEY. That would be my expectation. Again, we are speculating here about how he might or might not respond to events, but I think as long as he believes he has time that he will continue to try to work to find ways to break up the coalition and to refuse to come into compliance.

The positive side of the U.N. resolution that we adopted last Thursday of course was that we were able to get a 12-to- 2 vote from the Security Council authorizing the use of all means necessary. On the other hand, it does not kick in until January 15, so that means he has some six weeks now where he basically has a grace period.

I would not expect him, were he to respond to that threat, to do so until very close to January 15.

Senator GORTON. General Powell, on Saturday I had the pleasure and the honor of standing in the snow at Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane to speak to and say goodbye to about 50 members of an Air National Guard unit there, an air refueling unit, who were going on, in some cases, a second two or two-and-a-half week rotation to the Gulf.

I think it is safe for me to say that the message which came through most clearly from the officers and men and women to whom I spoke was that they were very pleased to be a part of this. They were honored to be a part of the Guard and of our military forces. It was very disruptive to their lives—most of them expect three or four of these rotations between now and April—and that they wanted a beginning, a middle, and an end to this adventure.

How long do you believe that the high morale to which you testified will remain in the absence of certainty on the part of the members of our armed services as to whether or not there will be some kind of deadline with respect to action or their relief and rotation?

General **Powell**. There is anxiety out there, Senator. At some point the troops will want to know when they will be rotated or when some action will take place. But, as I talk to troops and as I talked to a large group in Riyadh a few weeks ago, I said that we understand those feelings, but in order to give time for diplomacy to work and see if this can be resolved peacefully we will just have to keep being anxious.

We cannot answer those questions for you now. We have to give our political leaders time. But there is a limit to that, and the question you will get frequently is we are proud of being here. We are proud of what we are doing. We know the American people support us. But we would sure like to kind of know when we are either going home or going to do something. And the answer I give them is, I know that. I have been in the same boat a number of times before. Stick with us. Bear with us.

And they do. And they do it magnificently. The morale remains high. You can always get a GI to speak his mind, and we see that reported very, very often. It is a source of great pride for me every morning to watch my television set and see those "Hi Mom" shots going back. We can be very proud of this force.

But clearly there is a limit to what one can do. There is a limit to how much you can tell them just stay with it before you do something with respect to rotation or action. But I think we are some time away from that. As the Secretary pointed out, on December 7 we will go over the 4-month mark for the first troops who arrived. That is not an inordinate period of time to have been serving in an undesirable, in military terms, location.

We still have time before we have to deal with that, and I think we can keep the morale up. We can keep the spirit up and keep those young men and women dedicated to the task before them.

Senator **Gorton**. Mr. Secretary, in addition to such concern as we may have about how our own members react in that kind of environment, do you have any concern about the impact on the society of Saudi Arabia of a long-range presence of a very, very large number of American Armed Forces?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, to date I think the relationship between the Saudis and our forces has gone far smoother than many would have expected, given the cultural differences that clearly exist between our two societies. The Saudis really have been magnificent in terms of working with us and the forces. Our young men and women have adjusted very well to a difficult set of circumstances.

But clearly over a long period of time, for a nation that has never before had large foreign forces on their soil, for a nation that cares very deeply about sovereignty, as King Fahd clearly does and has expressed to us on a number of occasions, the prospect of a very large foreign force, not just United States but from all of these other nations as well, has to be a somewhat disturbing concept.

How long it takes before that begins to have an impact, before it gets to be a significant problem, there is no way to predict. But clearly the Saudis are carrying a very large burden by virtue of the significant forces that have now been deployed to the Kingdom.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gorton. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Secretary Cheney and General Powell, I am sure that all of us deeply appreciate your contribution to the deliberations of this committee. I wanted to make a brief statement and then I would invite, in particular, your comment, Secretary Cheney.

When this all unfolded all of us in Congress were home on the August break, and when the President indicated what he was going to do I was very supportive of it. I had a great many town hall meetings, both in the city and in the suburbs—in the city very Democratic areas, in the suburbs, in McHenry and DuPage and Lake and Kane and Will Counties, very Republican areas.

And as I went in and did these town hall meetings everybody supported the concept of being there in force, drawing the line in the sand, imposing an embargo and economic sanctions that would work. And the President had the support of the people of this country.

Now, one of my colleagues has talked about the question of a declaration of war and whether you would come to the Congress or not. While I would concede there could be some constitutional arguments, I would suggest that the overwhelming evidence we have heard, and I fully believe, is that a war undertaken without the support of the people will not in the end be a successful encounter at all.

So I simply want to say that while I am only in my tenth year in the United States Senate—I was not here during the Vietnam War—I remember that. I was an Illinois State Senator. I supported what we were doing there. I remember how unpopular it was.

And I remember, Mr. Secretary and General Powell, one day I went home to get a file because I was trying a law suit. My dearest friend and business partner, my next-door neighbor, had a son that was a lance corporal in the Marines in Vietnam. While I was home looking for the file, the doorbell rang and I went downstairs to the door, and a Marine major and a Marine sergeant were standing there and they asked for my dearest friend.

I said why. They said, we have just been to his house and there is no one there. I said, well, he is down at his warehouse. Later he told me that when they walked into his office he said, "My God, they've killed my son."

My friend, my young Congressman from my district, my protege, has a son there in the 82nd Airborne in Saudi Arabia now, and I say that before we undertake anything there we better have the support of the American people for this. I think since November the augmentation of forces, the offensive posture we have undertaken, is not as well received in the country, may I say that to you candidly, gentlemen.

I believe there is overwhelming evidence in what we have heard this week that either you have to have a draft or you have to come up with a sensible rotation policy which we even had in Vietnam, and that bothers me a great deal.

So I conclude by asking this question. I join my colleague Senator Bingaman in expressing my concern for a statement you said about 5 or 10 years, which I wrote down, waiting 5 or 10 years. Mr. Secretary, General, I do not suggest that; the Congress does not.

But the overwhelming evidence here is that some time can work in our favor. The embargo and the sanctions can. And I ask you gentlemen is it not wise for the administration to at least wait until next summer, to at least see—you know, I have advocated negotiations since the beginning. All last week in the question periods with Dr. Kissinger and everyone I advocated negotiations.

I appreciate very much the fact that your Administration and the President has come to this now, and that we are going to talk to those folks over there. Shouldn't we press through negotiations for all these goals we all support, that you are trying to achieve, and let this embargo take place and try to accomplish in every way we can through the passage of some reasonable time a decent result before you undertake the horrible alternative?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I think we are extremely aware—I know the President is and General Powell and I are—of our obligations and responsibilities in this matter, especially to the lives of young people who have been deployed to Saudi Arabia and the desert in connection with the operation.

It is something that we think about every day, and I do not know of anybody in the administration or in the senior command levels of the U.S. military, who takes those responsibilities lightly. If they did, they would not be there.

I think the point needs to be made that the President is trying absolutely every single thing he can think of to achieve our objectives by peaceful means. That includes assembling an unprecedented coalition of world forces—26, 27 nations. It includes the support of a majority of the members of the Arab League. It includes the effort to impose economic sanctions in a way that will convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw. And, as of last Friday, of course, it includes the effort to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad to make clear to Saddam Hussein that that is the preferable option for him.

But to make all of this credible, to give our coalition partners out there confidence that the United States is there to stay as long as we are needed, to give them the courage to stand up to the aggression of Saddam Hussein, to persuade the Saudis and the Gulf states and the Egyptians and others that they can indeed deal head-on with this man who has obliterated one of their neighboring nations, you have to have U.S. military force on the ground.

We also think you have to have significant U.S. military capability there as well to persuade Saddam Hussein that the low-cost option for him is to come into compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolution. Finally, you have to have the deployment that we put in and announced as well on November 8, the maximum possible force that we can get there in the event no other possibility develops and ultimately we have to use that force.

That is why we have embarked upon this course of action.

Senator DIXON. Could I interrupt to ask you one question?

Secretary CHENEY. The President has not made a decision to use that offensive military capability. We are trying all other avenues. But the President is deadly serious, as he stated repeatedly, that the only acceptable outcome is that indeed we have to prevail. Saddam Hussein has to get out of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein has to release our hostages. Saddam Hussein has to come into compliance with what clearly is the view of this Committee and, I think, the entire world.

Senator DIXON. Can we stay there until next summer without passing a law reinvoking the draft and at the same time adopt some kind of a reasonable rotation policy?

Secretary CHENEY. We will do everything we can, obviously, to carry out whatever assignment the President gives us. There get to be tradeoffs. Obviously at some point, if you are going to stay for an extended period of time, you want to come back and address anew the question of rotation policy. You might want to expand your reserve callup authority and go beyond the levels that we are currently contemplating.

You would have to look at deploying other forces to replace the ones you have there now. There are all kinds of questions that would crop up. At this point, we do not have to address those issues because, as the General has pointed out, we are not to the position yet where we are at the level we would like to be or where people have been there long enough to want to rotate them home.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I asked that my prepared statement be made a part of the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Senator Alan Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I have always stated, I support the President's initial deployment of United States forces in Saudi Arabia and his policy of pursuing a resolution of the crisis through an embargo.

However, I am deeply concerned, as are the American people, about the direction the crisis in the Gulf appears to be taking.

The President's recent bellicose and belligerent statements were quite alarming, especially when coupled with his refusal to open a dialogue with Saddam Hussein about a peaceful solution to the current Gulf crisis. I proposed and advocated all last week with the full range of witnesses before this committee that a dialogue be opened. I am now pleased to see a change in policy with the administration's proposal to open a dialogue with Saddam Hussein.

Another concern I have is with the President's accelerated major ground force build up in the Middle East—with no indication of troop rotation. It is important to have adequate forces in the region, but I think by maintaining a dangerous threshold of forces for an extended period of time necessitates an action—based on the stratagem of use or lose—a result which no one desires. Hopefully this morning we will hear from these distinguished witnesses about whether we may anticipate any other welcome policy changes in this area.

More over, I applaud the recent United Nations resolution which authorizes on January 15, 1991, member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Iraq's unconditional withdrawl from

Kuwait, to begin negotiations and to restore international peace and security in the area.

However, I would remind today's distinguished witnesses that the resolution is not a mandate or requirement for the use of force on January 15, 1991.

Additionally, I want to make it very clear that it is incumbent upon the President to obtain congressional authorization before he initiates offensive action, or takes steps that, in fact, introduce us into a state of war. The President must stay in a defensive mode, with an embargo in place, until such time as he comes to the Congress and obtains approval for further action.

Furthermore, I hope that the President will exercise every option to seek a peaceful resolution through diplomatic initiatives either through the United Nations or the Arab League, or any other productive means.

Also, I continue to believe that any offensive actions are premature at this time. However, I do think that Saddam Hussein should be aware that when we are discussing the President's actions, debate does not necessarily mean that we disagree with the President.

Our goals as I see them are at least five in number: (1) Saddam Hussein must remove his troops from Kuwait; (2) the legitimate Government of Kuwait must be restored; (3) Iraq must pay reparations; (4) Iraq must destroy all its chemical capabilities; and (5) Iraq must not be allowed to have any nuclear capability.

These goals can be achieved through a continued embargo and verified under the auspices of the United Nations.

Finally, Congress and the President must work together to achieve these objectives through peaceful means if possible, while dealing from a position of strength. Iraq, likewise, must realize the seriousness of our intent and our determination to do what is right for the world at large in the face of naked, unwarranted aggression.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, may I submit written questions, please?

Chairman NUNN. Yes. I am going to ask staff on both sides to coordinate all written questions so that we make sure we eliminate any duplications and minimize the number while covering the territory. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Powell and Secretary Cheney, thanks for your appearance and testimony this morning.

I know some of these questions have been touched on and you have responded, and I may want to ask one or two again maybe in a little bit different fashion, but I think it goes to the essential questions that are before the Committee and central points that ought to be made.

I am not a poker player and, if I did play, I probably would not be very good at it. But what little I can assess of Saddam Hussein I would think he is probably a real good poker player. I would not want to sit down at the table with him.

If I did, I would want to be as careful as I could in terms of tipping my hand. My assessment at this particular point would be that Saddam Hussein is sitting there with a number of cards in his hand and he knows we have a number of cards in our hand. And he is probably trying to determine whether or not we have got a trump card.

I think the trump card is the phenomenal, historic response that has been generated through the efforts of the administration, Secretary Baker and yourselves and others in terms of, first of all, deploying what everyone now considers an extremely viable military force into the Middle East, into a very hostile environment and under very difficult circumstances. I commend you both for it.

Second, an extraordinary diplomatic effort has exceeded anybody's wildest expectations.

I think Hussein at this point has to be saying, will that trump card be played. My concern is that as we attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution to this process that the questioning that is arising on our side of the poker table as to whether or not we will use that trump card in one sense could defeat the very purpose of the force option. And that is to convince Hussein that there simply is no other way out of this situation and that he faces certain defeat if he does not face up to the realities of the situation as they now exist.

So I guess my question is, in your opinion does the fact that the certainty, at least in his mind, of U.S. military response if he does not comply with the stated objectives of not only the United States but of literally the world's nations, with the exception of Cuba and Yemen, is that not the best hope for peace without military conflict? Does that not offer us our best prospect to succeed without military engagement, and does not our maneuvering to the point where perhaps we are denying the President and Secretary Baker that option in one sense make the likelihood of success of sanctions far less likely?

Secretary CHENEY. I want to be very careful in terms of how I respond to your question, Senator. Obviously to the extent that there is unity and agreement and a consensus in the United States, especially among the executive and legislative branches over our goals and objectives, I think that is an enormous asset in trying to resolve this matter peacefully.

As I mentioned earlier, I am struck, as I think Senator Nunn has been as well, that there is a very high degree of consensus on our objectives. I think that if there were to be deep divisions within the country, that would be reassuring, if you will, to Saddam Hussein in terms of how he looked at whether or not we had a credible force deployed. But I also think that we have to keep in mind that one of our great strengths as a nation is that we are a democracy, we have representative government, that debate and dialogue is a normal part of the discourse.

I frankly found the leadership meeting we had at the White House on Friday with the President one of the more significant and substantive and satisfying meetings I had sat through in 20-some years of going to meetings in the Cabinet room. It is an extremely important subject with great consequences for the United States and the world, and there is bound to be a certain amount of debate and discussion about how we should best pursue our objective.

So I think what we are looking for is responsible dialogue and debate and I think to date most people involved have in fact conducted themselves in such a fashion.

General POWELL. Having played a little bit of poker over the years, Senator, I share your view that the effect of the sanctions, the effect of the diplomatic efforts are enhanced by us showing Saddam Hussein for real that at the end of the day, whether the day is two months, six months, whatever length of time the President ultimately judges is correct, there are consequences for him, that there is a military capability present in the region that is decisive and that will be able to achieve our objectives without question.

I think we ought to do everything we can to keep that thought firmly in his mind.

Senator COATS. General Powell, I know it is extremely tempting just from a morale standpoint to want to respond that no matter what hardships we subject our troops to, no matter what length of time they are asked to prepare for the possibility of engagement, that they will always be prepared and they will always respond as effectively as any other time.

But to the extent that you can in this open hearing, what is your real feeling about our capabilities? Let us say we wait and adopt the suggestion that many have made that we wait 12 to 18 months to see if sanctions can work. What does that do for our military capability, and does that increase or decrease the risk of U.S. casualties should those sanctions fail and we have to engage in military conflict?

General POWELL. A lot depends on what the Iraqis are doing during that period of time. Obviously they would improve their defensive positions. Obviously they would do everything they could to make themselves less vulnerable to ultimate U.S. military action.

At the same time, however, sanctions in effect for that period of time would have something of a debilitating effect on their capability, so you have got to sort of make a balanced judgment as to who wins that debate.

Senator COATS. But what about on our side?

General POWELL. On our side, it would be difficult to sustain a force that size for an extended period of time without having a rotation policy, without—I think more than a rotation policy but beginning to think about second and third tours—and it would become extremely difficult to keep the necessary offensive option in place for a very long period of time without taking some rather extraordinary actions with respect to reserve components, production base activities, and other things necessary to keep the force in place and combat-ready.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Coats. I hate to call time, but we have run over just a little bit. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I wish you had read into the record here or called more attention to the first few pages of your written statement this morning because I think we have gone too long without really emphasizing some of that. You stress the importance of oil, why we are there, the importance to the world. I think this crucial point was left behind in some of the earlier talk by the Administration. I thought that was an excellent statement, the first few pages there.

I find that more convincing than the President's statement that he has had it or that it is Iraqi aggression, although we know it was that aggression, but everywhere there is aggression across a border and we do not throw in 400,000 troops. It is because of oil, hostages, the embassy, nuclear. All of these have been things that at least the press picked up on and glommed onto as big issues, as justification for why we are there.

And there really are good reasons as to why we have gone over there—oil, the 71 percent that your blue chart pointed out; our relationship for the future with the Arab and Muslim world into the indefinite future; the U.N. collective security actions that this may preface into the future; and the interests of Israel. I think all of these are good and fine reasons as to why we have taken on this chore. I find it disappointing sometimes that we do not stress more of that, and the Administration has not stressed more of that.

On the other hand, I come to some of the rest of your comments this morning, and it is almost a rebuttal of your statements—your statements, it seems to me, are almost a rebuttal of current policy. We have an embargo that was our policy, and I think an embargo is good. And if there is ever a time when I saw a situation where an embargo can really work, it is on Iraq. They are as isolated as anybody can be.

Yet you indicate that the embargo will not be effective, that the sanctions may even hurt some of the allies in our coalition maybe even more than Iraq, and we may have the coalition break up.

Now it seems to me that this is almost a Chicken Little approach to our current policy. The sky is falling in and there is only one option, and that is war. Yet we come back to whether we are going to be able to sustain our forces there. We do not have a rotation policy. We do not have a full reserve call-up; that is very limited. We do not have a draft. And it is very questionable as to how long we can maintain the forces there.

So I would ask first how long can we maintain a plus-400,000 force there without reaching a point where we either have to rotate, call up reserves, draft or use it. Right now, it appears to me that we are on a use-it-or-lose-it type bent with the current policy. General, would you address that, or either one of you?

General POWELL. I do not believe that we are in a use-it-or-lose-it bent, Senator.

Senator GLENN. How long can we maintain the force there? That is the question.

General POWELL. We have just started to approach the limit of our 200,000 call-up authority. The President still has partial mobilization authorities. We have units in the United States and in Europe and elsewhere that have not yet been committed to Desert Shield. So we have the possibility of keeping the force at that level for some period of time.

I do not want to be precise with respect to how many months or how many weeks. There will come a point where it will be very difficult to keep that force in place for an extended period of time. But for the foreseeable future it is a force that can be maintained.

Senator GLENN. The policy is announced. We are augmenting and going over 400,000. Can we maintain 400,000 without full Reserve call-up and/or a draft?

General POWELL. For the time being, without a draft or full Reserve call-up, there may be a requirement for some partial mobilization.

Senator GLENN. I am talking about time to let an embargo work.

General POWELL. Well, then you have to tell me what time you have in mind, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Let us say a year.

General POWELL. Yes, I think it is possible. I have not worked out all of the details, but it is possible.

Senator GLENN. Can we do a year and a half?

General POWELL. Well, Senator, I cannot be pinned down now because I have not done the analysis that you are asking me about.

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, if I might, let me take issue with your characterization of my testimony. Senator Nunn set certain questions that he thought should to be discussed here, and we have tried to address some of those concerns in our opening remarks. And I tried to point out that there is no guarantee that sanctions will work; unless you make the assumption they will get him out of Kuwait, that is a bit of a false choice.

Second, we are totally supportive of the policy. We designed the policy. We put the policy in place. We are pursuing the policy very aggressively on all facets, and the President has not made a decision to go to war.

But I remember very well something you told me, Senator, when I got this job. You took me aside shortly after confirmation and you said to me, Dick, you have only one requirement, one obligation as Secretary of Defense. All of the other talk about industrial base and all of these other considerations are irrelevant. Your concern is to make certain that we are prepared to fight and to win, if need be.

And the size force we have deployed there is based specifically on the notion that if there is to be hostility, if there is to be a conflict, that there should be absolutely no doubt about what the outcome will be or that the United States will prevail in as short a time possible.

Senator GLENN. Let me say this. I support that enhancement of forces because if combat starts, I want the maximum capability there. So I support that.

But my only quarrel with the Administration so far has been on letting this embargo work, and I think too often we say well, the embargo is going to force him out. People think it will do that. It will not do that, and I never have thought it would do that. But what you try and do if you have a potential enemy like this is you try and weaken his position as much as possible before you resort to military force, and certainly an embargo will do that.

An embargo affects his own logistics capability, his sustainability. It is not just food, which you properly point out he can probably make it through on okay. But it is the chemicals for textiles, refining, food processing, manufacturing, and parts. All of our experts tell us that it is mainly parts and resupply of parts that is going to be of significant impact from the embargo, and that takes a year or so to work before we resort to military action.

It seems to me our question is not the coalition. Our question is we have one big client over there who asked us in, and as long as they remain firm with our position we do not need to worry too much about the rest of the coalition because we are 90 percent of that coalition anyway, maybe even more than that, as far as actual combat capability goes.

So let me say that the embargo—food, parts, chemical manufacturing. Then if we go into combat, we should not model our strategy after the Greek phalanx attack of a defended position; first, you go air. And once again people tend to go all or nothing. We say we will do it all by air or not. Air is still a supporting arm. But if you knock out all the surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft, then you can really obliterate him step by step by step, without having to go to ground warfare until you are ready to move in on the ground.

But after an embargo to weaken him and air to weaken him, it appears that situation is the most advantageous toward keeping casualties down to a minimum. I do not see why we want to rush that schedule and not let these steps take their normal course of events to make certain that we keep casualties as long as possible.

I am under no illusions that Saddam Hussein is going to move out of his position tomorrow. I do not have much doubt that sometime we may have to wind up in combat over there. But let us do it from embargoing him to as weak a position as possible, then air warfaring him to a position where he has the least opposition to resist when or forces have to move in and take over.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. There was no question mark at the end of that, and we will turn to Senator Lott.

Senator GLENN. Question mark. [Laughter.]

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Cheney, General Powell, let me assure you it is a pleasure to hear you as opposed to my other committee hearing this morning.

Some people have been critical of the administration's articulation of our American objectives in the Gulf. Perhaps that has been because we have pointed at different objectives. Maybe it is because we have not specified them succinctly often enough. So I want to give you one more opportunity this morning, as I know you have the capability to do, Mr. Secretary, to succinctly set out for the record what our objectives are in the region.

Secretary CHENEY. Our objectives are to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait, to obtain the release of all foreign hostages, including hundreds of Americans held, and to do what we can to enhance the security and stability of the region.

Senator LOTT. Now, when you refer to the security and stability of the region, you refer then to other things, including oil that you have referred to in your opening statement this morning, and also the potential for Iraq developing nuclear capability. That is included in that broad third category or fourth category you specified.

Secretary CHENEY. Certainly in general terms, Senator, the things you mentioned in part are obviously in our strategic interest because of our historical relationships, because of energy, et cetera, that all enter into why this is important and why we ought to be involved in pursuing these objectives in the Gulf.

Senator LOTT. Just briefly, some short questions on this potential for nuclear capability. Of course there are some things we cannot say and you cannot respond to, but there is no doubt that Iraq has tried to acquire nuclear capability, correct?

Secretary CHENEY. Correct, and that is obvious from both public and classified sources. We know he is working hard to develop nuclear capability.

Senator LOTT. And that was my next question—is working now to develop that capability.

Secretary CHENEY. Correct.

Senator **Lott**. Do you have any doubt that in view of his past record under certain circumstances that he would be inclined to perhaps make use of those devices?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, that is a big speculative question. I think everybody thinks of nuclear weapons and shudders at the prospect that they would ever be used again. But, as the President said the other day, this is a man who has used every weapon system he has ever developed. Clearly they would have an impact if he simply possessed them in terms of his ability to dominate the region, dominate the Gulf, and dictate policy to our friends in the area.

Senator **Lott**. I think you have made it clear that one of your concerns here of waiting is the additional cost perhaps in lives and bloodshed a year from now, as opposed to sooner. Why? What is it that he is going to be doing in the next three months or four months or six months or nine months that would make our situation or make him more dangerous nine months from now than he is right now?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, that is a difficult question to answer, Senator. We know that if we do not do anything, he continues to hold hundreds of Americans hostage for that period of time. We know he continues to dismantle Kuwait to try to obliterate it. So those are considerations.

We know that there will continue to be pressures on the coalition, on our ability to keep other nations committed to this course of action, both in terms of maintaining the economic embargo and in terms of military force.

In terms of how time affects his military capability, which is, I sense, what you are asking, over that period of time he can improve his fortifications. On the other hand, as Senator Glenn pointed out——

Senator **Lott**. And he is in the process of doing that right now.

Secretary **Cheney**. And he is doing that right now. At the same time, his inability to get spare parts for major pieces of his equipment would tend to degrade his capability. So it is a mixed bag in that regard.

Senator **Lott**. General Powell, last week one of our witnesses, retired General Odom, said that our commanders and their staffs are not experienced in the maneuver of large units, brigade, division, corps-size, in a battle campaign. He implied concern about how fast we could get up on the learning curve after the commencement of hostilities.

Do you share that concern? Do we have that capability now?

General **Powell**. I think we have that capability. Our corps commanders have a great deal of experience and training in operating in Europe and operating in CPXs. We have done a lot, particularly in the Army as well as in the Marine Corps, to enhance our battle staff training in recent years. And we are not misusing the time we have in the field right now; we are conducting exercises, we are conducting map exercises, real exercises in order to give our commanders that on-the-ground training. So I do not share General Odom's rather negative assessment.

Senator **Lott**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Lott. I think we have a new precedent here; you have turned back in some of your time and we are grateful to you for it.

Senator **Lott**. I hope not too much.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to at the outset express my enormous respect for the two of you. You have heard me say that before, but I want you to know it is not boilerplate and I appreciate your testimony this morning as well.

I do not intend to focus in my brief time to ask questions on the subject of whether or not a declaration of war is required, but I would like to make a very brief statement about that. I say this in the hopes that both of you will genuinely listen and take it in the spirit in which it is offered.

This is not Vietnam. It is not Panama either. It is a unique experience in the Nation's history. But some of the lessons of past experiences do apply. One of the lessons from Vietnam is that an undeclared war waged with progressively more opposition from the American people reduces the chance of success in the undertaking and divides the country.

When we made the decision to shift from containment to going on the offense in Vietnam, according to the Pentagon Papers, that decision was made in close proximity to the election of 1964, and the decision to map out the plans was actually held until election day for fear that it would leak, and then after the election the change in policy was announced.

The newspapers have reported that, as you said a moment ago, Secretary Cheney, this decision to go on the offense was made a few days before the election this fall, and yet, according to at least one press account, there was a directive to keep that decision secret until after the election had passed. Now there are legitimate reasons to keep something of this kind out of the last-minute campaign dialogue in this country.

On the other hand, the President certainly made the confrontation with Saddam Hussein the centerpiece of every one of his campaign speeches during the weeks immediately leading up to the election.

Secretary **Cheney**. If I might on that point, Senator, just for clarification of the record, the concern was not an effort to hide the decision but, rather, that if we announced something relating to Desert Shield before the election we would be accused of trying to manipulate the foreign policy considerations that influenced the elections.

Senator **Gore**. I understand that, and I accept that response for what it says. But it also says something about the way in which the American people and their elected representatives are brought into the decisionmaking process. The central point I want to make before I go to my question is that I genuinely believe there is absolutely no doubt about the application of Article I of the Constitution where this particular national experience is concerned.

We have assembled a much larger force than was assembled for the assault on the continent of Europe at Normandy on D-Day, and we are methodically mapping out plans to go to war. When the nation goes to war in a formal way, the Constitution says the Congress has the power to declare war.

President Roosevelt did not feel it was optional to ask the Congress for a declaration of war in World War II. Under the doctrine that you have outlined here, Secretary Cheney, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt could have waged World War I and World War II without the Congress declaring war. I do not believe that is true. I do not believe that the Constitution is written that way.

I understand that things have changed and that in the age of nuclear weapons it is frequently no longer an all or nothing proposition and there are variations of how far we go. A declaration of war used to be a battle to the death on both sides, everything you have got is going to be used, and here we go. And wars are not like that any more. We hope they never will again be like that.

But this one is different from either Vietnam or Panama or any other war, and I really believe that the country is better off if the President formally asks for a declaration, should he in his own mind decide that we are going to war. I truly believe that.

Now let me move on to say that in spite of that controversy I agree with your statement earlier, Secretary Cheney, that the country is unified on our goals, and the difference is whether or not we should allow the sanctions to have their maximum impact for a reasonable period of time to test that option or initial strategy before launching an offensive action, or whether out of impatience or out of legitimate reasons that lead you to believe the coalition cannot hold for that period of time, to move early to an offensive action.

Now, you said—I do not remember your exact words, but you compared the effect of the economic deprivation in Iraq during their war with Iran to what they are likely to experience now, and yet to make your point that it was worse then you rolled in the casualties added on top of them. This is a tricky subject because here is my reading of it.

They suffered, a conservative estimate would be, 100,000 casualties in the war with Iran, probably more, many times that in the number of those seriously wounded. But the economic deprivation was not anything like what they will experience, according to all of the informed analysis, from the sanctions now applied by the world community economically.

If the experts are right that the support for Saddam Hussein inside Iraq does depend on the perception among his people that he has delivered the goods economically, and if we are cutting off 98 percent of their national income, and if the economic effects are going to completely dwarf what they experienced during the war with Iran, it seems to me that has to be weighed very heavily before you choose instead to apply the pain that they have already endured—that is, many, many thousands of casualties and wounded and suffering and bombing, et cetera.

Now, let me in the remaining time ask this question. You have said one of our goals is we want to restore stability to the Gulf. You have rephrased it slightly here and say we want to enhance it. Some of our witnesses raised the following concern: stability in the Gulf has in the past depended in significant measure on a balance of power between Iraq, Iran and Syria.

Do you agree with those who say that if we decide to launch an offensive action that we should attempt to inflict a great deal of pain on Saddam Hussein and his structure of power there, but we should not go so far as to eliminate their military capability? If so, how do we go just partway?

Secretary **Cheney**. Senator, I would love to respond to all of your comments.

Senator **Gore**. I wish we had time to do it.

Secretary **Cheney**. This question of sort of trying to restore a balance of power, if you will, is, I suppose, at the heart of the debate. If there had been a balance of power out there on August 2, he would not have been able to do what he did. It was his overwhelming military capability, his million-man army, and the fact that there was no countervailing force that let him take Kuwait as he did.

And certainly our interests are in security and stability in that part of the world, in addition to the other objectives we talked about. But when you start to talk about military capability and the application of military force to Iraq, I defer to my compatriot, the Chairman. I think it is a difficult thing to calibrate. Once you get into the business of combat and hostilities, then a lot will depend upon what he does, upon how quickly he complies with our wishes, upon how quickly we are able to achieve our objective.

I think under those circumstances you have to be concerned, first and foremost, with protecting our troops, minimizing our casualties and achieving our objectives of getting him out of Kuwait, et cetera.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Gore. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am going to take 2 or 3 minutes to read an opening statement and then I have a few questions.

I want to welcome Secretary Cheney and General Powell today. I am pleased that we were able to save the best for the last.

Mr. Chairman, last week's hearings highlighted some of the issues faced by this nation in the Persian Gulf. Although there was a great deal of speculation on the course our President is charting, there was little disagreement that the President's action in sending our forces to the Middle East was a bold and decisive act that halted further aggression by Iraq. Unfortunately, that message was ignored in the debate and press accounts.

After reviewing last week's testimony, I was reminded of a quote by H. L. Mencken which applies to this crisis. "There is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, plausible and wrong." Although all of us are hoping for an easy solution to this crisis, the facts point out that there is no neat and easy solution.

President Bush's announcement on Friday puts a new perspective on this crisis. Military action has been placed on the back burner while diplomacy is taking its rightful place in this crisis. Despite the spreading optimism, we should always remember that these negotiations must come from a position of strength.

The American people and the Congress must stand behind the President at this critical juncture and reflect the resolve that we will not tolerate naked aggression. I am confident that despite the perception of disunity that some wish to portray this nation stands united behind the President.

General Odom, in his statement before this committee, reflected that unity when he said, "Both our adversaries and our allies should understand that public debate about our strategy shows no lack of solidarity but rather serves to strengthen it through sounder understanding of our purpose and our means."

Secretary Cheney and General Powell, I want to compliment you and the men and women in the Defense Department for the magnificent manner in which you have handled this crisis. Because of you and our men and women deployed in the Persian Gulf region, we can negotiate from a position of strength. I thank you both for your dedication and contribution to our Nation during this time of crisis.

I have a few questions here. General Powell, the first question is for you. Based on what you know about the deployments in the Middle East, are you prepared to make any recommendation to this Committee on what changes we should make in this year's authorization act? If so, could you give us a hint on what to expect? Do not go into a lot of detail, but just briefly.

General POWELL. We are examining it, Senator. I do not have any recommendations to present to the Committee at this time, however.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Cheney, the Soviet Union has been very helpful in the diplomatic arena during this crisis. Has it provided the same cooperation from a military perspective, particularly in providing information on the Iraqi forces they helped to train and equip?

Secretary CHENEY. We have been pleased, Senator, with the way the Soviets have participated in this international effort. I think the changes that have occurred in the world over the last couple of years are marked and measured in part by the fact that we now have an effective U.N. Security Council and that the United States and Soviets have been able to agree upon this course of action.

I would also argue that the Soviet contribution in terms of shutting down the flow of spare parts for Soviet military equipment held by Iraq has been vital in the effort. So I would have to say on balance that I am pleased with the way the Soviets have conducted themselves in this crisis.

Senator THURMOND. Gentlemen, I call your attention to a clipping from the Washington Times of December 3, 1990, page two. "The Soviet Government newspaper Isvestia said yesterday that Moscow plans to increase military spending next year, despite the end of the cold war and the country's economic crisis." I think we had better be careful not to overlook that.

General Powell, do we have any indication that the embargo and the show of force is having any impact on the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait?

General POWELL. Sure it is having an impact, Senator, but so far that impact has not translated itself into any signs that they are unable to sustain their forces in the field or are thinking about withdrawing anything.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you for activating the first National Guard combat units last week.

What kind of problems has the Department experienced with the call-up of reservists and how are they performing?

Secretary CHENEY. Overall, I think we are extremely well pleased with the way the reserves have performed. We simply could not have done what we have done in terms of this deployment and supporting it without our reserve capability. They have been a vital part of it, and we now, as you mentioned, Senator, are moving to calling up ground combat units out of the National Guard as well.

I am sure we will learn lessons from this exercise in terms of how we might improve our procedures and our forces in the future, but given the challenge that we are faced with, the role of the reserves has been absolutely essential in achieving our mission.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, this is a clipping from the Washington Times of December 3, today. "Officials said Mr. Hussein has ordered increased production of chemical and biological weapons, the construction of command bunkers in Baghdad, and the laying of mines off the coast of Kuwait." Are you familiar with that information?

Secretary CHENEY. I have not read the Washington Times yet today, Senator. I have not seen the story.

Senator THURMOND. Regardless, are you familiar with that information?

Secretary CHENEY. We know, without getting specific for security reasons in terms of classification, that he is working in a number of areas to improve his capability, to position his forces, to dig them in, to build fortifications, and to generally do those things you might expect him to do to try to strengthen his position. We would be happy to arrange to share with you in a classified session some specifics that might relate to that.

Senator THURMOND. That leads me to this question. In this time when the President is trying to devise a strategy to successfully coclude this crisis, it seems that we are publishing in our papers and news media information on possible actions, are we not handicapping the President?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, I do not know how we avoid having a certain amount of that go on. I think the important thing is for our potential adversaries not to misunderstand us or misread us. They need to know that the President, as he stated repeatedly, is deadly serious about achieving our objectives and those of the United Nations, and they need to know that as a general proposition the Nation is solidly behind achieving those objectives.

Senator THURMOND. In an article that came out in the Defense Week publication of December 3, "the combat readiness of 10 top Air Force aircraft, including the B-1 and the F-15, could plummet by 1993 because of spare parts shortages." Is there merit in that statement?

Secretary CHENEY. Again, I have not seen that specific statement, Senator, but we are always looking to the question of spare parts. It is a debate we have every year before this Committee and the other committees of the Congress in terms of how much money ought to be funded for those purposes. I simply am not in a position to be able to comment on it at this time

General POWELL. We do have a problem over time in aviation spares. The Air Force has only been able to get roughly half of the requested amount from the Congress for aviation spares, and, in this fiscal year, of their roughly $272 million request they did not receive funding for those spares. So over time, as you use up your spares, particularly for operations such as Desert Shield, you have to replace the bins, and I am sure that will be one of the items we will be looking at very closely as we ask for funds for fiscal year 1992 and as we reconsider what we received from the Congress in fiscal year 1991.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are a lot of messages floating around. One of the early messages was that the President, our President, said he was drawing the line in the sand or something to that effect. And then last week there is the message that he is going to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad.

Was that offer last week an offer to talk, Mr. Secretary, a real offer to negotiate, or was it just a statement by the President for the media and the Congress to consume for several days, whatever spin you put on it?

Secretary CHENEY. Well, what we have done—and maybe this is a good place to sum up—we have a number of objectives in the Gulf. We have a number of reasons why it is strategically important to us, and we are pursuing a range of policies to try to achieve those objectives—military, economic, diplomatic.

The effort announced by the President on Friday is to make certain that there is a clear channel of communication, that we are not dealing through some third party or through Saddam Hussein's interpretation of what he hears on CNN as to what our policy and our goals and our objectives are.

Secretary Baker will go to Baghdad. President Bush will receive the Iraqi foreign minister in Washington. When Secretary Baker goes to Baghdad and when the meeting occurs in Washington, the discussions will be based upon emphasizing our objective of achieving the U.N. objectives and of implementing the U.N. resolutions. There will not be a negotiation of the possibility of accepting less than the U.N. objectives. That would mean we were going to let him keep part of Kuwait or we were going to let him keep some of the hostages.

Obviously those are unacceptable outcomes, so the bottom line is that the message that will be delivered is that in fact these objectives have to be achieved.

Senator SHELBY. Oftentimes a message is what the receiver hears, like Saddam Hussein in this case. Is he seeing out there a possibility that we are already weakening, that we are going to show him a way out? You say that we are going to deliver the message that we are standing by what we said. We want you out of Kuwait. We want the government restored and so forth.

But if that was achieved, would that not put us in a heck of a position down the road with a powerful Iraq, a growing Iraq, with oil revenue and all the potential that we have discussed here, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary **Cheney**. I think it would be fair to say that if he withdraws from Kuwait we will feel as though we have been very successful in our current efforts.

Senator **Shelby**. Will that be enough?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, it will not obviate the necessity for continued attention by the United States and the world community to developments inside Iraq. We will continue to have to pursue policies to limit his capacity to threaten his neighbors, to threaten the world supply of oil, to destabilize our friends in the region, and to acquire sophisticated weapons capabilities.

But there are a lot of ways to pursue that. Obviously the first step is to resolve the current crisis on terms and conditions approved by the United Nations and articulated by the President.

Senator **Shelby**. Mr. Secretary, I am sure you are familiar with former Secretary Kissinger's testimony before this Committee last week. I will just briefly bring it up again.

He says: "A choice must be made between relying on sanctions or, as a last resort, on military course. The two approaches have been presented as if they were successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive because at the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed a credible military option will probably no longer exist."

Do you disagree with that?

Secretary **Cheney**. No. I guess I would state it slightly differently, and of course that is part of this debate. We are pursuing economic sanctions and preparing for military options simultaneously. We are doing both. We hope the sanctions work. We think preparing for the military option may enhance the attractiveness of his doing what we want him to do.

But the military option to some extent depends upon the same coalition that has been arrayed economically. The same nations that are supporting the sanctions, shutting off the flow of commerce into and out of Iraq, are in some cases the same nations that are supporting us from a military standpoint. So keeping the coalition together is important in an economic sense; it is also important, I think, from a military standpoint.

Senator **Shelby**. Generally when you are dealing with someone, don't you show them a stick, which is the military option, and a carrot? Where is the carrot?

Secretary **Cheney**. The carrot is that he gets to come into compliance with U.N. resolutions. He gets to abide by the accepted norms of international behavior. He gets to release hundreds of Americans that he holds hostage and allow the restoration of the Kuwaiti Government. I think that has to be our objective.

Senator **Shelby**. And he gets to live politically, does he not?

Secretary **Cheney**. Well, that is up to the people of Iraq.

General **Powell**. And we do not use the stick.

Senator **Shelby**. General, did you have a comment?

General **Powell**. We just do not use the stick. Obviously one of the things we want to eventually convince him is that there are better uses for his wealth than to try to amass a military capability to threaten his neighbors.

Senator **Shelby**. It will take a big conversion to explain that to him, would it not?

General **Powell**. Yes, sir, quite.

Senator **Shelby**. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Shelby. Senator Byrd.

Senator **Byrd**. Mr. Secretary and General Powell, anent the discussion with respect to sanctions, it seems to me that it might be well to consider that some of us have been talking as though the sanctions must take a year or a year and a half. I think I made some comment to that effect the other day, based perhaps on some testimony by the witnesses who were before the committee.

On the other hand, in your presentation here you have used the words several times that there is no guarantee they will work. There is, indeed, no guarantee that they will work. You have also left the impression that there are those who may be proposing that the sanctions be allowed to go on indefinitely. I think I have heard the word "indefinitely" a few times here.

It seems to me that, certainly for my part, speaking for myself—and I would assume this is probably true with respect to several of the Members who have urged patience before using force—that we do not mean that we should rely on sanctions indefinitely. That is certainly not my feeling.

It is my feeling, however, that we should be patient in applying military force, that we should give the sanctions an opportunity to weaken Saddam Hussein so that if it becomes necessary to use the option of military force we will perhaps have saved some lives of American boys.

I note that former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, as has already been alluded to, had an article in the New York Times of yesterday. Secretary Weinberger objects to the policy of no rotation for our troops, saying it would help morale if they were rotated. But the bottom line of his statement, as far as I am concerned, is "we must preserve the military option, but let us see if patience and strength will give us victory without committing troops to combat."

I do not believe, nor have I ever believed, that the sanctions, of and in themselves, are going to bring Saddam Hussein to his knees and get him out of Kuwait. I have never believed that. But I am constrained to urge that there be some patience, if I might use that word, and that we might give the sanctions more time to work.

When I read that we have problems with ammunition and spare parts, when I read that our troops have been trained for jungle warfare and mountain warfare, it makes me wonder whether or not indeed we could not use some additional time over there in the training of our men, to acclimate them to the kind of conditions and problems that will confront them in a desert war.

You have already indicated that spare parts may not only be a problem of ours but also a problem to Hussein. You have also alluded a number of times to your concerns that the international coalition will not stay together. I am concerned, however, that we do not have a consensus here in this country that will support a war at this time.

I do not agree with you, Mr. Secretary, when you indicated that the President has enunciated our goals and reasons clearly enough to win the support of the American people. He may think he has done that, but I do not believe that that is the case.

So, if I might just summarize my own feelings—and we cannot do much summarizing and cannot ask many questions and get many answers in the course of 8 minutes but I also understand the overall constraints of time on the committee and on yourselves as witnesses—it would be that we not become overly-confident.

I was here in the Vietnam War, and I was an elected member of the Democratic leadership. I went to the White House on several occasions and I heard the expressions of confidence on the part of our military leaders, our generals, and even on the part of our President. But I saw the results of the Tet Offensive, in which we lost a lot of men. When I raised the suggestion to President Johnson that our intelligence information should have been better, perhaps, he gave me quite a lecture.

I will refer to that in the second volume of my history of the Senate, a copy of which your wife will receive. She received the first volume. I am an admirer of her good work, may I say.

But I also was in the leadership just prior to the Grenada invasion, and I heard General Vessey outline our mission. We were at the White House on that particular evening before the attack, and I said after he had finished, General, how long do you think it will take to complete your mission. He said, oh, a day or two.

I have heard these glowing estimates of what our military can do on so many occasions and found the estimates to be wrong. I do not, of course, cast reflection on anyone, in saying this. But I think that we ought not be overly-confident to the extent that it would cause us to rush in prematurely until we feel that indeed force is the option that we have to use and that we have gone the last mile of the way with sanctions first.

When it comes to that point, Mr. Secretary, I think you will probably come nearer getting the support here in Congress than you might if we feel, on the other hand, that the action is premature. Now, when you said, in answer to someone earlier, if we do go to war, the force ratios, offense to defense, and other military factors are critical to success—I believe that is a fairly correct quote—what do you judge to be the safe offensive- defensive force ratio right at this point that would assure us—and I would think that would be critical—that would assure us that we would be successful?

General POWELL. Senator, to give you a thorough answer I really believe I would need to do it in a closed session.

Senator BYRD. All right. I just have one final question. Mr. Secretary, you indicated in answer to an earlier question that the President now has all the authority he needs to initiate hostilities. That may not be your exact words. Should I take it from that that the President will not seek prior congressional authority, not seek prior to taking military action a declaration of war, in your judgment?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I have learned the President can speak for himself on those kinds of issues. The question I answered specifically was whether or not I felt the President had to come get a declaration of war before using military force. My response was to point out that on over 200 occasions in our history when forces have been committed by Presidents there have only been five occasions when there was a prior declaration of war, and that from a constitutional standpoint the President has significant authority under Article II, section 2 as commander-in-chief. That was my response to Senator Kennedy.

Senator Byrd. Well, would I correctly read the implication in your response that if the Congress were asked for a declaration of war and rejected the request, would the President still feel, in your judgment, and would he still, in your judgment, have the authority, notwithstanding, to proceed with military action?

Secretary Cheney. Well, Senator, this is all highly speculative, since we hope we will not have to use military force. We are preparing the option, should it be necessary, and those are obviously questions that only the President can answer.

Senator Byrd. I have one final question. In the New York Times of yesterday I read from one paragraph: "Although Resolution 678 now leaves the United States and its allies free to use force any time after January 15, American officials say they have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that if Iraq refuses to withdraw they will consult with him before actually giving an order to open fire. Officials say that having cooperated thus far with the Soviets they are not going to take them by surprise if the time comes to use force."

I do not know how accurate that story is, but my final question is this. If there have been assurances given to Mr. Gorbachev that he will be informed prior to military actions being taken—and I would assume that would be immediate—can we rest assured that Congress likewise will be informed, in your judgment, before the President launches military force?

Secretary Cheney. I think the record speaks for itself, Senator, in that the President has consulted extensively throughout this entire operation from the very beginning. I have heard the leadership of your party in leadership meetings at the White House praise the President for his consultation in this matter, say that they feel the consultation has been more extensive, more thorough, more effective than any other time in their memory. And I would expect that indeed that will continue to be the case, as events unfold and we wrestle with what obviously is a very important problem.

Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. My time is up.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.

Mr. Secretary, General Powell, thank you for your appearance here today. We look forward to continuing dialogue with you. We will have questions for the record. We will have any questions that any Members want to submit for the record.

Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that an opening statement by me appear before my questions?

Chairman Nunn. Without objection.

Mr. Secretary, if you can get to the White House in four minutes, we have kept you on schedule. We appreciate your being here. Thank you, General Powell.

Secretary Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. The committee has received a number of requests from other Members of Congress, from private citizens and groups to testify in these hearings. Due to the number of these requests, the Committee did not have time to hear from everyone who would like to testify in person. We would like, however, those people to know that their written statements will be included in the record at the appropriate place. Any statements received after the printing deadline will be retained in the committee files on these hearings.

[Following are the prepared statements of those persons who did not testify:]

CONGRESS
of the
United States of America
Ways and Means Committee

Andy Jacobs, Jr.

November 29, 1990

Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
SR-228
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would be pleased if you could include the enclosed in your hearing record on the Mid East troubles.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Sincerely,

Andy Jacobs

ANDY JACOBS, JR.

WHO DECIDES?

By U. S. Rep. Andy Jacobs, Jr.

An amazingly large number of our fellow citizens have been convinced that the Constitution places in the hands of the President the decision to go to war. It does not. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 provides that Congress shall have the "power to declare war." Unlike bills which require presidential concurrence to become law, not even so much as a presidential signature is involved in the declaration process. Why? Let Abe Lincoln tell you:

> The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.

In order to avoid ill-considered decisions to pull the lanyard of war, our Founders wisely placed the war-making authority in the most representative and deliberative of our three branches of government. It is after all the legislative branch which is most likely to be personally acquainted with the mothers and fathers of those Americans who have always done the horrible bleeding and dying, our young.

So why the misunderstanding about who decides? Because during the fifty years since our country was last attacked by a foreign power, most of our Presidents have got away with the assertion that since Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that "the President shall be the Commander in Chief...," it is the President and not the Congress who is duly authorized to make the apocalyptic decision. As long as citizens are willing to believe this myth, we will continue to suffer from it.

To argue that the naked term "Commander in Chief" supplants the specific and unambiguous language giving the war-making power to Congress is as far-fetched as to argue that the term "Chief of Police" confers the authority to make criminal law. In the case of each of these officials the duty is to carry out policy others are constitutionally authorized and required to establish. And no Chief of Police ever complained that the legislature was trying to be several hundred Chiefs of Police.

Yet every war our nation has fought during the past fifty years from Korea to Panama has been essentially an unconstitutionally presidential one. When the President has been a Democrat, Republicans have underscored its unconstitutionality, "Truman's war." When the President has been a Republican, Democrats have cited the violation. But violation it is no matter who does it. And the fact that on previous occasions Presidents have committed this violation with impunity does not mean that it has ceased to be a violation as our Secretary of State has been arguing lately.

Aside from their unconstitutionality, the common flaw in these presidential wars has been failure to think the policy through before adopting it. The thinking has tended to be one-dimensional, "If we light a match we'll be able to see into the gas tank." And the Americans who have escaped slaughter in those ill-advised presidential wars, though initially persuaded the wars were for "the good of the people," have lived to regret and pay for most of them with compounding interest. In the bitter aftermath of the Bay of Pigs debacle, President Kennedy said he wished there had been a public debate before carrying out what seemed so logical in covert contemplation.

Accordingly, I have prepared legislation to require the President to include in any request for a declaration of war a cost/benefit statement that "...shall identify areas of risk and uncertainty and describe them clearly so that the decision can be made with knowledge of the degree of reliability of the estimated benefits and costs and the effectiveness of alternate plans."

That language comes from the Reagan Administration's guidelines for Army Corps of Engineers water projects. Those guidelines adapt remarkably well to other military activities, especially if one regards government squandering of its citizens' lives in battle as being at least as serious as government squandering of its citizens' tax dollars.

There are about thirty wars raging on this earth at this moment and a good Hollywood writer could pick out good guys and bad guys, aggressors and victims, in all of them. But there is mounting evidence that the American people are tiring of a shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later foreign policy whose principal characteristic is borrowing money to borrow trouble in other people's wars. We should go to war if we have to, not just if we have a chance to.

With regard to military action already taken by this Administration in the current Mid-east trouble, there is an obvious and appalling confusion of purpose.

One day we are told that, despite our crushing debt, we should borrow $2 billion per month for the purpose of sending troops to discourage an attack on Saudi Arabia. Then, suddenly, we are told we should increase the new borrowing to $6 billion per month in order to send more troops in preparation for military action to eject Iraq from Kuwait. This on the moral ground that somehow it should be our sacrifice and not that of others like China, Russia, Japan, Germany or France to bleed, die and go more deeply into debt to punish Iraqi aggression which, in the recent case of Iran, our country helped finance.

Confusion of purpose indeed. In the case of Kuwait this Administration's own Ambassador gave the green light to Iraq by telling Saddam Hussein before the invasion that the United States "has no interest in Arab to Arab conflicts." Iraq, by the way, is already being punished severely by denial of any market in which to sell Kuwaiti oil or even Iraq's own oil.

The next thing we hear is Secretary Baker's assertion, in high if not shrill moral tones, that the oil involved is the "lifeblood of our economy," apparently well worth the lifeblood of those of our fellow citizens whom he appears willing to send to the slaughter. The CIA estimates 30,000 Americans would be killed in the first twenty days of an engagement against the Iraqi forces. Though they send our kin to foreign soil, they'll not spill a drop of American oil.

Oil? It is now estimated that the mere outbreak of war would send the price of oil to $100 per barrel. In the process of thinking this matter through, one should ask what full-scale war with its probable destruction of the oil-production capabilities of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia would do to the price. And what about the direct monetary cost of all-out war, the hundreds of billions in new government spending and taxes or debt? What would a thoughtful citizen think that would do to the arteries of our economy?

On November 13, one of the alleged "best and brightest," Henry Kissinger, declared that if Iraq "did not show signs of retreating, we could use air power selectively to destroy the military capacity of Iraq... and let events evolve from that posture." That kind of thinking is reason enough for my legislation.

Hats


LAKE SUCCESS
KOREA
REG-MANNING

Pulitzer-prize winning cartoon by Reginald W. Manning of *Arizona Republic,* Phoenix.

CONSORTIUM FOR INTER-AMERICAN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Macroeconomic and Political Implications of Recent Iraqi Adventurism

Remarks of

Dr. Thomas W. Frazier

Prepared for the
Washington Rally for the
Rescue of Kuwait

September 27, 1990

Good Afternoon. I am Thomas W. Frazier, Chief Executive Officer of the Consortium for Inter-American Trade and Development. The Consortium is an organization composed of economists, agricultural economists and other specialists involved in matters of trade, investment and economic security affairs. I have been asked here today, to discuss the macroeconomic and political implications of recent Iraqi adventurism, particularly as it affects the states of the Persian Gulf and World order.

My message is intended to be a communication to the people of Iraq, for whom I developed sympathy and affection years ago in my graduate student days. The Iraqi people must find immediate ways and means to retire Saddam Hussein before critical national infrastructures are destroyed and the Iraqi economy is reduced to a shambles. Very little time remains for this task -- only a matter of weeks -- before Iraq is likely to be at war with the World. Iraq cannot win this war. It would impact every household in Iraq in the most painful and destructive ways. Iraq has already lost large numbers of its finest young men in an unproductive war with Iran. It should not sacrifice its remaining young men following a military strategy that is flawed. The Iraqi war machine is essentially out of control and can only deal mutual death and destruction to innocents, without creating economic gains to the country.

There will be no Arab Solution or Arab benefactor to turn to when this devastation has been concluded. There are only apologists such as King Hussein of Jordan and Fidel Castro of Cuba, neither of whom is likely to be around much longer. And, the apologists are incapable of providing economic help to Iraq. The nations that have helped Iraq in the past and that could do so in the future are outraged by the genocidal practices of Iraq and the many other violations of World law and standards of national conduct that Saddam Hussein has engaged in. He no longer has trust. He no longer has honor. He will not obtain international finance or credit.

The multinational corporations are now in full support of President Bush's position on the Iraqi matter. They agree that Saudi Arabia must be protected at any cost. They agree that the legitimate government of Kuwait must be restored before Hussein completely destroys Kuwait. They support a lead US role in the rescue of Kuwait, even if action has to be taken before allied forces are completely ready for military action. But, the multinational corporations go further than Western governments in suggesting that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi war machine cannot both be left intact and operational. They now represent a threat to the global economy that must not be tolerated.

The people of Iraq, out of self-interest and enlightenment, have at their disposal the best solution to the Hussein problem. This is the solution of retiring Hussein by whatever means is quickest and most appropriate to the circumstances. No objective court in the World would deny acknowledgement of the heinous war crimes that he and his uniformed gangsters have perpetrated, both outside and inside of Iraq.

Saddam Hussein aspires to be the Lord-Protector of Islam, who will crush Israel, defeat the Western powers and give the Palestinians their home back. He will do none of these things. He cannot win a war against the World. He will not be allowed to crush Israel. It will only be a matter of a few years before Israel will return the West Bank to the Palestinians on its own volition. As the old Israeli radicals retire and liberal Soviet Jews increasingly emigrate to Israel, Israeli public opinion will force Israel to return the West Bank without force or intimidation from outside sources.

As evidence of his incompetence as a strategist and national leader, let me review how Hussein's strategies have backfired in recent months:

1) His emergence as a realistic threat to World order has created stronger, not weaker, bonds between the Moslem and Christian worlds;

2) His threats against Israel have only served Israeli interests in restoring lagging US support of military and economic assistance to Israel;

3) Hussein has had a significant role in the international restoration of the United Nations as a significant instrumentality for preserving world order;

4) The Iraqi threat to the world economy has softened the concern of US conservatives about political and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and its economic reconstruction;

5) Iraqi threats to destroy Persian Gulf oil producing and refining facilities have reinvigorated world interests in development of alternative fuels, including nuclear energy;

6) The dramatic increases in world oil prices will help restore the economies of previously hard-pressed oil producing countries.

7) As an anachronism and negative example, Hussein's behaviors have helped Latin American leaders to develop a consensus about the importance of hemispheric cooperation in development of free trade and market-oriented economies. This consensus will help President Bush's plan for a hemispheric free trade zone that is so important to the economic well-being of the Western Hemisphere.

8) Finally, the Iraqi affair will allow world leaders and their legislatures to divert attention from the emerging world recession. They will be able to blame the recession on the increased prices of oil, rather than their failures of policy and of national plans and programs.

While Hussein should be credited for these unrequested gifts, the message to the people of Iraq is that his policies and strategies have completely backfired and have no prospects of contributing to the peace and prosperity of his country. It is, therefore, of vital importance to Iraq itself to remove and retire this ineffective leader. This must be accomplished by one means or another immediately, before he precipitates a desperate suicidal war that he cannot possibly win. At present, Iraq is losing an estimated $100 million per day in lost oil revenues. But, this very substantial loss of revenue will not compare with the damages to Iraq that a serious war would create. Decades would be needed for Iraq to recover and it would lose important opportunities that it would otherwise have for integration into the new global economy.

If the people of Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait, retire Saddam Hussein and his Council, and reduce Iraq's military machine to an acceptable force level, then Iraq's former benefactors will be much more amenable to furthering economic assistance. Iraq will be given an opportunity to participate in the new global economy. Iraqi students will be able, once again, to be trained in US universities. This is the critical choice facing Iraq and a choice that must be made almost immediately. The first step, of course, is allowing all the foreign nationals held involuntarily in Iraq to return to their home countries without delay.

If these difficult steps can be taken in Iraq, then the Consortium will be among the first organizations in line to provide what assistance it can to help the Kuwaiti people.



Life
International
8501 Houston St., Silver Spring, Md 20910 (301) 589-5343

November 29, 1990

[illegible] Honorable Sam Nunn
[illegible] Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Nunn:

Enclosed is a letter that I wrote to you recently along with an article that I put in the Washington Post on November 9th. I have been following the hearings and wanted to know if it would be possible for me to testify before the Armed Services Committee for five or ten minutes. I think I represent the point of view of the average citizen, which I would appreciate sharing.

My basic premise is that the Iraqis want to negotiate, that we should negotiate without preconditions, and that war is not an option because it is in no way justified.

If it is not possible for me to testify, could my testimony be made a part of the record? Thank you very much for this consideration.

Sincerely,

Bob Meyers

Robert N. Meyers

CC: Armed Services Committee Members

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

November 29, 1990

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

My name is Robert N. Meyers and I am President of Life International. Thank you very much for this opportunity. As a concerned American, I have been giving a great deal of consideration to the situation in the Persian Gulf and would like to make some comments.

I put a $5,000 ad in the Washington Post on November 9, 1990, in the form of a letter to President Bush mentioning briefly that I had met with Ambassador Mohamed Mashat and also with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Khalid J. Shewayish at the Iraqi Embassy here in Washington. I have also written to President Saddam Hussein with regard to some suggestions to resolve the Gulf crisis.

As a result of my discussions with officials of the Iraqi Embassy, the public statements of Ambassador Mashat and statements coming out of Baghdad both on the television and in the press, I have concluded that they do not want war. On Wednesday, November 28, on the Larry King Show, Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Amir Al-Anbari, strongly suggested a peaceful solution to this confrontation.

From my perspective in the present situation, war is not an option for the United States or the multi-national forces. As long as Iraq does not take aggressive action against these forces of Desert Shield, war cannot be justified.

When we talk about the terrible things Iraq has done, can we remember that in the Vietnam War we left one million people dead from our napalm bombs, rockets, bullets, etc. Presently 250,000 Vietnamese are unaccounted for. We speak about President Hussein being like Hitler and we must ask ourselves if we are innocent. I am reminded of Jesus' words, "Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye" (Matthew 7:3).

What can be done? I have been told by the Iraqi officials here in Washington that they would like to negotiate. In the Washington Post letter I suggested that President Bush meet with President Hussein when he was visiting our troops at Thanksgiving. If this was not possible then Secretary of State James Baker and the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, China, France, Great Britain, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia meet with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to discuss Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait as well as the general Middle East situation, including the Arab-Israeli dispute over Israel-occupied territories and the presence of Syrian and Israeli troops in Lebanon.

If this is not possible, then Brent Scowcroft, or someone from the State Department, could meet with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Aziz, at a mutually acceptable location with no preconditions.

I feel that this second large buildup of troops is unnecessary. The Iraqis have also increased their military force accordingly. We should make Desert Shield more of a United Nations operation and reduce the force there by well over two-thirds and cancel this second deployment of forces. Then we should wait it out for as long as two years, keeping the embargo in place, and immediately begin to negotiate.

My emphasis is on dialogue because we all want to save face. This is what negotiations or compromises are all about, whether in the halls of Congress or the councils of war. Both sides have to come out as winners.

THE WASHINGTON POST - November 9, 1990

A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH

Dear Mr. President:

I briefly met Ambassador Mohamed Mashat and had a twenty-minute meeting with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Khalid J. Shewayish, at the Iraqi Embassy here in Washington. I have also written to President Saddam Hussein with regard to some suggestions to resolve the Gulf crisis. As a result of my discussions with officials of the Iraqi Embassy, the public statements of Ambassador Mashat, and statements coming out of Baghdad both on the television and in the press, I have concluded that they really want to negotiate a settlement. They do not want war.

I would like to kindly suggest that you meet with President Saddam Hussein without preconditions at a mutually acceptable location when you visit our troops at Thanksgiving. This would be an act of good faith on your part as well as a sign of great international leadership.

If this is not possible, then I would suggest that Secretary of State James Baker and the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, China, France, Great Britain, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia meet with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to discuss Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait as well as the general Middle East situation, including the Arab-Israeli dispute over Israel-occupied territories and the presence of Syrian and Israeli troops in Lebanon.

Jesus said to "Love your enemies" (Matthew 5:44) and one of the ways you could do this is to meet with President Saddam Hussein. After this confrontation is hopefully resolved peacefully, the twenty-six nations that have taken part in Desert Shield should mobilize similar resources to make an assault against the hunger, poverty, unemployment, disease, illiteracy and lack of opportunity that face the large majority of the world's people.

Sincerely,

Bob Meyers

Life International
8501 Houston Street
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
(301) 589-5343

Please call or write President Bush at the White House 202 - 456-1111

J ROBERT KERREY
NEBRASKA

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR ROBERT KERREY
Submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee
Regarding the Persian Gulf Crisis
November 27, 1990

I want to commend the Committee and your Chairman for holding these hearings, which underscore Congress's determination to have a voice in the management of this crisis. As I have said on previous occasions, the Senator from Georgia has been one of the very few voices in the U.S. Senate arguing for a new assessment of the security risks in this post Cold War world, and for a strategy and force structures which are consistent with those risks. The Administration has said very little on that point; Senator Nunn has said a great deal. The crisis in the Gulf proves it is an issue of paramount importance.

I am deeply troubled by the Administration's policy in this crisis. I believe that policy is pushing us into a war we could avoid, reopening social divisions we have only recently healed, and undermining public support for a sound and sustained foreign and military policy.

I have been troubled by the Administration's actions from the outset. When Iraq's troops stormed across Kuwait's border on August 2 in a brutal and flagrant violation of international law, it seemed to trigger both the best and worst of this Administration.

The best was embodied in the President's determination to preclude an invasion of Saudi Arabia through use of American troops, the only forces that could immediately accomplish that goal; his efforts through the UN to assemble an impressive international economic and diplomatic embargo; his public recognition that Iraq's behavior violated not only international law but also the norms of an emerging world order; and his willingness to inform, if not consult, the Congress to a greater degree than was typical over the past decade.

But those laudable steps, which might well have constituted a successful policy, were quickly undermined by the Administration's worst tendencies. As Yeats might have put it, the best lacked all conviction.

Candor succumbed to expediency. A foolish instinct to personalize the conflict and demonize Saddam Hussein overwhelmed any temptation to tell the American public about the warm support Hussein received from this Administration and its predecessor. A self-interested concern for careers and reputations stifled disclosures of the notorious July 25 meeting between Saddam

Hussein and our Ambassador, and her complacent behavior in the face of Hussein's honest if understated pledge to take Kuwait's northern oil fields. A narrow political and economic interest in defending an outdated military budget seemed to comingle with official assessments of the threat. The Administration showed little willingness to admit past mistakes and draw lessons from them--and in this ambiguous new era we need such lessons as much as we need victories.

The Administration tried to sell the American public a crusade where we needed a mission, hyperbole where we needed a rationale. Rather than set limited goals for an international effort in a deeply troubled region, they established then expanded a patently American military force, and declared its willingness to fight and die . . . for what? They diluted reasonable goals with ones that were unfounded, such as some American birthright to cheap oil; or uninspiring, such as restoration of the Kuwaiti monarchy; or unattainable, such as American invention of stability in the Persian Gulf.

Then, in a precipitous move that followed suspiciously close upon the heels of our adjournment and election day, the Administration suddenly changed course. It undermined its own effort to rally public understanding by switching from a defensive to an offensive posture. It undermined its own efforts to make the military presence international by nearly doubling the American troop presence. And it has now undermined its own efforts to sustain support for the embargo by declaring, through its own words and those of the imminent U.N. resolution, that our patience was almost spent. These combine into an ultimatum that weakens our best efforts, and propels us toward the worst.

So here we stand: the President has quite suddenly staked our nation's honor to an escalation he has not thought through, of a commitment he has not justified, to defend a world order he has not described, and quite possibly to launch a war he does not have the authority to declare.

But my purpose is not to list criticisms of Administration policy which I have detailed on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere over the past three months. My purpose is rather to spell out the dangers I foresee for our defense policy if we allow the Administration to take the last fateful step into war.

I have four primary concerns.

First, I believe that if we launch a military offensive we will sustain thousands of casualties without military necessity, moral justification, or public endorsement. I do not know how many are likely to be wounded or killed in an assault to retake Kuwait. I do know it is more than would be wounded or killed waiting a year to continue our enforcement of the embargo of Iraq. Experts on such matters, such as our colleague, Senator Moynihan, say that a year is only an average time to wait for such measures to take effect.

Nor have I seen any evidence that our casualties would be lighter now than later, assuming a fight is necessary. The world has just witnessed the virtual collapse of the Soviet military threat, in part, because the Soviets lacked the economic base to sustain their expansionist dreams. Do we really believe that Iraq's fighting forces will be stronger after a year of economic strangulation? I do not.

The Administration simply has not answered the fundamental question that must precede any use of American force: what is the principle for which we are ready to die. Oil is not a sufficient rationale. Nor are jobs. Our nation thought hard and spoke clearly about why we were willing to deploy American forces over several decades to prosecute the Cold War. In this case, the Administration has neither made a clear, compelling case for the use of force, nor justified the relationship between the threat we face and the size and structure of forces we have deployed. If the Administration fails explain these points in a persuasive manner. it will be doing a grave disservice to our security policy in this post Cold War era. For if we use America's forces without adequate justification, then the public may withhold its permission to use force in some future crisis where it is clearly needed.

Second, I fear for the survivors of this war. We will never have to explain why we fought to those who do not return. But we should be terrified by the prospect of another generation of veterans who are robbed of society's unambiguous praise because of an administration that failed to think through and justify its military commitments.

This is not an abstract concern. Barely 60 days into the conflict, one Gulf soldier said this to a reporter: "we all know what happened to the Vietnam vets. They were disrespected by the American people for being there. Well, that's a big concern to us out here, and we talk about it every night. We are ready to defend our country, but we want to be supported for what we're doing." Another soldier put it more directly: "When we deployed here, people cheered and waved flags. But if I go back home like the Vietnam vets did and somebody spits on me, I swear to God I'll kill them."

If Vietnam has cast those kind of shadows, it does not take much to foresee the the effect of another divisive war. I cannot imagine anything more destructive for our all volunteer force than an impression that those who had volunteered lacked the respect of the policymakers who sent them to war unnecessarily.

Third, I am deeply concerned that we are about to commit blood and treasure into a region that plays by a set of military rules we have still not learned, and are ill-equipped to master. New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman calls them the "Hama Rules", after the Syrian town in which our new coalition partner, Hafez al-Assad, slaughtered at least 20,000 of his own civilians in order to quell domestic opposition -- a cold-blooded massacre that makes Saddam Hussein's treatment of his Kurdish citizens look almost benevolent by comparison.

Hama Rules demand ruthlessness and duplicity. These are not activities at which democracies excel, nor should they be. If others are worried about comparisons to Munich, I am worried about more geographically contiguous comparisons to Beirut, where American forces in the 1980s were first committed to provide the firepower for a regime that commanded limited popular support, and then killed in their barracks by terrorists who resented American intrusion into the internecine warfare which racks Lebanon to this day.

As in Beirut, we are once again being asked to provide both the canons and cannon fodder for regimes which either cannot, or prefer not, to press this battle themselves. When America began to weigh into the fight against Hitler, Winston Churchill told Franklin Roosevelt, "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job." When Saudi Arabia allows 400,000 American troops to defend its soil, one of its ministers urges young Saudi men to pursue more "honorable" fields than enlisting in the military. That abysmal difference measures another dimension of the Hama Rules.

In preparing for an offensive into Kuwait and perhaps Iraq, I am not sure whether this Administration believes the Hama Rules will not apply, or whether it believes we have now mastered those rules. In either case, they are mistaken.

Finally, I am deeply concerned that if we transform this conflict into a shooting war we will undermine the long-term consensus that we can and must have for a smart, sustainable defense budget and policy in this new world we are entering.

Again, I think Munich is not the relevant analogy. I would urge that we look further back. One of the reasons Britain and much of Europe were caught with their defenses down in the late 1930s and early 1940s was that the terrible costs of World War I had weakened public consensus for a rational program of defense spending and modernization. If it had not been for Winston Churchill's lonely, brave, and ultimately correct arguments throughout the 1930s for defense modernization, Britain might well have collapsed.

Today, many of the brave voices for a rational program of defense modernization come from this Committee and its Chairman. His statements during the last Congress on the principles for a new defense budget and policy show both realism and vision. Unlike many aspects of this Administration's policy, the Chairman's recommendations recognize the enormous geopolitical changes the world has witnessed over the past two years. They advise us to shift our defense posture to reflect those changes. And they grapple with our limited fiscal resources.

As our domestic needs mount, it will become increasingly difficult to mobilize support for the research that must still be conducted, the weapons that must still be built, and the troops we must still train and deploy. Few citizens or policy makers can ignore the improvements we could obtain in education, health care, or public safety for the $1 billion a month we are spending for Desert Shield. And that figure will pale next to the human and fiscal costs of a shooting war.

War in the Gulf, if seen in retrospect as unwise, will undermine support for the kind of policies Chairman Nunn and others have espoused, such as the development of lighter, more lethal, and more mobile forces. Americans may well decide that a balanced defense policy and an enlightened internationalist foreign policy are simply not worth the risk and the cost. Thus, impatience in the current conflict may kill domestic support for the new world order which is supposedly one of our goals.

A far better course is available to us. I urge this Committee to call on the Administration to reconsider its deployment of an offensive troop structure. Instead, the Administration should work with Congress to clarify our goals to the American people. It should recognize the flexibility implied by the upcoming U.N. resolution as an opportunity to build consensus for a prolonged commitment to our economic sanctions. It should start the transition into a smaller, defensive, and truly international military force under U.N. auspices. It should continue efforts to ensure that Iraq's savage treatment of Kuwait and its people is remembered and documented so that Saddam Hussein and others responsible can be brought to justice. And the Administration should expand its efforts to control the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, not just in Iraq, but in other troubled areas as well.

I commend this Committee for your efforts to ensure that we do not foolishly rush in to a region where many wise men have tread and stumbled; for your efforts to ensure that Congress's Constitutional powers are not usurped by an Administration that is not willing to wait to see its own best policies succeed; and for your efforts to ensure that a new American generation, and an emerging new world, do not suffer the divisions and depredations of a costly and bloody, but avoidable war.

Hutterian Brethren in New York, Inc. FAX(914)339-6685
PLEASANT VIEW BRUDERHOF 300 ROSENTHAL LANE ULSTER PARK NY 12487 TEL(914)339-6680

November 26, 1990

TO GOVERNMENT LEADERS:

In view of the increasing danger of war in the Persian Gulf region, we have traveled to Washington to deliver the attached appeal to you personally. It will be mailed to those government leaders listed below the appeal.

The Hutterian Brethren Church is an historic peace church with close ties with the Mennonites, Brethren, Amish, and Quakers. We respect those in government and pray daily to God that He may give you wisdom and strength for your task.

One of our party, Ron Landsel, saw combat as a Marine in Vietnam before becoming a member of the Hutterian Brethren some years later. We join him in pleading with you that war be averted in the Persian Gulf. We ask you to give the attached appeal your full and immediate attention.

We would welcome further discussion of this important issue. Please contact Mark Clement at the above address.

Respectfully,

The Hutterian Brethren Church

Mark L. Clement
Mark Clement

An Open Letter to the Leaders of the World
November 18, 1990

AN URGENT APPEAL to the nations for peace, in the face of the massive military buildup in the Persian Gulf:

We are a simple people, not learned in the ways of international diplomacy or the methods of war. But we have known suffering. For over four hundred and sixty years we have called no nation or people our enemy. We have been persecuted, killed, exiled, and forced to flee from one country to another.

With God's help, giving our total allegiance to Jesus Christ, we witness that people can dwell together in peace. Coming from many nations, with some having formerly served as enemies in opposing armies, we share all things in common, living together as brothers and sisters.

WE PLEAD with you, our beloved leaders, to consider the incalculable suffering and loss of life which would result from an armed conflict in the Gulf. How can we justify such colossal anguish and such a massive allocation of the world's resources to war, at a time when the nations need to work together to confront the many desperate problems facing our world today?

WE URGE that all troops be withdrawn from this explosive confrontation and ask that all the resources at your disposal be committed to the search for a peaceful end to the tension there.

WE PRAY for you in all the heavy responsibilities you carry and wish to express our deep gratitude to God for the reduction of tension brought about by the end of the Cold War hostilities. As we think of the birth of the Prince of Peace, we pray for peace in the Persian Gulf and around the globe.

We greet you in heartfelt love,

The Hutterian Brethren Church at

Woodcrest, Rifton NY 12471 USA
Pleasant View, Ulster Park NY 12487 USA
Catskill, Platte Clove Rd., Elka Park NY 12427 USA
New Meadow Run, Farmington PA 15437 USA
Spring Valley, Farmington PA 15437 USA
Deer Spring, Norfolk CT 06058 USA
Oakwood, Rte 1, Box 138, Dexter MN 55926 USA
Starland, Rte 2, Box 133, Gibbon MN 55335 USA
Crystal Spring, Ste. Agathe, Manitoba ROG 1YO CANADA
Darvell, Robertsbridge, East Sussex TN32 5DR ENGLAND
Michaelshof, Auf der Hoehe, W-5231 Birnbach GERMANY

[This appeal, unanimously supported by the congregations listed above, has been sent to the leaders of the member nations of the United Nations Security Council, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and the United States Congress, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.]

PLEASANT VIEW SCHOOL
Hutterian Brethren

ULSTER PARK, NEW YORK 12487
Phone: 914-339-6680

November 27, 1990

Dear President Bush and Members of Congress,

We, the 7th and 8th grade class of the Pleasant View school would like to express our concern over the present situation in the Middle East and Gulf region. We do not agree with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and believe that any further aggression must be stopped. However, we are alarmed that our country seems to be preparing for military action against Iraq. Any military action would not accomplish long term stability or peace. Instead it would cost many lives, including many innocent civilians; men, women, and children. It would have disastrous effects and could lead to a large scale conventional, chemical, or nuclear war in the Middle East. We are afraid of a third World War.

Therefore we urge you to do everything in your power to prevent war and to find a peaceful solution to this problem. We hope you understand our point of view. We want to support and respect our government as far as our conscience allows, and realize that this is a difficult situation for you.

Personally submitted in Washington by classmate Gideon Clement on behalf of our class.

Respectfully yours,

Maria J Nelson Vivian G. Warren Jonathan P. Hochstetler
Andrew Mow Michael C. Friesen Marion Maull
John Winter Hillel A. Arnold Gideon M Clement
Francis A Winter Elya D. Baird Joseph M. Hulett
Emma Meier

Hutterian Brethren in New York, Inc. FAX (914)339 6685
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November 27, 1990

AN OPEN LETTER TO VIETNAM VETERANS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
I APPEAL TO YOU TO SPEAK OUT ON BEHALF OF A NON-VIOLENT SOLUTION TO THE POTENTIAL HORROR OF WAR THAT LOOMS OVER THE PERSIAN GULF.

After years of post-war seeking for a true, meaningful life, my wife and I joined the mid-Hudson valley area HUTTERIAN BRETHREN. Since 1981, our three children have grown up in an environment of finding loving, lasting solutions to their daily struggles. Learning these truths as adults, we are certain that a shared life of caring for our neighbor as we would for ourselves begins to answer the need of this world.

As a sergeant in the First Marine Reconnaissance Battalion, Da Nang, in 1968-69 I began to learn this the hard way. Like all of you, I bear "CO DAU DI BINH," the marks of the wounds.

While our children grow up with memories of love mixed with struggles for change toward what is right and lasting for their lives, we veterans cannot forget the many thousands of children with very different memories.

I survived and can forget the terror of the many mortar and rocket attacks, the ambushes, and near death bout with malaria.

The marks that remain forever are the rainy day farm field burials of poor North Carolina blacks. The rain soaked flags handed to inconsolable mothers as they stand fixed in the last planting time of that same field.

The marks that remain forever are the faces of the Vietnamese, especially of the children, the faces of the boys sent home to the VA stress units.

The marks that remain forever are of the tens of thousands of suicides, the imprisoned, and the homeless--harvests of the Vietnam war.

The marks that remain forever are endless. The refugees, the prostitution of children. It does not stop and will not stop unless we fight one more battle out of reverence and compassion for life.

I am going to Washington, D.C. November 27th to urge my Congressmen and Senators to resist another war: this is our chance to fight for an end to war.

There are over 125 names of mid-Hudson valley men etched in black granite. I hope to visit them, touch their names and cry.

I greet each of you in heartfelt hope and love,

Ronald C. Landsel

RONALD C. LANDSEL
HUTTERIAN BRETHREN
PLEASANT VIEW BRUDERHOF
ULSTER PARK, NY 12487

December 6, 1990

Statement of Harold E. Stassen

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

Responding to the opportunity to present written testimony, I wish to present concisely three points which have not been presented by others and which are based on the successful Eisenhower precedents for handling crisis situations without war.

Eisenhower's methods are now available for study by the recent opening up of the secret minutes of his National Security Council meetings. These minutes are the basis for the recently published book, "Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace", which I co-authored with Marshall Houts.

President Eisenhower repeatedly urged us to think through the situation on the other side of crisis situations, including the different cultures and circumstances, and analyze the potentially acceptable solution for them which would also meet our essential objectives without war.

Applying the Eisenhower precedent and method to the Persian Gulf crisis it should be noted that:

> Iraq now has the right to enter the world court with its claims against the area, the oil and the government of Kuwait, at the same time it withdraws its armed forces completely from Kuwait.

It is not generally realized that at the same time that we originated and signed the United Nations Charter in 1945, we also reestablished and signed the Charter for the World Court, the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

This court is not under the control of the Security Council. It is not under the control of the Assembly. It is not under control of any one country. It has fifteen judges and not more than one can be from any one country.

It is and should be of increased importance in the post-cold war world.

Iraq does not need United States permission, or any states' permission to enter the World Court with its claims.

The World Court is an unrecognized key to averting war.

Furthermore, while the World Court case is pending negotiations may go on about any and all issues of Iraq, Kuwait and the Mideast Region.

My second point from the successful Eisenhower precedents is his emphasis that:

> At the end of a complete victory is a war, you can impose an unconditional surrender; but in a negotiation to prevent a war you should not expect to attain an unconditional surrender.

My third point is also based on Eisenhower's precedents. He emphasized looking ahead to the situation after a crisis.

> Thus the United States should now obtain ten or fifteen year rights to a naval base and an air base in the Persian Gulf area.

I am, of course, willing to respond in detail to explain or expand upon any of these, or other areas of concern.

Respectfully submitted,

Harold E Stassen

Harold E. Stassen

Footnote:

Harold E. Stassen, in President Eisenhower's Administration as Director of Foreign Operations, Member of the National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board; one of the eight Americans appointed by President Roosevelt and reappointed by President Truman to negotiate, draft and sign the original United Nations Charter in 1945; Governor of Minnesota, elected for three terms and Chairman of the National Governors; served as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral William Halsey in WW II.

Chairman NUNN. I would also say that these hearings are at least in recess now. We will wait until the Foreign Relations Committee concludes their hearings and then we will determine whether we will have additional hearings, of course depending on events.

Thanks everyone for your attention. I thank the members.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

QUESTION. Are all other nations in the multinational coalition increasing their forces in the same degree as the United States? How many coalition members would support offensive military operations with their own forces? Would the support of the multinational coalition change if the military mission included striking targets in Iraq or if the military objectives were expanded to include the elimination of Iraq's offensive military capability?

Secretary CHENEY. The United States has great confidence in its coalition partners. Other countries in the coalition are increasing their force levels to the best ability of each nation to logistically move such forces and Saudi ability to absorb them. All 27 countries which have sent forces to Saudi Arabia understand the full potential of that act. UN Resolution 678 represents and supports this understanding. The fact that many countries, including Syria, Egypt, and Great Britain, are in the process of sending additional heavy forces underlines the broad determination to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

CONSTRAINTS ON COALITION MEMBERS

QUESTION. What constraints have been placed by coalition members on the use of their forces in combat operations? How do these constraints affect our own plans?

General POWELL. During combined planning by both U.S. and coalition members for the defense of Saudi Arabia, all land, air, and naval forces were employed according to their individual capability to accomplish tasks in support of the overall concept of operations. As such, coalition members have realistically employed their forces recognizing current capabilities. Known operational limitations have been allowed for in contingency plan development and therefore not considered constraints imposed by coalition partners.

QUESTION. How much host nation support are U.S. forces receiving in the region? How much has been pledged, either in cash or equipment and supplies, by the countries in the region and our allies around the world toward the United States' costs in Operation Desert Shield? How much has actually been contributed?

Secretary CHENEY. Saudi Arabia is providing host nation support to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and surrounding waters in the form of cost-free fuel, food, water, local transport, and facilities. The United Arab Emirates is providing similar host nation support for U.S. forces located in the UAE. The committee has received a chart for this hearing record that outlines commitments and contributions for the major contributing nations and includes host nation support, cash, in-kind material and supplies, and in-kind lift.

RESERVE GUARD CALLUP

QUESTION. What steps will be taken to replace the Reserve and National Guard units which have been called up under the limited callup authority in section 673b of title 10, United States Code, when their 180-day period of active duty expires? When will the callup period for the first Reserve and National Guard units activated under section 673b expire?

General POWELL. There are three options; (1) We continue calling up reservists under 673b authority where feasible. (2) Congress could amend the DOD Appropriations Act, Section 8132, to include all Reserve units for a 180-day extension. (Current authority applies only to combat units.) (3) The President could invoke section 673b, which would authorize the callup of a maximum of 1 million reservists for up to 2 years.

The 180-day period for the first units called up expires on 20 February 1991.

QUESTION. How will the military services replace personnel combat losses? Will members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) be called up? How many members of the IRR are likely to be available in the skills needed?

Secretary CHENEY. In the event that U.S. diplomatic efforts do not succeed and hostilities should occur, any personnel combat losses would be replaced through a variety of means. Available options would include calling Individual Ready Reserve personnel to active duty in appropriate circumstances. The skill mix of personnel who might be lost cannot be predicted with certainty in advance.

Question. On August 2, 1990, the President declared a national emergency to deal with the "threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States" caused by "the policies and actions of the Government of Iraq." At first, that authority was used to restrict transactions with Iraq and Kuwait. On November 14, the President cited that emergency as the basis for invoking the national emergency construction authority provided in 10 U.S.C. 2808.

Why was the national emergency construction authority invoked?

Secretary Cheney. The request for national emergency construction authority was initiated by the Department of Defense to permit construction, if needed, in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The emergency construction statute enable the Secretary of Defense to respond to the construction requirements arising from national emergency situation, and therefore provides needed flexibility to the Department of Defense to realign its construction requirements to meet construction requirements arising from emergency operations.

Question. What amounts of money do you anticipate obligating under that authority for construction projects not otherwise authorized by Law?

Secretary Cheney. Amounts to be obligated cannot yet be predicted. The Department will comply with the congressional notification requirements of Section 2808 of Title 10.

Question. Will all those projects be constructed in the vicinity of the forces deployed in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD? If not, where will they be constructed?

Secretary Cheney. Thus far, one project, for additional cargo handling space ($3.9 million) at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, has been approved for funding under 10 U.S.C. 2808, pursuant to an urgent request from the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command to support Operation DESERT SHIELD.

RESERVE COMPONENTS

Question. In view of the national emergency declared by the President and the President's intent to increase forces deployed in Operation DESERT SHIELD to provide an offensive capability, can you not only establish, but sustain, an offensive capability in Operation DESERT SHIELD and meet U.S. worldwide commitments without asking the President to invoke the authority under 10 U.S.C. 673 for activation of members of the Ready Reserve?

General Powell. This is an alternative that we will be prepared to implement, if required. I prefer not to elaborate on this response at this time.

Question. Would you use the authority under 10 U.S.C. 673 prior to requesting induction authority under the Military Selective Service Act?

Secretary Cheney. There is no legal requirement to do so, nor any legal prohibition against doing so. The decision would be based on an assessment of the circumstances at the appropriate time.

MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

Question. Can you establish and sustain an offensive capability in Operation DESERT SHIELD and meet U.S. worldwide commitments without requesting induction authority under the Military Selective Service Act?

General Powell. Yes. With the completion of the Phase Two deployments in mid-January we will have established an offensive capability. Under the present circumstances, I believe our Active and Reserve forces are sufficient to maintain this capability and also meet our other commitments worldwide.

Question. Secretary Cheney, you testified on September 11 that the increment cost of Operation DESERT SHIELD during fiscal year 1991, in the absence of hostilities, would be $15 billion, and that the administration hoped that about one half of that cost could be paid for through donations by foreign nations.

a. In view of the increases announced on November 9 that would essentially double the size of the U.S. forces, what is your projected incremental cost for deploying such forces during fiscal year 1991?

b. What is your current estimation of the amount of foreign contributions that will be available during fiscal year 1991 to pay for the costs of Operation DESERT SHIELD?

c. Please provide the total amount deposited in the Defense Cooperation Account since August 2, 1990, and list each country that has made a contribution and the amount contributed.

d. Of the funds authorized by Congress to be used from the Defense Cooperation Account, how much has been obligated to date for Operation DESERT SHIELD?

e. Do you plan to request authority to obligate additional funds from the Defense Cooperation Account for Operation DESERT SHIELD? If so, what is the amount you anticipate requesting and when do you plan to submit such a request?

f. Do you plan to request Supplemental Authorization and Appropriations bills to meet the incremental costs of Operation DESERT SHIELD? If so, what is the amount you anticipate requesting and when do you plan to submit a request?

Secretary Cheney. a. We have not yet completed such an estimate.

b.We have no estimate yet.

c. As of November 30, in U.S. $ million: Saudi Arabia $760; Kuwait $2,250; United Arab Emirates $250; Japan $376; Germany $272. Total cash deposited in Account: $3.908 billion.

d. None. Title IX of the fiscal year 1991 DOD Appropriations Act authorizes the transfer of $1 billion from the Defense Cooperation Account to the Operation and Maintenance appropriations to reimburse certain incremental expenditures in support of DESERT SHIELD.

e. As part of a fiscal year 1991 supplemental request, the administration is expected to ask for authorization and appropriation approval to obligate Account funds beyond the $1 already authorized.

f. The incremental costs of Operation DESERT SHIELD will be included in a fiscal year 1991 supplemental request.

SERVIVE CHIEFS

Question. Has any Service Chief submitted advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense?

General Powell. No. Obviously, each Service Chief constantly provides his advice and opinions and I dutifully report any disagreements. However, in respect to this crisis, the Chiefs concur in the advice presented to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

CRISIS RESPONSE

Question. If all of the forces announced for deployment to the Persian Gulf are in place by mid-January and no units currently there are withdrawn, what capability does the United States have to respond to contingencies or crises in other parts of the world?

General Powell. Even with the large force we have deployed, the U.S. military still retains a significant capability to react worldwide to a crisis. [Deleted.]

ADEQUACY OF MEDICAL SUPPORT

Question. What are the estimates of American casualties in a major ground offensive in the Persian Gulf? How many hospital beds are required in the theater of operations and how many operational beds do we currently have? Do we have sufficient medical evacuation capability, medical supplies and personnel in theater to adequately care for the projected number of casualties? What are the estimates of American casualties in a major ground offensive in the Persian Gulf?

General Powell. Casualties are defined as the overall loss of fighting potential due to death, wounding, injury, disease, missing, internment, or capture. Development of a casualty estimate is based on identification of valid parameters and variables that yield estimated casualty rates used for computer analysis. This is an exacting process involving not only the medical planning community but also the operations community, which provides input to many of the variables used such as intensity and length of combat and forces at risk. Within this planning process unknowns remain, such as the lack of casualty rate data concerning chemical, biological, and directed energy weapons. Once all the variables are identified and the computer planning module executed, analysis and refinement of the data occurs. At this point, an overall casualty estimate is established. The estimate of US casualties in a major ground offensive in the Persian Gulf is continuing to be developed by USCENTCOM and the medical/operational communities.

The number of beds to support combat operations depends on whether the mission is defensive or offensive in nature. Our intent is to deploy adequate medical assets to the theater to support USCINCCENT's mission. I am confident that the theater planners and their service counterparts are developing an adequate medical plan to support the increased troop deployments and will be ready to address any contingency that may present itself. We currently have over [deleted] operational beds in the theater.

We have sufficient medical evacuation crews in the inventory and in theater to meet our projected requirements. USCINCCENT has designated the Army as the single manager for all medical supplies in theater. To accomplish this, the Army has established a major depot facility in Saudi Arabia that resupplies all field medical units and hospital ships. We have sufficient materiel to support the units that are deployed and are in the process of refining stockage levels to meet the additional deploying field medical units. The equipment and supplies available in the theater are sufficient to provide an acceptable level of care to those troops who may be injured or wounded. I am very confident that we are moving quickly to finalize the medical support structure that will ensure adequate care for all U.S. combatants.

AMMUNITION SUPPORT

QUESTION. How much ammunition—both level-of-effort munitions and threat-oriented, smart munitions—do our forces currently have in theater?

General POWELL. [Deleted.]

QUESTION. What are the projected consumption rates for these types of critical munitions in the event of an offensive military operation?

General POWELL. while there are programmatic consumption factors for the services requirement determination, there are also several courses of action available to Iraq in responding to an allied offensive military operation. Thus, since the Iraqi response will drive consumption, we do not have definitive consumption rates. We are however preparing for any contingency.

QUESTION. What are the command and control arrangements for the various allied forces in the event of a decision to use offensive force against Iraq?

General POWELL. Only the present command and control structure is agreed to by the multinational forces. Overall command structure for DESERT SHIELD consists of two parallel chains, United States and Saudi. Islamic forces are controlled by the Saudis and UK forces by USCINCCENT. French forces are retained under national command lines and coordinate with U.S. and Saudi forces. USCINCCENT continues to work with Saudi counterparts and third-country representatives to ensure effective command relations.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

QUESTION. Have common rules of engagement been agreed upon for use by the allied forces?

General POWELL. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives that can be issued by a particular country's National Command Authority to establish the circumstances and limitations under which its units may engage enemy forces. [Deleted.]

OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES

QUESTION. What are the operational readiness rates of US military equipment and weapons systems in the Persian Gulf theater?

General POWELL. In almost all cases, current operational readiness rates meet or exceed service standards. The equipment is exercised extensively and maintained in a combat state of readiness. [Deleted.]

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT-OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES

QUESTION. Is the operating environment creating any constraints on the effectiveness or capability of U.S. weapons systems?

General POWELL. The operating environment has had a negligible impact on the effectiveness of our weapon systems. Although the desert environment has presented conditions that require special action to maintain effectiveness of weapon systems, increased preventive maintenance and aircraft maintenance shelters are alleviating environmental problems that might otherwise adversely affect our equipment. For ground forces, extensive training by Army Component Commands at the National Training Center and by Marine Component Commands at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center has prepared units to anticipate and deal effectively with operational and maintenance requirements in the desert. Environmental training worldwide, such as Exercise BRIGHT STAR and IRON COBRA, has given the Air Force the requisite knowledge to prevent degradation of air operations. The Navy has been operating for over 30 years and continues to operate with minimal problems in the Gulf, most recently in Operation EARNEST WILL. The application of established preventive maintenance procedures and command attention have ensured the effectiveness of all land, naval, and air equipment and weapons systems in the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

Senator EXON. Is the principal objective of our Gulf policy to force Hussein from power or remove his army from Kuwait?

Secretary CHENEY. The President has articulated U.S. objectives repeatedly:

—Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait;
—The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
—Release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies;
—Stability and security of this critical region of the world.

Senator EXON. Thomas Friedman writes in a December 2 New York Times article that on November 8, "Mr. Gorbachev pressed Mr. Baker about whether the Bush administration fully understood that once it had United Nations authorization for force, it would have to use it if Iraq refused to back down. When Mr. Baker said President Bush understood that perfectly, the Soviet leader then broached his idea of how to proceed."

Is this account accurate? Did the United States give the Soviet Union an understanding as to when force would be used if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait?

Secretary CHENEY. The question should be addressed to the participants in the alleged conversation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ALAN DIXON

Senator DIXON. I am concerned about burdensharing, financial, as well as, equipment and forces support, in the Gulf. We should have our allies and friends be better participants during this crisis, so it is not a U.S. versus Moslem effort.

For example, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the Army in Saudi Arabia has specifically requested Japanese-made 4-wheel drive vehicles be purchased. Yet we have U.S. manufacturers of 4-wheel drive vehicles, who have told me that there is ample product available, which could be shipped immediately from the United States. I have also been informed that one U.S. manufacturer has over 1,500 vehicles commercially available in Saudi. Yet, our Army is trying to buy Japanese vehicles. Mr. Secretary, why are we not using the moneys given us to purchase U.S.-made vehicles for use in Saudi?

Secretary CHENEY. The Japanese have committed to provide a total of $2 billion toward Desert Shield costs. Of the first billion dollars, about $350 million was earmarked by the Japanese for in-kind material support. Early in the crisis, CENTCOM identified an urgent requirement for 4-wheel drive vehicles and provided that requirement to the Japanese. The Japanese sought to meet that requirement as quickly as possible and sent Japanese 4-wheel drive trucks, paid for out of their $350 million earmarked for in-kind support at no cost to the U.S. Government. However, of the other early requirements identified by CENTCOM, a significant portion are being met by the Japanese from U.S. sources including building materials, computers, and forklifts. CENTCOM has recently provided the Japanese with some new requirements including additional vehicles which the Japanese have indicated will be procured from U.S. sources.

Senator DIXON. Are there any sanctions short of military force and permanent occupation of Iraq, which would effectively strangle and totally stop Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapon capability?

Secretary CHENEY. Iraq has developed a military capability in chemical weapons and has an ongoing program to develop nuclear technology. Containing these developments requires continuing international support to restrain Iraq's imports of weapons-related technology. A strict and effective embargo of technologies, components, and processes that contribute to weapons development or upgrade could help in efforts to free Iraq's arsenal at its current capability and may cause it to erode over time as spare parts and manufacturing resources are expended. But there is no guarantee that such sanctions could stop Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons capability.

Senator DIXON. With the sanctions in place, what is the staying power of the Iraqi military. How fast would you think their military capability is decaying?

Secretary CHENEY. The Iraqi military began its invasion of Kuwait with large stocks of equipment, supplies, and spare parts. The looting of Kuwait added to Iraq's stocks in important respects. Furthermore, Iraq is self-sufficient in the production of all but the most sophisticated equipment in its military inventory. Iraq's military industries have absolute priority in the allocation of resources, and remain in operation so far as we can determine. Its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs are proceeding despite the imposition of sanctions. In its current defensive posture, the Iraqi army is utilizing materiel at a very low rate, and under current conditions, it would be prudent to assume that Iraq's total military capability will not suffer significantly for at least a year.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

Senator **GLENN**. President Bush intervened personally in July to stop the shipment of special furnaces to Iraq—furnaces that the Commerce Department had approved for export. What are the potential nuclear-related uses of these furnaces? Do you believe they were sought by Iraq for such purposes?

Secretary **CHENEY**. These furnaces are especially designed to melt refractory metals. Several refractory metals are on the Nuclear Referral List and as such have been identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as being especially important from a nuclear explosives standpoint. In addition, the furnaces could be used to melt uranium for weapons. Due to the concern that these furnaces would be used to process metals on the NRL and the fear that these furnaces would also be used for missile production, the export was blocked.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS JOHN WARNER AND WILLIAM COHEN

Senators **WARNER** and **COHEN**. On the issue of critical munitions stocks, particularly smart munitions, you indicated in your statement that you would provide more detail in closed session. Since we did not have a closed session, would you please provide that information for the record?

General **POWELL**. [Deleted.]

Senators **WARNER** and **COHEN**. In his statement before our committee, General Odom raised several other areas which you did not have an opportunity to address when you appeared at our committee hearing. I would appreciate it if you would discuss in detail these areas which General Odom identified as possibly deficient:

airlift and sealift,
logistics infrastructure,
war reserve stocks for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces,
training base for rapid mobilization of Reserve component combat units.

General **POWELL**. *Airlift and sealift:* The movement of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD has been the most successful effort of its kind ever undertaken; over 200,000 troops and almost 2 billion pounds of cargo moved a record distance in less than 3 months. The effort has not been without problems, most of which are well documented. Ships have broken down, Ready Reserve force ships took too long to activate, airlift crews were severely taxed, etc. Some of these problems were unavoidable, others can be traced to inadequate funding over years, and still others were the result of conscious, calculated risks.

The experience of DESERT SHIELD offers some valuable lessons that we intend to use in structuring our future lift forces. Congress has directed, and we are vigorously pursuing, a comprehensive study of our transportation needs based on this experience, the changing world, ongoing development programs, and many other factors important to the issue.

Logistics Infrastructure: General Schwarzkopf, as the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, made a deliberate decision to move a deterrent force of combat troops to the Persian Gulf area in advance of logistic units. General Schwarzkopf believed he needed combat forces in place as soon as possible in order to deter further Iraqi aggression. Once sufficient combat troops were in the theater, emphasis was shifted to deployment of logistic forces. As our mission has been modified to provide the National Command Authority with an offensive option, additional logistic forces are being deployed to support the reinforcements in an expanded area of operations. Examples of the functions these logistic forces would perform are truck transportation, maintenance, medical, supply, and field services. Risks exist in any operation of this size and complexity. Thorough assessments have been made to ensure that only necessary, acceptable risks have been assumed.

[Deleted.]

Training base for rapid mobilization of Reserve component combat units: Plans have been developed to ensure that before Reserve combat units are deployed, they are sent to a mobilization station to complete mission essential training. [Deleted.]

The three Reserve combat brigades recently activated will conduct post mobilization training at Fort Stewart, GA; Fort Hood, TX; and Fort Polk, LA; and will be a combat-ready asset when needed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cheney, you have indicated that it is uncertain whether economic sanctions will work well enough to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. A few months earlier, you and other administration officials had a more positive opinion about the likelihood of sanctions accomplishing this goal. Did your opinion about the likelihood of sanctions driving Iraq from Kuwait change over the period of August to November? If so, when did your opinion change and why did it change?

Secretary CHENEY. The answer to your question is complicated because there are numerous measures of whether sanctions are likely to "work". In terms of the sanctions themselves, the answer is they are having important effects. They are continuing to significantly raise the cost to Iraq of its aggression. Iraqi exports are around 2 percent of pre-invasion levels—Saddam Hussein is losing about $1.5 billion per month in oil revenues. Imports are likewise down significantly to at least 10 percent of pre-invasion levels. Iraq's merchant fleet is neutralized; air traffic is down to a trickle of passenger operations; and Iraqi financial assets are immobilized. Now, it is less clear whether the curtailment of Iraq's trade is having major economic and political effects inside Iraq. We have not seen economic deprivation translating into political discontent in Iraq. Nevertheless, the most fundamental measure of whether sanctions are working is whether they are achieving our objectives. In this case, there is considerable doubt. The Iraqi Army is still in Kuwait and it remains unlikely that sanctions alone will force Saddam Hussein to change his policies. This can be accomplished only through sustained multilateral efforts on several fronts. Sanctions are a necessary and important part of these efforts but they are not likely to be sufficient in and of themselves to persuade Saddam to change his behavior and policies in the near terms.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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